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OK THE 



RIGHT USE OF REASON. 



IK THK 

INqUIRY AFTER TRUTH : 

WITH 

A VARIETY OP RULBB TO GUARD AGAINST ERROR IK THU 

AFFAIRS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN LIFE, AS 

WELL AS IN THE SCIENCES. 

BY ISAAC WATTS, D. D. 

■\ 

SIXTH AMERICAN EDITION. 



y 



BOSTON, 
PUBLISHED BY WEST^ RICHAfiDSON & LORD* 

E, P. Walton, Printer, Montpelier, Vt. 

18i9. 



"P 






TO 
SIR JOHN HARTOPP, Baronet. 

SIR, 

IT is fit the public should receive through your hands 
what was written originally for the assistance of youir 
younger studies, and was then presented to you. 

It was by the repeatedimportunitiesofour learned friend 
Mr. John Eamesy that I was persuaded to revise these rtidi- 
ments of logic^ and when I had once suffered ray self to be- 
gin the work, I was drawn still onward far beyond my first 
design, even to the neglect, or too long delay of other 
pressing and important demands that were upon mt^^ 

It hajs been my endeavour to form every part of this 
treatise both for the instruction of students, to open their 
way into the sciences, and for the more extensive and gen- 
eral service of mankind, that the gentleman and the Chris* 
tian might find their account in the perusal as well as the 
scholar. I have therefore collected and proposed the chief 
principles and rul^ of ridit judisfment in matters of com- 
mon and sacred importance, and pointed out our most fre- 
quent mistakes and prejudices in the concerns of life and 
religion, that we might better guard against the springs of 
error, guilt and sorrow, which surround us in our state of 
mortality. 

You know, Sir, the great design of this noble science is 
to rescue our reasoning powers from their unhappy slav- 
ery and darkness 5 and thus, with all due submission and 
deference, it offers an humble assistance to divine revela- 
tions. Its chief business is to relieve the natural weakness- 
es of the mind by some better efforts of nature; it is to 
diffuse alight over the understanding in our inquiries after 
truth, and not to furnish the tongue with debate and con- 
troversy. True logic is not that noisy thing that deals all 
in dispute and wrangling, to which former ages had debas- 
ed and confined it 5 yet its disciples must acknowledge 
also, that they are taught to vindicate and defend tha 



iv DEDICATION- 

truth, as well as to seareh it out True logic doth DOt re- 
quire a long detail of hard words to amuse mankind, and 
to puff up the mind with empty sounds, and a pride of false 
learning ; yet some distinctions and terms of art are ne- 
cessary to range every idea in its proper class, and to keep 
our thoughts from confusion. The world is now grown so 
wise as not to suffer this valuable art to be engrossed by 
the schools. In so polite and knowing an age every man 
of reason will covet some acquaintance with logic^ since it 
renders its daily service to ivisdom and vhiue^ and to the 
affairs of common life, as well as the sciences. 

I will not presume, Sir, that this little book is improved 
since its first composure in proportion to the improvements 
of 5^our manlj^ age. But when you shall please to review 
it in your ret'red hours, perhaps you may refresh your 
own memory in some of the early parts of learning : And 
if yo. find all the additional remarks and rules made so 
familiar to you already by your own observation, that 
there is nothing new among them, it will be no unpleasing 
reflection that you have so far anticipated the present zeal 
and labour of, 

SIRy 

Your most FaithfuU and 

Oiedimt Servant^ 

I. WATTS- 
London, Aug- 24, 1724. 



INTRODUCTION, 

AND 

GENERAL SCHEME. 



LOGIC is the art of using Reason* well in our inquiries- 
after truthy and the communication of it to others, 
^ Reason* is the glory of human nature; and one of the 
chief eminences whereby we are raised above our fellow- 
creatures, the brutes, in this lower world. 

Reason as to the power and principles of it, is the com- 
mon gift of God to all men ; though all are not favoured 
with it by nature in an equal degree : But the acquired im" 
provements of it, in different men, make a mucli greater 
distinction between them than nature had made. I could 
even venture to say, that the improvement of reason hath 
raised the learned and tJie prudent, in the European world, 
almost as much above the Hottentots^ and other savages of 
Africa^ as those savages are by nature superior to the birds, 
the beasts, and the fishes. 

Now, the design of logic is to teach us the right use of 
our reason^ or intellectual poioers, and the improvement of 
them in ourselves and others ;. this is not only necessary, in 
order to attain any competent knowledge in the sciences , or 
the affairs of learning, but to govern botli the greater and 
the meaner actions of life. It is the cultivation of our rea- 
son, by which we are better enabled to distinguish g-ooc? 
from evily as wellas truth fYom falsehood: And both these 
are matters of the highest importance, whether we regard 
this life, or the life to come. 

The pursuit and acquisition of truth h of infinite con- 
cernment to mankind. Hereby we become acquainted 

* The word REASON^ in this place^ is not confined to the mere 
faculty of reasoning, or infering one thing from another, but ingjudes 
all the intellectual powers of man., 
A2 



vi INTRODUCTION. 

with the nature of things, both in heaven and earth, and 
their various relations to each other. It is by this mean 
we discover our duty to God and our fellow creatures : By 
this we arrive at the knowledge of natural religion^ and 
learn to confirm our faith in divine revelation^ as well as 
to understand what is revealed. Our wisdom, prudence, 
and piety, our present conduct, and our future hope, are 
all influenced by the use oiowx rational powers in the search 
after ti^th. 

There are several things that make it very necessary 
that our reason should have some assistance in the exer- 
cise or use of it. 

The first is the depth and difficulty of many truths. ?Lni 
the weakness of our reason to see far into things at once, and 
penetrate to the bottom of them. It was a saying among the 
ancients, Feri^as inputco^ " Truth lies in a well^" and to 
carry on this metaphor, we may very justly say, that logic 
does, as it were, supply us with steps whereby we may go 
down to reach the waier ; or it frames the links of a chain, 
whereby we may draw the water up from the bottom. 
Thus, by the means of many reasonings well connected 
together, philosophers in our age have drawn a thousand 
truths out of the depths of darkness, which our fathers 
were utterly uij acquainted with. 

Another thing that makes it necessary for our reason to 
have some assistance given it, is the disguise and false coU 
ours in ivhich many things appear to us in this present im* 
perfect state : There are a thousand things which are not 
in reality what they appear to be, and that both in the 
natural and the moral world : So the mn appears lo be flat 
as a plate of silver, and to be less than twelve inches in 
diameter: The moon appears to be as big as the sun, and 
the rainboNv appears to be a large substantial arch in the 
sky ; all which are in reality gross falsehoods. So 
knavery ipuis on the fsice of justice ^ hypocrisy and super- 
stition, wear the vizard of piety ; deceit and evil are often 
clothed in the sliapes and appearances of truth and good- 
Qiess. Now, logic helps us to strip oft' the outward disguisa 
qf things, and to behold them, and judge of them in their 
own nature. 



INTRODUCTION. - vii 

There is yet a further proof that our intellectual or ra- 
tional powers need some assistance, and that is because 
they are so frait and fallible in the present state : We are 
imposed upon at home as well as abroad : We are deceived 
by • our senses^ by our imaginations y by our passions and 
appetites^ by the authority of men, by education and cus- 
tom, &c. and we are led into frequent errors, by judging 
according to the nature of things. Something of this frail- 
ty is owing to our very constitution^ man being compound- 
ed of flesh and spirit : Something of it arises from our m- 
fant'Stat6y and our growing up by small degrees to man- 
hood, so that we form a thousand judgments before our 
reason is mature. But there is still more of it owing to 
our original defection from God, and the foolish and evil 
dispositions that are found in fallen man : So that one 
great part of the design of logic is to guard us against the 
delusive influences of our meaner powers, to cure the mis- 
takes of immature judgment, and to rai^e us in some 
measure from the ruins of our falL 

It is evident enough, from all these things, that our rea^ 
son needs the assistance of art m our inquiries after truth 
or duttj ; and, without some skill and diligence, in forming 
our judgments aright,, we shall be led into frequent mis- 
takes, both in matters of scienee, and in matters of prac*' 
tice; and some of these mistakes may prove fatal too. 

The art oflogicy even as it assists us to gain the knowl- 
edge of the sciences, leads us on toward virtue and happi- 
ness I for all Q\xx speculative aGquaintance with things should 
be made subservient to our better conduct in the civil and 
religious life. This is infinitely more valuable than all 
speculations y and a wise man will use them chiefly for 
this better purpose. 

All the good judgment and prudence that any man exp- 
erts in his common concerns of life^ without the advan- 
tage of learning, is called wiwraZ Zogt'c: And it is but a 
higher advancement, and a farther assistance of our ra- 
tional powers, that is designed by, and expected from, this 
artificial logic. 

In order to attain this, we must inquire what are the 
principal operations of the mind ^ which are put foi^th in the 
exercise of our reason ? and we &haU find them to be these. 



viii INTRODUCTION. 

four, namely, perception^ judgment^ argumentation^ and 
disposition » 

Now, the Art of Logic is composed of those observa- 
tions and ru'es which men have made about these four op- 
erations of the mind, perception^ judgment, reasoning y and 
disposition^ m order to assist and improve them. 

I. PerceptioniConcepiiony or apprehensio?^, is the mere 
simple contemplation of things ofiered to our minds, with- 
out affirming or denying any thing concerning them. So 
we conceive or think of a horse, a tree^ high, swift y slowy 
animal, time, motion, matter, mind, life, death, 8[c, The 
form under which these things appear to the mind, or the 
result of our conception or apprehension, is called anirfea. 

n. JiArdgment is that operation of the mind whereby we 
join two or more ideas together by one affirmatidn or ne- 
gation ; that is, we either affirm or deny this to be that. 
So This tree is high ; That horse is^not swift ; The mind of 
man is a thinking being ; Mere matter has no thought he- 
longing to it; God is just ; Good men are often miser ahle 
in the world ; A righteous governor will make a difference 
hetwixt the evil and the good; which sentences are the ef- 
fect of judgment^ and are called propositions^ 

111. Argumentation or reasoning is that operation of the 
mind, whereby we infer one thing, that is, one proposition 
from two or more propositions premised. Or, it Is the 
drawing a conclusion, which before was either unknown, 
or dark, or doubtful, frem some propositions which are 
more known and evident. So, when we have judged that 
matter cannot think, and that the mind ofwMn doth think, 
Ave then infer and conclude, that therefore the mind of man 
is not Tnatter, 

So we judge, that a just governor will make a difference 
between the evil and the good; we judge also, that God is a 
just governor; and from thence we conclude, that God 
will make a difference between the evil and the good. 

This argumentation may be carried on farther : Thus, 
God will one time or another make a differefice between the 
good and the evil: But there is little or no difercnce made 
m this world : Therefore ihei^e must be anotlwr world where' 
in this difference shall be made. 



INTRODUCTION. ix 

These inferences or conclusions are the effects of reason- 
ing 5 and the three propositions, taken all together, are 
all called a syllogism or argument. 

IV. Disposition is that operation of the mind, whereby 
wa put the ideas, propositions, and arguments, which we 
have formed concerning one subject, into such an order as 
is fittest to gain the clearest knowledge of it, to retain it 
longest, and to explain it to others in the best manner : 
Or, in short, it is the ranging of our thoughts in such or- 
der as is best for our own and others conception and mem- 
ory. The effect of this operation is called method. This 
very description of the four operations of the mind and 
their effects^ in this order ^ is an instance or example of 
method. 

Now as the art of logic assists our conceptions, so it 
gives us a large and comprehensive view of the subjects we 
inquire into, as well as a clear and distinct knowledge of 
them. As it regulates ouv judgment and our reasonings so 
it secures us from mistakes, and gives us a true and certain 
knowledge of things ; and, as it furnishes us with method, 
so it makes our knowledge of things both easy and regular, 
and guards our thoughts^from confusion. 

Logic is divided into four parts, according to these four 
operations of the mind, which it directs, and therefore we 
shall treat of it in this order. 



THE 
FIEST PART OF LOGIC- 

OF PERCEPTIONS AND IDEAS. 

THE first part of Logic contains observations and 
precepts about the first operation of the mind, perception or 
conception: And^ since all our knowledge, how wide and 
large soever it grow, is founded upon our conception and 
ideas, here we shall consider, 

1. The general nature of them. 

2. The objects ol our conception, or the archetypes or patterns of 
these ideas. ^^ 

3. The several divisions of them* 

4. The words and terms whereby our ideas are expressed* 

5. General directions about our ideas. 

6* Special rules to direct our conceptions. 



CHAfTEK 1. 

OF THE NATURE OF IDEAS. 

FIRST, the nature of conception or perception shall 
just be mentioned,* though this may seem to belong to 
another science rather than Logic. 

Perception is that act of the mind, or (as some philoso- 
phers call it) rather a passion or impression, whereby the 
mind becomes conscious of anything; as, when I feel 
hunger, thirst, or cold, or heat j when I see a horse, a tree 

* Note— The words conception and per option are often used pro- 
miscuously, as I have done here, because I would not embarrass a 
learner with too many distinctions; but, if I were to distinguish 
thenn, I would say, perception is the consciousness of an object when 
present; conception is the fotmiv^ an idea of the object, whethe 
present or absent. 



12 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 

or a man ; when I hear a human voice, or thunder, I am 
conscious of these things, and this is called perception. If 
I study, meditate, wish, or fear, I am conscious of these 
inward acts also, and my mind perceives its own thoughts^ 
wishes^ fears y §-c. 

An idea is generally defined a representation of a thing in 
the mind; it is a representation of something that we have 
see7ijfdtf heardy Sfc, or been conscious of. That notion or 
form of a horse, a tree, or a man, which is in the mind, is 
called the idea of a horse^ a tree, or a man. 

That notion of hunger, cold, sound, colour, thought, or 
wish, or fear, which is in the mind, is called the idea of 
hunger, cold, sound, wish, &c* 

It is not the outward object, or thing which is perceived^ 
namely, the horse, the man, &c» nor is it the very pircep' 
Hon or sense, and feeling, namely, of hunger, or cold, &c. 
which is called the idea ; but it is the thing as it exists in 
the mind by way of conception or representation, that is 
properly called the idea^ whether the object be present or 
absent. 

As a horse, a man, a tree, are the outward objects of our 
perception, and the outward archetypes or patter/is of our 
ideas; so for our own sensations of hunger, cold, &c. are 
also inward archetypes or 2^^ttems of oar ideas: But the no* 
iions or pictures of these things, as they are considered, or 
conceived in the mind, are precisely the ideas that we have 
to do with in Logic. To see a horse, or to feel cold, is one 
thing ; to thinlc of, and converse about a man, a horse, hun- 
ger, or cold, is another. 

Among all these ideas, such as represent bodies are gen- 
erally called images, especially if the idea of the shape be 
included. Those inward representations which we have of 
spirit, thought^ love, hatred^ cause, effect, ^c. are more^i^r^ 
and mental ideas, belonging more especially to the mind, 
and carry nothing of shape or sense in them. But I shall 
have occasion to speak more particularly of the original 
and the distinction otideas in the third chapter. I proceed 
therefore now to consider the objects ofowv ideas. 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. IS 

CHAPTER 11. 

OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION. 
SECT. I. 

OF BEING IN GENERAL. 

\ THE object of perception is that which is represented 
in the idea, that which is the archetype or pattern^ accord- 
ing to whi«h the idea is formed ; and XYms judgments^ pro^ 
positions^ rectsons, and long discourses may all become the 
objects of perception ; but in this place we speak chiefly 
of the Jirst and most simple objects of it, before they are 
joined and formed into propositions or discourses. 

Every object of our idea is called a theme^ whether it be 
a hehig or not-being ; for not-being may be proposed to 
our thoughts, as well as that which has a real being. But 
let us first treat of beings^ and that in the largest extent 
of the word. 

A being is considered as possible^ or as actual. 

When it is considered as possible^ it is said to have an 
essence or nature ; such were all things before their creation : 
When it is considered as actual^ then it is said to have ix- 
istence also ; such are all things zvhich m^e created^ and God 
himself the creator. 

Essence^ therefore, is but the very nature of any being, 
whether it be actually existing or not. A rose in winter 
has an essence^ in summer it has existence also. 

'Note. — There is but one being which includes existencem 
the very essence of it, and that is God, who therefore ac- 
tually eocists by natural and eternal necessity ; but the ac- 
tual existence of every creature is very distinct from its 
essence^ for it may Z>e, or may not be^ as God pleases. 

Again — Every being is considered either as subsisting in 
and by itself, and then it is called a substance ; or it sub- 
sists in and by another, and then it is called a mode or man- 
ner of being ; though few writers allow mode to be called a 
being in the same perfect sense as a substance is ; and some 
Rhodes have evidently more of real entity or being than 
others, as will appear when we come to treat of them. 
These things will furnish us Avith matter for large discourse 
in the following sections. 

B 



14 LOGIC ; OR THE Part I. 

SECT. II. 

OF SUBSTANCES AND THEIR VARIOUS KINDS. 

A SUBSTANCE is a being which can subsist by it- 
self, witliout dependauce upon any other created being. 
The notion of subsisting by itself gives occasion to logi- 
cians to call it a substance. So a horse, a house, wood, 
stone, water, fire, a spirit, a body, an angel, are called 
substances, because they depend on nothing but God for 
their existence. 

It has been usual also, in the description of substance^ to 
add, it is that which is the subject of modes or accidents : 
a body is the substance or subject, its shape is the mode. 

But, lest we be led into mistakes, let us here take notice, 
that, when a substance is said to subsist without dependence 
upon another created being; all that we mean is, that it 
cannot be annihilated, or utterly destroyed and reduced to 
nothing, by any power inferior to that of our Creator ; 
though its present particular form, nature, and properties, 
may be altered and destroyed by many inferior causes : A 
horse may die, and t&rn to dust 3 wood may be turned in- 
to fire, smoke, and ashes ; a house into rubbish, and water 
into ice or vapour ; but the substance or matter of which 
they are made stiil remains, though the forms and shapes 
of it are altered. A body may ceaSe to be a house or a 
horse, but it is a body still 5 and in this sense it depends 
only upon God for its existence. 

Among substances, some are thinking or conscious be- 
ings, or have a power of thought, such as the mind of man, 
Godj angels. Some are extended and solid or impenetrable, 
that is, they have dimensions of length, breadth, and depth, 
and have also a po.ver of resistance, or to exclude every 
thing of the same kind from being in the same j)iace 
This is the proper character of matter or body. 

As for the idea 01 Space, whellier Jtbe void or fuH, that 
i$, a vacuum or a plenum^ whether it be interspersed among 
all bodies, or may be supposed to reach beyond the bounds 
of the creation, it is an argument too long and too liard 
to be disputed in this place what the nature of it is : It has 



Chap, II, RIGHT USE OF REASON, 15 

been much debated whether it be a real substance, or a 
mere conception of the mind ; whether it be the immensi- 
ty of the divine nature, or the mere order of co-existent 
beings ; whether it be the manner of our conception of the 
distances of bodies, or a mere nothing. Therefore I drop 
the mention of it here, and refer the reader to the first 
essay among the Philosojihical EssaTjs, by 1, JF, published 
m 1733, 

Now if we seclude Space out of our consideration, tliere 
wiil remain but two sorts of substances in the world, that 
is, Matter and Mindy or as we otherwise call them, Body 
and Spirit ; at least we have no ideas of any other sub- 
stances but these.* 

* Because men have different ideas end notions of Su bstances, I 
thought it not proper entirely to omit all accounts of them, and there- 
fore have thrown them into the margin, 

Some philosophers suppose that our acquaintance with matter or 
mind reaches no farther than the mere properties of them, and that 
there is a sort of unknown being, which is the substance or the sub^ 
ject by which these properties o£ solid extension and of cogitation are 
supported, and in which these properties inhere or exist, But per- 
haps this notion arises only from our turning the mere abstracted or 
logical notion of substance or stlf-subsisting into the notiojri of a dis- 
tinct physical or natural being, without any necessity. Solid extension: 
seems, to me, to be the very substance of matter, or of all bodies 5 
and a power of thinking, which is always in act, seems to be the ve- 
ry substance of all spirits ; for God himself is an intelligent almighty- 
power ; nor is there any need to seek for any other secret and un- 
known being, or abstracted substance, entirely distinct from these, irr 
order to support the several modes or properties of matter or mrnd» 
for these two ideas are sufficient for that purpose ; therefore I rathec 
think these are substances* 

It must be confessed, when we say, Spirit is a thinking substance, 
and Matter is an extended solid substance, we are sometimes ready to 
imagine that extension and solidity are but n\ere modes and proper- 
ties of a certain unknown substance or subject which supports them, 
and which we call body ; and that a power of thinking is but a mere 
mode and property of some unknown substance or subject which sup^ 
ports it, and which we call spirit : But I rather take this to be a mere 
mistake, which we are led into by the grammatical form and use o£ 
words; and perhaps our logical way of thinking by substances and 
modes, as well as our grammatical way of talking by substantives 
and adjectives, help to delude us into the supposition. 

However, that 1 may nor be wanting to any cf my readers, I would 
let them know Mr, Locke's opinion, which has obtained much in the 
present age; and it is this: *♦ That our idea of [any particular sub- 



16 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 

Among substances, some are called simple, some are 
compound^ whether the words be taken in a philosophical 
or a vulgar sense. 

Simple substances, in a philosophical seme are either spirits 
which have no manner of composition in them, and in this 
sense God is called a simple heiyig ^ or tliey are the first 
principles of bodies, which are usually called elements, of 
which all other bodies are compounded : Elements are such 
substances as cannot be resolved, or reduced into two or 
more substances of different kinds. 

The various sects of philosophers have attributed the 
honour of this name to various things. The Peripatetic, 
or followers o^ Aristotle^ made, Fire, Air, Earth, and Wa- 
ter, to be the four elements of which all earthly things vvere 
compounded ; and they supposed the heavens to he 2i quint- 
essences ox fifth sort of body, distinct from all these : But, 

stance is only such a combination of simple ideas as represent that 
thing as subsisting by itself, in which the supposed or confused idea 
ef substance (such as it is) is always ready to offer itself. It is con. 
junction of ideas co-existing in such a cause of their union, and makes 
the whole subject subsist by itself, though the cause of their union be 
unknown ; and our general idea of substance arises from the self* 
subsistence of this collection of ideas. 

Now if this notion of substance rest here, and be considered merely 
as an unknown cause of the union of properties, it is much more easy 
to be admitted; but, if we proceed to suppose a sort of real, substan- 
tial, distinct being,, different from solid quantity or extension in bodies, 
and different from a power of thinking in spirits, in my opinion it is 
the introduction of a needless scholastical notion into the real nature 
of things, and then fancying it to have a real existence. 

Mr. Locke, in his Essay of Human understanding, Book 2. chap. 
22, § 2» seems to ridicule this common idea of substance, which rrten 
have generally supposed to be a sort of substratum, distinct from all 
properties whatsoever, and to be the support of all properties. Yet, 
in Book 4, chap, 3. § 6. he seenns to suppose there may be such an 
unknown substratum, which may be capable of receiving the proper- 
ties both of matter and of mind, namely, extension, solidity, and co- 
gitation; for he supposes it possible for God to add cogitation lo that 
substance which is corporeal, and thus to cause matter to think. If 
this be true, then spirits (for aught we know) may be corporeal be- 
ings, or thinking bodies^ which is a doctrine too favourable to the mor- 
tality of the soul. But 1 leave these debates to the philosophers of the 
age^ and will not be too positive in my opinion of this abstruse subject. 
See more of this argument in Philosophical Essays^ before cited^ 
F,5say 2d. 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 17 

since experimental philosophy and mathematics have been 
better understood, this doctrine has been abundantly re- 
futed. The Chemists make Spirit, Salt, Sulphur , Water ^ 
and Earthy to be their five elements^, because they can re- 
duce all terrestrial things to these five : This seems to come 
nearer the truth 5 though they are not all agreed in this 
enumeration of elements. In short, our modern philoso- 
phers generally suppose matter or body to be one simple 
principle, or solid extension, which being diversified by its 
various shapes, quantities, motions, and situations, makes 
all the varieties that are found in the universe ; and theie- 
fore they make little use of the word element. 

Compound substances are made up of two or more simpl& 
substances : So every thing in this whole material crea- 
tion, that can be reduced by the art of man into two or 
more different principles, or substances, is a compound bo-- 
dy in the philosophical sense. 

But, if we take the words simple and compound in a vul- 
gar sense, then all those are simple substances which are 
generally esteemed uniform in their nature. So every 
herb is called a simple^ and every metal ^.mineral; though 
the chemist perhaps may find all his several elements Ik 
each of them. So a needle is ?i simple ho Ay , being only 
made of steel ; but a sword or a knife is a compound, be- 
cause its haft or handle is made of materials different from 
the blade. So the Bark of Peru, or the Juice of the Sorrel, 
is a simple medicine : But, when the apothecary^s art has 
mingled several simples together^ it beconies a compound j 
SiS Diascordium, ov Mithridate. 

The terms of pure and mixt, when applied to bodies, are 
much akin to simple and compound. So a guinea is pure 
gold, if it has nothhig but gold in it, vvitliout any alloy of 
baser metal : But, if any other mineral or metal be min- 
gled with it, it is called a mixt substance or body. 

Substances are also divided into animate and inanimate^ 
Animated substances are either animal or vegetable,^ 

* NOTE. — Vegetables, as well as animals,^ have gotten the name 
of animated substances, because some ©f the ancients supposed herbs 
and plants, beasts and birds^ 5;c» to have a sort of sdul^ distinct from, 
luatter^ or body. 

B S 



18 LOOrC : OR, THE Part. L 

Some of the animal substances have various organical or 
instrumental parts, fitted for a variety of motions from 
place to place, and a spring of life within themselves, as 
beasts, birds, fishes, and insects 5 these are called animals. 
Other animated substances are called vegetables, whiclihave 
within themselves the principles of another Sort of life and 
growth, and of various productions of leaves, flowers and 
fruits, such as we see in plants, herbs, and trees. 

And there are other substances, which are called inani- 
Tiiatey because tliey have no sort of life in them, as earth, 
stone, air, water, &c. 

There is also one sort of substance or being, which rs 
compounded of hody^w^ mind, or a rational spirit united 
to an animal ; such is mankind. Angels, or any other be- 
iiigs of the spiritual and invisible world, who have assum- 
ed visible sliapes for a season, can hardly be reckoned a- 
mong this order of compounded beings ; because they 
drop their bodies, and divest themselves of those visible 
hapeS, when their particular message rs performed, arid 
thereby shew that these bodies do not belong to their na- 
AiTes. " 

SECT. Ifl. 

^F udistMy Ayi^rlHEm vAitio^ kinds ; and j»irst> of essitn? 

TIAL AND ACCrDENTAL MODES. 

THE Ilex t sort of objects which are represented in our 
ideas, are C2^\Qi^ modes or manners of being .'^ 

A mode \s that which cannot subsist in and of itself, but 
s shvays esteemed as belonging to, and subsisting by the 
.elp of some substance, which^ for that reason, is called its 
subject. A mode must depend on that substance for its ve- 
ry existence and being ; and that not as a being depends 
on its cause^ (for so substances themselves depend on God. 

* Ko'TE — The term mode is by some authors appUed chiefly to 
the relations, or relative manners of being. But in logical treatises^ 
it is often used in a larger sense^ and extends to all attributes 'what- 
soever^ andir.cludes the most essential and inward properties^ as well 
as outv^^ard respects and relations^ ^nd reaches to actions themselver.^ 
as w€ll t^s m;vuners of action. 



Chap, II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 19 

their creator *^) but the very being of a mode depends on 
some substance for its subject^ in which it is. or to which it 
belongs 5 so motion, shape, quantity, weight, are modes of 
the body; knowledge, wit, folly, love, doubting, judging, 
SLYe modes of the mind ; for the one cannot subsist without 
body^ and the other cannot subsist without mind. 

Modes have their several divisions, as well as substances. 

I. Modes are either essential or a>ccideutal. 

kn essential mode ov attribute/\% that which belongs to 
the very nature or essence of the subject wherein it is $ and 
the subject can never have the same nature without it; 
such is roundness in a bowl, hardness in a stone, softness in 
water, vitalmotion in an animal, solidity in matters, think" 
ing in a spirit ; for, though that piece of wood which is 
now a bowl may be made square^ yet, if roundfiess be tak- 
en away, it is no longer a bowl : so, that very flesh and 
bones, which is now an anmaZ, may be without life or in- 
ward motion ; but if all motion be entirely gone, it is no 
longer an animal, but a carcass ; so, if a body or matter be 
'Ahested o£ solidity, it is a nrere void space, or nothing; 
and, if spirit be entirely without ^AmArin^, I have no idea 
of any thing that is left in it; therefore, so far as I am 
aWe to judge, co7iciou$ness must be its essential attribute.* 
Thus all the perfections of God are called his uttributes^ 
for he cannot i>e without them. 

An essential m&de is either primary ox secondary, 

A primary essentiail mode is the first or chief thing that 
constitutes any being in its particular essence or nature, and 
makes it to be that which it is, and distinguishes it from 
all other beings : This is called the difference in the defi- 
nition of things ; of which hereafter; So roundness is the 
primary essential mode or difference of a bowl 5 themeeting 
of two lines is the primary essential modfe, or the difference 
of an angle; the perpendicularity of these lines to each oth- 

* Note— When I call solid extensionan essential mode or attribute 
of matter, and a power of thinking an essential mode or attributeof 
a spirit, I do it in compliance with common forms of speech.- But 
perhaps in reality these are very essences or substances themselves, 
and the most substantial ideas that we can form of body and spirit^ 
and have no need of any (we know not what) substratum^ or unintel- 
ligible subst^nce^ to sujppi^rt tJt^m in tMr -eicistence or being. 



20 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 

er is the difterence of a right angle : Solid eximsion is the 
primary attribute or difference of ma//e?'.* Consciousmssy 
or at least a power of thinkings is the difference or prima- 
ry attribute of a spirit;^ and to fear and love God is the 
primary attribute of a pious man, 

A secondary essential mode is any other attribute of a 
thing which is not of primary consideration : This is called 
a property. Sometimes indeed it goes towards making up 
the essence, especially of a complex beings so far as we are 
acquainted with it; sometimes it depends upon, and fol- 
lows from the essence of it ; so, volubility or aptness to roll, 
is the property of a bowl, and is derived from its roundness. 
Mobility y SLXiAfgiiref or shape are properties of matter; and 
it is the property of a pious man to love his neighbour. 

An accidental mode, or an accident^ is such a mode as is 
not necessary to the being of a thing, for the subject may 
be without it, and yet remain of the same nature that it 
was before, or it is that mode which may be separated or 
abolished from its subject : So, smoothness ovroughnessj 
blackness or whiteriesSy motion or rest, are the accidents of 
a bowl; for these may be all changed, and yet the body 
remain a bowl still ; Learningy justice, f oily ^sickness^ health, 
are the accidents of a man/ Motion, squareness, or any 
particular shape or size, are the accidents of body : Yet, 
shape and size, in general, are essential modes of it ; for a 
body must have some size and shape ; nor can it be with^ 
out them : Sa, hope, fear, wishing, assenting, and doubt- 
ing, are accidents of tlie mind, though thinking, in general, 
seems to be essential to it. 

Here observe, that the name of accident has been often- 
times given by the old Peripatetic philosophers to all 
modes, whether essential or accidental ; but the moderns 
confine this word accident to the sense in which I have 
described it. 

Here it should be noted also, that, though the word 
property be limited sometimes, in logical treatises, to the 
secondary essential mode, yet it is used in common language 
to signify these four sorts of modes ; of which some are 
me7itial, and some accidental, 

* See preceding^ Not«* 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 21 

1. Such as belong to every subject of that kind, but not 
only to those subjects. So, yellow colour, and ductility , are 
properties of gold ; they belong to all gold, but not only to 
gold 5 for saffron is also yellow^ and lead is ductile. 

2. Such as belong only to one kind of subject, but not to 
every subject of that kind. So, learnings readhig^ and writ- 
ing ^ are properties oi human nature; they belong only to 
man, but not to all men. 

3. Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and only 
to them, but not always. So, speech or language is a pro- 
perty of man, for it belongs to all men, and to men only ; 
but men are not always speaking. 

4* Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and to 
them only and always. So, shajye and divisibility are pro- 
perties of body ; so omniscierice and omnipotence are proper- 
ties of divine Nature ; for in this sense properties and at- 
tributes are the same ; and, except in logical treatises, 
there is scare any distinction made between them. These 
are called propria quarto modo in the school, or properties 
of the fourth sort. 

Note. — Where there is any one property or essential at- 
tribute so superior to the rest, that it appears plainly that 
all the rest are derived from it, and such as is sufficient to 
give a full distinction of that subject from all other sub- 
jects, this attribute or property is called the essential dif 
Jerencef as is before declared ; and we commonly say, the 
essence of the thing consists in it ; so the essence of matter 
in general seems to consist in solidity, or solid extension. 
But for the most part, we are so much at a loss in finding 
out the intimate essence of particular natural bodies, that 
we are forced to distinguish tlie essential difference of most 
things by a combination of properties. So a sparrow is a 
bird which has such coloured feathers, and sueh a partic- 
ular size, shape and motion. So worinivood is an herb 
which has such a leaf of such a colour, and shape, and 
taste, and such a root and stalk. So beasts and fishes, 
minerals, metals, and works of art sometimes, as well as 
of nature, are distinguished by such a collection of proper- 
He^. 



22 LOGIC : OR, THE Paet. I 



SECT. IV. 

^ THE FARTHER DIVISIONS OF MODE. 

THE second division of Modes is into absolute and rela- 
tive. An absolute mode is tiiat which belongs to its sub- 
ject, without respect to any other beings whatsoever : But 
a relative mode is derived from the regard that one being 
has to others. So roundness and smoothness are the a&50- 
hite modes of a bowl ; for, if there were nothing else ex- 
isting in the whole creation, a bowl might be raw»<i and 
smooth : But greatness and smallness are relative modes 5 
for the very ideas of them are derived merely from the 
comparison of one being with others : A bowl of four 
inches diameter is very great compared v*ith one of an 
inch and a half: but it is very small in comparison of an- 
other bowl whose diameter is eighteen or twenty inches. 
Motion is the absolute mode of a body, but swiftness or 
slowness are relative ideas ; foi the motion of a bowl on a 
bovvlinggreen is swift when compared with a snail j and it 
is slow when compared with a cannon- bullet. 

These relative modes are largely treated of by some lo- 
gical and metaphysical writers, under the name of rela-^ 
tions : And these relations themselves are farther subdi- 
vided into such as arise from the nature of things, and such 
as arise merely from the operation of our minds ; one sort 
are called reciL relations, the oilier mental ; so the likenes^s 
of one egg to another is a real relation, because it arises 
from the real nature of things ; for, whether there was 
any man or mind to conceive it or not, one egg would be 
like another : But, wiien we consider an egg as a noiin 
substantive in grammar, or as signified by the letters egg, 
these are mere mf^ntal relations, and derive their v^ry na- 
ture from the mind of man. These sort of relations are 
called by the schools entia rationis, or second notions ^ 
which have no real being, but depend entirely on the op- 
eration of the mind. 

III. The third division of modes shews us they arc ei- 
ther intrinsicaly or extnnsical. Intrinsical modes pre con- 



Chap. IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 23 

ceived to be in the subject or substance, as when we say a 
globe is round y or swift ^ rollings or at rest : Or when vyc say 
a man is tallj or learned^ these are intrinsic modes : But ex- 
trinsic modes are such as arise from something tliat is not 
in the subject or substance itself 5 but it is a manner of be- 
ing which some substances attain by reason of something 
that is external or foreign to the subject : as this globe lies 
within two yards of the ivall; or this man is beloved^ or hat- 
ed. Note — Such sort of modes as this last example, are 
called external denominations. 

IV. There is ?l fourth division much akin to this, where^ 
by modes are said to be inherent or adherent^ that is, proper 
or improper. Adherent or improper modes arise from the 
joining of some accidental substance to the chief subject, 
which yet may be separated from it^ so Avhen a bowl is 
we4, or a boy is clothed^ these are adher&nt modes ; for the 
water and the clothes are distinct substances, which adhere 
to the bowl^ or to the boy : But when we say the bowl is 
swift or rounds when we say the hoy is stjong or ivitty^ 
these ate proper or inherent modes^ for they have a sort of 
in-being in the substance itself, and do not arise from the 
addition of any other substance to it. 

V. Action and passion are modes or manners which be- 
long to substances, and sl.ould not entirely be omitted here. 
When a smith with a hammer strikes a piece of iron^ the 
hammer and the smith are both agents or subjects of action; 
the one is the prime or supreme^ the other the subordinate : 
The iron is Xhe patient, or the subject of passion, in a phi- 
losophical sense, because it receives the operation of the 
agent; though this sense of the words passion ^nd patient 
difters much from the vulgar meaning of them.* 

VI. The sixth division of modes m^ty he into physical ^ 
that iSj natural^ civil, moral, and supernaturaU So when we 
consider the a'postle Paul, who was a little man, a Roman 
by the privilege of his birth, a man of virtue or honesty, 
and an inspired apostle ; his low stature is a physical mode, 



*NoTE — Agent signifies the doer, patieift the suiFerer ; action is 
doing, passion is suffering; *\gent and action have retained their 
original philosophical sense, trough patient and passion have ac- 
quired a very different meaning in common language. 



24 LOGIC : OR, THE Pab'T L 

his being a Roman is a mn'Z privilege, his honesty is a moml 
consideration, and his being inspired is suptmaturaL 

VII. Modes belong either to body or to 5;pm7, or to both. 
Modes of body belong only to matter or to corporeal be- 
ings ; and these ?Lxeshape^ size, situation orplace^ 8fc. Modes 
of spirit belong only to minds ; such are 'knowledge^ assent^ 
dissent^ doubting^ reasonings &c. Modes which belong to 
both have been sometimes called mixed modes, or human 
modes y for these are only found in human naturie, which is 
compounded both of body and spirit; such are sensation^ 
imagination, passion^ &c. in all which there is a concur- 
rence of the operations both oi mind and body^ that is of 
animal and intellectual nature. 

But the modes of body may be yet farther distinguished. 
Some of them are primary modts or qualities, for they be- 
long to bodies considered in themselves, whether there were 
any man to take notice of them or not ; such are those be- 
fore mentioned, namely, shape, size, situation, ^c. Secondary 
qualities, ov modes, are such ideas as we ascribe to bodies on 
account of the various impressions which are made on the 
senses of men by them ; and these are called sensible quali- 
lies, which are very numerous ; such are all colours, as red, 
green, blue, §c. such are all sounds, as sharp, shrilly loud, 
hoarse ; all tastes, ?iS sweet, bitter, sour ; all smells, Avhether 
jjleasant, offensive, or indifferent; and all tactile qualities, 
or such as affect the touch or feeling, namely, heat, cold, <^x. 
These are properly called secondary qualities; for, though 
we are ready to conceive them as existing in the very bod- 
ies themselves which affect our senses, yet true philosophy 
has most undeniably proved that all these are really various 
ideas or perceptions excited in human nature by the differ- 
ent impressions that bodies make upon our senses, by their 
primary medes, that is, by means of the diQerent shape, 
size, motion, and position, of those little invisible parts 
that compose them. Thence it follows that a sicondai^ 
qudlity, considered as in the bodies themselves, is nothing 
else but a power or aptitude to produce such sensations in 
us: See Lockers Essay on the Understanding, Book II. 
Ghap.8. 

VIII. I might add, in the last place, that, as modes^ be- 
long to substances, so tliere are some aUo that are but jnodts 



Thap. H. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 25 

of other modes : For, though they subsist in and by the 
substance^ as the original subject of them^ yet they are pro- 
perly and directly attributed to some mode of that sub* 
stance. Motion is the mode of a body; but the swiftness 
or slowness of it, or its direction to the north or the south, 
are but modes of motion. Walking is the mode or man- 
ner of a man, or of a beast ; but walking gracefully im- 
plies a manner or mode superadded to that action. All 
comparative and superlative degrees, of any quality, are 
the modes of a mode, 3S swifter implies a greater measure 
of swiftness. 

It vi^ould be too tedious here to run through all the modes^ 
accidents, and relations^ at large, that belong to various be- 
ings, and are copiously treated of in general^ in the science 
<:alled Metaphysics^ or, more properly Ontology : They are 
also treated of, in particular^ in those sciences which have 
assumed them severally as their proper subjects. 



SECT. V. 

OF THE TEN CATEGORifes, OF SUBSTANCE MODIFIED* 

WE have thus given an account of the two chief objects 
of our ideas, namely, substances and modes^ and their va- 
rious kinds; and in these last sections we have briefly 
comprised the greatest part of wlmt is necessary in the 
famous ten ranks of being, cj^lled the ten predicaments or 
categories of Aristotle^ on which there are endless volumes 
of discourses formed by several of his followers. But that 
the reader may not utterly be ignorant of them, let him 
know the names are these; Substance, quantity^ quality^ re- 
lationy action, passion, where, when, situation, and clothing. 
It would be mere loss of time to shew how loose, how in- 
judicious, and even ridiculous, this tenfold division of things 
is : And whatsoever farther relates to them, and which 
may tend to improve useful knowledge, should be sought 
in Ontology, and in other sciences. 

Besides substance and mode, some of the moderns would 
have us consider the substance modified as a distinct object 
of our ideas ; but I think there is nothing more that need 



26 LOGIC : OR THE Part L 

be said on this subject, than this, namely, There is some 
difference between a substance, when it is considered with 
all its modes about it, or clothed in all its manners of ex- 
istence, and when it is distinguished from them, and con- 
sidered naked without them. 



SECT. VI. 

OP NOT-BEING. 

AS being is divided into substance and mode^ so we may 
consider not-being with regard to both these. 

I. JVoZ-Z^eing- is considered as excluding all substance, 
and then all modes are also necessarily excluded ; and 
this w€ call pure nihility^ or m^er^ nothing. 

This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or ^ philosophi- 
cal sense; so we say, There is nothing in the cup in a vuU 
gar sense, when we mean tbere is no liquor in it ; but we 
cannot say. There is nothing in the cup, in a strict philoso- 
phical sense, where there is air in it, and perhaps a million 
of rays of light are there. 

II. Not-being, as it has relation to modes or manners of 
being, may be considered either as a mere negation, or as 
a privation. 

A negation is the absence of that which does not natur- 
ally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which has 
no right, obligation, or necessity, to be present with it ; 
as, when we say, a stone is inaniinate, or blind, or deaf; 
that is, it has no life, nor sight, nor hearing ; nor when 
we say, ai'carpenter, or 2l fisherman is unlearned, these are 
mere negations. 

But a privation is the absence of what does naturally be- 
long to the tiling we arc speaking of, or which ought to be 
present with it ; as when a man or a horse is deaf, or blind, 
or dead ; or if a physician or a divine be unlearned, these 
are called privatimis : So the sinfidness of any human ac- 
tion is said to be a privation ; for sin is that want of con- 
formity to the law of Cod which ought to be found in ev 
ery action of man. 

Note, — There are some writers who make all sorts of 
relative modes or relations^ a3 >vel/ as all external denomin- 



Chap. Ill, RIGHT USE OF REASON. 27 

ations, to be mere creatures of the mind, and entia rationis^ 
and then they rank them also under the general head of 
not-heings ; but it is my opinion, that whatsoever may be 
determined concerning mere mental relations and external 
denominations, which seem to have something less of enti- 
ty or being in them, yet there are many real relations^ which 
ought not to be reduced to so low a class; such are the 
situation of bodies, their mutual distances^ their particular 
proportiotis and measures^ the notions of fatherhood, broth- 
erhoody sonship, Sfc. all which are relative ideas. The very 
essence of virtues or holiness consists in the conformity of 
our actions to the rule of right reason, or the law of God : 
The nature and essence of sincerity, is the conformity of 
our words and actions to our thoughts, all which are but 
niere relations ; and I think we must not reduce such pos- 
itive beings as piety, and virtue, and inifh, to the rank of 
non.entities, which have nothing real in them, thougli sm, 
or rather the sinfulness of an action, may be properly call- 
ed a not-being ; for it is a want of pietv and virtue. This 
is the most usual, and perhaps the justest way of repre- 
senting these niatters. 



CHAPTER in. 

OF THE SEVERAL SORTS OF PERCEPTIONS 

OR IDEAS. 

IDEAS may be divided with regard to their originaL 
their nature, their objects, and their qualities. 

SECT. I. 

OF SENSIBLE, SPIRITUAL, AND ABSTRACTED IDEAS. 

THERE has been a great controversy about the on^m 
of ideas, namely, whether any of our ideas are innats or 
not, that IS, born with us and naturally belong to our 
mnds. Mr. Locke utterly denies it ; others as positively 



28 LOGIC : OR, THE Paht. I. 

affirm it. Now, though this controversy may be cpmpris* 
ed, by allowiisg that there is a sense wherein our first 
ideas of some things may be said to be innate (as I have 
shewn in some remarks on Mr» Locke's Essay, which have 
lain long by me) yet it does not belong to this place and 
business to have that point debated at large, nor will it hin- 
der our pursuit of the present work to pass over it in silence. 
There is sufficient ground to say, that all our ideas with 
regard to the original, may be divided into three sorts, 
iiamely, sensible^ spirihtaly and aostracUd ideas. 

I. Sensible or corporeal ideas, are derived originally from 
our senses, and from the communication which the soul 
has with the animal body in this present state 5 such are 
the notions we frame of nil colours^ sounds, tastes, Jigures^ 
or shapes and no lions ; for our senses being conversant a- 
bout particular sensible objects, become the occasions of 
several distinct perceptions in the mind ; and thus we come 
by the ideas of yellow^ vjhite^ heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, 
sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities. All 
the ideas which we have of body, and the sensible modes 
and properties that belong to it, seem to be derived from 
sensation. 

And howsoever these may be ti'easured up in the menv 
ary, and by the work of fancy may be increased, dimin- 
ished, compounded, divided, and diversified, (which we 
are ready to call our invention^) yet they all derive their 
first nature and being from something that has been let 
into our minds by one or other of our senses. If 
think of a golden mountain, or a sea of liquid jire, yet the 
single ideas oi^ sea, fire, mountain, and gold, came into my 
thoughts at first by sensation 5 the mind has only com- 
pounded them. 

II. Spiriiual* or intellectual ideas, are those which we 
gain by reflecting on the nature and actions of our own 
souls, and turning our thoughts within ourselves, and ob- 
serving what is transacted in our own minds. Such ar 
the ideas we have of thought, assent, dissent, judging, rta* 
son, knowledge, understanding, will, love, fear, hope, 

*♦ Here the word spiritual is used in a. mere natural, and not in 
religious sense. 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 29 

By sensation the soul contemplates things (as it were) 
out of itself, and garns corporeal representations or sensi- 
ble ideas : By reflection, the soul contemplates itself, and 
things within itself, and by this mean it gains spiritual 
ideas, or representations of things intellectual. 

Here it may be noted, though the first original of these 
two sorts of ideas, namely, sensible and spiritual^ may be 
entirely owing to these two principles, sensation and reflec- 
tion, yet the recollection^ and fresh excitation of them, may 
be owing to a thousand other occasions and occurrences off 
life. We could never inform a man who was born blind 
or deaf what we mean by the words yellow, Hue, red, or by 
the words loud or shrill, nor convey any just ideas of these 
things to his mind, by all the powers of language, unless 
he has experienced those sensations of sound and colour ; 
nor could we ever gain the ideas of thought, judgement ^ rea^ 
son, doubting, hoping, ^c, by all the words that man could 
invent, without turning our thoughts inward upon the ac- 
tions of our own souls. Yet, when once we have attained 
these ideas, by sensation and reflection, they may be ex- 
cited afresh by the use of names, words, signs, or by any 
thing else that has been connected with them in our 
thoughts^ for, when two or more ideas have been asso- 
ciated together, whether it be by custom, or accident, oir 
design, the one presently brings the other to mind. 

III. Besides these two which we have named, there is a 
third sort of ideas, which are commonly called abstracted 
ideas, becausej though the original ground or occasion oC 
them may be sensation, or reflection, or both, yet these 
ideas are framed by another act of the mind, which we 
usually call abstraction^ Now, the word abstraction signi- 
fies a withdrawing some part of an idea from other parts of 
it, by which, means such abstracted ideas are formed, as 
neither represent any thing corporeal or spiritual, that is^^ 
any thing peculiar or proper to mind or body. Now these 
are of two kinds. 

Some of these abstracted ideas are the most absolute^ 
general and universal conceptions of things, considered in 
5iemselves, without respect to others -, such as entity or 
being, and not-being, essence, existence, act^ power, substance-^ 
mode, accident, 8fc, 
C2 



30 LOGIC : OR, THE Part L 

The other sort of abstracted ideas is relative^ as when 
we compare several things together, and consider merely 
the relations of one thing to another, entirely dropping 
the subject of those relations, whether they be corporeal 
or spiritual 3 such are our ideas of cause^ ^ffed^ likeness^ 
unlikenessy subject^ object y identity^ or sameness^ and contrari- 
ety, order SLuA other things which are treated of in Ontology. 

Most of the terms of art, in several sciences, may be 
ranked under this head of abstracted ideas, as noun, pro- 
noun, verb, in grammar, and the several particles of speech, 
as wherefore, therefore, when, how, although, howsoever, ^c. 
So connections^ transitions, similitudes, tropes, and their va* 
rious forms in rhetoric. 

These abstracted ideas, whether absolute or relative, 
cannot so properly be said to derive their immediate, com- 
plete and distinct original, either from sensation, or reflec- 
tion, (1.) Because the nature and the actions, both of 
body and spirit, give us occasion to frame exactly the 
same ideas of essence, mode, cause^ ^ff^^t, likeness, contraries - 
ty^ ^c. Therefore these cannot be called either sensible or 
spiritual ideas, for they are not exact representations, ei- 
ther of the peculiar qualities or actions of spirit or body, 
but seem to be a distinct kind of idea framed, in the mind, 
to represent our most general conceptions of things, or 
their relations to one another, without any regard to their 
natures, whether they be corporeal or spiritual. And, (2.) 
the same general ideas, of cause and effect, likeness, ^c, may 
be transferred to a thousand other kinds of being, whetlier 
bodily or spiritual, besides those from whence we first de- 
rived them : Even those abstracted ideas, which must be 
iirst occasioned by bodies, may be as properly afterward 
attributed to spirits, 

Now^ though Mr. Locke supposes sensah'^n and reflection 
to be the only two springs of all ideas, and that these (wo 
are sufficient to furnish our minds with all that rich va- 
riety of ideas which we have ; yet abstraction is certainly a 
different act of the mind, whence these abstracted ideas 
have their original; though perhaps sensation or reflec- 
tion may furnish us with all the first objects and occasions 
whence these abstracted ideas are excited and derived. 
Nor in thi^ 5en5>c and view of things can T think Mr. Locke 



Ohaf, III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 31 

himself would deny my representation of the original of 
abstracted ideas, nor forbid them to stand for a distinct 
species. 

Note — Though we have divided ideas in this chapter 
into three sorts, namelVj smsihle^ spiritual^ and abstracted^ 
yet it may not ba amiss just to take notice here, that a 
man may be called a compound substance y being made of 
body and mind, and i\\e modes which arise from this com- 
position are called mixed modes, such as sensation^ passion^ 
discourse, &c. so the ideas of this substance or behig called 
man, and of these mixed modes, may be called mixed ideas y 
for the3/ are not properly and strictly spiritualy sensible 
or abstracted. See a much larger account of every part 
of this chapter in the Pkilosophical Essays, by L Wattt^ 
Essay III. iV. &:c. 



SECT. II. 

OP SIMPLE AND COMPLEX, COMPOUND AND COLLECTIVE IDEAS* 

IDEAS, considered in their nature, are either siwzpZe or 
tomplex. 

A simple idea is one uniform idea, which cannot be di- 
vided or distinguished by the mind of man into two or more 
ideas; such are a multitude of our sensations y as the idea 
of sweet, hitter, cold, heat, white, red, blue, hard, soft, mo^ 
Hon, rest, and perhaps extension and duration : Such are 
also many of our spiritual ideas 5 such as thought, will^ 
wish, knoivledge, &c. 

A complex idea is made by joining two or more simple 
ideas together ; as a square, a triangle, a cube! a pe7i, a ta- 
hie, reading, writing, truth, falsehood, a body,, a maji, a 
horse, an angel, a heavy body, a swift horse, &c. Every 
thing that can be divided by the mind into two or more 
ideas is called complex. 

Complex ideas are often considered as single and distinct 
beings, though they may be made up of several simple 
ideas ; so a body, a spirit, a house, a tree, a floiver. But, 
when several of these ideas of a different kind are joined to- 
gether, which ai'^ wgnt to b^ eonsidei'^d ^S distinct singly 



32 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 

beings, this is called a compound idea, whether these united 
ideas be simple or complex. So, a man is compounded of 
body and sjnrit ; so mithridate is a compound medicme^ be- 
cause it is made of many different ingredients: This I have 
shewn under the doctrine of sulstances. And modes also 
may be compounded. HarnftfOny is a compound idea made 
up of different sounds united : So, several different virtues 
must be united to make up the compounded idea or char-^ 
acter, either of a hero, or a saint. 

But, when many ideas of the same kind are joined to- 
gether, and united in one name, or under one view, it is 
called a collective idea : so, an army^ or a parliament , is a 
collection of men ^ a dictiorjLary or nomenclatura, is a col- 
lection of words 5 a J?0€t is a collection of sheep; a forest, 
or grove^ a collection of trees ; an heap, is a collection of 
sand, or corn, or dust, &c. a city^ is a collection of houses 5 
a nosegay, is a collection of flowers ; a month, or ^/^ar, is a 
collection of days ; and a thousand, is a collection of units. 

The precise difference between a compound and collective 
idea is this, that a compound idea, unites things of a different 
kind, but a collective idea things of the same kind : Though 
this distinction in some cases is not accurately observed, 
and custom oftentimes uses the word compound for collec-. 
live. 

SECT III. 

OF UNIVERSAL ANP PARTICULAR IDEAS, REAL AND IMAGINARY. 

IDEAS, according to their objects, may first be divided 
into particular or universal. 

A particular idea is that which represents one thing only. 

Sometimes the one thing is represented in a loose and 
indeterminate manner, as, when we say, some man, any 
man, one man, another man ; some horse, any. horse ; one 
city, or another ; which is called by the schools individuum 
vagum- 

Sometimes the /)ar^ici(Zar zcZga represents one thing in a 
determinate manner, and then it is called a singular idea; 
such is Bucephalus, or Alexanders horse, Cicero the orator, 
Pe^er the apoistle, the p^ileice Qf V^rmUes^ this iook^ that 



Chap, IIT. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 8S 

\mvery the New Forest^ or the city of London : That idea 
which represents one particular determinate thing to me, 
i^ called a singular idea^ whether it be simple, or compkx, 
or compound. 

The object of any particular idea, as well as the idea it- 
self, is sometimes called an individual : So Peter is an in- 
dividual man, London is an individual city. So, this loolcy 
one Jiorse, a7iother horsey are all individuals 3 though the 
word individual is more usually hmiled to one singular^ 
certain and determined object. 

An unwersal idea^ is that which represents a common 
nature agreeing to several particular things 3 so a horse^ a 
mauy or a book^ are called yniversal ideas ; because they 
agree to all horses y m$nr or books. 

And I think it not amiss to intimate, in this place, that 
the universal ideas are formed by that act of the mind 
which is called abstraction^ that is, a withdrawing some part 
of an idea from other parts of it : For, when singular idias 
are first let into the mind, by sensation or reflection, then, 
in order to mako thern itniversaL we leave out, or drop all 
those peculiar and determinate characters, qualities, modes 
or circumstances, v/hieh belong merely to any particular 
individual being, and b}?- which it differs from other beings ; 
and we only contemplate those properties of it, wherein it 
agrees with other beings. 

Though, it must be confessed, that the name of abstract- 
Qd ideas is sometimes attributed to universal ideas^ both sen-' 
sible or spiritual yet this abstraction is not so great, as 
when we drop out of our idea every sensible or spiritual 
JFepresentation, and retain nothing but the most general 
and absolute conceptions of things, or their mere relations 
to one another, without any regard to their particular na- 
tures, whether they be sensible or spiritual^ And it is to 
this kind of conceptions we more properly give the name 
o( abstracted ideas y as in the first section of this chapter. 

An universal idea is either general or spirituaL 

A general idea is called by the schools a genus ; and it 
is one common nature agreeing to several other common 
natures. So animal is a genus ; because it agrees to horse^ 
liony whahp butterflyy which are also common ideas; sojish 
is 2i genus ; because it agrees to trouty herring^craiy which 
are common natures also. 



34 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 

A special idea is called by the schools a species ; it is one 
common nature that agrees to several singular individual 
beings ; so horse is a special idea, or a species, because it 
agrees to Bucephalus, Trott, and SnowhalL City is a sp&^ 
cial idea, for it agrees to London, Paris, Bristal. 

'Note 1st. — Some oi ih^seuniversals are g^eniises, if com- 
pared with less common natures -, and they are species, if 
compared with natures more common.. So bird is a genus, 
if compared with eagle, sparroio, raven, which are also 
common natures: But it is a species, if compared with the 
more general nature, animal. The same may be said of 
fish, leasts, ^c. 

This sort of universal ideas, which may either be con- 
sidered as a genus, or a species, is called subaltern : But 
the highest genus, which is never a species, is called the 
most general ; and lowest species, which is never a genus^ 
is called the most special. 

It may be observed here also, that that general nature 
or property, wkerein one thing agrees with most other 
things, is called its more remote genus : So substance \^ the 
remote genus of bird, or beast, because it agrees not only to 
all kinds of animals, but also to things inanimate, as sun, 
stars, clouds, metals, stones, air, water, &c. But animal 
is the pr&ximate or nearest genus of bird, because it agrees 
to fewer other things. Those general natures which stand 
between the nearest and most remote, Sire cMedintermediate. 

Note 2d. — In universal ideas it is proper to consider 
their comprehension and their exten'iion,^ 

The comprehension of an idea regards all the essential 
modes and properties of it 5 So body, in its comprehension, 
takes in solidity, figures ^ quantity ^mobility, 8fc* So a bowl, 
in its comprehension, includes roundness, volubility, 8fc. 

The extension of an universal idea regards all the partic- 
ular kinds and single beings that are contained under it. 
So a body in its extension includes sun, moon, star, wood, 
iron, plant, animal, &c. which are several species, or indi" 
viduals, uDder the general n^me of body, So s, bowl, in 
its extension, includes a wooden bowl, a brass bowl, a white 

*NoTE — The word extension here is taken in a mere logical 
sense, and not in a physical and mathematical sense. 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 35 

and black ho^^l, a heavy bowl, &c» and all kinds of bowls, 
together with all the particular individual bowls in the 
world. 

Note. The comprehensmi of an idea is sometimes taken 
in so large a sense; as not only to include the essential at- 
tributes, but all the properties, modes, and relations what- 
soever, that belong to any being, as will appear. Chap. VI. 

This account of genus and species is part of that famous 
doctrine of universals, which is taught in the school, with 
divers other formalities belonging to it^ for it is in this 
place that they introduce difference^ which is the primary 
essential mode^ and propertyy or the secondary essential 
mode, and accident^ or the accidental mode ; and these 
they call the five predicables^ because €very thing that is 
affirmed concerning any being must be either the genus ^ 
the species, the difference, some property, some accident: 
But what farther is necessary to be said concerning these 
things will be mentioned when we treat of definition. 

Having finished the doctrine of imiversal and particular 
ideas, I should take notice of another division of them, 
which also hath respect to their objects ; and that is they 
are either real or imaginary. 

Real ideas are such as have a just foundation in nature, 
and have real objects, or exemplars, which did, or do, or 
may actually exist, according to the present state and na- 
ture of things ; such are all our ideas of long, broad^ swift^ 
slow, wood, iroiif men, horses, thoughts, spirits,. sl cruel maS' 
t^r, a proud beggar, a man seven feet high. 

Imaginary ideas, which are also called fantastical, or 
chimerical, are such as are made by enlarging, diminishing, 
uniting, dividing real ideas in the mind, in such a manner, 
as no objects, or exemplars did or ever will exist, accord- 
ing to the present course of nature, though the sevpral 
parts of these ideas are borrowed from real objects ; such 
are the conceptions we have of a centaur, a satyr, a golden 
mountain, ^flying horse, a dog without a head, a bull less 
than a mouss, or a mouse as big as a bull^ and a man twen- 
\iy feet high. 

^ Some of these fantastic ideas are possible, that is, they 
are not utterly inconsistent in the nature of things ; and 
therefore it is within the reach of clivine power to make such 



Z6 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 

objects; such are most of the instances ah'eady given ^ 
But impossibles to carry an utter inconsistence in the ideas 
which are joined; such are self-active matter, Sind irifi)iit£> 
or eternal men^ a 2?iot«5 man iviihotit honesty j ov heavm 
without holiness. 



SECT. ly, 

IHE DIVISrON OP IDEAS, WITH REGARD TO THEIR QUALITIE.S, 

It>EAS, with regard to their qualities^ alTord l.s these 
several divisions of thenie 1. They are either cZtjar and 
distinct^ or oosciire and confused. 2. They are vulgar or 
learned. 3. They are perfect or imperfect ^ 4, They are 
true or false. 

I. Our ideas are either <;Z^ar and distinct y or ohscure ^uA. 
confused. 

Several writers have distinguished the clear ideas from 
thuse that are distinct ; and the confused ideas from those 
that are obscure ; and it must be acknov/ledged there may 
be some difference between them; for it is the clearness of 
ideas for the most part makes them distircct; and the ob- 
scurity of ideas is one thing that will aUyays bring a sort of 
■corfusion into them. Yet when these writers come to talk 
largely upon this subject, and to explain and adjust their 
meaning with great nicety, I have generally found that 
they did not keep up the distinction they first designed, 
but they confound the one with tne other. 1 shall there- 
fore treat of char or distinct ideas, as one and the same 
sort, and obscure or confused ideas, as another. 

A clear and distinct idea, is that which represents the 
object of the mind with full evidence and strength, and 
plainly distinguishes it from all other objects whatsoever. 

An obscure and confused idea represents the object ei- 
ther so faintly, so impierfectly, or so mingled with other 
ideas, that the object of it doth not appear plain to the 
mind, nor purely in its ovvn nature, nor sufficiently dis- 
tinguisiied from other things. 

When we see the sea and sky nearer at hand, we have 
a clear and distinct idea of each ; but, when we look far to- 



Chap. IIL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 37 

ward the horizon, especially in a misty day, our ideas of 
both are but obscure and confused^ for we know not which 
is sea, and Avhich is sky. So when we look at the colours 
of the rainbow, we have a clear idea of the red^ the blue^ the 
green, in the middle of their several arches, and a distinct 
idea too, while the eye fixes there; but, when we consider 
the Jorrfer of those colours; they so run into one anotherj 
that it renders their ideas e£)n/i«5^£? and obscure; So the idea 
wliich we have of our brother, or our friend, whom we see 
daily, is clear and distinct ; but, when the absence of many 
years has injured the idea, it becomes obscme and confused. 

Note here — That some of our ideas may be very clear 
and distinct in one respect, and very obscure and confused 
in another. So when we speak of a Chiliagonum, or a 
figure of a thousand angles, we may have a clear and distinct 
rational idea of the number one thousand angles ; for we 
can demonstrate various properties concerning it by reason? 
But the image, or sensible idea, which we have of the figure, 
is but confused and obscure; for we cannot precisely distin- 
guish it by fancy from the image of ^figure that has nine 
hundred angles, or nine hundred and ninety. So when we 
speak of the infinite divisibility of matter, we always keep 
in our minds a very clear and distinct idea of division and 
divisibility ; but, after we have made a little progress in 
dividing, and come to parts that are far too small for the 
reach of our senses, then our ideas or sensible images of 
these little bodies become obscure and indistinct, and the 
idea of infinite is very obscure, imperfect and confused. - 

II. Ideas are either vulgar ov learned. A vulgar idea 
represents to us the most obvious and sensible appearances 
that are contained in the object of them : But a learned 
idea penetrates farther into the nature, properties, reasons, 
'Causes, and effects of things. This is best illustrated by 
some examples. 

It is a vulgar idea that we have of a rainbow, when we 
conceive a large atch in the clouds, made up of various 
colours parallel to each other : But it is a learned idea 
which a philosopher has when he considers it as the vari- 
ous reflections and refractions of ^un-beams, in drops of 
falling rain. So it is a vulgar idea, which we have of the 
colours of solid bodies^ when we perceive them to be, as it 



88 LOGIC : OR, THE Paet I. 

were, a red, or blue, or green tincture of the surface of those 
bodies ; but it is 3. philosophical idea^ when we consider the 
various colours to be nothing else but different sensasions 
excited in us by the variously refracted rays of light, reflect- 
ed oirour eyes in a different manner, according to the dif- 
ferent size, or shape, or situations of the particles of which 
the surfaces of those bodies are composed. It is a vulgar 
idea which we have of a watch or clock ^ when we conceive 
of it as a pretty instrument, made to shew us the hour of 
the day : But it is a learned idea which the watchmaker 
has of it, who knows all the several parts of it, the spring, 
the balance, the chain, the wheels, their axles, &c. togeth- 
er with the various connections and adjustments of each 
part, whence the exact and uniform motion of the index 
is derived, which points to the minute or the hour. So, 
when a common understanding reads VirgiVs jEneid, he 
has but a vulgar idea of that poem, yet his mind is natur- 
ally entertained with the story, and his ears with the verse: 
But, when a critic, or a man who has skill in poesy, reads 
it, he has a learned idea of its peculiar beauties, he tastes 
and relishes a superior pleasure ^ he admires the Roman 
Poet, and wishes he had known the Christian Theology, 
^vhich would have furnished him with nobler materials 
and machines than all the Heathen idols. 

It is with a vulgar idea that the world beholds the Car- 
toons of Raphael at Hampton Court, and every one feels 
his share of pleasure and entertainment : But a painter 
contemplates the wonders of that Italian pencil, and sees a 
thousand beauties in them which the vulgar eye neglected : 
His learned ideas give him a transcendant delight, and 
yet, at the same time, discover the blemishes which the 
common gazer never observed. 

III. Ideas are either perfect or imperfect, yihich are oth- 
erwise called adequate or inadequate. 

Those are adequate ideas which perfectly represent their 
archetypes or objects. Inadequate ideas are but a partial, 
or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which 
they are lefened. 

All OUT simple ideas are in some sense adequate or perfect, 
because simple ideas, considered merely as our first per- 
fj^eptions, have no parts in them : So we may be said to 



Chaf. Ill RIGHT USE OF REASON. 39 

have a perfect idea of white, black, siveef, sour, length, light , 
motion, rest, Sfc. VVe have also a perfect idea of various 
figures, as a triangle, a square, a cylinder^ a cube, a sphere, 
whicli are complex ideas : But, our idea or image of a 
figure of a thousand sides, our idea of the city of London, 
or Xhe powers of a loadstone, are very imperfect, as well as 
our ideas oi infinite length or breadth, infinite power, wis- 
dom, ov duration; for the idea of f?y?m^(j is endless and 
ever growing, and can never be completed. 

Note 1. — When we have a perfect idea of any thing in 
all its parts, it is called a complete idea ; when in all its pro« 
perties, it is called comprehensive. But when we have but 
an inadequate and imperfect idea, we are only said to ap- 
prehend it ; therefore we use the term apprehension when 
we speak of our knowledge of God, who can never be 
comprehended by his creatures. 

Note 2. — Though there are a multitude of ideas which 
may be called perfect, or adequate, in a vulgar sense, yet 
there are scarce any ideas which are adequate, comprehen- 
sive, and complete, in a philosophical sense ; for there is 
scarce any thing in the world that we know, as to all the 
parts^and powers and properties of it, in perfection. Even 
so plain an idea as that o^ vl triangle, has, perhaps, infinite 
properties belonging to it, of which we know but a few. 
Who can tell what are the shapes and positions of those 
particles, which cause all the variety of colours that ap- 
pear on the surface of things ? Who knows what are the 
figures of the little corpuscles that compose and distinguish 
difierent bodies ? The ideas of brass, iron, gold, wood, stone^ 
hysop, and rosemary, have an infinite variety of hidden 
mysteries contained in the shape, size, motion, and position 
of the httle particles of which they are composed ; and 
perhaps, also infinite unknown properties and powers, that 
may be derived from them. And, if we arise to the ani- 
mal world, or the world o{ spirits, our knowledge of them 
must be amazingly imperfect, when there is not the least 
grain of sand, or em>pty space, but has too many questions 
and difficulties belonging to it for the wisest philosopher 
upon earth to answer and resolve. 

IV. Our ideas are either true or false ; for an idea being 
the representation of a thing in a mind, it must be either 



40 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. 1. 

a true or ^Jalse representation of it. If the idea be con- 
formable to the object or archetype of it, it is a true idea ; 
if not^ it is ^fahe one. Sometimes our ideas are referred 
to things really existing without us, as tiieir arclietypes. 
If I see bodies in their proper colours^ T have a true idea : But, 
when a man under the jaundice sees all bodies yellow, he has 
a false idea of them. So, if we see the sim ormoon rising 
or settings our idea represents them bigger than when they 
are on tJhe meridian: And in this sense it is a false idea, 
because those heavenly bodies are all day and all night of 
the same bigness. Or, when i see a. straight staff appear 
crooked while it is half under the water, I say the water 
gives me a false idea of it. Sometimes our ideas refer to 
tiie id^as of other men, denoted by such a particular word^ 
as their archetypes : So, when I hear a P^rotestant use the 
words church and sacraments, if I understand by these words 
a congregation of faithful m^n, who profess Christianity, and 
the two ordinances, baptism, and the Lord's supper, I have 
a trus idea of those words in the common sense of Protest- 
ants : But, if the man who speaks of them he a Papist, he 
means the church of Rome and the seven sacraments, and 
then I have a mistaken idea of those words, as spoken by 
him, for he has a different sense and meaning : And, in 
general, whensoever I mistake the sense of any speaker or 
writer, I may be said to have a. false idea of it. 

-Some think that truth or falsehood properly belongs on* 
ly to propositions, which shall be the subject of discourse in 
the Second Part of Logic; for, if we consider icZea as mere 
impression upon the mind, made by outward objects, those 
impressions will ever be conformable to the laws of nature 
in such a case : The water will make a stick appear crook' 
-ed, and the horizontal air will make the sun and moon ap^ 
pear bigger* And, generally, where there is falsehood in 
idea$, there seems to be some secret or latent proposition^ 
\?hereby we judge falsely of things. This is more obvious 
where we take up the words of a writer or speaker in a 
mistaken sense, for we join his words to our own ideas, 
which are different from his. But, after all, since ideas 
are pictures of things, it can never be very improper to 
pronounce them to be true or false, according to their cnn- 
formity or nonconformity to their examplars. 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 41 



CHAPTER IV. 

OF WORDS, AND THEIR SEVERAL DIVISIONS^ 

TOGETHER WITH THE ADVANTAGE 

AND DANGER OF THExM. 



SECT. I. 

OP WORDS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR USE. 

THOUGH our ideas are first acquired by the percep- 
tion of objects, or by various sensations and reflections j yet 
we convey them to each other by the means of certain 
sounds, or written marks, which we call loords ; and a 
great part of our knowledge is both obtained and commu- 
nicated by these means, which are called speech or language* 

But, as we are led into the knowledge of things by words^ 
so we are oftentimes led into errour or mistake by the use 
or abuse of words also. And, in order to guard against 
such mistakes, as well as to promote our improvement m 
knowledge, it is necessary to acquaint ourselves a littie 
with words and terms. We shall begin with these obser- 
vations. 

Observation 1. \Vords (whether they are spoken or writ- 
ten) have no natural connection with the ideas they are de- 
signed to signify, nor with the things which are represent- 
ed in those ideas. There is no manner of affinity betweeu 
the sounds lohiie in English, or blajic in French, and that 
colour which we call by that name ; nor have the letters, of 
which these words are composed, any natural aptness to 
signify that colour rather than red or green. Words and 
names, therefore, are mere arbitrary signs /in\ented by men 
to communicate their thoughts or ideas to one another, 

Observ, 2. If one simple word were appointed to ex- 
press one simple idea, and nothing else, as white, blacky 
sweety sour, sharp, bitter, extension, duration, there would 
be scarce any mistake about them. 

But alas ! it is a common unhappiness in language, that 
different simple ideas are sometimes expre^ssed by the same 

Da 



42 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. I. 

word ; so the words sioeet and sharp are applied both to 
the objects of hearing and lasting, as we shall see hereaf- 
ter ; and this, perhaps, may be one cause or foundation of 
obscurity and errour arising from words. 

Observ. 3. In communicating our complex ideas to one 
another, if we could join as many peculiar and appropriat- 
ed words together in one sound, as we join simple ideas to 
make one complex one, we should seldom be in danger of 
mistaking : When I express the taste of an apple, which 
we call the bitter sweety none can mistake what I mean. 

Yet this sort oi composition would make all language a 
most tedious and unwieldy thing, since most of our ideas are 
complex and many of them have eight or ten simple ideas 
in them ; so that the remedy would be worse than the dis- 
ease ; for, what is now expressed in one short word, as 
montky or year^ would require two lines to express it. It is 
necessary therefore, thai single words, bein vented to express 
complex ideas, in order to make language short and useful* 

But here is our great infelicity, that when single loords 
signify complex ideas, one word can never distinctly mani- 
fest all the parts of a complex idea ^ and thereby it will 
often happen, that one man includes more or less in iiis idea 
than another does, while he affixes the same word to it. 
In this case, there will be danger of mistake between them, 
for they do not mean the same object, though they use the 
same name. So, if one person or nation, by the word year^ 
mean twelve months of thirty days each, that is, three 
hundred and sixty days, another intend a solar year of three 
hundred sixty live days, and a third mean a lunar year, or 
twelve luna/months, that is, three hundred fifty four days, 
there will be a great variation and errour in their account 
of things, unless they are well apprised of each other's mean- 
ing before hand. This is supposed to be the reason why 
some ancient histories, and prophecies, and accounts of 
chronology, are so hard to be adjusted. And this is the true 
reason of so furious and endless debates on many points of 
divinity ; the wovdschurch/cuoi'bhipy idolatry yrepentancejfaith^ 
election, merits grace, and many others, which signify very 
com{)lex ideas, are not applied to include just the same sim- 
ple ideas, and the same number of them by the various con- 
tending parlies \ tiicuce avi^e coufusiou anul goatest, 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 43 

Observ. 4. Though a single name does not certainly man- 
ifest to us all the parts of a complex idea, yet it must be ac- 
knowledged, that in many of our complex ideas, the single 
name may point out to us some chief property which be- 
longs to the thing that the word signifies ; especially when 
the word or name is traced up to the original, through sev- 
eral languages from whence it is borrowed. So an apostle 
signifies one loho is sent forth ^ 

But this tracing of a word to its original, (which is called 
etyuwlogy) is sometimes a very precarious and uncertain 
things and, after all, we have made but little progress t*)- 
wards the attainment of the full meaning of a complex idea, 
by knowing some one chief property of it. We know but 
a small part of the notion of an apostle, by knowing bare- 
ly that he is sent forth 

Qbserv. 5. Many (if not most) of our words which are 
applied to moral and intellectual ideas, when traced up to 
their original in the learned languages, will be found to 
signify sensible and corporeal things. Thus, the words op- 
prehension, understanding, abstraction, invention p idea, in- 
ference, prudence^ religion, church, adoration, Sfc. have all a 
corporeal signification in their original. The name spirit 
itself signifies breath or air, in Latin^ Greek, and Hebrew : 
Such is the poverty of all languages, they are forced to use 
these names for incorporeal ideas^ which thing has a ten- 
dency to errour and confusion. 

Observ, 6. The last thing I shall mention, that leads us 
into many a mistake, is, the multitude of objects that one 
name sometimes signifies : There is almost an infinite 
variety of thine^sand ideas, both simple and complex, be- 
yond all the words that are invented in any language 5 
thence it becomes almost necessary that one name should 
signify several things. Let us but consider the two col- 
ours oiyclloio and blit^;^ if they are mingled together in 
any considerable proportion they make a green : Now, 
there may be infinite difierences of the proportions in the 
mixture o^ yellow and blue ; and yet we have only these 
three words, yelloio, blue, and green, to signify all ojihem^ 
at least by one single term. 

Wlien I use the word shore, I may intend thereby a coast 
of laiid near the sea, 01: ^ drain to carry offwater^ ox a prap^ 



44 LOGIC ; OR THE Part L 

to support a building ; and by the sound of the word porter^ 
who can tell whetlier I mean a man who hears burdens y or 
a servant ivho waits at a nobleman^ s gate ? The world is 
fruitful in the invention of utensils of life, and new charac- 
ters and offices of men, yet names entirely new are seldom 
invented; therefore old names are almost necessarily used 
to signify new things, which may occasion much confusion 
and error in the receiving and communicating of knowledge. 
Give me leave to propose one single instance, wherein 
all these notes shall be remarkably exemplified. It is the 
word bishop^ which in France is called evQque upon which 
I would make these several observations* 1. That there 
is no natural connection between the sacred office hereby 
signified, and the letters or sounds which signify this of- 
fice ; for both these words, ev^que or bishop^ signify the 
same office^ though there is not one letter alike in them 5 
nor have the letters which compose the English or the 
French word any thing sacred belonging to them, more 
than the letters that compose the words kifig or soldier. 
2. If the meaning of a word could be learned by its deri- 
vation or etymology, yet the original derivation of words 
is oftentimes very dark and unsearchable; for who would 
imagine that each of these words are derived from the 
Latin episcopus^ or the Greek episkopos. Yet, in this in- 
stance,* we happen to know certainly the true derivation; 
the French being anciently writ evesque, is borrowed from 
the first part of the Latin word; and the old English bis- 
cop from the middle of it. 3. The original Greek word 
signifies an overlooker, or one who stands higher than his 
fellows and overlooks them : It is a compound word, that 
primarily signifies sensible ideas, translated to signify or in- 
clude several moral or intellectual ideas ; therefore all will 
grant that the nature of the office can never be known by 
tiie mere sound or sense of the word overlooker. 4. I add 
farther, tiie word bishop or episcopus, even when it is thus 
translated from a sensible idea, to include several intellect- 
ual ideas, may yet equally signify an overseer of the poor; 
an inspector of the customs ; a surveyor of the highways ; a 
supervisor of the excise, &c. but by the consent of men, 
and the language of scripture, it is appropriated to signify 
ei swrei office in (h^ c/mrcft. &• Tbi;5 v^ry id^a and name, 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 45 

til us translated from things sensible, to signify a spiritual 
and sacred thing, contains but one property of it, namely, 
one that has the oversight or care over others ; btit does not 
tell us whether it includes a cafe over one church or rnany ; 
over the laity, or the clergy. 6, Thence it follows, that 
those who, in the complex idea of the word bishop, include 
an oversight over the clergy, or over a whole diocese of 
people, a superiority to presbyters, a distinct poicer of or- 
dination, &c. must necessarily disagree with those who in- 
clude in it only the care of a single congregation. Thus 
according to the various opinions of men, this word signi- 
fies as pope, a Galilean bishop, a Lutheran superintendant, 
an English prelate, 3. pastor of a single assembly, or a pres- 
byter or elder. Thus they quarrel with each other perpet- 
ually 5 and it is well if any of them all have hit precisely 
the' sense of the sacred writers, and include just the same 
ideas in it, and no others. 

I might make all the same remarks on the word church 
or hirk, which is derived from Ktfltiou oikos, or the home 
of the Lord, contracted into Kyrioick, which some suppose 
to signify an assembly of Christians, some take it for all 
the world that professes Christianity, and some make it to 
mean only the clergy ; and on these accounts it has been 
the occasion of as many and as furious controversies as 
the word bishop which was mentioned before. 



SECT. II. 

OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE TERMS. 

FROM these, and other considerations, it will follow, 
that, if we would avoid errour in our pursuit of knowledge, 
we must take good heed to 'he use oi words and terms, and 
be acquainted with the various kinds of them. 

I. Terms^ are either positive or negative. 

Negative terms are such as have a little word or syllable 
of denying joined to them, according to the various idioms 
of every language ; as unpleasant, imprudent, immortal, ir- 
regular, ignorant, infinite, endless, lifeless, deathless, non- 



46 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. I. 

sense^ ahyss, anonymous where the propositions wm, im, m, 
nouj a^ an, and the termination lessy signify a negation, ei- 
ther in English, Latin^ or Greek. 

Positive terms are those which have no such negative 
appendices belonging to them, as life, deathy end, sense, 
mortaL 

But so unhappily are our words and ideas Hnked togeth- 
er, that we can never know which are positive ideas, and 
which are negative, by the word that is used to express 
them, and tl>at for these reasons: 

1 st, There are some positive terms which are made to 
signify a negative idea; as dead is properly a thing that is 
deprived of life ; blind implies a negation or privation of 
sight ; deaf a want of hearing ; dumb a denial of speech. 

2dly, There are also some negative terms which imply 
positive ideas, such as immortal and deathless, which signify 
evir living, or a continuance in life : Insolent, signifies rude 
and haughty f indemnify, to keep safe; and hfinite, per- 
haps has a positive idea too, for it is aii idea ever growing ; 
and when it is applied to God, it signifies his complete per- 
fection* 

Sdly, There are both positive and negative terms, invent- 
ed to signify the same, instead of contrary ideas: as un- 
happy and miserable ; sinless, and holy ; pure and undefiled ; 
impure a.nd f Ithy ; unkind and cruel; irreligious and pro- 
fane ; unforgiving and revengeful, &c. and there is a great 
deal of beauty and convenience derived to any language 
fiom this variety of expression ; though sometimes it a 
little confounds our conceptions of being and not-being, 
our positive and negative ideas. 

4ithly, I may add also, that there are some words which 
are negative in their original language, but s^em positive to 
an Englishman, because the negation is unknown ; an 
abyss, a place without a bottom ; anodyne, an easing medi- 
cine; amnesty, an unremembrance, or general pardon; 
anarchy, a state without government; anonymous, that is, 
nameless ; inapt, that is, not fit ; iniquity, that is, unright- 
eousness; infant^ one that cannot speak, namely, a child; 
injurious, not doing justice or right. 

The way therefore to know whether any idea be nega- 
five or not. is to consider whether it primarily imply the 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 47 

absence of any positive being, or mode of being 5 if it doth, 
then it is a negation^ or negative idea ; otlierwLse it is a 
positine one, whether the word that expresses it be positive 
or negative. Yet, after all, in many cases, this is very 
hard to determine, as in amnesty^ infinite^ abyss^ which are 
originally relative terms, but ihey signify pardon^ &c. 
which seems to be positive. So darkness ^ madness, clown, 
are positive terms^ but they imply the want of light, the 
want of reason, and the want of mannen ; and perhaps 
these may be ranked among the negative ideas. 

Here note, That in the English tongue two negative 
terms are equal to one positive^ and signify the same thing, 
as not unhappy, signifies happy ; 7iot imsnortal, signifies 
mortal; he is, no imprudent man, that is he is a man of 
prudence: But the sense and force of the word, in such a 
negative way of expression, seem to be a little diminished. 



SECT HI. 

OF SIMPLE AND COMPLEX TERMS. 

TI. TERMS are divided into simpU or complex, A sim- 
ple term is one word,^ complex term is when more words 
are used to signify one thing. • 

Some terms are complex in words, but not in sense ; such 
is the second Emperor of Rome ; for it excites in our mind 
onl}'' the idea of one man, namely, Aiigmtus. 

Some terms are complex in sense, hut not in words ; so 
when I say an army, ^ forest^ I mean a multitude of men or 
trees : and almost all our moral ideas, as well as many of 
our natural ones are expressed in this manner ; Religion, 
piety, loyalty, knavery, theft, include a variety of ideas in 
each term. 

There ar€ other terms which are compUx loth in words 
and sense ; so when I say, 21 fierce dog, or a pious man, it 
excites an idea, not only of those two creatures, but of 
their peculiar characters also. 

Among, the terms that are complex in sense, hut not in 
ivords, we may reckon those simple terms which contain 
a primary and a secondary idea in them 5 as when I hear 



48 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I- 

my neighbour speak that which is not true, and I say to 
him, This is not true^ or this is false, I only convey to him 
the naked idea of his errour ; this is the primary idea : But 
if I say it is a lie, the word lie carries also a secondary idea 
in it, for it implies both the falsehood of the speech and 
my reproach and censure of the speaker. On the other 
hand, if I say it is a mistake, this carries also a secondary 
idea with it; for it not only refers to the falsehood of his 
speech, but includes my tenderness and civility to him at 
the same time. Another instance may be this 5 when I 
use the word incest, adultery, and murder, 1 convey to an- 
other not only the primary idea of those actions, but I in- 
clude also the secondary idea of their unlawfulness, and 
my abhorrence of them. 

Note 1st* — Hence it comes to pass, that among words 
which signify the same principal ideas, some are clean and 
decent, others unclean ; some chaste, others oh scene ^ some 
are kind, others are affronting and reproachful, because of 
the secondary idea which custom has affixed to them. And 
it is the part of a wise man, when there is a necessity of 
expressing any ^vil actions, to do it either by a word that 
has a secondary idea of kindness or softness, or a word that 
carries with it an idea of rebuke and severity, according as 
the case requires: So when there is a necessity of expres- 
sing things unclean ov obscene, a wise man will do it in the 
most decent language, to excite as few uncleanly ideas as 
possible in the minds of the hearers. 

Note 2d. — Jn length of time, and by the power of cus- 
tom, words sometimes change their primary ideas^ as shaU 
be declared, and sometimes they have changed their seco7id- 
ary ideas ^ though the primary ideas may remain : So words 
that were once chaste by frequent use grow ohsiene and 
uncleanly; and words that were once honourable may, in 
the next generation, grow mean and contemptible. So the 
word dame originally signified a mistress of a family, who 
was a lady ; and it is used still in the English law to signi- 
fy a lady, but in common use now a-days it represents a 
farmer^ s wife, or a mistress of a family of the lower rank in 
the country^ So those words oT Habshaketh^ Isa. xxxvi. 12. 
in our tran^lrtion, (eat their own dung, 8fc.) were doubt- 
less decent and clean language, when our translators 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 49 

wrote them, above a hundred years ago. The word eat 
has maintained its old secondary idea and inoffensive sense 
to this day; but the other word in that sentence has by 
custom acquired a more uncleanly idea, and should now 
rather be changed into a more decent term, and so it 
should be read in public, unless it should be thought more 
proper to omit the sentence.* 

For this reason it is that the Jewish Rabbins have sup- 
plied other chaste words in the margin of the Hebrew Bi- 
ble, where the words of the text, through time and cus- 
tom, are degenerated, so as to carry any base and unclean 
secondary idea in them ; and they read the word which is 
in the margin, which they call fceri, and not that which 
wa5 written in the text, which they called chetib. 



SECT. IV. 

OP WORDS COMMON AND PROPERr 

III. WORDS and names are either common or proper. 
Common names are such as stand for universal ideas, or a 
whole rank of beings, whether general or special. These 
are called appellatives ; so Jishj bird, man, city, river, are 
common names; and so are trotit, eel, lobster, for they all 
agree to many individuals, and some of them to many spe- 
cies ; But Cicero, Virgil^ Bucephalus, London, Rome, JEtna, 
the Thames, are proper names, for each of them agrees on- 
ly to one single being. 

Note here first. That a proper name may become in some 
sense common, when it hath been given to several beings of 
the same kind ; so Caesar, which was the proper name of 
the first emperor Julius, became also a common name to 
all the following emperors. And tea, which was the prop- 
er name of one sort of Indian leaf, is now-a-days become a 
common name for many infusions of herbs, or plants, in 
water ; as sage tea^ ale hoof tea, limon tea, 8fc. So Peter ^ 

*Note — So in sortie places of the sacted historians, where it is 
written, every oiie that pisseth against the wall, we should read, ev- 
ery male^ 

E 



50 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 

TJiomaSj John, William^ may be reckoned common names 
also, because they are given to many persons, unless they 
are determined to signify a single person at any particular 
time or place. 

Note in the second place, That a common name may be- 
come proper by custom, or by the time, or place, or per- 
sons that use it ; as in Great- Britain, when we say the hing^ 
i-ve mean our present rightful sovereign King George, who 
now reigns; when we speak of Me prince^ we intend his 
royal highness George Prince of Wales : If we mention 
the city, when we are near London, we generally mean the 
city of London: When in a country town we say the parson 
or the esquire, all the parish knows who are the single per- 
sons intended by it; so when we are speaking of the histo- 
ry of the New Testament, and use the words Peter, Paul] 
John, we mean those three apostles. 

Note in the third place. That any common name whatso- 
ever is mside proper by terms of particularity added to it, as 
the common words pope, king^ horse, garden, book, knife, 
&c. are designed to signify a singular idea, when we say, the 
present pope ; the king 0/ Great Britain ; the horse that won 
the last plate at Newmarket ; the royal garden at Kensing- 
ton ; this book, that knife, ^c. 



SECT. V. 

OF CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT TERMS. 

IV. WORDS or terms are divided into abstract and con-' 

Crete, 

Abstradfierws signify the mode or quality of a being, 
without any regard to the subject in which it is; as white^ 
ness, roundness, length, hreadth,wisdom,mortality, life, death. 

Concrete terms, while they express the quality, do also 
either express or imply, or refer to some subject to which 
it belongs ; as ichite^ round, long, broad, wise, mortal, liv- 
ing, death. But these are not always noun adjectives in a 
grammatical sense; for a fool, a knave, n p^iilosopher, and 
many other concretes, are substantives, as well as knavery, 
folly and philosophy, which are the abstmct terms that be- 
long to them. ^ 



Chap, lY. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 51 

SECT. VL 

OP UNIVOCAL AND EQUIVOCAL WORDS. 

V. WORDS and terms are either univocal or equivocau 
Univocal words are such as signify but one idea, or at least 
but one sort of thing ; equwocal words are such as signify 
two or more different ideas, or different sorts of objects. 
The words hook^ bible, Jish, house, elephant, may be called 
univocal words; for I know not that they signify any 
thing else but tliose ideas to which they are generally af- 
fixed; but head is an equivocal word, for ft signifies the head 
of a nail, or of a pin, as well as of an animal^ Nail is an 
equivocal word, it is used for the nail of the hand, or foot., 
and for an iron nail to fasten any thing. Post is equivocal, 
it is Q. piece of timber, or a swift messenger, A church is a 
religious assembly, or the large fare Ijuilding where they 
meet ; and sometimes the same word means a sytiod of 
bishops^ or o£ ptesbyters, and in some places it is the pop& 
and a general counciL 

Here let it be noted, that when two or more v/ords sig- 
nify the same thing, as wave and billow, mead and meadow^ 
they are usually called synonymous words : But it seems 
very strange, that words, which are directly contrary to 
each other, should sometimes represent almost the same 
ideas; yet thus it is in some few instances ; a valuable, or 
an invaluable blessing) a shameful, or a shameless villian / 
a thick skull, or a thin skulV d fellow , a xneve paper skull ; a 
man of a large conscience, little conscience, or no conscience ^ 
a famous rascal, or an infamous one. So uncertain a thing 
is human language, whose foundation and support is custom! 

As wot*ds signifying the same thing are called synony- 
mous, so equivocal words, or those which signify several 
things, are called homonymous, or ambiguous ; ^nd when 
persons use such ambiguous words with a design to de- 
ceive, it is called equivocafiofi. 

Our simple ideas, and especially the sensible qualities, fur- 
nish us with a great variety of equivocal or ambiguous words; 
for these being the first and most natural ideas we have, 
we borrow some of their names, to signify many other 



62 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 

ideas, both simple and complex. The word sweet express^ 
es the pleasant perceptions of almost every sense 5 sugar is 
sweet, but it hath not the same sweetness as music : Nor 
hath music the sweetness of a rose; and a sweet prospect 
differs from them all : Nor yet have any of these the same 
sweetness as discourse^ council^ or meditation hath ; y«t the 
royal Psalmist saith of aman, }Ve took siveet council to geth^ 
er ; and of God, My meditation of him shall h^ sweet. Bit- 
ier is also such an equivocal word 5 there is bitter worm- 
woody there are bitter words, there are bitter enemies^ and 
a bitter cold mornifig. So there is a sharpness in vinegary 
and there is a sharpness in pain, in sorrow.^nd in reproach/ 
there is a sharp eye, a sharp wit, and a sharp sword: But 
there is not one of these seven sharpnesses the same as an- 
other of them 5 and a sharp east wind is different from 
them all. 

There are also verbs, or words of action, which are equiv- 
ocal, as well as nouns or names. The words to Z^eao to 
take, to come, to get, are sufficient instances of it ; as when 
we say, to bear a burden, to bear sorrow or reproach, to 
bear a name, to bear a grudge, to ht^v fruit, or bear chiU 
dren; the word bear is used in very different senses: And 
'AQ is the word get, when we s^ay, to get money ^ to get in, 
to get off, to get ready, Xo get a stomach, and to get a cold, 8^c, 

There is also a great deal of ambiguity in many of the 
English particles ; as but, before, beside, with, without, that, 
then, there, for, forth, above, about, &c. of which grammars 
and dictionaries will sufficiently inform us. 

SECT. VII. 

VARIOUS KINDS OP EQUIVOCAL WORDS. 

IT would be endless to run through all the varieties of 
words and terms which have different senses applied to 
ihem : I shall only mention therefore a few of the most 
remarkable and most useful distinctions among them. 

1st, The first division of equivocal words lets us know 
that some are equivocal only in their sound ov jyronunciation ; 
othei'S are equivocal only in writing ; others both in wriiing 
and in sound. 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON, 53 

Words equivocal in sound only are such as these } the 
rem of a bridle, which hath the same sound with the reign 
of a king, or shower of rain ; but all three have different 
letters, and distinct speUing. So, mighty or strength, is 
equivocal in sound, but differs in writing from mitey a lit- 
tle animal, or small piece of money. And the verb to 
write has the same sound with wright a woAman, right os: 
equity, and rite or ceremony 5 but it is spelled very differ- 
ently in them all. 

Words equivocal iii writing only are such as these. To 
tear to pieces, has the same spelling with a tear : To lead^ 
or guide, 2ias the same letters as Zejad, the metal; and a 
howl for recreation, is written the same way as a hoipl 
for drinking ; but the pronunciation for all these is differ- 
ent. 

But those words which are most commonl)^ and justly 
called equivocal^ are such as are both written and pronoun- 
ced the same way, and yet have different senses, or ideas 
belonging to them : Sueh are all the instances v/hich were 
given in the preceding section. 

Among the words which are equivocal in sound onbjp 
and not in writing, there is a large field for persons who 
dehght in jests and puns, in riddles and quibbles, to sport 
themselves. This sort of words is also used by wanton 
persons to convey lewd ideas, under the covert of expres- 
sions capable of a chaste meaning, which are called double 
entendres ^ or when persons speak falsehood with a design 
to deceive, under the covert of truth; though it must be 
confessed, that all sorts of equivocal words yiel«l sufficient 
matter for such purposes* 

There are many cases also, wherein an equivocal word 
is used, for the sake of decency, to cover a. foul idea : For 
the most chaste and modest, and well bred persons, hav- 
ing sometimes a necessity to speak of the things of nature, 
convey their ideas in the most inoffensive language by this 
mean. And indeed, the mere poverty of all languages 
makes it necessary to use equivocal words upon many oc- 
casions, as the common writings of men, and even the ho- 
ly book of God, sufficiently manifest. 

2dly, Equivocal words are usually distinguished, accord- 
ing to their original^ into 3ucb, whose various senses arise 
E2 



54 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. L 

from viere chance or accident, and such as are made equivo- 
cal by design ; as the word hear signifies ft shaggy htast^ 
and it signifies, also to hear or carry a hurden ; this seems 
to be the mere effect o£ chance: But if I call my dog hear, 
because he is shaggy, or call one of the northern constel- 
lations by that name, from a fancied situation of the stars 
in the shape of that animal, then it is by design that the 
>vord is made yet further equivocal. 

But because 1 think this common account of the spring 
or origin of equivocal words is too slight and imperfect, I 
shall reserve this subject to be treated of by itself, and 
proceed to the third division. 

Sdly, Ambiguous or equivocal words are such as are 
sometimes taken in a large and general sense, and some- 
times in a sense more strict and limited^ and have diiferent 
ideas affixed to them accordingly. Religion, or virtuey 
taken ia a large sense, includes both our duty to God and 
our neighbour^ but in a more strict, limited, and proper 
sense, virtue signifies our duty towards men, and religion 
our duty to God, Virtue may yet be taken in the strictest 
sense, and then it signifies power or courage, which is the 
sense of it in some places of the New-Testament. So 
grace, taken in a large sense, means the favour of God^ 
and all the spiritual blessings that proceed from it, (which, 
is a frequent sense of it in the bible) but in a limited sense 
it signifies the habit of holiness wrought in us by divine fa- 
vour, 01- a complex idea of the Christian virtues. It may 
also betaken in the strictest sense, and thus it signifies 
any singfe Christian virtue^ as in 2 Cor. viii. 6, 7,, where it 
is used for liberality. So a city, in a strict and proper 
<!eiise, means the houses enclosed within the walls ; in a 
large sense it reaches to all tlie suburbs. 

This larger and stricter sense of a word is used in almost 
all the sciences, as well as in theology, and in common 
^ife. The word geography, taken in a strict sense, signifies 
the knowledge of the circles of the earthly globe, and the 
^situation of the various parts of the earth ; when it is ta- 
ken in a little larger sense, it includes the knowledge of 
the seas also ; and in the largest sense of all, it extends to 
the various customs, habits and governments of nations. — 
Wh^n an asironompjr uses the woid star \i\ its proper and 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 55 

strict sense, it is applied only to ilie Jlxed stars, but in a 
large sense it includes the planets also. 

This equivocal sense of words belongs also to many 
proper names : So Asia, taken in the largest sense is one 
quarter of the world; in a more liniited sense it signifies 
Natolia, or the Lesser Asia ; but in the strictest sense it 
means no more than one little province in Natolia, where 
stood the cities of Ephesus, Smyrna, Sardis^^c. And this 
is the most frequent sense of the New-Tesiament. Flan- 
ders, and Holland, in a strict sense, are but two single pro- 
vinces annong the seventeen, but in a large sense Holland 
includes seven of them, and Flanders ten. 

There are also some very common and little words in 
all languages, that are used in a more extensive, or more 
limited sense; such as, all, every, luhatsocver, 8^c, When 
the apostle says, all men have sinned and all men trmst die, 
all is taken in its most universal and extensive sense, in- * 
eluding all mankind, RoxTi, v. 12. When he appoints 
prayer to he made for all meiin it appears, by the following 
verses, that he restrains tlie word all to signify chiefly all 
ra?ik$ and degrees of men, 1 Tim. ii. I. But when St. Paul 
says, I please all men in all things, 1 Cor. x. 33, the word 
all is exceedingly limited, for it reaches no farther than 
that he pleased all those men whom he conversed with in 
all things that were lawfiiL 

4thly, Equivocal words are, in the fourth place, distin- 
guished by their literal or figurative sense. Words are us- 
ed in a proper ov literal sense when they are designed to 
signify those ideas for which they were originally made, 
or to which they are primarily and generally annexed ; but 
they are used in a figurative or tropical sense when tfiev 
are made to signify some things, which only bear either a 
reference or a resemblance to the primary ideas of tbem. — 
So when two princes contend by their armies, we say they 
are at loar in a proper sense; but when we say there is 
^'war betwixt the winds and the waves in a storm, this is 
csiWedfgurative, and the peculiar figure is a metaphor. So 
when the scripture SdLvs, Riches make themselves wings, and 
fly away as an eagle towards heaven, the wings, and the 
flight of the eagle are proper expressions ; hut "when flight 
and wings are applied to riches^ it is only by wBLyoffguret 



56 LOGIC : OR, THE Part t 

and metaphor. So when a man is said to repent, or laugh, 
or grieve, it is literally taken ; but when God is said to be 
grieved, to repent, or laugh, Sfc. these are all figurative ex- 
pressions borrowed from a resemblance to mankind. — 
And when the words Job qr Esther are used to signify those 
very persons, it is the literal sense of them ; but when they 
signify those two books of scripture, this is a figurative 
sense. The names of Horace, Juvenal, and Milton^ are 
used, in the same manner, either for books or men. 

When a word, which originally signifies any particular 
idea or object, is attributed to several other objects, not so 
much by way of resemblance, but rather on the account of 
some evident reference or relation to the original idea, this 
is sometimes peculiarly called an analogical word ', so a 
sound, or healthy pulse, a souyid digestion, sound sleep, are 
all so called with reference to a sound and healthy constitu- 
tion ; but if you speak of sound doctrine, or sound speech, 
this is by way of resemblance to health ; and the words are 
metaphorical: Yet many times analogy and 7netaphor are us- 
ed promiscuously in the same sense, and not distinguished. 

Here note, That the design o{ metaphorical language, and 
figures of speech, is not merely to represent our ideas, but 
to represent them with vivacit}', spirit, affection and pow- 
er 5 and though they often mal^e a deeper impression on 
the mind of the hearer, yet they do as often lead him into 
a mistake, if they are used at improper times and places. 
Therefore, where the design of the speaker or writer is 
merely to explain, instruct, and to lead into the knowledge 
of naked truth, he ought for the most part to use plain, 
and proper words if the language afibrds them, and not to 
deal much in figurative speech. But this sort of terms is 
used very profitably by poets and orators whose business 
is to move and persuade, and work on the passions, as 
well as on the understanding. Figures are also happily 
employed in proverbial moral ^ sayings, by the wisest and 
the best of men, to impress them deeper on the memory 
by sensible images ; and they are often used for other val- 
uable purposes in the sacred writings, 

5thly, I might adjoin another 50?Y of equivocal words; as 
there are some which have a difierent meaning in common 
language from what they Ijiavg in the sciciKCs ; the word 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 57 

passion signifies the receiving any action in a large philoso- 
phical sense 5 in a more limited philosophical sense, it 
signifies any of the affections of human natu/re, as love^fear, 
joyy sorrow^ Sfc, But the common people confine it only 
to anger : So the word simple philosophically signifies 5iw- 
gle, but vulgarly it is used for foolish, 

6thlyy Other equivocal words are used sometimes in an 
absolute sense, as when God is called perfect ; which allows 
of no defect j and sometimes in a comparative sense, as 
good men are oftentimes called perfect in scripture, in 
comparison of those who are much inferior to them in 
knowledge or holiness : But I have dwelt rather too long 
upon this subject already, therefore I add no more^ 



SECT. VIIL 

THE ORIGIN OR CAUSES OF EQUIVOCAL WORDS, 

NOW, that we may become more skillful in guarding 
ourselves and others against the danger of mistakes which 
may arise from equivocal words, it may not be amiss to 
conclude this chapter with a short account of the various 
ways or means whereby a Avord changes its signification, 
or acquires any new sense, and thus becomes equivocal^ 
especially if it keeps its old sense also. 

J. Mere chance sometimes gives the same word difierent 
senses ; as the word light signifies a body that is not heavy ; 
and it also signifies the effect of sun beams or the medium 
ivhereby we see objects : This is merely accidental, for there 
seenis to be no connection between these two senses, nor 
any reason for them. 

2. Error and mistake is another occasion of giving vari- 
ous senses to the same words 5 as when different persons 
read the names of priest^ bishop, church, Easter, &c. in the 
New Testament, they affix different ideas to them, for 
want of acquaintance with the true meaning of the sacred 
writer ; though it must be confessed, these various senses, 
which might arise at first fiom honest mistake, may be 
culpably supported and propagated by interest, ambition, 
prejudice, and a party spirit on any side. 



58 LOGIC : OR THE Part I. 

3. Time and Custom alters the meaning of words. Knave 
heretofore signified a diligent servant (Gnavus) and a vil- 
lain was an under tenant to the lord of the manor (vilUcus) 
but now boch these words carry an idea of wickedness and 
reproach with them. A ballad once signified a solemn and 
sacred song, as well as one that is trivial, when Solomon's 
Song was called the ballad of ballads ; but now it is ap- 
plied to nothing but trifling verse, or comical subjects. 

4. Words change their senses hy figures and metaphors^ 
which are derived from some real analogy or resemblance 
betv/een several things ^ as when wings avkd flight are appli* 
ed to riches^ it signifies only, that the owner may as easily 
lose them as he would lose a bird who flew away with wings. 

And I think, under this head, we may rank those words 
which signify different ideas, by a sort of an unaccounta- 
ble far-fetched analogy^ or distant resemblance, that fancy 
has introduced between one thing and another ; as when 
we say, the meat is green^ when it is half -roasted : We 
speak of airing linen by the fire ^ when we mean drying or 
warming it : We call for round coals for the chimney when 
we mean large square ones : And we talk of the wing of a 
rabbit J when we meznihe fore-leg : The true reason of 
these appellations we leave to the critics. 

5. Words also change their sense by the special occasion 
of using them, the peculiar manner of pronunciation^ the 
sound of the voice^ the motion of the face ^ or gestures of the 
body ; so when an angry master says to his servant, it is 
bravely done I or you are a fine gentleman ! he means the 
contrary ; namely, it is very ill done ; you are a sori^ fel- 
low : It is one way of giving a severe reproach, for the 
words are spoken by way of sarcasm, or irony. 

6. Words are applied to various senses, by new ideas 
appearing or arising faster than 7uw words are framed. 
So when gunpowder was found out, the word powdery vfh'ich 
before signified only dust, was made then to signify that 
mixture or composition of nitre, charcoal, Sfc. And the 
name cannon, which before signified a law or a rule, is 
now also given to a great gun, which gives laws to nations. 
So footboys, who had frequently the common name of 
Jack given them, were kept to turn the spit, or to pull oflf 
their masters boots -, but when instruments were invented 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 59 

for both those services, they w^re both called Jacfo, though 
one was of iron the other of wood, and very different in 
their form. 

7. Words alter their significations according to the ideas 
of the various persons^ sects^ or parties, who use them, as 
we have hinted before ^ so when a Papist uses the word 
heretics, he generally means the Protestants ; when a Fro^ 
testant uses the word, he means any persons who are iviU 
fully (and perhaps contentiously) obstinate in fundumental 
erroiirs. When a Jew speaks of the true religion, he means 
the institution of Moses ; when a Turk mentions it, he in- 
tends the doctrine of Mahomet: but when a Christian makes 
use of it, he designs to signify Christianity, otihe truths 
and the precepts of the gospel, 

8. Words have different significations according to the 
hook, writing, or discourse in which they stand. So in a 
treaties oi anatomy, ^.foot signifies that member of the body 
of a man: But in a book of geometry or mensuration, it 
signifies twelves inches. 

If I had room to exemplify most of these particulars in 
one single word, I know not where to choose a fitter than 
the word sound, which it seems as it were by chance to sig- 
nify three distinct ideas, namely, healthy j (from sanus) as a 
sound body ; 7ioise, (from sonus) as a shrill sound ; and to 
sound the sea (perhaps from the French sonde, a probe, or 
an instrument to find the depth of water ) From these 
three, which I may call original senses, various dtrivative 
senses arise ; as sound sleep, sound lungs, sound wind and 
limb, a sound heart, a sound mind^ sound doctrine, a sound 
divine, sound reason, a sound cask, sound timber, a sound 
reproof to beat one soundly, to sound one's meaning or 
inclination, and a sound or narrow sea; turn these all into 
Latin, and the variety will appear plain. 

I confess some few of these which I have mentioned, as 
the diflerent springs of equivocal words, may be reduced in 
some cases to the same original: But it must also be grant- 
ed, that there may be other ways besides these whereby a 
word comes to extend its signification, to include various 
ideas, and become equivocal. And though it is the busi- 
ness of a grammarian to pursue these remarks with more 
variety and particularity, yet it is also the work of a logi- 



60 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 

cia7i to give notice of these things, lest darkness, confu- 
sion, and perplexity, be brought into our corsceptions, by 
the means of words, and thence our judgments and reason' 
ing become erroneous. 



CHAPTER V. 



GENERAL DIRECTIONS RELATING TO OUR 

IDEAS. 

DiREc. 1. FURNISH yourselves with a variety of 
ideas ; acquaint yourselves with things ancient and mod- 
ern ; things natural, civil and religious ; things domestic 
and national ; things of your native land, and of foreign 
countries; things present, past and future; and above all, 
be well acquainted with God and yourselves; learn animal 
nature, and the workings of your own spirits. 

Such a general acquaintance with things will be of very 
great advantage. 

The j'?r5^ benefit of it is this ; it will assist the use of rea- 
son in all its following operations ; it will teach you to 
judge of things aright, to argue justly, and to methodise 
your thoughts with accuracy. When you shall find several 
things akin to each other, and several diflerent from each 
other, agreeing in some -part of their idea, and disagreeing 
in other parts, you will range your ideas in better order, 
you will be more easily led into a distinct knowledge of 
things, and will obtain a rich store of proper thoughts and 
arguments upon all occasions. 

You will tell me, perhaps, that you design, the study of 
the law or divinity ; and what good can natural philosO' 
phy or mathematics do you, or any other science, not direct- 
ly subordinitte to your chief design ? But let it be consid- 
ered, that all sciences have a sort of mutual connection ; 
and knowledge of all kinds fits the mind to reason and 
judge belter concerning any particular subject. I have 



Chap, V- RIGHT USE OF REASON. 61 

known a judge upon tlie bench betray his ignorance, and 
appear a Hltle confused in his sentiments, about a case of 
suspected murder brought before him, for want of some 
acquaintance with animal nature and philosophy. 

Another ??e/i£^^ of it is this.- such a large and general 
acquaintance with things will secure you from perpetual 
admirations and surprises, and guarxl you against the weak- 
ness of ignorant persons who have never seen any thing 
beyond the confines of their own dwelling, and therefore 
they wonder at almost every thing they see; every thing 
beyond the smoke of their own chimney, and the reach of 
their own windows, is new and strange to them. 

A third benefit of such an universal acquaintance with 
things is this ; it will keep you from being too positive and 
dogmatical, from an excess of credulity and unbelief, that 
is, a readiness to believe or to deny every thing at first 
hearing ; when you shall have often seen that strange and 
uncommon things, which often seem incredible, are found 
to be true; and things very commonly received as true, 
have been found false. 

The Way of attaining such an extensive treasure of ideas, 
is with diligence to apply yourself to read the best books ; 
converse with the most knowing and the wisest of men ; 
and endeavour to improve by every person in whose com- 
pany you are ; suffer no hour to pass away in lazy idle- 
ness, and impertinent chattering, or useless trifles : Visit 
other cities and countries when you have seen your own, 
under the care of one who can teach you to profit by trav- 
elling, and to make wise observations; indulge a just curi- 
osity in seeing*the wonders of art and nature ; search into 
things yourselves, as well as learn them from others ; be 
acquainted with men as well as books; learn all things as 
much as you can at first hand; and let as many of your 
ideas as possible be the representations of things, and not 
merely the representations of other mens ideas : Thus 
your soul, like some noble building, shall be richly fur- 
nished with original paintings, and not with mere copies. 

Direct II. Use the most proper fnethods to retain that 
treasure of ideas which you have acquired ; for the mind is 
ready to let many of them slip unless some pains and la- 
bour be taken io fix them upon the memory, 

F 



62 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. i. 

And more especially let those ideas be laid up and pre- 
served with the greatest care, which are most directly- 
suited, either to your eternal 'welfare as a Christian, or to 
your particular station and 'profession in this life ; for 
though the former rule recommends an universal acquaint- 
ance with things, yet it is but a more general and, superfi- 
cial knowledge that is required or expected of any man, in 
things which are utterly foreign to his own business : Bat 
it is necessary you should have a more particular and ac- 
curate acquaintance with those things that refer to your 
peculiar province and duty in this life, or your happiness 
in another. 

There are some persons who never arrive at any deep, 
solid, or valuable knowledge in any science, or any busi- 
ness of Hfe, because they are perpetually fluttering over 
the surface of things in a curious and wandering search of 
infinite variety ; ever hearing, reading, or asking after 
something new, but impatient of any labour to lay up and 
preserve the ideas they have gained : Their souls may be 
compared to a looking glass, that wheresoever you turn it., 
it receives the images of all objects but retains none. 

In order to preserve your treasure <>f ideas, and the 
knowledge you have gained, pursue the following advices., 
especially in your younger years. 

1. Recollect evenj day the things 'youhave seen, or heard y 
or ready which may have made an addition to your under- 
Standing : Read the writings of God and men with dili^ 
gence and perpetual reviews: Be not fond of hastening to 
a new book, or a new cjiapter, till you have well fixed and 
established in your mind what was useful in the last; 
make use of your memory in this manner, and you will 
sensibly experience a gradual improvement of it while you 
take care not to load it to excess. 

2. Talk over the things which you have seen, hean^d, or 
learnt y with some proper acquaintance : This will make a 
fresh impression on your memory; and if you have no 
fellow-student at hand, none of equal rank with yourselves, 
tell it over to any of your acquaintance, where you can do 
it with propriety and decency ; and whether they learn any 
thing by it or not, your own repetition of it will be an im- 
provement to yourself : And this practice also will fur- 



Chap. Y. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 6S 

nish you with a variety of words) and copious language, to 
express your thoughts upon all occasions. 

3. Commit to writing some of the most considerable 
imprevements which you daily make, at least such hints 
as may recal them again to your mind, when perhaps 
they are vanished and lost. And here I think Mr. Lockers 
method of adve'rsariayov commoji places, which he describes 
in the end of the first volume of his posthumous works is 
the best; using no learned method at all. setting down 
things as they occur, leaving a distinct page for each sub- 
ject, and making an index to the pages. 

At the end of ever5^ week, or month, or year, you may 
review your remarks, for these reasons ; First, to judge of 
your own improvement ; when you shall find that many of 
your younger collections are either weak and trifling; or 
if they are just and proper, yet they are grown now so fa- 
miliar to you, that you will tliereby see your own advance- 
ment in knowledge. And, in the next place, what re- 
marks you find there worthy of 3^our riper observation, 
you may note them in a marginal slar, instead of transcrib* 
ing them, as being worthy of your second year^g review, 
when others are neglected. 

To shorten something of this labour, if the books which 
you read are your own, mark with a pen, or pencil, the 
most considerable things in them which you desire to re- 
member. Thus you may read that book the second time 
over with half the trouble, by your eye running over the 
paragraphs which your pencil has noted. It is but a very 
weak objection against this practice to say, I shall spoilmy 
hook ; for I persuade myself, that 3'ou did not buy it as a 
hookseller^Xo sell it again for gain, but as a scholar, to im- 
prove your mind by it 5 and if the mind be improved,- your 
advantage is abundant, though your book yields less monev 
to your executors^ 

* Note — This advA of writing;, marking, and reviewing your 
marks, refers chiefly to those occasional notions you meet with eith- 
er in reading or in conversation : But when you are direcily and pro- 
fessedly pursuing any subject of knowledge in a good system in your 
younger years, the system itself is your commonplace-book, and 
must he entirely reviewed. The same may be said concerning anv 
treatise which closely, succinctly^ :xn6. accurately handU^s anv psrtici^* 
lav theme. 



64 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. I. 

Direct. 111. As you proceed both in learning and in life, 
make a wise observation ivhat are the ideas ^ what the discour- 
ses and the parts of knowledge that have been more or less 
useful to yourself or others. In our younger years, while 
we are furnishing our minds with a treasure of ideas, ouf 
experieiiee is but small, andour judgment weak 5 it is there- 
fore impossible at that age to determine aright concerning 
the real advantage and itsefulness of many things we learn. 
3ut, when age aud experience have matured your judg- 
ment, then you will gradually drop the more useless part 
of your y o linger furniture f and be more solicitous to retain 
that which is most necessary for your welfare hi this life, 
or a better. Hereby you will come to make the same 
complaint that almost every learned man has done after 
long experience in Itudy and in the affairs of human hfe 
and religion: Alas I how many hours, and days, and 
months, have I lost in pursuing some parts of learning, and 
in reading some authors, which have turned to no other ac- 
count, but to inform me that they were not worth my labour 
and pursuit / Happy the man who has a wise tutor to con- 
duct him through ali the sciences in the first years of his 
study ; and who has a prudent friend always at hand to 
point out to him, from experience, how much of every 
science is worth nis pursuit ! And happy the student that 
is so wise as to follow such advice I 

Direct. IV. Learn to acquire a government over your 
ideas and your thoughts, that they may come ivhen they are 
called, and depart when they are bidden. There are some 
thoughts that arise and intrude upon us while we shun 
them; there are others that fly from us, when we would 
hold and fix them. 

If the ideas which you would willingly make the matter 
of your present meditation are ready -to fly from you, you 
must be obstinate in the pursuit of them by an habit of 
fixed meditation ; you must keep youi^oul to the work, 
when it is ready to start aside every moment, unless you 
will abandon yourself to be a slave to every wild imagi- 
nation. It is a common, but it is an unhappy and a 
shameful thing, that every trifle that comes across the 
senses or fancy should divert us, that a buzzmg fly should 
teaz.e our spirits, and scatter our best ideas ; But we must 



Chap, V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 65 

learn to be deaf to, and regardless of other things, besides 
that which we make the present subject of our medita- 
tion : And in order to help a wandering and fickle humour, 
it is proper to have a book or paper in our hands, whicli 
has some proper hints of the subject we design to pursue. 
We must be resolute and laborious, and sometimes conflict 
with ourselves, if we would be wise and learned. 

Yet I would not be too severe in this ride : It must be 
confessed there are seasons when the mind, or rather the 
brain, is over tired or jaded with study and thinking; or 
upon some other accounts, animal nature may be languid 
or cloudy^ and unfit to assist the spirit in rneditalioo; at 
such seasons (provided that they return not too often) it 
is better sometimes to yield to the present indisposition j 
for if nature entirely resist, nothing can be done to the 
purpose, at least in that subject or science. Then you may 
think it proper to ^ive yourself up to some hours o( leisure 
and recreation^ or useful idleness ; or if not, then turn your 
thoughts to some other alluring subject, and pore no longei: 
upon the Jirst^ till some brighter or more favourable mo- 
ments arise. A student shall do more in one hour, when 
all things concur to invite him to any special study, than 
in four hours, at a dull and improper season. 

I would also give the same advice \£ some ram, or worth-' 
less, or foolish idea, will crowd itself into your thoughts; 
and if you find that all your labour and wrestling cannot 
defend yourself from it, then divert the importunity of 
that which offends you, by turning your thoughts to some 
entertaining subject, that may amuse you a little, and 
draw you off from the troublesome and imposing guest; 
and many a time also, in such a case, when the imperti- 
nent and intruding ideas would divert from present duty, 
devotion ^nd prayer have been very successful to overcome 
such obstinate troublers of the peace and profit of the 
soul. 

If the natural genius and temper be too volatile, fickle and 
ivandering, such persons ought in a more special manner 
to apply themselves to mathematical learning, and to be- 
gin their studies with arithAnetic and geometry; wherein 
liew truths continually arising to the mind, out of the 

FS 



66 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 

plainest and easiest principles^ will allure th^ thoughts 
with incredible pleasure in the pursuit: this will give the 
student such a delightful taste of reasoning, as will fix his 
attention to the single subject which he pursues, and by 
degrees will cure the habitual levity of his spirit : But let 
him not indulge and pursue these so far, as to neglect *^r 
prime studies of his designed profession. 



CHAPTER VL 



SPECIAL RULES TO DIRECT OUR CONCEP i ION> 

OF THINGS. 

A GREAT part of what has heen already written k 
designed to lay a foundation for those rules which may 
guide and regulate our conceptions of things ; this is our 
main business and design in the Jzrsi part of logic. Now, if 
we can but direct our thoughts to a jiist and happy man- 
ner in forming our ideas of things, the other operations of 
the mind will not so easily be perverted ; because most 
of our errors in judgment^ and the weakness, fallacy, and 
mistakes of our argumentation proceed from the dark- 
ness, confusion, defect, or some other irregularity in our 
^conceptions. 

The rules to assist and direct our conceptions are tliese: 

1. Conceive of things deaWi/ and di5/27?c% in their aM;M 
natures, 

2. Conceive of things completely in all ihe\r parts. 

3. Conceive of things comprehcndvely in all their prop- 
erties and relations, 

4. Conceive of things extensively in all their kinds, 

5. Conceive of things orderly or in a proper method. 



Chap. V L RIGHT USE OF REASON. 67 

SECT. I. 

OF GAINING CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS, 

THE first rule is thiSj Seek after a clear and distinct 
conception of things as they are in their own nature^ and do 
not content yourselves ivith obscure and confused ideas^ where 
dearer are to be attained. 

There are some things indeed whereof distinct ideas are 
scarce attainable ; they seem to surpass the capacity of 
the understanding in our present state ; such are the no- 
tions of eternal^ immense ^ infnite^ whether this infinity ^ be 
applied to number^ as an infinite multitude ; to quantity^ 
as infinite length, or breadth ; to powers and perfections^ 
as strength, wisdom, or goodness, infinite, &c. Though 
mathematicians, in their way, demonstrate several things, 
in the doctrine of infinites yet there are still some insolv- 
able difficulties that attend the ideas of infinite^ when it is 
applied to mind or body 5 and while it is in reality but 
an idea €(cer growings we cannot have so clear and dis?» 
tinct a conception of it as to secure us from mistakes in 
some of ^ur reasonings about it. 

There are many other things that belong to the mate- 
rial world, wherein the sharpest philosophers have never, 
yet arrived at clear and distinct ideas ; such as the par- 
ticular shape, situation^ contexture, and motion of the small 
particles of minerals, metals, plants, ^c, whereby their ve- 
ry natures and essences are distinguished from each other. 
Nor'have we either senses or instruments sufficiently nice 
and accurate to find them out. There are other things 
in the world of spirits wherein our ideas are very dark and 
confused, such as their union with animal nature, the way of 
their acting on material beings, and their converse with each 
other,. And though it is a laudable ambition to search 
what may be known of the^ matters, yet it is a vast hin«- 
derance to the enrichment of our understandings, if we 
spend too much of our time and pains among infinites 
and unsearchables, and those things for the investigation 
whereof we are not furnished with proper faculties in the 



68 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. t. 

present state. It is therefore of great service in the true 
improvement of the mind to distinguish well between 
knowables and unknovjables. 

As far as things txrelcnowalU by us, it is of excellent use 
to accustom ourselves to clear and distinct ideas. Now, 
among other occasions of the darkness and mistakes of 
our minds, there are these two things which most remark-, 
ably bring confusion into our ideas - 

1. That from our infancy we have had the ideas of 
things so far connected with the ideas of words^ that we 
often mistake words for things, we mingle and confound 
one with the other. 

2. From our youngest years we have been ever ready 
to consider things not so much in their own natures, as in 
their various respects to ourselves, and chiefly to our sens* 
es ; and we have also joined and mingled the ideas of 
some things, with many other ideas^ to which they were not 
akin in their own natures. 

In order therefore to a clear and distinct knowledge of 
things, we must unclothe them of all these relations and 
mixtures^ that we may contemplate them naked, and in, 
their own natures^ and distinguish the subject that we have 
in view from all other subjects whatsoever : Now, to per*^ 
form this well, we must here consider the definition of 
ivordsy and the definition of things. 



SECT. II. 

OP THE DEFINITION OF WORDS OR NAMES. 

IF we could conceive of things as angels and unbodied 
spirits do, without involving them in those clouds which 
words and language throw upon them, we should seldom 
be in danger of such mistakes, as are perpetually commit- 
ted by us in the present stat*; and indeed it would be of 
unknown advantage to us to accustom ourselves to form 
ideas of things without wordsy that we might known them 
in their ow7i proper natures. But, since we must use ivords 
both to learn and CQnunuuicate most of our notions we 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 69 

should do it with just rules of caution. I have already de- 
clared in part, how often and by what means our words 
become the occasion of errors in our conception^ of things. 
To remedy such inconveniences^, we must get an exact 
definition of the words we make use of, that is, we must 
determine precisely the sen^e of our words, which is call- 
ed the definition of tlie name. 

Now a definition of the name being only a declaration in 
what sense the word is used, or what idea or object we 
mean by it, this may be expressed by any one or more of 
the properties, effects, or circumstances of that object 
which do sufficiently distinguish it from other objects: As, 
if I were to tell what I mean by the word air, I may say, 
it is that thin matter which we Ireathein and breathe out 
continually ; or it is that fiuid body in ivhich the birds fly a 
little a^ove the earth: or it is that invisible matter which 
fills all places near the earthy or which immediately encom^ 
pasess the glohe of earth and water. So if I would tell what 
I mean by light I would say it is that medium whereby we 
see the colours and shapes of things ; or it is that which dis" 
tinguishes the day from the night. If I were asked what 
I mean by religion, I would answer, it is a collection of all 
our duties to God, if taken in a strict and h'mited sense; 
but if taken in a large sense, it is a collection of all our du- 
ties bath to God and man. These are called the definitions 
of the name. 

Note — In defining the name there is no necessity thai we 
should be acquainted with the intimate essence or nature 
of the things ; for any manner of description that will but 
sufficiently acquaint another person what we mean by 
such a word, is a sufficient definition for the name. And 
on this account a synonymous word, or a mere negation of 
the contrary, a translation of the word into another tongue, 
or a grammatical explication of Ity is sometimes sufficient 
for this purpose; as if one would know wliat I mean by a 
sphere, I tell him it is a globe ; if he ask what is a triangle^ 
it is that which has three angles / or an oval is that which 
has tlie shape of an egg. Dark is that which has no light; 
asthma is a difficulty of breathing ; a diaphoretic medicine, 
or a sudorific, is something that will provoke sweating ; 
sind an insolvent^ is a man that cannot pay his debts. 



70 LOGIC : OR, THE Part L 

Since it is the design of Logic^ not only to assist us in 
learning but in teaching also, it is necessary that we should 
be furnished with some particular directions relating to 
lie definition ofnamesp both in teaching and learning. 



SECT. III. 

DIRECTIONS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF NAMES. 

DiREc. 1. HAVE a care of malcing use of mere words ^ 
instead of ideas, that is, such words as have no meaning, 
no definition belonging to them : Do not always imagine 
that there are ideas wheresoever there are names : For, though 
mankind hath so many millions of ideas more than they 
have names, yet so foolish and lavish are we, that too of^ 
ten we use some words in mere waste, and have no ideas 
for them; or, at least, our ideas are so exceedingly shatter- 
ed and confused, broken and blended, various and unset- 
tled, that they can signify nothing ♦oward the improve- 
ment of the understanding. You will find a great deal of 
reason for this remark, if you read the popish schoolmeji, 
or the mystic divines. 

Never rest satisfied therefore with words which have no 
ideas belonging to them, or at least no settled and determin- 
ed ideas. Deal not in such empty ware, whether you are a 
learner or a teacher ; for hereby some persons have made 
■hemselves rich in words and learned in their own esteem; 
.vherea^, in reality, their understandings have been poor, 
and they knew nothing. 

Let nic give, for instance, some of those writers or talk- 
ers who deal much in the words nature, fate, luck, chance, 
perfection, power, life, fortune, instinct, Sfc. and that even 
in the most calm and instructive parts of their discourse ; 
though neither they themselves nor their hearers have any 
settled meaning under those words; and thus they build 
up their reasonings, and infer what they please, with an 
ambition of the name of learning, or of sublime elevations 
in religion ; whereas in truth, they do but amuse them- 
selves and their admirers with swelling loords of vanity, 
understanding neither what they say, nor ivhereof they affirm. 



Chap. VL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 71 

But this sort of talk was reproved of old by the two chief 
apostles, St. Peter and St. Pauly 1 Tirn. i. 7. and 2 Peter 
ii. 18. 

When pretenders to philosophy or good sense grow 
fond of this sort of learning, they dazzle and confound 
their weaker hearers, but fall under the neglect of the 
wise. The Epecurians are guilty of this fault when they 
ascribe the formation of the world to chance : The Aris- 
totelimis, when they say, Nature abhors a vacuum : The 
Stoicks, when they talk of fate^ which is superior to the 
gods : And the gamesters^ when they curse their ill'lucl^ 
or hope for the ftivours oi fortune. Whereas if they would 
tell us, that, by the word nature they mean the properties 
of any beings or th§ order of things established at the crea* 
Hon ; that by the word fate intend the decrees of Gody or 
the 7iecessary connection and influence of second causes and 
effects ; if by the word luck or chance they signify the abso- 
lute negation of any determinate cause or only their igno- 
rance of any such cause, we should know how to converse 
with them, and to assent to, or dissent from, their opin- 
ions. But, while they flutter in the dark, and make a 
noise with words which have no fixed ideas, they talk to 
the wind, and ijever can profit. 

I would make this matter a little plainer still by instan- 
ces borrowed from the Peripatetic philosophy, which was 
once taught in all the scliools. The professor fancies he 
has assigned the true reson why all heavy bodies tend doivn^ 
ward J why amber ^i 'II draw feathers or straivs, and the load- 
stone draw iron wli »n he tells you that this is done by cer- 
tain gravitating and attractive qualities^ which proceed from 
the substantial forms of those various bodies. He imagines 
that he has explained why the loadstone'^ s north pole^ shall 
repel the north end of a magnetic needle^ and attract the south, 
when he affirms, that this is done by its sympathy with one 
end of it. and its antipathy against the otlier end. Where- 
as in truth all these names o^ sympathy, antipathy^ substan- 
tial forms, and qualities, when they are put for the causes 

* Note — Soriie writers call that the south pole of a loadstone which 
attracts the south end of the needle ; but I choose to follow those 
who call it the north pole. 



72 LOGIC : OR THE Part, J. 

of these effects in bodies, are but hard words, which only 
express a learned and pompous ignorance of the true cause 
of natural appearances 5 and in this sense they are mere 
words without ideas* 

This will evidently appear, if one ask me, Why a con^ 
cave mirror or convex glass. will burn wood in the son beams, 
orwhy a wedge will cleave it? And I should tell him, it 
is by an ustorioiLs quality in the mirror or glass, and by a 
cleaving power in the wedge, nnsing from a certain un- 
known substantial form in them, whence they derive these 
qualities ; or if he should ask me, Why a clock strikes and 
points to the hour ? and I should say, it is by an indicative 
form and sonorific quality ; whereas I ought to tell him 
how the sun beams are collected and united by a burning- 
glass ; whence the mechanical force of a wedge is deriv- 
ed ; and what are the wheels and springs^ the pointer^ and 
hammer^ and bell, whereby a dock gives notice of the time, 
both to the eye and the ear. But these ustorious and cleav- 
ing poivers, sonorous and indicative forms and qualities, do 
either teach the enquirer nothing at all but what he knew 
before, or they are mere words loithout ideas,* 

And there is many a man in the vulgar and in the learn- 
ed world, who imagines himself deeply skilled in the con- 
tTOversies of divinity whereas he has only furnished him- 
self with a parcel o^ scholastic or mystic words, under some 
of which the authors themselves had no just ideas 5 and 
the learner, when he hears, or pronounces them, hath 

* It may be objected here, ** And what does the modem philoso- 
pher, with all his detail of mathematical numbers, and diagrams, do 
more than this towards the solmion of these difficulties ? Does he not 
describe gravity by a certain unknown foice, whereby bodies tend 
downward to the centre \ Hath he found the certain and mechanical 
reasons of attraction, magnetism, &c. ?" I answer, that the moderns 
have found a thousand thiligs by applying mathematics to natural 
philosophy, which the ancients were ignorant of , and when they 
use any names of this kind, viz. gravitation, attraction. &.c, they use 
them only to signify that there are such effects and such causes, with 
a frequent confession of their ignorance of the true springs of them : 
They do not pretend to make these words stand for the real causes of 
things as th( ugh they thereby assigned the true philosophical solution 
of these difficulties ; for in this sense they will still be words without 
ideas, whether in the mouth of an old philosopher or a new one* 



Chap. VI- RIGHT USE OF REASON. 73 

scarce any ideas at all. Such sort of words sometimes 
have become matters of immortal contention, as though 
the gospel could not stand without them ; and yet the zeal- 
ot perhaps knows little more of them than he does o£ Shib' 
holeth, or Higgaion, Selah, Judges xii. 6» Psal ix. 16. 

Yet here I would lay down this caution, that there are 
several objects of which we have not a clear and distinct 
idea, much less an adequate or comprehensive one, and 
yet we cannot call the names of these things ivords without 
ideas ; such are the infinity and eternity of God himself^ 
the union of our own soul and body, the union of the divine 
and human natures in Jesus Christ, the operation of the Ho- 
ly Spirit on the mind of man, &c. These ought not to be 
called ivords without ideas, for there is sufficient evidence 
for the reality and certainty of the existence of their ob- 
jects ', though there is some confusion in our clearest con- 
ceptions of them ; and our ideas of them, though imper- 
fect, are yet sufficient to converse about them, so far as 
we have need, and to determine so much as is necessary 
for our own faith and practice. 

Direct. II, Do not suppose that the natures or essences of 
things always differ from one another as much as their names 
do. There are various purposes in human life, for which 
we put very different names on the same thing, or on 
things whose natures are near akin ; and thereby often- 
times, by making a new nominal species, we are ready to 
deceive ourselves with the idea of another real species of 
things : And those, whose understandings are led away by 
the mere sound of words, fancy the nature of those things 
to be very different whose names are so, and judge of 
them accordingly. 

I may borrow a remarkable instance for my purpose 
almost out of every garden which contains a variety of 
plants in it. Most or all plants agree in this, that they 
have a root, a stalk, leaves, buds^ blossams, and seeds : But 
the gardener ranges them under very different names, as 
though they were really different kinds of beings, merely 
because of the different use and service to which they are 
apphed by men : As, for instance, those plants whose 
roots are eaten, shall appropriate the names of roots to 
themselves ; such are carrots^ turnips, radishes, ^c. If the 
G 



74 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I^ 

leaves are of chief use to us, then we call them herbs; as 
sage, mint, thyme. If the leaves are eaten raw, they are 
termed sallad; as lettuce, purcelain. If boiled, they become 
potherbs; as spinnage, colworts ; and some of those same 
plants, which are potherbs, in one family, are sallad in an- 
other. If the buds are made our food, they are called heads 
or tops ; so cabbage heads, heads of asparagus and arti^ 
ehoaks. If the blossom be of the most importance, we call 
it 2i flower ; such are daizies, tulips, and carnations, which 
are the mere blossoms of those plants. If the husk or seeds 
are eaten, they are called the f units of the ground, as peasy 
leans, strawberries, &c. If any part of the plant be of 
known and common use to us in medicine, we call it a phy- 
sical herb, as car dims, scurvy- grass; but if we count no part 
useful, we call it a weed, and throw it out of the garden ; 
and yet j)erhaps our next neighbour knows some valuable 
property and use of it ; he plants it in his garden, and gives 
it the title of an herb, or a flower. Tou see here how 
small is the real distinction of these several plants, con- 
sidered in their general nature as the lesser vegetables : 
Yet what very different ideas we vulgarly form concern- 
ing them, and make different species of them, chiefly be-* 
cause of the different names given them. 

Now, when things are set in this clear light, it appears 
how ridiculous it would be for two persons to contend, 
whether dajidelion be an herb or a weed ; whether it be a 
potherb or sallad ; when, by the custom or fancy of differ- 
ent families, this one plant obtains j^ll these names ac- 
cording to the several uses of it, and the value that is put 
upon it. 

Note here — ^^That I find no manner of fault with the va-^ 
3iety of names which are given to several plants, accord- 
ing to the various use we make of them. But I would not 
have our judgments injposed upon hereby, to think that 
these mere nominal species, namely, herbs, sallad, and 
weeds, become three really different species of beings, on 
this account, that they have different names and uses. 
But I proceed to other instances. 

It has been the custom of mankind, when they have 
been angry with any thing, to add a new ill name to it, 
fliat they may CORvey thereby a hateful idea of it, tliougb 



Chap. VI. RIGHT tSE OF REASON. 75 

the nature of the thing still abides the same. So the Pa- 
pists call the Protestants Heretics ; a profane person calls 
a man of piety a Precisian; and in the times of the 
civil war, in the last century, the Royalists called the Par- 
liamentarians Fanatic^ Roundheads^ and Sectaries, And 
they in requital called the Royalists Malignants : But the 
partizans on each side were really neither better nor worse 
for these names. 

It has also been a frequent practice, on the other hand, 
to put new favourable names upon ill ideas ^ on purpose to 
take off the odium of them. But, notwithstanding all these 
flattering names and titles, a man of profuse generosity is 
h\x\r ^ spendthrift ; a natural son is a bastard still; a gal- 
lant is an adulterer ; and a lady of pleasure is a whore. 

Direct. IIL Talce heed of believing the nature and essence 
of two or more things to be certainly the same, because they 
may have the same name given them. This has- been an un- 
happy and fatal occasion of a thousand mistakes in the 
natural, in the civil, and religious affairs of life, both a- 
mongst the vulgar and the learned. I shall give two or 
three instances, chief! j^ in the matters of natural philosophy ^ 
having hinted several dangers of this kmd relating to the^ 
ology in the foregoing discourse concerning equivocal words. 

Our elder philosophers have generally made use of the 
word Soul to signify that principle whereby a plant grows, 
and they call it the vegetative soul : The principle of the 
animal motion of a brute has been likewise called a soul, 
and we have been taught to name it the sensitive soul ; 
they have also given the name soul to that superior prin- 
ciple in man, whereby he thinks, judges, reasons, &c. and 
though they distinguished this by the honourable title of 
the rational soul, yet in common discourse and writing, 
we leave out the words vegetation, sensitive and rational^ 
and make the word soul serve for all these principles : 
Thence we are led into this imagination, that thereis a sort 
of spiritual being in plants and in brutes, like that in men. 
Whereas, if we did but abstract and separate these things 
from words, and compare the cause of growth in a plant, 
with Xhe csLUse of reasoning in man, (without the word soul) 
we should never think that these two principles were at all 
like one another ; nor should we perhaps so easily and 



T6 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 

peremptorily conclude that brutes need an intelligent mind 
to perform their animal actions. 

Another instance may be the word Life, which being at- 
tri baled to plants ^ to brutes, and to men, and in each of 
them ascribed to ihe soul, has very easily betrayed us from 
our infancy into this mistake, that the spirit or mind, or 
thinking principle in man is the spring of vegetative and an- 
imal life in his body : Whereas it is evident, that if the spir- 
it or thinking principle of man gave life to his animal na- 
ture, the way to save men from dying would not be to use 
medicines, but to persuade the spirit to abide in the body. 

I might ^derive a third instance from the word Heat, 
which is used to signify tlie sensation ive have when we are 
near the fire, as well as the cause of that sensation, which 
is in the fire itself; and thence we conclude from our in- 
fancy, that there is a sort of heat in the fire resembling our 
sensation, or the heat which ice feel : Whereas, in the fire, 
there is nothing but little particles of matter, of such par- 
ticular shapes, sizes, situation and motions, as are fitted 
to impress such motion on our flesh or nerves as excite 
the sense of heat^ Now if this cause of our sensation in 
the fire had been always called by a distinct name, per- 
haps we had not been so rooted in this mistake, that tfie 
fire is hot with the same sort of heat that we feel. This will 
appear with more evidence when we consider, that we are 
secure from the same mistake where there have been two 
different names allotted to our sensation, and to the cause 
ofit; as, we do not say, pain is in the fire that burns us, 
ov in the knife that cuts and wounds us; for we call it 
burning in the fire, cutting in the knife^ and, pain only 
when it is in ourselves. 

Numerous instances of this kind might be derived from 
the words sweet, sour, loud, shrill, and almost all the sensi* 
lie qualities, whose real natures we mistake from our very 
infancy, and we are ready to suppose them to be the same 
in us, and in. the bodies that cause them; partly, because 
the words which signify our own sensations are applied 
also to signify those unknown shapes and motions of the 
tittle corpuscles which excite and cause those sensations. 

Direct, IV. In conversation or reading, be diligent to find 
oxki ihe true sense, or diatvict idea^ which the speaker or wrU 



Chap, VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 77 

ter affixes to his words, and especially to those words which 
are the chief subjects of his discourse. As far as possible 
take heed lest you put more or fewer ideas into one word 
than the person did when he wrote or spoke; and endeav- 
our that your ideas of every word may be the same as 
his were : Then you will judge better of what he speaks 
or writes. 

It is for want of this that men quarrel in the dark ; and 
that there are so many contentions in the several sciences, 
and especially in dimnity. Multitudes of them arise A onn 
a mistake of the true sense or complete meaning in which 
words are used by the writer or speaker ; and hereby 
sometimes they seem to agree when tliey really differ in theirr 
sentiments ] and sometimes they seem to differ when they reg- 
ally agree. Let me give aa instance of both. 

When one man by the word church shall understand all 
that believe in Christ; and another by the word church 
means only the church of Rome; they may both assent to 
this proposition. There is no salvation out of the churchy 
and yet their inward sentiments may be widely different. 

Again, if one writer shall affirm that virtu,e added to 
faith is sufficient to make a Christian, and another shall as 
zealously deny this proposition, they seem to differ wide- 
ly in words, and yet perhaps they may both really agree 
in sentiment 5 if, by the word virtue, the affirraer intends 
our whole duty to God and man ; and the denier by the 
word virtue means only courage, or at most our duty tO" 
wards our neighbour, without inckiding in the idea of it 
the duty which we owe to Gx>d\ 

Many such sort of contentions, as these are, traced to 
their original, will be found to be mere logomachies, or 
strifes and'^qiiarrels about names and words, and vainjang-* 
lings, as the apostle calls them in his first letter of advice 
to Timothy. 

In order therefore to attain char and distinct ideas of 
what we read and hear, we must search the sense of words ; 
we must consider what is their original and derivation in 
our own or foreign languages ; what is their common 
sense among mankind, or in other authors, especially such 
^ wrote in the same country, in the same age, about the 
SAnae time, and upon the same subjects : Wq must con- 



78 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 

sider in what sense the same author uses any particular 
word or phrase^ and that when he is discoursing on the 
same matter, and especially about the same parts or para- 
graphs of his writing: We must consider whether the 
word be used in a strict or limited, or in a large and gen- 
eral sense; whether in a hteral, in a figurative, or in a 
prophetic sense ; whether it has any secondary idea an- 
nexed to itj besides the prnnary or chief sense. We must 
inquire further, what is the scope and design of the writer 5 
and wlmt is the connection of that sentence with those 
that go before it, and those which follow it. By these 
and other methods we are to search out the definition of 
names J tliat is the true sense and meaning in which any 
author or speaker uses any word, which may be the chief 
subject of discourse, or may carry any considerable im- 
portance in it. 

Direct. V. When ive communicate our notions to others, 
merely ivifh a design to inform mid improve their knowledge, 
let us in the beginning of our discourse take care to adjust the 
definition of names wheresoever there is need of it ; tiiat is, 
to determine plainly what we mean by the chief words 
which are the subject of our discourse ; and be sure always 
to keep the same ideas, whensoever we use the same words 
unless we give due notice of the change. This will have a 
very large and happy influence, in securing not only others 
but ourselves too fi om confusion and mistake ; for even 
writers and speakers themselves, for want of due watchful- 
ness, are ready to affix different ideas to their own words, in 
different parts of their discourses, and hereby bring perplex- 
ity into their own reasonings, and confound their hearers. 

it is by an observation of this rule that niathematicians^ 
liave so happily secured themselves, and ihe sciences which 
Ihey have professed, from wranghng and controversy; 
because r/hcnsoever, in the progress of their tieatises, tliey 
have occasion to use a new and unknown word, they al- 
ways define it, and tell in what sense they shall take it ; 
and in many of their writings you find a heixp of definitions 
at tlie very beginning. Now. if the writers o£ naiwal phi* 
losophj and nioralit/h^d used the same accuracy and care, 
they liad elTecturilly secluded a multitude of noisy and 
iruitlcys de\)atc3 out of th^ir own sev^j,ol provinces : Nor 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 79 

had that sacred theme of divinity been perplexed with so 
many intricate disputes^ nor the church of Christ been torn 
to pieces by so many sects and factions, if the words grace^ 
faitkj righteousness y repentance, justijicationy worship^ churchy 
bishop, presbyter, &c. had been well defined, and ttieir sig- 
nifications adjusted, as near as possible, by the use of 
those words in the New Testament ; or at least, if every 
writer had told us at first in what sense he would use thos^ 
words. 

Direct. VI. In your own studies as well as in the commu- 
nication of your thoughts to others merely for their informa-^ 
Hon, avoid ambiguous and equivocal terms as much as pos' 
sible. Do not use such words as have two or three defini- 
tions of the name belonging to them, that is, such words as 
have two or three senses, where there is any danger of 
mistake. Where your chief business is to inform the 
judgment, and to explain a matter rather than to persuade 
or affect, be not fond of expressing yourselves in figura- 
tive language, when there are any proper words that signify 
the same idea in the literal sense It is the ambiguity of 
names^ as we have often said, that brings almost infinite 
confusion into our conceptions of things. 

But where there is necessity of using an ambiguous 
word, there let double care be used in defining that word^ 
and declaring in what sense ydu take it. And be sure to 
suffer no ambiguous word ever to coiiiC into your defini- 
tions. 

Direct. VIT. In communicating your fiotions, use every: 
word as near as possible in the same sense in ivhich mankind 
commonly use it, or which writers that have gone before you 
have usually affixed to it, upon condition that it is free from 
ambiguity. Though names are in their original merely 
arbitrary, yet we sliould always keep to the established 
meaning of them, unless great necessity requires the alte- 
ration ; for, when any word has been used to signify an 
idea, that old idea will recur in the mind when the word is 
heard or read, rather than any new idea which we may 
fasten to it. And this is one reason why the received defi^ 
niiion of names should be changed as little as possible. 

But iadd further, that, though a word entirely new in- 
troduced into ^ Isinguage may |)^ affixed to whs^t idea you 



80 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. L 

please, yet an old word ought never to be fixed to an un- 
accustomed idea, without just and evident necessity, or 
without present or previous notice, lest we introduce there- 
by a licence for all manner of pernicious equivocations and 
falsehoods ; as for instance, when an idle boy, who has 
not seen his book all the morning, shall tell his master 
that he has learned his lesson^ he can never excuse himself 
by saying, that by the word lessoii he meant his hrealcfastj 
and by the word learnt he meant eating ; surely this would 
be construed a downright lie, and his fancied wit would 
hardly procure him a pardon. 

In using an ambiguous word, which has been used in 
different senses, we may choose what we think the most 
proper sense, as I have done, p, 72, in naming the poles of 
the loadstone^ north or south. 

And, when a word has been used in two or three senses, 
and has made a great inroad for errour upon that account, 
it is of good service to drop one or two of those senses, 
and leave it only one rema^ining, and affix the other senses 
or ideas to other words. So the modern philosophers, 
when they treat of the human souly they call it the inind or 
mens humana and leave the w^ord aniniay or soul^ to signify 
the principle of life and motion in mere animal beings. 

The poet Juvenal has long ago given us a hint of this 
accuracy and distinction, when he says of irutes and mm, 

Indulsit fnundi communis conditor illis 
Tantam animas ; nobis animum quoque. 

Sat. ix. v. 134. 
Exception. There is one case, wherein some of these 
last rules concerning the definition of words may be in some 
tneasure dispensed with ; and that is, when strong and 
rooted prejudice hath established some favorite word or 
phrase, and long used it to express some mistaken notion, 
or to unite some inconsistent ideas 5 tor then it is some- 
limes much easier .to lead the world into truth, by indalg- 
ing their fondness for a phrase, and by assigning and ap- 
plying new ideas and notions to their favorite word ; and 
this is much safer also than to awaken all their passions 
by rejecting both their old words and phrases, and no- 
tjiops, and introducing all new at once : Therefore we 



Chap, VI, RIGHT USE OF REASON. 81 

continue to say, there is heat in the fire^ there is coldness in 
ice, rather than invent new words to express the powers 
which are in fire or ice, to excite the sensations o( heat or 
cold in us. For the same reason, some words, and phras- 
es, which are less proper, may be continued in theology^ 
while people are led into clearer ideas with much more ease 
and success, than if an attempt was made to change all 
their beloved forms of speech. 

In other cases, these logical directions should generally 
be observed, and different names affixed to different ideas. 

Here I cannot but take occasion to remark, that it is a 
considerable advantage to any language to have a variety 
of new words ininoduced into it f ih2Lt when, in course of 
time, new objects and new ideas arise, there may be 7iew 
words and names assigned to them : And also where one 
single name has sustained two or three ideas in time past, 
these new words may remove the ambiguity by being af- 
fixed to some of those ideas. This practice would, by de- 
grees, take away part of the uncertainty of language. 
And for this reason I cannot but congratulate our English 
tongue, that it has been abundantly enriched with the 
translation of words from all our neighbor nations, as well 
as from ancient languages, and these words have been as 
it were infranchised amofi^st us 5 for French, Latiji, 
Greek, and German names, will ^gnify English ideas, as 
well as words that are anciently ^d entirely English. 

It may not be^miss to mention in this place, that, as 
the determination of the particular sense in which any 
word is used is called the definition of the name, so the enu- 
meration of the various senses of an equivocal word is 
sometimes called the division or distinction of the name 5 
and for this purpose good doctrines are of excellent use. 

This distinction of the name or word is greatly necessary 
in argumentation or dispute ; when a fallacious argument 
is used, he that answers it distinguishes the several senses 
of some word or phrase in it, and shews in what sense it is 
true^ and in^what sense it \\e\'\deui\y false. 



8? LOGIC : OR THE Part. I- 



SECT, IV. 



OP THE DEFlNIflON OP THINGS, 

AS there is much confusion introduced into our ideaSy 
by the means of those words to which they are afBxed, so 
the mingling our ideas with each other without caution, is 
a farther occasion whereby they become confused. A court 
ladyy born and bred up amongst pomp and equipage^ and 
the vain notions of birth and quality constantly joins and 
mixes all these with the idea of herself, and she imagines 
these to be essential to her tiature^ and as it were, necessary 
to her being ; tijence slie is tempted to look upon menial 
servantSym\A the lowest rank oT \xi^vi\imAy as another species 
of beings quite distinct from herself. X plow-boy ^Xh^Xlms 
never travelled beyond his own village, and has seen 
nothing bat thatched houses and his parish churchy is natu- 
rally led to imagine that thatch belongs to the very nature 
of a houscy and that that must be a church which is built of 
stone, and especmlly if it has a spire upon it. A child 
wlu>se uncle has been excessive fond, and his schoolmastef 
very severe, easily believes that fondness always belongs 
to uncles, and tiiat severity is essential to masters or in* 
struciors. He lias seen also soldiers with red coats, or min- 
is ter s mih long black gowns y and therefore he persuades 
himself that these garbs are essential to those characters, 
and that he is not a minister who has not a long black gown, 
nor can he be a soldier who is not dressed in red. It would 
be well if all sacli mistakes ended with childhood. 

It might be also subjoined, that our complex ideas be- 
come confused, not only by uniting or blending together 
more simple or single ideas than really belong to them as 
in the instances just mentioned ; but obscurity and confu- 
sion sometimes come upon ouj^ ideas also, /<9r want afuni- 
ting a sufficient number of single ideas to make the com- 
plex one: So if I conceive of a leopard only as a spotted 
bsasty this does not distinguish it from a tyger or a lynXf 
nor from many dogs or horses, which are spotted too 5 and 



Chap. VL RIGHT USE OF REASON. S3 

therefore a leopard must have some more ideas added to 
complete and distii guish it. 

J grant that it is a large and free acquamtance with the 
world, a watchful observation and diligent search into the 
nature of things, that must fully correct this kind of er- 
rors: The rules of logic 2ixe not sufficient to doit: But 
yet the rules of logic may instruct us by v'hat means to dis- 
tinguish one thing from another, and how to search and 
mark out, as far as may be, the cotitents and limits of the 
nature of distinct beings, and thus may give us^reat as- 
sistance towards the remedy of these mistakes. 

As the definition of names free us from ♦hat confusion 
which words introduce, so the definition of things will in 
some measure guard us against that confusion which min^ 
gled ideas have introduced : For, as a definition of the 
name explains what any word means, so a definition of the 
thing explains what is the nature of that thing. 

In order to form a definition of any thing, we must put 
forth these three aqts ol the mind. 

First, compare the thing to be defined with other things 
that are most like to itself, and see wherein its essence or 
nature agrees with them ; and this is called the general 
nature or genus in a definition : So if you would define 
what wine is, first compare it with other things like itself, 
as cider^ perrys &c. and you will find it is a sort ofjuice^ 

Secondly, Consider the most remarkable and primary 
attribute, property, or idea wherein this thing difiers from 
those other things that are mostlikGit; and that is, its 
^isential or specific difference : So K;me differs from cider 
and perry, and all other juices, in that it is pressed from a 
grape. This may be called its special nature^ which dis- 
tinguishes it from oiher juices. 

Thirdly, Join the general and special nature together, 
or (which is all one) the genus and tlie difference^ and 
these make up a definition. So (he juice of a grape, or 
juice pressed from grapes, is the defiirUion of wine. 

So, if I would define what winter is, J consider first 
wherein it agrees with other things which are most like it, 
namely, summer, spring, autumn,^ and I find they are all 
seasons of the year ; therefore a season of the year is the §•«- 



84 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I- 

Htis. Then I observe wherein it differs from these, and 
that is in the shortness of the days; for it is this which 
does primarily distinguish it from other seasons ; there- 
fore this may be called its spmal nature or its difference. 
Then, by joining these together, I make a definition. Win^ 
ter is that season of the year wherein the days are shortist^ 
I confess indeed this is but a ruder definition of it, for to 
define it as an accurate astronomer, I must limit the days, 
hours, and minutes. 

After the same manner, if we would explain or define 
what the picture of a man is, we consider first the genus or 
general nature of it, which is a representation ; and herein 
it agrees with many other things, as a statue, a shadow, a 
print, a verbal description of a man, &c. Then we consid- 
er wherein it differs from these, and we find it differs from 
a verbal description, in that it is a representation to the 
eye and not to the ear : It differs from a statue, in that it 
is a representation upon a flat surface, and not iif a solid 
figure: It differs f vom a ihadow, in that it is an abiding 
representation, and, and not a fleeting one: It differs from 
a, print or draught, because it represents the colours by 
paint, as well as the shape of the object by delineation. 
Now, so many, or rather so few of these ideas put togeth- 
er, as are just suflicient to distinguish a picture from all 
other representations, make up its essential difference, or 
its special nature ; and all these are included in its being 
painted on a plain surface. Then join this to the genus, 
which is a representation ; and thus you have the complete 
definition of a man, namely, it is the representation of a man 
in paint upon a surface, (or a plane,) 

Here it must be observed, that when we speak of the 
genus and difference as composing a definition, it must al- 
ways be understood that the nearest genus, and the specific 
difference, are required. 

The next general nature, or the 7uarest genus, must be 
used in a definition, because it includes all the rest as parts 
of its complex idea ; as if I would define wine, I must say, 
wine is a juice, which is the nearest genus; and not say, 
wine is a liquid, which is a remote general nature -, or, 
wine is a substance, which is yet more remote ; for juice 
includes both substance and liquid. Besides, neither of 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 85 

these two remote general natures would make any distinc- 
tion between wi7ie^ and a thousand other substances^ or oth- 
er liquidsj a remote genus leaves the thing too much un- 
distinguished. 

The specific difference is that primary attribute which 
distinguishes each species from one another, while they 
stand ranked under the sam© general nature or genus. Tho' 
wine differs from other liquids in that it is the juice of a 
certain fruity yet this is but a general or generic difference^ 
for it does not distinguish wine from cider or perry '^ the 
specif c difference of wine therefore is its pressure from the 
grape: as cider is pressed from apples^ and perry from pears. 

In definitions also, we must use the primary attribute 
that distinguishes the species ©r special nature, and not at- 
tempt to define wine by its peculiar tastes, or effects, or 
other properties, which are but secondary or consequential ^ 
when its pressure from the grape is the most obvious and 
primary distinction of it from all other juices. I confess 
in some cases it is not so easily known which is the pri- 
mary idea that distinguishes one thing from another; and 
therefore some would as soon define winter by the cold-^ 
ness of the season, as by the shortness of the days ; though 
the shortness of the days is doubtless the most just, primary 
and phil4b)phical difiference betwixt that and the other 
seasons of the year, since winter days are always shortest 
but not always the coldest ; I add also, that the shortness 
of the days is one cause of the coldness, but the cold is no 
cause of their shortness^ 



SECT. V. 

BULES OP THE DEFINITION OP THE THING. 

THE special rules of a good definition are the follow- 
ing: 

Rule l.-^A definition must be universal^ or, as some cell 
it, adequate; that is, it must agree to all the particular 
species or individuals that are included under the same 
idea ; so the juice of a grape agrees to all proper wines^ 
whether ted, white, French, Spanish, Florence^ &c* 

H 



^ LOGIC : ORf THE Part, i. 

'Rule II.— J^ must lejiroper and peculiar to the thing define 
ed and agree to that alone; for it is the very design ol a 
definition effectually to distinguish one thing from all oth- 
ers : So the juice of a grape agrees to no other substance, 
to no other liquid, to no other being h\x\ wine. 

These two rules being observed, will always render n 
definition reciprocal with the things defined; which is a 
scholastic way of speaking, to signify thaft the definition 
jnay be used in any sentence in the place of the thing de- 
fined, or they may bemutualh^ confirmedxoncerningeach 
other, or substituted in the room of each other. The juice 
of the grape is loinCyOr wine is the juice of the grape. And 
^vheresoever the word wine is used, you may put the juice 
of the gm^e instead of it, except when you consider wine 
rather as a ivord than a thinf, or when it is mentioned in 
such logical rules, 

■ Rule III.-^^ definition ought to he clear and plain ; for 
the design of it is to lead us into the knowledge of the 
thing defined. 

Hence it will follow, that the words used in a definition 
ought not to be doubtful^ or equivocal and obscure^ but as 
plain and easy as the language will a^Q^^d : And indeed it 
is a general rule concerning the definition both of namet 
and things, that no 'vl'Ord should be used in eithei^f tlieni 
%vhich has any darkness or difficulty in it, unless it has 
been before explained or defined. 

Hence it will follow also, th^it there are many things 
vvhich cannot well be defined, either as to iheiiame or tins 
thing, unless it be by S}^onymous words, or by a negation 
of the contrary idea, &c. for learned men know not how 
to make tliem more evideM, or tnt)te intelligible, thnn the 
ideas which «very man has gained by the vulgar methods 
of teaching. Siich are the ideas of extension ^ duration^ con- 
.sciousness, and most of our simple ideas, and particularly 
.sensible qualities, as ivhite^ blue^ red, cold, /leat, shrill, hit- 
fery sour, ^c. 

We can say of duration, tluU it is a continuance in being, 
t>r a 7wt ceasing to be ; we can say of conscious7icss, that it 
is as it were a feeling tcithin ourselves ; we may say, heat 
is that which is not cold; or sour is tliat which is like vin- 
egar ; or we may poi?U Jo the clear sky^ and say^ that i^ 



Chap. VL RIGHT USE OF REASON, 8t 

hlue. These are vulgar meihods of teaching the deJinitiofh§ 
oj names, or meaning of words. But there are some phi- 
losopherSj whose attempts to define the«e things learnedly 
have wrapt up their ideas in greater darkness, and exposed 
themselves to ridicule and contempt; as when tiiey define 
heat, they say it is Qifalitas eongregans homogenia, and sc- 
grigans heterogenea ; that i^, a quality gathering together 
things of the same kind, and separating things of a differ- 
ent kind. So they define ii^hite, a colour arising from the. 
prevalence of brightness : But every child knows Aof and, 
'white better without these definitions* 

There are many other definitions given by the Peripa- 
tetick philosophers, which are very faulty, by reason of 
their obscnrity ; asviolioii is defined by them the act of a be- 
ing in power, so far forth as it is in power. Time is the 
measure or number of motion cccordlng to pctst. present and 
fuiiire. The soul is the act (fanorganical natural body hav- 
ing life in power ; and several others of the same stamp. 

Rule IV. — It is also commonly prescribed amongst the 
rules of definition, that it should ha short, so that it musi; 
have no tautology in it, nor any ivords superfluous, I confess 
deffinitions ought to be expressed in as few words as is 
consistent with a clear and just explication of the nature 
of the thing defined, and a distinction of it from all other 
things besides: but it is of much more importance, and 
far better, that a definition should explain clearly the sub-s 
ject we treat of, though the words be many, than to leave 
obscurities in the sentence by confining i*^ withirr too nar- 
row hmits. So in the definition which we have given of 
logic, that is the art of using reason ivell in the search after 
truth, and the communication of i't to others, it has indeed 
many words in it, but it could not be well short^f. Art is 
the genus wherein it agrees with r^hetoric, poesy, arithmeticJc, 
wrestling, sailing, building, &c. for all these are a?'^salso : 
But the difference or special nature of it is drawn from 
its oh jeci, Teas 071 ; from the act using it ivell, and from its 
two great ends or designs, namely, the search after truths 
and the communication of it ; nor can it be justly described 
and explained in fewer ideas. 

V. — If we add a fifth rule, it must be, that neither the 
tJmig defined, nor a mere synonymous name, should make- a 



88 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 

part of the definition^ for this would be no explication of /Ae 
nature of the thing ; ai^d a synonymous word at best could 
only be a definition of the name. 



SECT. VL 



OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OP THING1». 

a 

BEFORE I part with this subject, I must propose sev- 
eral observations which relate to the definition of things. 

1st Observ, There is no need that, in defnitiony we 
should be confined to one single attribute or property ^ in or- 
der to express the difference of the thing defined, for 
sometimes the essential difference consists in two or three 
ideas or attributes. So 3, grocer is a man who buys and 
sells sugar, and plumbs and spices Jor gain, A clock is an en- 
gine with weights and wheels^ that shows the hour of the day 
both by pointing and striking : And if I were to define a 
repeating clock, I must add another property, namely, that 
it also repeats the hour. So that the true and primary es- 
sential difference of some complex ideas consisting in sev- 
eral distinct properties, cannot be well expressed without 
conjunctive particles of speech. 

2d, Observ, There is no need that definitions should al- 
ways be positive^ for some things differ from others mere- 
ly by a defect of what others have; as, if a chair be defin- 
ed a scat for a single person with a back belonging to it^ 
then a a stool is a seat for a single person without a back; 
and a foi^m is a seat for several persons without a back : 
These are negative differences. So siii is a want of con^ 
fennity to the law of God ; blindness is a want of sight ; a 
vagabond is a person without a' home. Some ideas are mg- 
ative^ and their definition ou^it to be so too. 

3d. Observ, Some things may have two or more defini- 
iionsy and each of them equally just and good ; as a mile 
is the length of eight furlongs j or it is the third part of a 
league^ Eternal is that which ever was^ and ever shall be ; 
or it is that ivhich had no beginning and shall have no end. 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 89 

Man* is usually defined a rational animal: But it may be 
much better to define him a spirit united to an animal of 
such a shape, or an animal of such a peculiar shape united to 
a spirit, or a teing composed of such an animal and a mind. 
Uh Ohserv. Where the essences of things are evident, 
and clearly distinct from each other, there we may be 
more accurate and exact in the dejinitions of them : But, 
where their essences approach near to each other, the defi-^ 
nition is more difficult. A bird may be defined 2i feathered 
animal with wings, a ship may be defined a large hollow- 
building made to pass over the water with sails : But if you 
ask me to define a bat, which is between a bird and a beast, 
or to define a barge and hoy, which are between a boat and 
a ship, it is much harder to define them, or to adjust the 
,^ bounds of their essence. This is very evident in all mon^ 
' strous births, and irregular productions of nature, as well as 
in m3,ny woj^ks of art, which partake so much of one species^ 
and so much of another, that we cannot tell under which 
species to rank them, or how to determine their specific 
difference. 

The several species of beings are seldom precisely limit- 
ed in the nature of things by any uncertain and unaltera- 
ble bounds : The essences of many things do not consist 
in indivisibili, or in one evident indivisible point, as some 
have imagined ; but by various degrees they approach 
nearer to, or differ more from, others that are of a kindred 
nature. So (as I have hinted before) in the very middle 
of each of the arches of a rainbow, the colours of g-reen, 
yellow and red are sufficiently distinguished ; but near the 
borders of th« several arches they run into one another, 
so that you liard!y know how to limit the colours, nor 
whether to call it red or yellow, green or bine. 

5th Observ. As the highest or chxef genuses, namely, bc- 

* The common definition of man, namely a rational animal, is 
very faulty. J. because the animal is not rational ; the rationality, 
of man arises from the mind to which the animal is united. 2. Be- 
cause if a spirit should be united to a horse, and make it a rational 
being, surely this would not be a man : It is evident therefore that 
the peculiar shape must enter into the definition of a man to render 
it just and perfect ; and for want of a full description the^reof, all 
our definitions are defective. 

H2 



90 LOGIC: OR, THE Part I. 

big and not-being^ can never be defined, because there is 
no genus superior to them : so neither can singular ideas 
or mdividiials be well defined, because either they have no 
essential differences from other individuals, or their difter- 
ences are not known ; and therefore individuals are only 
to be described by their particular circumstances : So 
King George is distinguished from all other men and other 
kings, by describing him as the Jirst king of Great Britain 
of the house of Brunswick ; and Westminister HaZZ is des- 
cribed by its situation and its use, ^c. 

That individual bodies can hardly have any essential 
difference, at least within the reach of our knowledge, n^ay 
be made thus to appear : Methuselah^ when he was nine 
hundred and sixty years old^ and perhaps worn out with 
age and weakness, was the same person as when he wasiin 
his full vigour of manhood, or when he was an infant, new- 
ly born ; but how far was his body the same ? Wiio can 
tell whether there was any fibre of his flesh or his bones 
that continued the same throughout his whole liTe? Or 
who can determine which are those fibres? The ship in 
which Sir Francis Drake sailed round the world might be 
new built, and refitted so often, that few of the same tim- 
bers remained i and who can say whether it must be call- 
ed the same ship or not? And what is its essential diifer- 
ence? tiow shall we define^ Sir Francis Drake^s ship, or 
inake a definition for Methuselah ? 

To this head belongs that most difiicult question, What 
is the principle vf individuatio7i ? Ox what is it that makes 
any one thing the same as it was sometime before? This- 
!s too large and laborious an inquiry to dwell upon in this 
nlaco: Yet I cannot forbear to mention this hint, namely, 
Since our own bodies must rise at the last da}'- for us ti> 
receive rewards, or punishments in them, there may be 
perhaps some original fibres of each human body, some 
stamina vicoCfOvprinievdil seed of Ufe, which may refrain 
unchanged through all the stages of life, death, nnd the 
grave ; these may become the springs and principles of a 
resurrection, and sufficient to denominate it that same body. 
But. if there be any such constant and vital atoirjs which 
distinguish every human body, they are known to God 
only. 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 91 

6f/i Observ, Where we cannot find out the essence or 
essential difference of any species or kind of beings that we 
would define, we must content ourselves witli a collectioa 
of such chief parts or properties of it as may best explain it, 
so far as it is known, and best distinguish it from other 
things : So a marigold is ^fiower ivhick hath many long and 
yelloiv leaves , round a Utile knot of seeds in the midsty with 
such a peculiar stalk, &c. So if we would define silver, we 
say it jsBi white and hard metal^ next in weight to gold : If 
we would define an elder tree, we might say it is one among 
the lesser trees, whose younger branches are soft and full 
of pith, whose leaves are jagged or indented, and of such a 
particular shape, and it hears large clusters of small Mack 
berries : So we must define earth, stone, a lion, an eagle, a 
serpent, and the greatest part of ?ia^ii?^aL_beings, by a coU 
lection of those properties, which according to our obser- 
vation distinguish them from all other things. This is 
what Mr Locke calls nominal essence^ and norriinal defi- 
nitions. And indeed^ since the essential differences of the 
various natural beings or bodies round about us arise 
from a peculiar shape^ size, motion, and situation of the 
small particles of which they are composed, and since we 
have no sufficient method to inform us what these are, we 
must be contented with such a sar/ of definition of the 
bodies they compose. 

Here note, That this sort of definition, which is made- 
up of a mere collection of the most remarkable parts or, 
properties, is calledan imperfect definition, or a description ^. 
whereas the definition is c^Wed perfect when it is composed, 
of the essential difference^ added to the general nature or 
genus, 

1th Observ. The perfect defnilian of any being always in- 
cludes the definition of the name whereby it is called, for it 
informs us of the sense or meaning of that word, andi 
siiews us what idea that word is affixed to 5 But the c?e- 
fnition of the name does by no means include SLperftct defi^. 
nition of the thing ; foj', as we have said before, a mere sy- 
nonymous word, a negation of the contrary, or the men= 
tion of any one or two distinguishmg properties of the 
thing, may be a sufiicient definition of the name. Yet in 
those cases where the e^seuti^l difierewces or eijsenge of a 



92 LOGIC . OR, THE Part. I. 

thing is unknown, there a definition of the name^ by the chief 
properties, and a description of the thing, are much the same. 

And here I think it necessary to take notice of one gen- 
eral sentiment, that se^ms to run through that excellent 
performance, Mr. Lockers essay on human understanding ^ 
and that is ; That the essence of things are utterly un- 
known to us, and therefore all our pretences to distinguish 
the essences of things can reach no farther than mere nom^ 
inal essences ; or a collection of such poperties as we know 5 
to some of which we affix particular names, and others we 
bundle up, several together, under one name : And that 
all our attempts to rank beings into different kinds of spe- 
cies can reach no farther than to make mere nominal spe^ 
sies ; and therefore our definitions of things are but mere 
nominal descriptions or definitions of the name.'' 

Now, that we may do justice to that great author, we 
ought to consider that he confines this sort of discourse 
only to the essence of simple ideas, and to the essence of 
substances^ as appears evident in the fourth and sixth chap- 
ters of his third book ; for he allows the names of mixed 
modes always to signify the real essences of their species ^ 
Chap. V. and he acknowledges artificial things to have real 
distinct species ; and that, in the distinction of their essen- 
ces, there is generally less confusion and uncertainty than in 
natural, Chap. VI. sect. 40,41, though it «iust be confessed 
that he scarcely makes any distinction between the defi- 
nition of the name and the definition of the things IV. and 
sometimes the current of his discourse decries the knowl- 
edge of essences in such general terms as may justly give 
occasion to mistake. 

It must be granted, that the esences of most of our sm- 
pZeicZeas, and the greatest part of particular natural sub- 
stances are much unknown to us ; and therefore the essen- 
tial difference of different qualities, and of the various 
kinds of bodies (as I have said before) he beyond the reach 
of our understandings : We know not what makes the pri- 
mary real inward distinctionsbetweenre(;?,g'r6e?i^si(;^e/,sowr, 
&;c. between wood, iron, oil, stone, fire, water, flesh, clay in 
their general natures ; nor do we know what are the in- 
ward and prime distinctions between all the particular kinds 
w speciesin the vegetable^ animalimineral^ metallic* or liquid 



Chap, VI, RIGHT USE OF REASOxN. 93 

world of things. See Philosophical Essays^ Essay xi. sec 1. 
But still there is a very large field for the knowledge of 
the essences of things, and for the use of perfect definitions 
amongst our complex ideasy the modal appearances and chan* 
ges of nature f the ivorks of art ^ the matters of science^ and 
jail the affairs of the civil the moral, and the religious life : 
And indeed it is of much more importance to all man- 
kind to have a better acquaintance with the works of art 
for their own livelihood and daily use, with the affairs 
<?/ morality for their behaviour in this world, and with the 
matters of religion^ that they may be prepared for the 
world to come, than to be able to give a perfect definition 
of the works of nature. 

If the particular essences of natural bodies are unknown 
to us, we maj- be yet good philosophers, good artists, good 
neighbors, good subjects, and good Christians, without 
that knowledge 3 and we have just reason to be content. 

Now that the essences of some o£ihe modal appearan- 
ces and changes in nature as well as things of arty science^ 
and morality y are sufficiently known to us to msike perfect 
definitions of them, will appear by the specimen of a few 
definitions of these t|iings. 

Motion is a change of a place. Swiftness is the passing 
over a long space in a short time. A natural day is the 
time of one alternaterevolutionof hght and darkness, or it 
is the duration of twenty-four hours. An eclipse of the sun 
is a defect in the sun's transmition of light to us by the 
moon interposing. *Snow is congealed vapour. ^Hail is 
congealed rain. An Hsland is a piece of land rising above 
the surrounding water. An ^hillis an elevated part of the 
earth, and a ^grove is a piece of ground thick set with 
trees. An house is a building made to dwell in, A cot- 
tage is a mean house in the country. A supper is that 
meal which we make in the evening. A triangle is a fig- 
ure composed of three sides. A gallon is a measure con- 

*NoTE — Island, hill, grove, are not .defined here in their more 
rennote and substantial nature Sj (if I may so express it) or as the 
matter of them is earth : for in this sense we know not their es. 
sence, but only as considered in their modal appearances whereby 
one part of earth is distinguished from another. The same may 
be said of snow, hail, & c. 



94 LOGIC : OR, THE Part L 

taining eight pints. A Porter is a man who carries bur- 
dens for hire. A A:mg' is the chief ruler in a kingdom. — 
Veracity is the conformity of our words to our thoughts, 
Covetousness is an -excessive love of money, or other pos- 
sessions, Killi?ig is the taking away the life of an animal. 
Murder is the unlawful kiUing of a man. Rhetoric is the 
art of speaking in a manner St to persuade. Natural phi- 
losophy is the knowledge of the properties of bodies, and 
the various effects of them, or it is the knowledge of the 
various appearance in nature, and their caus^es^ and Logic 
is the art of using our reason well, &c. 

Thus you see the essential difference of various beings 
may be known, and are borrowed from their qualities and 
properties y their causes, effects, objects y adjunct ends, &c, and 
indeed, as infinitely various as the essences of things are, 
their definitions must needs have various forms. 

After all it must be confessed, that many logicians and 
philosophers in the former ages have made too great a bus- 
tle about the exactness of their definitions of things, and 
entered into long, fruitless controversies, and very ridicu- 
lous debates in the several sciences, about adjusting the 
logical formalities o^ evexy definition ; whereas that sort of: 
wrangling is ik>w grown very justly contemptible, since it 
is agreed that true learning and the knowledge of things 
depend much more upon a large acquaintance with their 
various properties, causes, effects, subject, object, ends and 
designs, than it does upon the formal and scholastick nice- 
ties of genus and difference. 



Sect. vtt. 

OP A COiMPLETE CONCEPTION OF THINGS. 

HAVING dwelt so long^ upon the first rule to direct 
oufc* conceptions, and given an account of the definitior 
both of names ^wAthings, in order to gain clear and distinc 
ideas, we make iiaste now to the second rule, to guide our 
conceptions, and that is, Conceive of things completely in 
all their parts. 



CsAp. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 9a 

All parts have a reference to some whole : Now there is 
an old distinction which logical writers make of a whole 
and its parts into four several kinds/ and it may be propet 
just to mention them here. 

1. There \s ^Mnetaphysical whole ^ y^\\en ihe essence of 
a thing is said to consist of two parts, the genus and the 
difference^ that is, the general and the special nature, which 
being joined together make up ^-definition. This has been 
tlie subject of the foregoing sections. 

2. Tijere is a mathematical whole, v/hich is better call- 
ed integral, Avhen the several parts which go to make up 
the whole are really distinct from one another and each 
of them may subsist apart. So the 7?eac?, the limbs, and 
the trunk, 2ire the integral parts of any large number^ so 
these discourses which I have written concerning percep- 
tion, judgment, reasoning, and disposition, ave four integral 
parts of Zog-ic. This sort of parts goes to make up the 

-completeness of any subject ; and this is the chief and most 
direct matter of our discourse in this section. 

3. There is a physical or essential whole, which is usually 
made to signify a.nd include only the iwo essential jiarts of 
man, body and souL But I think the sense of it may bet- 
ter be altered, or at least enlarged, and so include all the 
essential modes, attributes, or properties, which are con- 
tained in the comprehension of afiy idea. This shall be the 
subject of discourse under the tJdrd rule to direct our con- 
ceptions. 

4. There is a logical whole, which is also called an urd- 
cemal ; and the parts of it are all tiie particular ideas to 
which tills universal nature exten^g. So a genus is a ivhole 
in respect to several species which are its parts. So the* 
species is a whole and alMhe individuals are the pdrtiot it. 
This shall be treated of, in the fourth nde to guide our con- 
ceptions. 

At present we consider an idea as mi integral whole, and 
our second rule directs us to contemplate it in all its parts ^ 
But this can only refer to complex ideas, for simple ideas 
feave no parts. 



96 LOGIC : OR, THE Pakt I. 



SECT, vm, 



OF DIVISION AND THE RULES OF IT. 

SINCE our minds are narrow in their capacity, and 
cannot survey the several parts of any complex being, 
with one single view, as God sees all things at once ; there- 
fore we must, as it were, take it to pieces, and consider of 
the parts separately, that we may have a more complete 
conception of the whole. So that, if 1 would learn the na- 
ture of a watch the workman takes it to pieces and shews 
me the springs the wheels^ the axles^ the pinions^ the hal^ 
ance, the dial-plate pointer^ the case, &c. and describes each 
of these things to me apart, together with their figures and 
their uses. If I would know what an animal is, the anat- 
omist considers the head, the trunk, the limbs^ the towels^ 
apart from each other, and gives me distinct lectures upon 
each of them. So a kingdom is divided into its several 
provinces; a hook into its several chapters ; and any science 
is divided according to the several subjects of which it treats. 

This is what we properly call the division of an idea^ 
which is an explication of the whole by its several parts, or 
an enumeration of the several parts that go to compose any 
whole idea, and to render it complete. And I think when 
man is divided into body and soul, it properly comes under 
this part of the doctrine of integral division, as well as 
when the mere body is divided into head, trunk, ?iXidi limbs : 
This division is sometimes called />ar/i7i(;n. 

When any of the parts of any idea are yet farther divi- 
ded in order to a clear explication of the whole, this is call- 
ed a subdivision ; as when a year is divided into months^ 
each month into days, and each day into hours^ which may 
also be farther subdivided into 7ninutes, and seconds. 

It is necessary, in order to a full explication of any be- 
ing, to consider each part, and the properties ofit^ distinct 
hy itself, aS well as in its relation to the whole: For there 
are many properties that belong to the several parts of a 
being which cannot properly be ascrij^ed to the whole, 



Chap. VI. niGHT USE OP REASON, 97 

though these properties may fit each part for its propet 
station, and as it stands iii that relation to the whole com- 
plex being : As in a hoiisey the doors are moveable, the 
rooms square, the ceilings white, the windows transparent, 
yet the house is neither moveable, nor square, nor white^ 
nor transparent. 

The special Rules of a good Division are these. 

1 Rule— ^£ac^ part singly taken must contain less than 
"he whole^ hut all the parts taken collectively y (or together j) 
fnust contain neither more nor less than the whole. There- 
fore, if in discoursing of a tree you divide it into the trunk 
and leaves, it is an imperfect division, because the root and 
the branches are needful to make up the whole. So logic 
would be ill divided into apprehension, judgment and rea-' 
sotiing ; ioM method is a considerable part of the art which 
teaches us to use our reason right, and should by no means 
be omitted. 

Upon this account, in every division wherein we diesigtl 
a perfect exactness, it is necessary to examine the whole 
idea with diligence, lest we omit any parts of it through 
want of care; though in some cases it is not possible, and 
tn others it is not necessary, that we should descend to the 
minutest parts. 

II Rule. — In all divisions we shouti first consider the lar^ 
ger and more immediate parts of the subject, and not divide 
it at once into the more minute and remote parts. It would 
by no means be proper to divide a kingdom first m\6 
streets^ and lanes, ^hd fields ; but it must be first divided 
inio provinces o\ counties, then those counties, may be Aivi' 
ded into towns, viltages, field Sy&c.^^nd towns into streets 
and lanes. 

III Rule. — The several parts of a division ought to te fjp- 
posite, that is, one part ought not to contain another. It 
would be a ridiculous division of an animal into head, Vimb^ 
Tfody^ and brain, for the &ram^ are contained in the head. 

Yet here it must be noted, A\kt sometime^ the subjects 
of any treatise, or the objects of atiy particular science, 
may be properly and necessarily so divided, that the second 
may include tlie first, and the third may include the first 
and 3ecotid; without offending against this rule, because 



OS LOGIC : OR, THE Part I 

in the second or following parts of the science or discourse 
these objects are not considered in the same manner as in 
the first; as for instance, geometry divides its objects into 
lines, surfaces, and solids : Now, though a line be contain- 
ed in a surface or a solid, yet it is not considered in a sur- 
face, separate and alone, or as a niere line, as it is in the 
first part of geometry, which treats of lines. So logic is 
Tightly Ai\lded inio conception, judgment, reasoning, and 
method. For, though^d^as ot conceptions are contained in 
the following parts of logic, yet they are not there treated 
of as separate ideas, which are the proper subject of the 
iirstpart. 

IV Rule. — Ijct not sul divisions he too numerous without 
necessity : For it is better many times to distinguish more 
parts at once, if the subject will bear it, than to mince the 
discourse by excessive dividing and subdividing. It is 
preferable therefore, in a treatise of geography, to say, that 
in a city we will consider its walls, its gates, its buildings., 
its streets, and lanes, than to divide it formally first into 
the encompassing and the encompassed parts; the encom- 
passing parts are the walls and gates, the encompassed 
parts include the ways and buildings ^ the ways are the 
streets arid the lanes; buildings ^consist of the foundations 
and the superstructure, ^c. 

Too great a number of subdivisions has been affected by 
some persons in sermons, treatises, instructions, &c. under 
pretence of great accuracy: But this sort of subtilities 
hath often caused great confusion to the understanding, 
and sometimes more difiiculty to the memory. In these 
cases it is only a good judgment can determine what sub- 
divisions are uselul. 

y Rule. — Divide every subject accordrt\g to the special de* 
sign you have in vieio. One and the some idea or subject 
may be divided in very different manners, accoiding to 
the diflerent purposes we have in discoursing of it. So, if 
a printer were to consider the several parts of a book^ he 
must divide it into sheets, the sheets \Mo pages, the pages 
into lines, and the li7ies into letters, Bui ^grammarian di- 
ji'idQS a hook into periods, sentences, and ivords, or parts of 
speech, as noun, pronoun.^ verb, <^c. A logician considers a 
book as divided into chapters, sections, arguments, proposi- 
tions, ideas; and, with the help of ontology, he divides tlie 



eHAP. VL RIGHT USE OF REASOxN. 99^ 

propositions inlo suhjecty object, property ^ relation, action^ 
passion, cause^ ^ff^ct, 8[c. But it would be very ridiculous 
for a logician to divide a look into sheets, pageSy and lines ; 
or for a printer to divide it into no^ms and pronouns, or iur 
tor propositions, ideas, properties, or causes, 

VI Rule. — In all your divisions observe with the greatest 
exactness the nature of things. And here I am constrained 
to make a subdivision of tliis rule into two very necessary 
particulars. 

(1.) Let the parts of your divisions be such as are prop- 
erly distihguished in nature. Do not divide asupder those 
parts of tlie idea which are intimately united in nature, nor 
unite those things into one part which nature has evident- 
ly disjoined : Thtfs it would be very improper, in treating^ 
Ofi 2iVi animal body^ to divide it into xhe superior smd inferior 
halves ; for it would be hard to say how much belongs by 
nature to the inferior half, and how much to the superior. 
Much more improper would it be still to divide the animal 
into the right hand parts and left hand parts, which would 
bring greater confusion. This would be as unnatural as if 
a man should cleave a hazle rmt in halves through the husky 
the shell, and the kernel, at once, and say, a nut is divided 
into these two parts ; whereas nature leads plainly to the 
threefold distinction o^ husk, shell, and kernel. 

(2.) Do not affect duphcates, nor triplicates, nor any 
certain number of parts in your division of things ; for we 
know of no such certain number of parts which God the 
Creator has observed in forming all the varieties of his 
creatures; nor is there any uniform determined number 
of parts in the varioirs subjects of human art or science; 
yet some persons have disturbed the order of nature, and 
abused their readers, by an affectation o^f dichotomies, trich- 
otomies, sevens, twelves, ^e. Let the nature of the subject, 
considered together with the design which you have in 
view always determine the number of parts into which you 
divide it. 

After all, it must be confessed, that an intimate knowl- 
edge of things, and a judicious observation, will assist in 
the business of division, as well as o^ definition, heXiex than 
too nice and curious an attention to the mere formalities of 
logical writers, witlwut a real acquaintance witli things. 



100 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I^ 



SECT. IX. 

QF A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPTION OF THINGS, AND OF AB- 
STRACTION. 

THE third rule to direct our conceptions requires us to 
conceive of things comprehensively. As we must survey an 
object in all its parts^ to obtain a complete idea of it, so we 
must consider it in all its modesy attributesy properties, and 
relations^ in order to obtain a comprehensive conception 
of it. 

The comprehension ot?iniie^y as it was explained under 
tlie docfrine of universale, includes only the essential 
modes or attrihuies of thatid^a/ but in this place the word 
is taken in a larger sense, and implies also the various (?c- 
casional properties, accidental modes ^ and relations. 

The necessity of this rule is founded upon the same rea- 
son as the former, namely. That our minds are narrow 
and scanty in their capacities, and as they are not able to 
consider all the ^ar^s of a complex idea at oncey so neither 
can they a^ once contemplate all the different attributes 
and circumstances of it : We must therefore consider things 
successively and gradually in tlieir various appearances 
and circumstances : As our natural eye cannot at once 
behold the six sides of a die or cube, nor take cognizance 
of all the points that are marked on them, and therefore 
we turn up the sides successively, and thus survey and 
number the points that are marked on each side^ that we 
may know the whole^ 

In order to a comprehensive view of any idea, we must 
first consider, whether, the object of it has an existence as 
well as essence; whether it be a simple or complex idea; 
whether it be a substance or a mode. If it be a substance^ 
then we must inquire what are the essential modes of it 
which are necessary to its nature, and what are those 
properties or accidents of it which belong to it occasionally, 
or as it is placed in some particular circumstances : We 
must view it in its internal and absolute modes, and observe 
it in those various external relations in which it stands to 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON 101 

other beings : We must consider it in its powers and capa^ 
cities either to do or suffer : We must trace it up to its va- 
rious causes, whether supreme or subordinate. We must 
descend to the variety of its effects, and take notice of the 
several ends and designs which are to be attained by it» 
We must conceive of it as it is either an object or a subject^ 
what are the things that are akin to it, and what are the op- 
posiies or contraries of it ; for many things are to be known 
both by their contrary and kindred ideas. 

If the thing we discourse of be a mere 7node, we must in- 
quire whether it belongs to spirits or bodies; whether il be 
3. physical or moral mode^ If moral, then we must consider 
its relation to God, to our selves, io ouv neighbour ; its ref- 
erence to this life^ or the life to come- If it be a virtue, we 
must seek what are the principles of it, what are the rules. 
of it, what are the tendencies of it, and what are thefalsz 
virtues that counterfeit it, and what are the real vices that 
oppose it, what are the evils which attend the neglect of it^ 
and what are the rewards of the practice of it, both here and 
hereafter. 

If the subject be historical, or a matter of fact, we may 
then inquire whether the action was don£ at all; whether 
it was done m such a manner, or by such persons as is re- 
ported-3 at what time it was. done; inivhat place; hy what 
motive, and for what design; what is the evidences of the 
fact; loho are the witnesses ; what is their character and 
credibility; what 5zg'?is there are of such a fact; what con- 
current circumstances which may either support the truth of 
it, or render it doubtful. 

In order to make due inquiries into all these, and many- 
other particulars which go towards the coinplete and com-- 
prehensive idea of any being, the science of ontology is ex- 
ceeding necessary. This is what was wont to be called 
the frst of metaphysics in the Peripatetick schools, it treats 
of being in its most general nature, and of all its affections 
and relations. I confess the old Popisii schoolmen have 
mingled a number of useless subtiiities with this science; 
they have exhausted their own spirits, and the spirits of 
their readers, in many laborious and intricate trifles ; and 
some of their writings have been fruitful of names without 
ideas, which have done much injury to the isacred istudv of 
12 



102 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I- 

divinity. Upon this account many of the moderns have 
most unjustly abandoned the whole science at once, and 
throw abundance of contempt and raillery upon the very 
name of metaphysics ; but this contempt and censure is ve- 
ry unreasonable ; for this science, separated from some Ar- 
ristotelian fooleries, and scholastic subtilities, is so neces- 
sary to a distinct conception, solid judgment, and just rea- 
soning on many subjects, that sometimes it is introduced 
as a part oflogic^ and not without reason. And those who 
utterly despise and ridicule it, either betray their own ig- 
norance, or will be supposed to make their wit and banter 
a refuge and excuse for their own laziness. Yet this much 
I would add, that the later writers of ontology are general- 
ly the best on this account, because they have left out 
much of the ancient jargon, ^^e the Brief Sclieme of (hi- 
iology in the Philosophical Essays^ by L Watts, ' 

Here let it be noted, that it is neither useful, necessary^ 
or possible, to run through all the modes^ circmnstances and 
relations of every subject we take in hand 5 but in ontology 
we enumerate a great variety of them, that so a judicious 
mind may choose what are those circumstances ^ relaticns., 
and properties of any subject, which are most necessary 
to the present design of him that speaks or writes, either 
to explain, to illustrate, or 10 prove the point. 

As v^e arrive at that complete knowledge of an idea in all 
its parts y by that act of the mind which is called division y so 
we come to a comprehensive conception of a thing in its 
several properties and relations^ by that ^ct of the mind 
which is called abstraction : that is, we consider each sin- 
gle relation or property of the subject alone 5 and thus we 
do as it were withdraw and separate it in our minds, boUi 
from the subject itself, as well as from other properties and 
relations, in order to make a fuller observation of it. 

This act 01 abstraction is said to be twofold, either preci- 
sive or negative, 

Precisive ahstraciion is when we consider those things 
apart which cannot really exist apart ; as when we consid* 
er a mode without considering its substance and subject ^ or 
one ccsential mode without another. Negative ahstr action is,. 
\yhcn we .consider one thing separate from auother, which 



Chap, VI, RIGHT USE OF REASOxV. 103 

may also exist without it ; as when we conceive of a 
subject without conceiving of its accidental mode» or reZa- 
tiu3is ; or when we conceive of 07ie accident without think- 
y ing of another. Jf I think of reading or writing without 
the express idea of some manythis \s precisive abstraction^ 
or if I think of the attraction of iron, without the express 
idea of some particular magnetic body. But, when T think 
of a needle without an idea of its sharpness^Xhxs is negative 
abstraction ; and it is the same when I think of its sharp-^ 
ness without considering its lengtlu 



SECT. X. 

OF THE EXTENSIVE CONCEPTION OF THINGS, AND OF DIS- 
TRIBUTION. 

AS the completeness of an idea refers to the several j?ar/s 
that compose it, and the comprehension of an idea inckides 
its various properties; so the extension of an idea denotes 
the various sorts or kinds of beings to which the same idea 
belongs ; And i^ we would be fully acquainted with a sub- 
jectj we must observe 

This fourth rule to direct our conceptions, namely, Co^i- 
ceive of things in all their extension ; that is, we must search 
out the various species or special natures which are con- 
tained under it, as a gemis or general nature. If we would 
know the nature of an animal perfectly, we must take 
cogniz»ance of beasts y birds, fshes and insects, as well as 
men, all which are contained under the general nature and 
name of animal. 

As an integral whole is distinguished into its several parts 
by division; so the word distribution is most properly used 
when we distinguish an universal whole into its several 
kinds or species : And perhaps U had been better, if this 
word had been always con/itied to its signification, though 
it must be confessed that we frequently speak of the di- 
vision of an idea into its several kinds, as well as into its 
several parts. 

The rules of a good distribution are-miiCh the same with 
those which wq have before applied to diiimn^ which 



104 LOGIC : OR, THE Part 1. 

must be just repeated again in the briefest manner, in or- 
der to give examples of them. 

Rule I.— Each part singly taken must contain less than 
the whole^ but all the parts taken collectively ^ or together j 
must contain neither more nor less than the whole ; or, 
as logicians sometimes express it, the parts of the division 
ought to exhaust the ivhole thing which is divided. So ined^ 
W>feis justly distributed into prophylactic^ or the art of 
preserving health ; and therapeutic, or the art of restoring 
health; for there is no other sort of medicine besides these 
two. But men are not well distributed into tall or shorty 
for there are some of a middle stature. 

Rule If. — In all distributions we should first consider 
the larger and naare immediate kinds of species, or ranks 
of being, and not divide a thing at once into the more m5>- 
iiute and remote. A genus should not at once be divided 
into individuals^ or even into the lowest species^ if there be 
a species superior. Thus it would be very improper to di- 
vide animal into trout^ lobster^ eely dog, bear, eagle, dove^* 
worm and butterfly, for there are inferior kinds 5 whereas 
animal ought first to be distributed into man, beast, bird, 
fish, insect ; and then beast should be distributed into dog^ 
bear, &c. Bird into eagle, dovey&c. Fishinio trout, eel y 
lobster, &;c. 

it is irregular also to join any species in the same rank 
or order with the superior ; as, if we should distinguish 
animals into birds, bears, and oysters, &c. it would be a ri- 
diculous distribution. 

Rule III. — The several parts of a distribution ought to 
be opposite ; that is, one species or class of beings in the 
same rank of division, ought not to contain or include 
another 5 so men ought not to be divided into the rich, the 
poor .^ the learned, and the tall ; for poor men may be both 
learned and tall, and so may the rich. 

But it will be objected, Are not animated bodies rightly 
distributed into vegetative and animal, or (as they are usu- 
ally called) sensitive? Now the sensitive contains the vege* 
tative nature in it, for animals grow as well as plants. I an- 
swer, that in this, and in all such distributions, the word 
vegetative signifies merely vegetation ; and in this sen^re^- 
^tativ^ will b^ gujici^ntiy oppofit^ tp mUmlj for it can- 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 105 

not be said af aii animal that it contains mere vegetation 
in the idea of it. 

Rule IV. — Let not subdivisions be too numerous with- 
out nece&sity ; therefore I think quantity is better distin- 
gui»!ied at once into a liney surface^ and a solid ; than to 
say, ^s Ramus does, that quantity is either a line or a 
thing lined ^ and a thing lined is either aline or a solid. . 

Rule V. — Distribute every Subject according to thespe- 
cial design you have in view, so far as is necessary or 
useful to your present inquiry. Thus a poUticiofn distrib- 
utes mankind according to th^ir civil characters into the 
tillers and ihe ruled ; ar^d a physician divides them into the 
side ov the healthy ', but a divine distributes them into 
Turks y Heathens^ Jews or Christians, 

Here note. That it is a very useless thing to distribute 
any idea into such kinds or members as have no different 
properties to be spoken of; as it is mere trifling to divide 
right angles into such whose legs are equals and ivhose legs 
are unequal, for as to the mere right angles they have no 
different properties. 

Rale VI. — In all your distributions observe the nature 
of things with great exactness, and do not affect any par- 
ticular form of distribution ^ as some persons have done 
by dividing evei^y genus into two species ; or into three spe* 
cies ; whereas nature is infinitely various, and human af- 
fairs and human sciences have as great a variety 5 nor is 
there any one form of distribution that will exactly suit 
with all subjects. 

'Note.-^li is to this doctrine of distribution of genus into 
its several species we must also refer the distribution of a 
cause according to its several effects, as some medicines are, 
heatings some are cooling ; or aa effect, when it is distin- 
guished byits^causes, as faith is either built upon divine 
testimony or human. It is to this head we refer particu- 
lar artificial bodies, when they are distinguished according 
to the ma//^r they are made of, as a statue is either of brass ^ 
of marble, or ofwood, &c. and any other beings, when they 
are distinguished according to iheir end and design, ^s the 
furniture of body or mind is either for ornament or use. 
To this head also we refer subjects when they are divided 
according to tjbeir modes or accidents ; as men are either 



lOS LOGIC : OR, THE Pakt t 

Iherry, or grave, or sad ; and modes^ when they are divid- 
ed by their subjects^ as distempers belong to the fluids, or 
to the sohd parts of the animal. 

It is also to this place we reduce the proposals of a dif- 
ficulty under its various cases, whether it be in speculation 
or practice : As, to shew the reason of sunbeam-^ burning 
wood, ivhether it be done by a conmx glass or a concave ; or 
to slievv tlie construction and mensuration of triangles^ wheth- 
er you have two angles and a side given, or two sides 
and an angle, or only three sides. Here rt is necessa- 
ry to distribute or divideadiiiiculty ina41 its cases, in or- 
der to gain a perfect knowledge of the subject you con- 
tern plate. 

It might be observed here, that logicians have sometimes 
given a mark or sign to distinguish when it is an intC" 
gral whole that is divided into its parts ov members^ or when 
it is a genus^ an universal ivhole, that is distributed into its 
species and individuals. The rule they gy\e is this : When^ 
soever the whole idea can be directly and properly affirm- 
ed of each part, as, a bird is an animal, a fish is an animaly 
Bucephalus is a horse^ Peter is a man, then it is a distribu- 
tion Q^ ^ genus into its species, or a species into its individ'- 
uals: But when the whole cannot be thus directly affirm- 
ed concerning every part, then it is a division of an inte- 
gral inio its several /?ar/5 or members ; as we cannot say 
the head the breast, the hand, or the foot is an animal, but 
we say, the head is a part of the a?2i??inZ, and the foot is an- 
other part. 

This rule may hold true generally in corporeal beings, 
or perhaps in all substances : But. when we say the fear 
of God is wisdom, and so is human civility; criticism is 
true learning, and so is philosophy : To execute a murder- 
er is justice, and to save and defend the innocent is justice 
too. In these cases it is not so easily determined, Nvheth- 
er an integral whole be divided into its parts, or an univer- 
sal into its species : For the fear of God may be called 
either one part, or one kiiid of ivisdom : Criticism is one 
pait, or one kind o^ learning : And the execution ofamuV' 
dei^er may be called a species of justice, as well as apart of 
it. Nor indeed is it a matter of great importance to de- 
termine this controversy. 



eKAp.VL ' RIGHT USE OF REASON. 107 

SECT. XI. 

OP AN ORDERLY CONCEPTION OF THINGS. 

THE last rule to direct our conceptions is, that we 
should rank and place tbem in proper method and just or- 
der. This is of necessary use to prevent confusion ; for, 
as a trader who never places his goods in his shop or ware- 
house in a regular order, nor keeps his accounts of his 
buying and selhng, paying and receiving, in a just method, 
is in the utmost danger of plunging all his affairs into 
confusion and ruin ] so a. studmt who is in the search of 
truth, or an author or teacher who communicates knowl- 
edge to others, will very mach obstruct his design, and 
confound his own mind or the minds of his hearers, un- 
less he range his ideas in just order. 

If we would therefore become successful learners or 
teachers we must not conceive of things in ^confused hmp^ 
but dispose our ideas in some certain method^ which may be 
most easy and useful both for the understandicg and 
znemory ; and be sure, as much as may be, to follow the 
nature of things, for which many rules might be given 5 
namely, 

1. Conceive as much as you can o?i\ie essentials of any 
subject, before you consider its accidentals.^ 

2. Survey first the general par^s and properties of any 
subjectj^ before you extend your thoughts to discourse of 
the particular kinds or species of it. 

3. Contemplate things fiisi m tlieir own simple natures^ 
and afterwards view them in composition with other things; 
unless it be your present purpose to take ^compound hein^ 
to pieces, in order to find out, or to shew the nature of it, 
by searching and discovering of what simples it is com- 
posed. 

4. Consider the absolute modes ot affections of any being 
as it is in itself, before you proceed to consider it relatively y 
or to survey the various relations in which it stands to oth- 
er beings, &c. 

Note. — These rules chiefly belong to the method of in- 
.struction which the learned call sijnthetic. 



108 LOGIC: OR> THE PartI. 

But in the regulation of our ideas, there is seldom an 
absolute necessity that we should place them in this or the 
other particular method : It is possible in some cases that 
many methods may be equally good, that is, may equally 
assist the understanding and the memory : To frame a 
method exquisitely accurate, according to the strict nature 
of things, and to maintain this accuracy from the begin- 
ing to the end of a treatise, is a most rare and difiicult 
thing, if not impossible. But a larger account of method 
^'ould be very improper in this place, lest we anticipate 
what belongs to ihe fourth part of logic. 



SECT. XIL 



THESE FIVE KULES OF CONCEPTION EXEMPLIFIED© 



IT may be useful here to give a specimen of the five 
•^special rules to direct our cohceptions, which have beeii 
the chief subject of this long chapter, and represent them 
practically in one view. 

Suppose the theme dfour discourse was the passions of 
the mind, 

\st. To gain a clear and distinct idea ofj^ctssiouy we must 
'def7ie both the name and the thing. 

To begin with the defnition of Ike name. We are not 
here to understand the word passion in its vulgar and most 
limited sense, as it signifies merely anger ovfiiry; nor do 
we take it in its most extensive philosophical sense, for the 
sustai7iing the action of i\n agent; biit in the more limited 
philosophical sense, passions signify tlie various affections 
of the mind, such as admiration^ love, or hatred: this is the 
definition of the name. 

We proceed to the definition of the thing Passio7i is de* 
fined a sensation of some speciaJ comfnotv n in anitKal nature 
vc<:asioned hythe mind^s percBption of some object suited to eift* 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 109. 

cite that commotion* Here* the genus, or general nature 
o{ passion f is a sensation oj some special commotion in ani- 
mal nature; and herein it agrees with hunger, thirst, pain, 
&c. The essential difference of it is, that this commotion 
arises from a thought or perception of the mind ^w[id hereby, 
it is distinguished from hunger, thirst, or pain. 

2dly^ We must conceiveof it c(?mpZe^eZi/, oi* survey the 
several parts that compose it These are, (1 ) the mind^s 
perception of some object. (2.) The consequent ruffle^ or spc' 
cial commotion of the nerves, and blood, and animal spirits. 
And (3 ) The sensation of this imvard commotion. 

Sdli/y We must consider it comprehensively, in its various 
properties. The most essential attributes that make up its 
nature have been already mentioned under the foregoing 
heads. Some of the most considerable properties that re- 
main are these, namely, That passion belongs to all mankind 
in greater or lesser degrees : It is not constantly present with 
us, but upon some certain occasions : It is appointed by our 
Creator for various useful ends and purposes, namely, to give 
us vigour in the pursuit of what is good and agreeable to 
us, or in the avoidance of what is hurtful ; It is very prop- 
er for our state of trial in this world : It is not utterly to 
be rooted out of our nature, but to be moderated and gov- 
erned according to the rules of virtue and religion, &c. 

Athly, We must take cognizance of the various kinds of 
it, which is called an extensive conception of it. If the ob-" 
ject which the mind perceives be very uncommon^ it excites 
the passion oi admiration : If the object appears agreeable^ 
it raises love : If the agreeable object be absent and attain-^ 
ablcy it causes de5i?'e ; If likely to be obtained^ it excites 

* Since this was written, I have published a short treatise of the 
passions, wherein I have so far varied from this definition, as to call 
thena sensible commotions of onr whole nature, both soul and body 
occasioned by the mind's perceptions of sonae object, &c I made 
this alteration in the description of the passions in that book chiefly to 
include in a more explicit manner, the passions of desire and aver- 
sion, which are acts of volition rather than sensations Yet since 
some commotions^ of animal nature attend all the passions, and since 
there is always a sensation of these commotions, I shall not change 
the definition I have written here ; for this will agree to all the pas- 
sions whether they include any act of volition or not ; r40r indeed is 
tli6 matter of any great importance, Nov, IT, 172B, 

K 



no LOGIC: OR, THE Part I. 

liop^ : If U7iatfainahle, despair ^ If it be present and posses'^s^ 
ed^ it is the passion of joy : If lost^ it excites sorrow : If the 
object be disagreeable, it causes, in general, hatred or ar^r- 
sio7i: If it be absent, and yet we are in danger of it, it rais- 
es our /gar; If it be ^pr^sm/, it is sorrow, and sadness^ &c. 

dthly^ All these things and many more, which go to 
compose a treatise on this subject, must be placed in their 
proper order : A slight specimen of which is exhibited in 
this short account oT passion, and which that admirable au- 
thor Descartes has treated of at large ; though for want of 
sufficient experiments and observations in natural philoso- 
phy, there aresom^ few mistakes in his account of animal 
nature. 



SECT. XIII. 

AN ILLUSTRATION OF THESE FIVE HVLES BY SIIMILITUDES. 

THUS we have brought the first part of logic to a con- 
clusion: And it may not be improper here lo represent 
its excellencies (so far as we have gone) by general hints 
i}f'its chief design and use, as well as by a various compari* 
son of it to those instruments which mankind have invented 
for their several conveniences and improvements. 

The design of logic is not to furnish us with the perceiv- 
nig faculty, but only direct and nssist us in the use of it : It 
doth not give irs the objects of our ideas, but only casts such a 
light on those objects which nature furnishes us with, that 
they may be the more clearly and distinctly known : It 
doth not add new parts or properties to things, but it dis- 
covers the various parts, properties, relations and depen- 
dencies of one thing upon another, and by rnnking alt 
things under general and special hrnds^ it renders the na- 
ture, or any of the properties, powers, and uses of a thing, 
more easy "to be found out, when we seek in what rank of 
beings it lies, and wJierein it agrees with, and wherein it 
clifi'ers from others. 

If any comparisons would illustrate this, it may be thu$ 
represented. 

i, W]\en loeic assists us to attain a clear and disfinct 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. Hi 

conception of the nature of things by definition, it is Hke 
those glasses whereby we behold such objects disiirwtly^ as, 
by reason of their smallness, or their great distance, ap- 
pear in confusion to the naked eye : So the telescope dis« 
covers to us distant wonders in the heavens, and shews the 
milky way, and the bright cloudy spots in a very dark sky, 
to be a collection of little stars, which the eye unassisted 
beholds in a mingled confusion. Sa when bodies are too 
small for our sight to survey them distinctly, then the mic- 
roscope is at hand for our assistance, to shew us all the 
liinbs Siwd Jeatures of the most minute animals y with great 
clearness and distinction. 

II. When we are taught by logic to view a thing com- 
pletely m all its parts^ by the help of division, it has the use 
of an anatomical knife^ which dissects an aiiimal body, and 
separates the veins, arteries, nerves, rmiscles, membranes, Sfc, 
and shews us the several parts which go to the composi- 
tion of a complete animal. 

III. Wlien logic instructs us to surve}?- an object compre- 
hensively in all the modes^ properties, relations, faces, and 
appearances of it, it is of the same use as a terrestrial globe, 
which turning round on its axis represents to us all the va- 
riety of lands and seas, kingdoms 2iXid ^lations, on the sur- 
face of the earth, in a very short succession of times shews 
the situations and various relations of them to each other, 
and gives a comprehensive view of them in miniature. 

IV. When this art teaches us to distribute any extensive 
idea into its different kinds or species, it may be compared 
to the prismatic glass, that receives the sun-beams or rays 
of light, which seem to be uniform when falUng upon it, 
but it separates and distributes them into their different 
kinds siud colours, and ranks them in their proper succession. 

Or, if we descend to subdivisions and subordipate ranks 
of being, then distribution may also be said to form the re- 
semblance of a natural tree, wherein the genus or general 
idea stands for the root or stock, and the several kinds or 
species, and individuals, are distributed abroad, and repre- 
sented in their dependence and connection, like the seve- 
ral boughs^ branches, and lesser shoots. For instance let 
animal be the root of a logical tree, the resemblance is 
seen by mere inspection , though the root be not placed at 
the bottom of the page- 



112 



LOGIC : OR, THE 



Part L 



Man 



r Philip, 
James, 
Peter, 

Thomas, &c, 



Beas^t 




Animal ^ 



Bird 



Fish 



I Bear, &c. 
C Eagle, 
J Lark, 

i Duck 

I Goose, &c. 

Trout, 

Whale, 

Oyster, &c. 



5 Trot, 
( Bayard 

'^Mastifi; 
Spaniel, 
Greyhound, 

I Beagle, &c. 

English, 
Muscovy, 
Hook-Bill, &c= 



Wasp, 
Bee, &c. 
Worm, 



r Flying 

Insect^ Creepmg — ^ Ant, 
l^ I C Catterpillarj &c. 

The same similitude will serve also to illustrate the di- 
vision and subdivision of an integral whole into its several 
parts. 

When logic directs us to place all our ideas in a proper 
methodj most convenient both for instruction and memory, 
it doth the same service as the cases ofivell contrived shelves 
in a large library^ yvherein folios, quartos y octavos, and less- 
69' volumes, are disposed in such exact order, under the par- 
ticular head§ of divinity, history, mathematics, ancient and 
miscellaneous learning, &c. that the student knows where 
to find every book, and has them all as it were within his 
command at once^ because of the exact order wherein they 
are placed. 

The man who has such assistants as these at hand, in 
order to manage his conceptions and regulate his ideas, is 
well prepared to improve his knowledge, and to join these 
ideas together in a regular manner hy judgment, which is 
the second operation of the mindj and will be the subject 
of the second part of logic. 



THE 



SECOND PART OF LOGIC 



OF JUDGMENT AND PROPOSITION. 



WHEN the mind lias got acquaintance with things by 
framing ic^eas of them, it proceeds to the next operation^ 
and that is, to compare lliese ideas together, and to join 
them by affirmation^ or disjoin them by negation, accord- 
ing as we find them to agree or disagree. This act of the 
imnAiscaWeA judgment ; as wlien we have by perceptioa 
obtained the ideas o^ Plato a 'philosopher^ man innocent^ we 
form these judgments; Plato was a philosoplur : No mait 
is innocent. 

Some writers have asserted, ihsd judgrmnt consists in a 
mere perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. 
But I rather think there is an act of the will (at least in 
most cases) necessary to. form a judgment ; for, though we 
do perceive, or tliink we perceive, ideas to agree or disagree, 
yet we may sometimes refrain from judging or assenting to 
thq perception,^ for fear lest the perception should not be 
sufficiently clear, and we should be mistaken : And I am 
well assured at other times, that there are multitudes of 
judgments formed^ and a firm assent given to ide^s joined or 
disjoined^ before there is any clear perception whether they 
agree or disagree 5 and this is the reason of so m^ny false 
judgments or mistakes among men. Both these practices 
ace a ^voof^ ihdii judgment has something of the will in it^ 
and does not merely consist in perception; since we some- 
times j udge (though unhappily) without perceiving, a^d 
sametiojes we perceive without immediate judging. 
K2 . 



114 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. tl. 

As an idea is the result of our conception or apprthensiony 
so ^proposition is the effect of judgment. The foregoing 
sentences, which are examples "of the act of judgment, are 
properly called propositions. Plato is a philosopher, &c. 

Here let us consider, 

1. The generkl nature of a proposition, and the parts of which it is 

composed, 

2. The various divisions or kinds of propositions. 

3. The springs of false judgment, or the doctrine of prejudices. 

4. General directions to assist us in judging right. 

5. Special rules to direct us in fudging particular objects. 



GHAPTER I. 



OF THE NATURE OF A PROPOSITION, AND ITS 
SEVERAL PAftTS. 

A PROPOSITION is a sentence wherein two ar more 
ideas or terms are joifted or disjoined by one affirmation or 
negation, as Plato was a philosopher : Every angle is form' 
ed hy two lines meeting : No man living on earth can be 
completely happy. When there are ever so many ideas or 
terms in the sentence, yet if they are joined or disjoined 
merely by one single affirmation or negation, they are 
properly called but one proposition^ though they may be 
resolved into several propositions which are implied there- 
in, as will hereafter appear. 

In describing a proposition, I use Ihe word terms as well 
as ic^^as, because, when mere ideas are joined in the mind 
without words, it is rather called a judgment ; but when 
clothed with words it is called 3. proposition^ even though 
it be in the mind only, as well as wJien it is expressed by 
speaking or writing. 

There are three things which go to the nature and con- 
stitution of a proposition, namely; \\i^ mhject^Wi^ predicate^ 
and the copaif^. 



Chap. L RIGHT USE OF REASON. 115 

The subject of a proposition is^ that concerning which 
any thing is affirmed or denied : So Plato^ angle, man liv 
ing on earth, are the subjects of the foregoing propositions. 

The predicate is that which is affirmed or denied of the 
subject; so philosopher is the predicate of the first propo- 
sition ; formed by two lines meeting, is the predicate of thcr 
second ; capable of being completely happy, the proper jror 
(licat^ of the third. 

The subject and predicate of a proposition taken together,, 
are called the matter oiWy for these are the materials oC 
which it is made. 

The copula is iheform of a proposition ; it represents 
the act of the mind affirming or denying, and it is ex- 
pressed by the words, a^m^ art, is, are, <fec. or am not, art 
not, is not, are not, &c. 

It is not a thing of importance enough to create dispute, 
whether the words, no, none, not, never, &c. which disjoin 
the idea or terms in a negative proposition, shall be called 
a part of the subject of the copula, or of the predicate. 
Sometimes p(5rhaps they may seem most naturally to be 
included in one and sometimes in the other of these, 
though a proposition is usually denominated affirmative or 
negative itom lis copula, as hereafter. 

]Vb/e 1 .— Where^ each of these partsof a proposition is 
not expressed di-stinctly in so many words, yet they are all 
understood^ and implicitly contained therein 5 as Socrates 
disputed, is a complete proposition, for it signifies Socrates 
was disputing^ So I die, signifies J am^ dying. I can write, 
that is, lam able to write. In Latin and Greek one single 
word is Hiany times a complete composition. 

Note, ^-^Ihese YfmA^nam^ art, 2>, &c. when they are 
used alone without any other predicate, signify both the 
aotofthe mind judging, which includes the copula and sig- 
nify also actual existence, which is the predicate of that 
proposition So Rome is, signifies Kome is existent : There 
are some strange monsters : that is. Some strange monsters 
are existent ; Carthage is no more, that is, Carthage has no 
being 

Note 3. — The subject and predicate of a proposition are 
not always to be known and distinguished by the placing 
of the words ia the geatence^ bui by reflecting duly on the 



116 LOGIC: OR, THE Part 11, 

sense of the words^ and on the mind and design of the 
speaker or writer : As if I say, Li Jfrica there are many 
lions, I mean many lions are existent in Africa : Many lions^ 
is the subject, and existent in Africa is the predicate. 
It is jproperfor a pkilosapher to understand geometry ; here 
the word proper is the predicate, and all the rest is the 
subject, except Is the copula. 

Note 4. — The subject and predicate of a proposition 
ought always to be iwo different ideas^ or two different 
terms ^ for, where both the terms and ideas are the same, it 
is called an identical proposition^ which is mere tricing, and 
cannot tend to promote knowledge ; such as, A rule is a 
rule, or A good man is a good man.. But there are some 
propositions, wherein the tenns of the subject and predicate 
seem to be the same; yet the ideas B.re not the same; 
nor can these be called purely identical or trifling proposi- 
tions : such as Home is home^ that is Hoine is a concenient 
or delightsome place ; Socrates is Socrates still ; that is, Th& 
inan Socrates is still a philosopher : The hero was not a hero, 
that is, The hero did not sheiv his courage ] fV hat I have 
written^ I have written; that is. What I ivrote I still approve ^ 
and will not alter it : What is done is done ; that is, it can- 
not he undone. It may be easily observed in these proposi- 
tions the term is equivocal^ for in the predicate it has a dif- 
ferent idea from what it has in the subject. 

There are also some propositions whereia the terms of 
the subject and predicate differ, but the ideas are the same ; 
and these are not merely identical or trifling propositions j 
as impudent is shameless; a billow is^a wave; or fluctus 
(in Latin) is a wave ; a globe is a round body. In these 
propositions^ either the words are explained by a definition 
of the name, or the ideas by a definition of the ihiiig, and 
.therefore they aie by no means useless when formed for 
this purpose. 



Chap. IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. tlT 

CHAPTER n. 

OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS* 

PROPOSITIONS may be distributed into various 
kinds> according to their subject^ their copula^ Xheir predi- 
caiCf their nature or composition, their sensCy and their evU 
denccy which distributions will be explained in the follow- 
ing sections. 

SECT. I. 

OP UNIVERSAL, PAETICULAR, INDEFINITE, AND SINGULAR 

PROPOSITIONS. 

PROPOSITIONS m2cy be drvided, according to their 
siibjecty into universal and particular ; this is usually call- 
ed a division arising from the quantity. 

An universal proposition is when the subject is taken ac- 
cording to the whole of its extension ; so, if the subject 
be a genus^ or a general nature, it includes all '\i% species or 
kinds: If the subject be a 5peae5, it includes all individu- 
als. This universality is usually signified by these words, 
allj every, no, none, or the like ; as, All must die : No man, 
is almighty: Every creature had a beginnings 

A particular proposition^ is when the subject is not ta- 
ken according to its whole extension 5 that is, when the 
term is limited and restrained to some one or more of those 
species or individuals whose general nature it expresses 
but Veaches not to all 5 and this is usually denoted bv the 
words, some, many, few, there, are, which, &c. as Some birds 
can sing well ; Few men are truly wise : There are parrots 
ivhich will talk an hundred things. 

A singular proposition is when the subject is a singulai: 
or individual term or idea : as, Descartes was an inge7iious 
philosopher : Sir Isaac Newton has far exceeded all his prede^ 
cessors: The palace at Hampton Court is a pleasant dwelling : 
This day is very cold. The subject here must be taken »€«■ 



118 LOGIC : OR, THE Part II. 

cording to the whole of its extension, because, being an 
individual^ it can only extend to one, and it must therefore 
be regulated by the laws of universal propositions , 

An indefinite propositiofi, i^ when no note, either of uui- 
versaiity or particularity, is prefixed to a subject, which 
is in its own natore general 5 as, A planet is ever changing 
its place: AngeU are nohh creatures. Now this sort of 
proposition, especially when it describes the nature of 
things, is usually counted universal also, and it supposes 
the subject to be taken in its whole extension : For, if 
there were any plauet which did not change its place^ or 
an}'' angel that were not a noble creature, these propositions 
would not be strictly true. 

Yet, in order to secure us against mistakes in judging 
o[%miversal, particular and indefinite propositions, it is ne- 
cessary to make these following remarks. 

I. Concerning universal propositions. 

Note 1. — Universal terms may either defiote a meta- 
physical, 3,phyical or a moral universality. 

A metaphyical ar matheniatical universality, is, when all 
the particulars contained under any general idea have the 
same predicate belonging to them, without any exception 
whatsoever; or when the predicate is so essential to the uni- 
versal object, that it destroys the very nature of the subject 
to be without it; as, All circles have a centre and ^ cir- 
cumference: All spirits in their own nature are immortal. 

A physical or natural universalit}^, is when, according 
to the order and common course of nature, a predicate 
agrees to all the subjects of that kind, tliough there may be 
some accidental and preternatural exceptions ; as All men 
use words to express their thoughts, yet dwnb persons are 
excepted, for they cannot speak. All beasts I•a^e four 
feet, yet there may be some monsters with five; 01: maimed 
who have but three. 

A moral universality, is when the predicate agrees to 
the greatest part of the particulars which are contained 
under the universal subject ; as All negroes are stupid crea- 
tures : All men are governed by afiection rather than by 
reason : All the old Romans loved their country : And the 
scripture uses this language, when St. Paul telLs us, TAa 
Greie^ are always liars. 



Chap, II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 119 

Now it is Evident, that a special or singular conclusion 
cannot be inferred from a moral universality^ nor always 
and irifaiLbly from a physical one, though it may be always 
inferred from an universality which is metaphysical^ with- 
out any danger or possiWlity of a mistake. 

Let it be observed also, that usually we make little or no 
distinction in common language, between a subject that 
is physically or metaphysically universal, 

Noie2. — An universal term is sometimes i^keu coUec*- 
lively for all its particular ideas united together, and some- 
times distrihuHvely, meaning each of them single and alone. 

Instances of a collectively universal are such as these : All 
these apples will Jill a bushel : All the hours of the night are 
sufficient for sleep: All the rules of Grammar overload the 
memory. In these propositions it is evident, that the pre- 
dicate belongs not to the individual, separately ^ but to the 
whole collective idea; fov we cannot affirm the same predi*- 
cate if we change the word all into one or into evei^y we 
cannot say one apple or every apple ivillfUla bushel. Now 
such a collective idea^ when it becomes the suhject of a 
proposition, ought to be esteemed as one single thing; and 
this renders the propositions singular or indefinite^ as we 
shall shew immediately . 

A distributive univei^al will allow the word all to be 
•hanged into every , or into one^ and by this means is dis- 
tinguished from a colled ive. 

Instances of a disirihulive universal are the most common 
on every occasion ; as, All men are mortal : Every man is 
a sinner^ &c. But; in ih\^ sovt o^ universal there is a dis- 
tinction to be made, wl.ich follows in the next remark. 

ISiote -3. — When an universal term is taken distributivelyy 
sometimes it includes all the individuals contained in its 
inferior spec'es : As when I sa}-, Every sickness has a teii- 
dency to death ; I mean etei^ individtkil sithiess^ as well as 
every kind. But sometimes it includes no more than mere- 
ly each species or kind; as, when the Evangelist says, Christ 
healed every disease, or every disease ivas healed by Christ; 
that is, every kind of disease. The first of these logicians 
cdll the distribution of an universal in singula generum; 
the 7a5^ is a distribution in genera singuforum. Bui, ei- 
ther of them joined to the subjecti- render a proposition 
univer^aL 



120 LOGIC: OR, THE Part IL 

NoU 4. — The universality of a subject is often restrained 
by a part of the predicate; as when wae say, AH men learn 
wisdom by experience : the universal subject, all men^ is 
limited to signify only all those men who learn wisdom. The 
scripture also uses this sort of language, when it speaks of 
^*all men being jusiifieci by the righteousness of one/^ Ro. 
V. 10 that is, all men who are justified obtain it in this way. 

Observe here, That not only a metaphysical or natural, 
but a moral universality also is ofteniinies to be restrained 
by a part of the predjcate;; as when we say. All the Dutch 
are good seamen: All the Italians are subtil politicians; 
that is, those among the Dutch that are seamen are good 
seamen ; and those among the Italians who ar« politicians 
are subtil politicians, that is, they ar« generally so 

Note 5. — The universality of a term is many times re- 
strained by the particular time, place, circumstance, &c. 
or the design of the speaker; as, if we were in the city of 
London, and say, All the weavers went to present their pe- 
tition ; we mean only. All the weavers who dwelt in the 
city. So when it is said in the gospel, All men did mar- 
vel, Mark v, 20. it reaches only to All those men who 
heard of the miracles of our Saviour. 

Here also it should be observed, that a moral universality 
is restrained by time, place, emd other circumstances, as well 
as a natural ; so that by these means the word all some- 
limes does not extend to a tenth part of those who at first 
might seem to be included in that word. 

One occasion of these difficulties and ambiguities,that be- 
long to wmtJergaZ propositions h the common humor and 
temper of mankind, who generally have an inclination to 
magnify their ideas, and to talk roundly and umversally 
concerning any thing they speak of; wliich has introduced 
universal terms of speech into custom and habit, in all 
nations and all languages, more than nature or reason 
would dictate; yet, when this custom is introduced, it is 
not at all improper to use Uiis sort of language in solemn 
and sacred writings, as well as in familiar discourse. 

II Remarks concernwg indejinite propositions. 

Note 1. — Propositions carrying in them universal forms 
of expression may sometimes drop the note af universalitij 
and become indefinite and yet retain the same universal 



Chap. IL RIGHT USE OF BEASON, 121 

sense, whether metaphysical^ natural^ or moral, whether 
collective or distributive^ 

We may give instances of each of these. 

Metaphysical ; as, A circle has a centre arid circumference. 
Natural 5 as, Beasts have four feet. Moral ; as, Negroes 
are stupid creatures. Collective; SiS^ The apples will Jill a 
bushel. Distributive ; a-, Men aremortul. 

Note 2. — There are laiany cases wherein a collective idea 
is expressed in a proposition by an indefinite term, and 
that wheie it describes the nature or quality of the subject, 
as well as when it declares some past matters of fact; as, 
Fir trees set in good order will give a charming prospect ; 
this must sigJiify a collection, for one makes no prospect. 
In matters of fact this is more evident and frequent; as^ 
The Romans overcame (he Gauls : The robbers surrounded, 
the coach: The wild geese few over the Thames in the form 
of a wedge. All these are collective subjects. 

Note 3. — In indefinite propositions the subject is often re- 
strained by the predicate, or by the Special time, place, or 
circumstances, as well as in propositions which are ex« 
pressly universal ; as, The Chinese are ingenious silk weav- 
ers ; that is, those Chinese which are silk-weavers are m- 
genious at their work. The stars appear to us when the 
twilight is gone; this can signify no more than the stars 
which are above our horizon. 

Note 4. — All these restrictions tend to reduce some in- 
definite propositions almost into particular^ as will appear 
under the next remarks. 

1 1 1. Remarks concerni n g particular propositions. 

Note 1.— As particular propositions may sometimes be 
expressed indefinitely , without any notie of particularity 
prefixed to the subject ; as, In times of confusion laws are 
not executed: Men of virtue are disgraced, and murderers eS'> 
cape ; that is^ some laws^ some men ofvirtiiCy some murder^ 
ers : Unless we should call this languagfe amoral universal^ 
ity, though I think it can hardly extend So far. 

Note 2.^^The words some, a few, &C. though they gen- 
erally denote a proper particularity^ yet sometimes they 
espvoss ei collective idea; as, Some of the memies beset the 
general around: A few Greeks woiild beni a thousund In^ 

h 



122 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 

I conclude this section with a few general remarks oa 
this subject, namely. 

Gen. Rem. I. Since Universal, indefinite and particular 
terms, in the plural number, may either be taken in a col-- 
iective or distributive sense, there is one short and easy 
'Way to find when they are collective, and when distributive ; 
jiamely, if the plural number maybe cli^anged ir4o the sin- 
gular, that is, if the predicate will agree to one single sub- 
ject, it is a distribuHve idea ; if not, it is collective. 

Gen Rem. JI. Universal and particular terms, in the plu- 
yal number; such as, all, some, few, many, Sfc when they 
are taken in their distributive sense, represent several sin- 
gle ideas ; and when they are thus affixed to the subject 
of a proposition, render that proposition, universal or parr 
iicular, according to the universality or particularity of 
the terms affixed. 

Gen Rein. HI. Universal ^w(}l particular terms, in the 
plural number, taken in their collective sense, represent 
generally one collective idea. 

If this one collective idea be tiius represented, (whether 
by universal or particular terms) as the subject of a prop- 
osition, which describes the nature of a thing, it properly 
Hiakes either a singular or an indefinite projwsition ; for 
the words all^ some, a few, &c* do not then denote the 
giean^i/i/ of the proposition, but are esteemed merely as 
terms which connect Uie individuals together, in order to 
com\io^e one collective idea . Observe tiiese instances ; All 
the sycamores in the gajden would make a l^) ge grove ; that 
is, tins one collection of S3^camore, which h a singular idea. 
Some of the sycamores, in t!ie garden vtould make a fine 
grove : sycamores wouicJ make a noble grove : In these 
last the subject is rather indefinite than siugnhr. But it is 
very evident, that in each of these pro]»osi<h»ns the predi- 
cate can only belong to ^.collective idea, and therefore ilyd 
subject must be esteemed a collective. 

If iW\s collective idea (whether represented by universal 
or particular terms) be used in desciibing past matters of 
fact, then it is generally to be esteemed a si7igular idea, 
and renders the proposition si7igu!.ar; ^^^All the scddiers 
of Alexander made but a little army: A fw Macedonians 
vanquished the large army tf Darius : ^^iome grenadiers in 
the camp plundered aid the ■neighbouring towns. 



GftAp. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON, 123 

Now we have shewn before, that if a proposition describe 
ing the 7iatufe of things has an mdefinitt subject, it is gen- 
erally to be esteemed universal in its prepositional sense 5 
And J if it has a singular subject y m its propositional sens^ 
it is always ranked with wiiversals.' 

After all, we must be forced to confess, that the lan- 
guage of mankind, and the idioms of speech, are so ex- 
ceeding various, that it is hard to reduce them to a few 
rules; and, if we would, gain a just and precise idea of ev- 
ery universal particular and indefinite expression, we must 
not only consider the pecuhar idioms of the language, but 
the time, the place, the occasion, the circumstances of the 
matter spoken of, and thus penetrate, as far as possible^ 
into the design of the speaker or writer. 



SECT. IL 



OP AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS; 



WHEN a proposition is considered with regard to its 
copula^ it m?y be divided into affirmative and negative $ 
for it is the copula }o\ns or. disjoins the two ideas. Others 
call this a division of propositions according to their qual- 
ity, . 

An affinnativt proposition is when the idea of the' predi- 
cate is supposed to agree to the idea of the subject, and is^ 
joined to it by the word fs, or are^ which is the copula ; as, 
All men are sinners. But, when the predicate is not sup- 
posed to agree with the subject, and is disjoined from if 
by the particles, is not y are not, &c, the proposition is 7ie* 
gative ; as Man is not innocent ; or, No man is innocents. 
In an affirmative proposition, we assert one thing to be* 
long to another, and, as it were, unite them in tliought 
and word : In negative propositions, we separate one 
thing from another and deny their agreement. 

It may seem something odd, that two ideas or terms are 
said to be disjoined by a copula : But, if we can but suppoijC 



lU LOGIC: OR, THE Part II. 

the negaitive particles do really belong to the copula of 
negative propositions, it takes away the harshness of the 
expression ; and, to make it yet softer, we may consider 
that the predicate and subject may be properly said to be 
joined in a form of words as a proposition, by connective 
particles in grammar or logic, though they are disjoined 
in their sense and signification. Every youth who has 
learned his grammar, knows there are such words as dis^ 
junctive proposmofu. 

Several things are worthy our notice on this subject. 

Note 1st. — As there are some terms y or words, and ideas ^ 
(as I have shewn before) concerning which it is hard to de- 
termine whetJi^r they are negative or positive, so there are 
%ome propositions concerning which it may be difficult to 
say whether they affirm or deny : As, when we say, Plato 
was no fool : Cicero was no unskilful orator : Csesar made 
no expedition to Muscovy : An oyster has no part like an 
eel: It is not necessary for a physician to speak French i 
and for a physician to speak French is needless. 

^YkQ sense of these propositions is very plain and easy, 
though logicians might squabble perhaps a whole day, 
whether they should rank them under the names of nega^ 
Uve or affirmative. 

Note 2d, — In Latin and English, two negatives joined 
in one sentence make an affirmative f as when we declare 
No man is not mortal ; it is the same as though we said, 
Man is mortal. But, in Greek, and oftentimes in French, 
two negatives make but a stronger denial. 

Note 3 A — If the mere negative term not be added to the 
copula of an universal affirmative proposition, it reduces it 
to a particular negative ; as, ^11 men are not wise, signifies 
the same as, Some men are not wise. 

Note 4th. — In all affirmative propositions, the predicate 
is taken in its whole comprehension ; that is, every essen- 
tial part and attribute of it is affirmed concerning the sub- 
ject ; as when I say, j4 ti-'ue christian is an honest man, eve- 
ry thing that belongs to honesty is affirmed concerning a 
true christian. 

Note ^th. — In all neg^ative propositions the predicate is 
takeu in its whole exten.^iQn ; that is, every ,5pecies and 



Cha?. II. RIGHT USE OF REASOxV. 123 

individual that is contained in the general idea of the pred- 
icate, is utterly denied concerning tlie subject.: So ni this 
proposition, A spirit is not an animal, we exclude all sorts 
and kinds and particular animals whatsoever from the idea 
of a spirit. 

From these two last remarks we may derive this infer- 
ence, that we ought to attend to the entwe comprehension of 
our ideas,^ and to the universal extension of them, as far as 
we have proper capacity for it, before we grow too confi- 
dent of our affirming or denying any thing which may 
have the least darkness, doubt or difficult/ attending it i 
It is the want of this attention that betrays us into many 
mistakes. 



SECT. IIL 

OF THE OPPOSITION AND CONVERSION OP PROPOSITIONS, 

ANY two ideas being joined or disjoined in various 
forms, will affi>rd us several propositions. All these may 
be distinguished according to their quantity and their qiml* 
ity* into four, which are marked or denoted by the letters, 
A, E, I, O, thus : 

f Universal affirmative, 
denotes J Universal negative. 

^ j Particular affirmative. 
l^ Particular negative, 
according' to the old Latin rhymes— 

Asserit A, negat E, verum generaliter amhae. 
Asserit I, negat O, sed, particulariter amOo, 
This may be exemplified by these two ideas, a vine and. 
a tree* 

\ A Every vine is a tree. 
E No vine is a tree, 
I Some vine is a tree- 
O Some vine is not a iree^ 






^ The reader should remember bere^ that a proposition according^ 
to its quantity is called universal or particular ; and according to its 
<3i«ality, it is either affirmative or nesatiye. 



126 LOGIC : OR, THE Paet. II; 

The logicians of the schools have written many large 
trifles concerning the opposition and cotiversions of proposi- 
tions. It will be sufficient here to give a few brief hints of 
these things, that the learner may not be utterly ignorant 
of them. 

Propositions which are made of the same subject and 
predicate, are said to be opposite^ when that which is deni- 
ed in one is affirmed in the other, either in whole or in 
part, without any consideration whether the propositions 
be true or not. 

If they differ both in quantity and qnality, they are call- 
ed contradictory ; as, 

A Every vine is a ^ 

tree f These can never be both true or both 

OSome vine is not \ false at the same lime. 
a tree, J 

If two universals differ in quahty, they are contraries ; a5, 

A Eveiy vine is a^ 

tree. ! These can never be both true together^ 

E No vine is a \ but they may be both false. 

tree, ^ 

If two particular propositions differ in quality, they are 
^ihcontraries ^ as, 

I Some vine is a 7 

tree, I These may be both true together, but 

O Some vine is not f they can never be both false. 

a tree, } 

Both particular and universal propositions, which agree 
in quality, but not in quantity^ are called subaltern^ though 
these are not properly opposite; as, 

A Every viiu is a tree. 
I Some vine is a tree. 
Or thus : — E No vine is a tree, 

O Some vine is not a tree. 

The canons of subaltern propositions are usually reckon- 
ed these three ; namely, (1.) If an universal proposition 
he true, tl]Q particular will be true silso^ but not on the 



Chap, II. RIGHT USE OF REASOPf. 1^7 

contrary. And (2.) K sl particular proposition be false^ 
ihe universal must be false too, but not on the contrary. 
(3.) Subaltern propositions y whether universal or particular,, 
may sometimes be both tiue, and sometimes both false. 

The conversion oj propositions^ is when the subject and 
predicate change their places with preservation of the truth* 
This may be done with coustant certainty in all universal 
negatives and particular affirmatives ; as, iVo spirit is an ani* 
maly may be converted. No animal is a spirit : and, Some 
tree is a vine, may be converted, Some vine is a tree. But 
there is more of formal trifling in this sort of discourse 
than there is of solid improvement, because this sort of 
cmiversion arises merely from the form of words, as con- 
uecied in a proposition, rather than from ihe matter. 

Yet it may be useful to observe, that there are some 
propositions, which, by reason of the ideas or matter of 
-which they are composed, may be converted with con- 
stant truth : Such are those propositions whose predicate 
is a nominal or real definition of the subject, or the differ- 
ence of it, or a property of the fourth kind, or a superla^^ 
tive degree of any property or quality whatsoever ; or, in 
short wheresoever the predicate and the subject have ex- 
actly the same extension, or the same comprehension ; as, 
Every vine is a tree bearing grapes j^ and, Every tree bear^ 
ing grapes is a vine : Religion is the truest wisdom; and, TAd 
truest wisdom is religion : Julius Caesar was the first emperor 
•f Rome J and, The first emperor Rome was Julius Ccesar* 
These are the propositions which are properly convertiblej^^ 
and they are called reciprocal propositions. 



SECT. IT- 



©r PURE AND MODAL PROPOSITIONS. 



ANOTHER division of propositions among the schol- 
^s^tic writers is iuto;>wre and modal. This may be called 
Qbr distinction sake) a division according to the predicate* 



128 LOGIC: OR, THE Part II. 

When a propostion merely expresses that the predicate 
is connected with the subject, it is called a pure proposition ;. 
SiSy Every true Christiaji is an honest man. But, when it 
also includes the way and manner wherein the predicate iSL 
connected with the subject, it is called a modal proposition ; 
as when< l say, Jj( is necessary that a true Christian should b& 
an honest mem*. 

Logical writers generally make the modality of this prop- 
osition to belong to the copula, because it shews the man- 
ner of the connection between the subject and predicate. 
Buf, if the form of^he seRtence ^s 3, logical proposition be 
duly considered, the mode itself is the very predicate of the 
proposition, and it must run thus; That a true Christian 
should be an honest man is a necessary things and then the 
whole primary proposition is included in the subject of the 
modal proposition. 

There ixxefour modes of connecting the predicate with 
the subject, which are usually reckoned upon this occa- 
sion, namely, necessity and contingency y wiiich are two oppo* 
sites ; possiiility and impossibility which are also opposites ; 
as, It is necessary that a globe should be round : That a 
globe be n^ade of wood or glass, is a necessary or contin- 
gent thing : It is impossible that a globe should be square ;. 
It is possible that a globe niay be made of water. 

With regard to the modal propositions which the schools 
have introduced, I would make these two remarks. 

Remark 1. These propositions in English are formed by 
the resolution of the words, must be, might not bi, can be^ 
and cannot be^ into those more explicate forms of logical 
copula and predicate, is necessary ^ is contingent, is possible, 
is impossible : For it is necessary that a ghbe should be round^ 
signifies no more than than that a globe must be round. 

Remark 2. Let it be noted, that this quadruple modality 
is only an enumeration of the natural modes or manners 
wherein the predicate is connected with the subject : We 
might also describe several moral and civil modes of con- 
necting two ideas together, namely, lawfulness and unlawful" 
ness, conveniency and znconveniency, &c. whence we may form 
sod. modal propositions as these; It is unlaw tul for any per- 
son to kill auniuQceat man. It is unlawful for Christians 



Ghap, II, RIGHT USE OF REASON. 129^ 

to eat flesh in lent : To tell all that we think is inexpe- 
dient : for a man to be aifabie lo his neighbor is very con«^ 
venient, &c. 

There are several other modes of speaking whereby a 
predicate is connected with a subject : i^uch as, it rs certain, 
it is doubtfLil, it is probable, it is improbable, it is agreed, it 
is granted, it is said by the ancie its, it is written, &;c. all 
which will form other kinds of modal propositions. 

But, whether the modality be natural^ morale &c. yet in 
all tiiese propositions, it is ihemodey is the proper predicate^ 
and all the rest of the propositions, except the copula (or 
word i6',) belongs to the subject ^ e^nd thus they become 
pure propositions oC SL com/^Zejic nature, of which we shall 
treat in the next section ; so ihat there is no great need of 
making modah of a distinct &nrt. 

There are many little subtiUies which the schools ac- 
quaint us with concerning the conversion and oppositioriy 
and equipollence of these modal propositions, suited to the 
Latin or Greek tongues, rather than the English, and fit 
to pass away the idle time of a student, rather than to en^ 
rich his understanding* 



SECT. V. 

OF SINGLE PROPOSITIONS, WHETHER SIMPLE OR COMPLEX. 

WHEN w^e consider the nature of propositions^ together 
with ihefmmation of them, and divide the materials whereof 
they are made, we divide them into single ^wd compound* 

A single proposition, is that which has but one subject 
and one predicate 5 but if it has more subjects or more pre- 
dicates, it is called a compound proposition, and indeed it 
contains two or more propositions in it. 

A single proposition (which is also called categorical) 
may be divided again into simple and complex,^ 

*/Vs simple ideas are opposed to complex, and single ideas to cora» 
pound, so propositi ns are distinguished in the same manner: The 
English tongue, in tnis respect, having some advantage above the 
learned language, vrhich have no usval Vv^prd to distinguish single 
from simple. 



130 LOGIC : OR, THiE Pakt U. 

A purely simple proposition is that whose subject and pre- 
dicate are made up of single terms 5 as, Virtue is desira- 
ble : Evdy penitent is pardoned : No man is innocent. 

When the subject or predicate^ or both, are made up of 
complex terms, it is called a complex proposition ; as, Every 
sincere penitent is pardoned : Virtue is desirable for its 
own sake: No man alive is perfectly innocent. 

If the term which is added to the subject of a complex 
proposition be either essential or any way necessary to it, 
then it is called explicative^ for it only explains the subject : 
as. Every mortal man is a son of Adam. But if the term 
added to make up the complex subject does not necessarily 
Qr constantly belong to it, then it is determinative^ and 
Kmits the subject to a particular part of its extension ; as, 
Every pious man shall be happy. In the first proposition 
the word mortal is.merely explicative : In the second prop- 
osition the word pious is determinative. 

Here note, that whatsoever may be affirnried ov denied 
concerningany subject, with an explicative addition, may 
be also affirmed or denied of that subject without it^f as we 
may boldly say. Every man is a son of Adam, as well as 
every mortal man : But it is not so, where the addition is 
determinative, for we cannot say, Every man shall be hap- 
py, though eveiy pious man shall be so. 

In a complex proposition, the predicate or subject is 
sometuaes made complex by the proiroims who, which, 
whose, to whom, &c. which make another proposition; as, 
Every man who i^ pious shall be saved : Julius, whose sir 
name was Caesar, overcame Pompey : Bodies, which are 
transparent; have many pores. tJeie the wliole proposi- 
tion is called the primary or chief, and the additional pro- 
position is called an incident proposition. But it is still to 
be esteemed in this case merely as a part of the complex 
term, and the truth or falsehood of the whole complex 
proposition is not to be judged by the truth or falsehood of 
the incident proposition, but by the connection of the 
whole subject with the predicate. For the incident prop- 
osition may be false, and absurd, or impossible, and yet 
the whole complex proposition may be true ; as, A horse' 
which has wings might fly over the Thames* 



Chap. n. RIGHT USE OF REASON- 131 

Besides this complexion which belongs to the subject or 
-predicate, logical writers useto^ay, there is a complexion 
wliich may fa»l upon the copula also : But this F have ac- 
counted for hi the section concerning modal propositi on^s; 
and itideed it is riOt of much importance whether it were 
.placed there or here. 

SECT. VI. 

OF COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS. 

A COMPOUND proposition is made up of two or more 
^subjects or predKates, or both ; and it contains in it two or 
rinore propositici s, which are either plainly expressed, or 
concealed and implied. 

The first sort of compound propositions are those whereiu 
the composition is expressed and evident, and they are 
^istin^i ished into these six kinds, namely, copulative, dis- 
junctive, conditional, causal, relative, and discretive. 

I. Copulative propositions, are those which have more 
subjects or predicates connected by affirmative ur negative 
conjunctions ; as. Riches and honor are temptations to 
pride: Caesar conquered the l^auls and Britous : Neither 
gold or jewels will purchase immortality. These proposi- 
tions are evidently compounded, for each of them may be 
resolved into two propositions, namely. Riches are tempt- 
ations to pride J and Honor is a temptation to pride 5 and 
so the rest. 

The truth of copulative propositions depends upon the 
truth of all the parts of them j for ifCsesar had conquered 
the Gauls, and not the Britons, or the Britons, and not the 
Gauls, the second copulative proposition had not heen true. 

Here note. Those propositions, which cannot be resolved 
into two or more simple propositions, are not properly 
co))ulative, though two or more ideas be connected and 
coupled by such conjunctions, either In the subject or pre- 
dicate; fif.5 Two and three make five : Majesty and meekness 
do not ofven meet: The sun, moon, and stars, are not all 
to be seen at once. Such propositions are to be ester med 
merely complex, because the predicate cannot be affirmed 
of each single subjectj but only all of thejn together as a 
collective subject. 



1S2 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. IL 

II. Disjunctivepropositions^ave when the pavts are dis- 
joined or opposed to one another by disjunctive particles ; 
as, It is either day or night : The weatlier is either shining 
or rainy : Quantity is either length, breadth, or depth. 

The truth of disjunctives depends on the necessary and 
immediate oppositions of the parts ; therefore only the last 
of these examples is true; but the two first are not strictly 
true, because twilight is a medium between day and night $ 
and dry cloudy weather h a medmmhetvfeen shining and 
raining. 

HI. Conditional or hypothetical propositions ^ are those 
whose parts are united by the conditional part'cle i/; as, 
J/* the sun be fi^ed the earth must move : If there be no 
fire, there will be no smoke. 

Note — The first part of these propositions, or that where- 
in the conditional is Contained, is called the antecedent, the 
other \s C8i\\tid the consequent. 

The truth of these piopositions depends not at all on the 
truth or falsehood of their two parts, but on the truth of 
the connection of them ; for each part of them may be ^Ise, 
and yet the whole proposition true; aSj If there be no 
providence, there will be no future punisijment* 

IV. Causal propositions, are wliere two propositions are 
joined by causal particles; as, Houses were not built that 
they might be destro} ed : Rehoboam waB unhappy because 
lie followed fevil counsel 

The truth of a lixusdl proposition arises hot from the 
truth of the parts, but from the causal iit/lnence that the 
one part has upon the other; for both parts may be true, 
yet the proposition false, if one part be not the cause of 
the other. 

Some logicians refer reduplicate propositions to thiis 
place ; as, Men, considered as men, are rational creatures, 
that is, becmise tfiey are men. 

V. Relative proposHunis have their partsjoined by such 
particles as ex])iess a relation or comparison of one thing 
to another ; as. When you are silent 1 will speak : As much 
Es you are worth so much shall you beiSleemed : .As i| 
the father, so is the son : Where there is no tale-l>eaie'rf 
tJonteation wiil ceajsfe; 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 133 

These are very much akin to conditional propositions, 
and the truth of them depends upon the justness of their 
connection. 

VI. Discretiv^ propositions are such wherein various and 
seemingly opposite judgments are made, whose variety or 
distinction is noted by the particles, but, ihough,yet^ Sfc. as, 
Travellers may change their climate but not their temper : 
Job was patient, though his grief was great. 

The truth and goodness of a discretive proposition depends 
on the truth of both parts, and their contradistinction to 
one another; for, though both parts should be true, yet if 
there be no seeming opposition betv\een them, it is an use- 
less assertion, though we cannot call it a false one ; as, 
Descartes was a philosopher, yet he was a B renchman : 
The Romans were valiant, but they spoke Latin ; both 
which propositions are ridiculous, for want of a seeming 
opposition between the parts. 

Since we have declared wherein the truth and falsehood 
of these compound popositions consist, it is proper also to 
give some intimations how any of these propositions, when 
they are false, may be opposed or contradicted. 

All compound propositions, except copulatives and dis" 
aretivesy are properly denied or contradicted when the ne- 
gation affects their conjunctive particles; as, if the dis- 
junctive proposition asserts. It is either day or night ; the 
opponent says. It is not either day or night ; or. It is uot 
necessary that it should be either day or night : so the %- 
pothetical proposition is denied, by saying, It does not fol- 
low that the earth must move if the sun be fixed, 

A disjunctive pi oposition^ may be contrr dieted also by de- 
nying all the parts ; as, It is neither day nor night. 

And a causal proposition may be denied or opposed in- 
directly and improperly^ when either part of thr piopositioa 
is denied ; and it must be f^^ilse if eitlier p'jrt be false : But 
the design of the proposition being to sht^w the causal con* 
nection of the two parts, each part is supposed to be true, 
and it is not properly contradicted as a causal propt sition^ 
unless one part of it be de ied to ht: the cause of <he oiher. 

As for copulatives and discretive^, because their truth de- 
pends more on the truth of their parts, therefore these may 
be opposed or denied, as many ways as the parts of which 
M 



134 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. H. 

they are composed ra^y be denied 5 so this copulative pro- 

EositroD, Riches and honor are temptations to pride, may 
e denied by saying, Riches are not temptations, though 
honor may be : or, Honor is not a temptation, though 
riches may be : or, Neither riches nor honor are tempta- 
tions, &c. 

So this discreiive proposition, Job was patient, though 
!iis grief was great, is denied by saymg, Job was not pa- 
tient, though his grief was great : or, Job was patient, but 
his grief y. as not great: or. Job was not patient, nor was 
his ^rief great. 

We proceed now to the second sort of compound p^-oposi- 
tipns, namely, such whose composition is not expressed^ but 
latent or concealed ; yet a small attention will find two pro- 
positions included in them. Such are these th^t follow. 

1. Exclusives 5 as, The pious man alone is happy. It 
is only Sir Isaac Newton could find out true philosophy. 

2. Exceptives; as. None of the ancients but Plato well 
defended the soul's immortality. The protestants worship 
none but God. 

3 Comparatives ; as, Pain is the greatest affliction. No 
Turk was fiercer than the Spaniards at Mexico. 

Here note, That the comparative degree does not always 
imply the />05i7ii;« ; as, if I say, A fool is better than a 
knave; this does not affirm Xlmi folly is good, but that it is 
a less evil than knavery. 

4. Inceptives and desitives, which relate to the beginning 
or ending of any thing ; as. The Latin tongue is not yet 
forgotten. No man before Orpheus wrote Greek verge. 
Peter, Czar of Muscovy, began to civilize his nation. 

To these may be added contiiiiuitives ; as, Rome remains 
to this day, which includes at least two proposiiions, 
namely, Rome was, and Rome is. 

Here let other authors spend time and pains in giving 
the precise definitions in all these sorts of propositions 
which may be as well understood by their names and ex- 
amples. Here let them tell what their truth depends up- 
on, and how they are to be opposed or contradicttd 5 but 
a moderate share of common sense, with a review of what 
is said on the former compounds, will sufiice for all these 
nurposes; without tlie formality of rules. 



eBAp.IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 186 



SECT. VIL 



OP TRUE AND FALSE PROPOSITIONS. 

PROPOSITIONS are next to be considered according 
to their se7is6 or signification, and thus they are distributed 
into true amd false. A true proposition represents things as 
they are in themselves 5 but, if things are represented oth- 
erwise than they are in themselves, the proposition \s false. 

Or we may describe them more particularly thus ; a truei 
proposition joins those ideas and terms together whose ob- 
jects are joined and agree; or it disjoins those ideas and 
terms whose objects disagree, or are disjoined ; as, Every 
bird has wings : A Brute is not immortal. 

A false proposition joins those ideals or terms whose ob- 
jects disagree, or it disjoins those whose objects agree ; as. 
Birds have no wings : Brutes are immortaK 

Note — It is impossible that the same propositions should 
be both true and false at the same time, in the same sense, 
land in the same respect 5 because a proposition is but the 
representation of the agreement or disagreement of things : 
Now it is impossible that the same thing should be and not 
be, or, that the same thing should agree, and not agree, at 
the same time, and in the same respect. This is a first 
principle of human knowledge. 

Yet some propositions may seem to contradict one an- 
other, though they may be both true, but in different sens- 
es, or respects, or ttmes| aSj Man was immortal in para« 
dise, and Man was mortal in paradise. But these two pro* 
positions must be referred to different times ; as, Man &g- 
fore his fall was immortal, but at the fall he became mortaK 
So we may say now, Man is mortal^ or man is immortal^ 
if we take these propositions in different respects : as, Man 
is an immortal creature as to his soul, but mortal as to his 
body, A great variety of difficulties and seeming contra- 
dictions, both in Holy Scripture, and other writings, may 
be solved and explained ia this manner* 



136 LOGIC: OR, THE Part U. 

The most important question on this subject is this. 
What is the criterion or distinguishing mark of truth ? How 
shall we know when a proposition is really true or false ? 
There are so many disguises of truth in the world, so ma- 
ny f>itee^^ppearances of truth, that some sects have declar- 
ed there is no possibility of distinguishing truth horn false- 
hood ; and therefore they have abandoned ail pretences to 
knowledge, and maintain strenuously that nothing is to be 
Jcnown^ 

The first men of this humour make themselves famous 
in Greece by the name of sceptics^ ihat is, seekers. They 
were also called academics^ borrowing their name from aca- 
demiay their school or place of study. li\\ey taught that all 
things are 'uucertain^ though they allowed that some are 
mt'T-e probable tiian others. After these arose the sects of 
Fxjrrhonics^ so named from Pyrrho their master, who would 
not allow one proposition to be more probable than anotli* 
er ; but professed that all things are equally uncertain. 
Now all these men (as an ingenious author expresses it) 
were rather to be called a sect of liars than philosophers. 
and that censure is just for two reasons : (1.) Because they 
determined concerning every proposition that it was uncev' 
tain, and believed that as a certain truth, while they pro- 
fessed /A^re was nothing certain^ and that nothing could be 
determined concernitig truth or falsehood ; and thus their 
very doctrine gave itself the lie. (2.) Because they judged 
and acted as other men did in the common affairs of life j 
thej^ woiild neither run into fire nor water, though they pro- 
fessed ignorance and uncertainty, whether the one would 
burn, or the other drown them. 

There have been some in all ages who have too mucli 
affected this humour, who dispute against every thing, un- 
der pretence that truth has no certain mark to distinguish 
it Let U9 therefore inquire what is the general criterion 
of truth? And, in order to this, it is proper to consider 
what is the reason why we assent to those propositions 
which coiitain the most certain and iv dubitable truths, 
jsuch as these. The whole is greater than a paxt : Two 
and three make five. 

Tlie only reason why we believe these propositions to 
be true; is because the ideas of the subjects and predicates 



Chap, II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. Uy 

appear with so much clearness and strength of evidence to 
agree to each other, that the mind cannot help discerning 
the agreement, and cannot doubt of the truth of them, it is 
constrained to judge them true. So, when we compare the 
ideas of a circle and a trianghy or the ideas of an oyster 
and buUei^y, we see such an evident disagreement between 
them that we are sure that a hutterjlyis not an oyster^ nor is 
a triangle a circle. There is nothing: but the evidence of 
the agreement or disagreement between two ideas that 
makes us affirm or deny the one or the other. 

Now it will follow from hence, that a clear and distinct 
perception or full evidence of the agreement and disagreement 
of OUT ideas to one another, or to things, is a certain criteri- 
on of truth : For, since our minds are of such a make, that 
where the evidence is exceeding plain and strong, we can- 
not withhold our assent 5 we should then be necessarily ex« 
posed to believe falsehood, if cf)mplete evidence should be 
found in any propositions that are not true* But surely 
the God of perfect wisdom, truth and goodness, would nev- 
er oblige his creatures to be thus deceived 5 and therefore 
he would never have constituted us of such a frame as 
would render, it naturally impossible to guard against er- 
rour. 

Another consequence is naturally derived from the for- 
mer, and that is, that the only reason why we fall into 
mistake, is because we ate impatient to forrii a judgment 
of thiiigs before we. have axlear and evident perception of 
their agreement or disagreement ; and, if we will make 
haste to judg^e while our ideas are obscure and confused, 
or before we see whether tbey agree or disagree, we shall 
plunge ourselves into perpetual errors. See more on this 
subject in an Essay on th$ Freedom of will in God and Man^ 
published in 1732, section 1; page 13.; 

Note — -What Is here asserted concerning the necessity of 
clear and distinct ideas, refers chiefly to propositions which 
we form ourselves by our own powers : As for propositions 
which we derive from the testimony of others, they will be 
aiGCOunted for in Chap. IV. 



138 LOGIC : OR, THE Part II. 



SECT. VIM. 

OF CERTAIN AND DUBIOUS PROPOSITIONS OP KNOWLEDGE AND 

OPINION. 

SINCE we have found that evidence is the great crite- 
rioxi, and the sure mark of truth, this leads us directly to 
coiij^ider propositions according to their evidence 5 and here 
we must take notice both of the different degrees of evi- 
dence, and the different kinds of it. 

Propositions, according to their different degrees of evi- 
dence, are distinguished into certain and dubious.* 

Where tiie evidence of the agreement or disagreement 
of the ideas is so strong and plain, tliat we cannot forbid 
nor delay our assent, the prop^^sition is called certain: as. 
Every circle hath a centre : The world did not create it- 
self. An assent to such propositions is honored with the 
name of knowledge. 

But when there is any obscurity upon the agreement or 
disagreement of the ideas, so that the mind does not clear- 
ly perceive it, and is not compelled to assent or dissent, 
then the proposition, in a proper and philosophical sense, 
is called doubtful or imcertain; as. The planets are inhab- 
ited , The souls of brutes are mere matter; The world 
Aviil not stand a thousand years longer ; Dido built the 
city of Carthage, &c. Such imcertain propositions are 
called opinions. 

When we consider ourselves as philosophers, or search- 
ers after truth^ it would be well if we always suspended a 
full judgment or determination about any thing, and 

* it may be objected, that this certainty and uncertainty being, 
only in the nnind, the division belongs to propositions rather, accord- 
ing to the decrees of our assent, than the degrees of evidence. But 
it may be well answered, that the evidence here intended is that 
"which appears so to the mind, and not the mere evidence in the na- 
ture of things. Bcbides (as we shall shew immediately,) the degree 
of assent ought to be exactly proportionable 10 the degree of evidence. 
And therefore the difference is not great^ wheiher propobitions be 
called certain or uncertain, according to ibe measure of evidence, or 
of assent. 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 139 

made farther inquiries, where this plain and perfect evi- 
dence is wanting : but we are so prone of ourselves to 
judge without full evidence, and in some cases the neci^s- 
sity of action in the affairs of life constrains us to judge 
and determine upon a tolerable degree of evidence, tiiat 
we vulgarly call ihose propositions certain, where we have 
but very little room or reason to doubt of them, though 
the evidence be noi complete and resistless. 

Cei^iainty, according to the schools, is distinguished into 
ohjective and subjective. ' Objedive certainry, is when the 
proposition is certanily true iiself 5^ and suhjeUive, wi en we 
are certain of the truth of it. The one is in things^ the 
oihei is in our minds. 

But let it be observed here, that every proposition in it- 
Self is Certainly true or certainly talse. For, though doubt- 
fnUiess or unceriaiitv seems to be a medium between cer- 
tain truth and certain falsehood in our minds, yet there is 
no such medium m thmgs themselves, no, not even in fu- 
ture events : For now at this lime it is certain in itself, that 
midsummer-day seven years hence will be serene, or it is 
certasn It ivlll be cloudy, though we aie uncertain and ut- 
terly ignorant what sort of a day it will be : The certainty 
of distant futurities is known to God only. 

Uncertain or dubious propositions, that is, opinions, are 
distinguished into probable or improb-ible. 

When the evidence of any proposition is greater than 
the evidence of tne conuary, then it is a probabie opinion : 
Where the evidence and arguments are stronger on the 
contrary side, we call it improbable. But, vUiile the ar- 
guments on either side seem to be equally strong, and the 
evidence for, and against any proposition appears equal to 
the mind, then in common language we call it a doubiful 
matter. We also call it a dubious or doubtful proposition, 
when there are no arguments on either side, as, Next 
Christmas-day will be a very sharp frost. And in general, 
all those propositions aredoubiful^ wherein we can perceive 
no sufficient marks or evidences of truth or falsehood. In 
such a case, the mind winch is searching for truth ought 
to remain in a state of doubt or suspense, until s-rperior ev- 
idence on one side o^* the other incline the balance of the 
judgment, and determine the probabiUty or certainty to 
ihe one side. 



140 LOGIC : OR, THE ' Part. H. 

A great many propositions which we generally believe 
or m'sbelieve in human affairs, or in the sciences, have 
very various degrees of evidence, which yet arise not to 
complete certainty, either of truth or falsehood. Thus it 
comes to pass that there are such various and almost infi- 
nite degrees of probability and improbability. To a weak 
probdbihty we should give a weak assent; and a stronger 
assent is due where the evidence is greater, and the mat- 
ter more probable. If we proportion our assent in ail 
things to the degrees of evidence, we do the utmost that 
human nature is capable of^ in a rational way to secure 
itself from error. 



SECT. IX 



OF SENSE, CONSCIOUSNESS, INTELLIGENCE, KEASON; FAITK, 
AND INSPIRATION, 

AFTER we have considered the evidence of propositions 
in the various degrees of it, we come to survey the several 
kinds of evidence or the different ways whereby truth is 
let into the mi ^d, and which produce accordingly several 
kinds of knowledge. We shall distribute them into these 
six ; namely, Sense, Consciousness, Intelligence, Reason, 
Faith, and Inspiration 3 and then distinguish the proposi- 
tions, which are derived from them> 

I. The evidence of sense is, when we frame a proposi- 
tion acx^ording to the dictates of any of our senses; so we 
judt^e that grass is green; that a trumpet gives a pleasant 
sound; that fire burns wood , water is soft, and iron is 
hard; for we have seen, heard or felt all these. It is up- 
on this.evidence of sense, that we know and beheve the 
daily occurrences of human hfe; and almost all the histo- 
ries of mankind, that are written by eye or ear witnesses, 
are built upon this pririciple. 

Under the evidence of sense we do not only include 
that knowledge which is derived to us by our outward 
senses of hearing, seeing, feeling, tasting, and smelling j 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASOiN. 141 

but that also which is derived from the inward sensa- 
tions and appetites of hunger, thirst, ease, pleasure, pain, 
weariness, rest, &c. And all those things svhich belong 
to the body ; as Hunger is a painful appetite / Light i$ 
pleasant ; Rest is sweet to the weary limhs. 

Propositions which are built on this evidence, may be 
named sensible propositions, or the dictates of sense. 

ir. As we learn what belongs to the body bv the evi- 
dence of sense, so we learn what belongs to the soul by aa 
inward consciousness, which mjiy be called a sort of inter- 
nal feeling, or spiritual sensation of what passes in the 
mind; as, I think before I speak; I desire large knowl- 
edge; 1 suspect my own practice; I studied hard to-day 5 
My conscience bears witness of my sincerity ; My soul 
hates vain thoughts ; Fear is an easy passion ; Long med- 
itation on one thing is tiresome. 

Thus it appears that we obtain the knowledge of a 
multitude of propositions, as well as of sir^gle ideas, by 
those two principles which Mr. Locke calls sensation and 
reflection : One of them is a sort of consciousness of what 
affects the body, and the other is a consciousness of what 
passes in the mind. 

Propositions which are built on this internal conscious- 
ness, have yet no particular or distinguishing name assign- 
ed to them« 

Ifl. Intelligence relates chiefly to those abstracted pro- 
positions which carry their own evidence with them, and 
admit no doubt about them. Our perception of this self- 
evidence i» any proposition is called intelligence. It is 
eur knowledge of those first principles of truth which are, 
as it were, wrought into the very nature and make of our 
minds : They are so evident in themselves to every man 
who attends to them, that they need no proof. It is tlie 
prerogative and peculiar excellence of those proposriioris 
that they can scarce either W proved, or denied : They 
cannot easily be proved^ because tiiere is nothing supposed 
to be more clear or certain, from whicii an argument may 
be drawn to prove them. Tliey cai not well be denied, 
because their own evidence is so brigi't and convincing, 
that as soon as tlie terms are understood the mind neces- 



142 LOGIC : OR, THE Part II, 

Safily assents 5 such are thes6, Whatsoever acteth hath 
a being ; Nothing has no properties; A partis less than 
the whole ; Nothing can be ihe cause of itself. 

These propositions are called axioms, or maxims, or 
first principles; these are the very foundations of all im- 
proved knowledge and reasonings, and on that account 
these have been thought to be intimate propositions, or 
truths born with us. 

Some suppose that a great part of the knowledge of an- 
gels and human souls in the separate state is obtained in 
this manner, namely, by such an immediate view of things 
in their own nature, which is called intuition. 

IV. Reasoning is the next sort of evidence, and that is, 
when one truth is inferred or drawn from others by natu- 
ral and just methods of argument ; as, if there be much 
light at midnight, I infer, it proceeds from the moon ; 
because the sun is under the earth.* If J see a cottage in 
a forest, I conclude, some man has been there and built 
it. Or when I survey the heavens and earth, this gives 
evidence ta my reason^ that there is a God who made 
them. 

The propositions" wWch I believe u^on this kind of ev- 
idence, are called conclusions, or rational truths ; and the 
knowledge that we gain this way is properly called science. 

Yet let it be noted, that the word science is usually ap- 
plied to a whole body of regular and methodical observa- 
tions or propositions, which learned men have formed 
concerning any subject of speculation, deriving one truth 
from another by a train of arguments. If this knowledge 
chiefly directs our practice, it is usually called an art. 
And this is the most remarkable distinction between an 
art and a science, namely, the one refers chiefly to prac- 
tice, the other to speculation. Natural philosophy, or 
physics, and ontology, are sciences ; logic and rhetoric 
are called arts ; but mathematics, include both art and 
science : for they have much of speculation, and much of 
practice in them. 

* Note — Since this book was wrhten^ we have had so many ap- 
pearances of the aurora borealis as reduces this inference only to ^ 
probability, 



Chap. TI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 14S 

Observe here, That, when the evidence of a proposition 
derived froin sense, consciousness, intelligence, or reason, 
is firnri and indubitable^ it produces such assent as we call 
a natural certainty. 

V. When we derive the evidence of any proposition 
from the testimony of others, it is called the evidence of 
faith : and this is a large part of our knowledge. Ten 
thousand things there are which we believe merely upon 
tlie authority or credit of those who have spoken or writ- 
ten of them. It is by this evidence that we know tiiere is 
such a country as China, and there was such a man as 
Cicero who dwelt in Rome. It is by this that most of the 
transactions inhuman life are managed: We know our 
parents and our kindred by this mean ; we know the per- 
sons and laws of our present governors, as well as things 
that are at a vast distance from us in foreign nations, or 
in ancient ages. 

According as the persons that inform us of any thing 
are many or few, or more or less wise, and fai thinly and 
credible, so our faith is more or less iii m or vvavering and 
the proposition believed is either certain or doubtful ; but 
in matters of faith, an exceeding great probability is call- 
ed a moral certainty. 

Faith is generally distinguished into divine and human, 
not with regaid to the propc^sitions that are believed, but 
with regard t6 the testimony upon which we believe 
them. Wlien God reveals any thing to us, this gives us 
the evidence of divine failii ; but what man only acquaints 
us with, produces a human failh in us; the or.e being 
built upon the word of man, arises but to moi ;il certaiiKy ; 
but the other being founded upon the word of God, arises 
to an absolute and infa^llible assurance, so far as we under- 
stand the meaning of this word. This is called supernat- 
ural certainty. 

Propositions which we believe upon the evidence of hu- 
man testimony are called narratives, relations, reports, 
historical observations, &c. b<U such as are built on divine 
testimony, are termed mauers of revelation ; and, if they 
are of great importance in rehgion, they are called arti- 
cles of faith. 



144 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IL 

There are some propositions or parts of knowledge, 
which are said \o be derived from observation and expe- 
rience, that is experience in ourselves and the observa- 
tions we have made on other persons or things ; but these 
are made up of some of the former springs of knowledge 
joined together, namely, sense, consciousness, reason, 
faiih, &c. and therefore are not reckoned a distinct kind 
of evidence. 

VI. Inspiration is a sort of evidence distinct from all 
the former, and that is. when such an overpowering im- 
pression of any proposition is made upon the mind by 
God himself, that gives a convincing and indubitable evi- 
dence of the truth and divinity of it^ So were the pro- 
phets and the apostles inspired.* 

Sometimes God may have been pleased to make use of 
the outward senses, or the inward workings of the imagi- 
nation, of dreams, apparitions, visions, and voices, or rea- 
soning, or perhaps human narration, to convey diviue 
truths to the mnid of the prophet 5 buc none of these 
wonld be sufficient to deserve the name of inspiration, 
without a superior or divine light and power attending 
them 

This sort ^f evidence is also very distinct from what we 
usually call divine faith ; for every common Christian ex- 
ercises divine faith when he believes any proposition which 
God has revealed in the bible upon this account, because 
G >d has said it, though it was by a train of reasonings 
that he was led to believe that this is the word of God. 
Whereas in the case of inspiranon, the propliet not only 
exercises divine faith in believing what God reveals, but 
he is under a superior heavenly impression, light and evi- 
dence, whereby he is assured that God reveals it. This 
is the most eminent kind of supernatural certainty. 

Though persons might be assured of their own inspira- 
tion, by some peculiar and inexpressible consciousness of 
this divine inspiration and evidence in their own spirits, 
yet it is hard to make out this inspiration to others, and 
to convince them of it, except by some a^iteccdent or con- 

* Note here, I speak chiefly of the highest kind of inspiration, 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 145 

sequent prophecies or .miracles^ or some public appearan- 
ces more than human. 

The propositions which are attained by this sort of ev- 
idence aie called inspned truths. This is divine revela- 
tion at first hand, and the dictates of God in an immedi- 
ate manner, of which theological writers discourse ai large : 
But since it belongs only to a few favourites of heaven to 
be inspired, and not tlie bulk of mankind, it is not necessa- 
ry to speak more ol it in a treatise of logic, «vhich is de- 
signed for the general improvement of human reason. 

The various kmds of evidence upon vihich we believe 
any proposition, afford us these three remarks: 

Remark I. The s?»me proposition may be known to us 
by the different kinds of evidence : That the whole is big- 
ger than a part, is known by our senses, and it is known 
by the self-evidence of the thnig to our mind. That God 
created the heavens and the earth is known to us by rea- 
son, and is known also by divine testimony or faith. 

Remark II. Among these various kinds of evidence 
some are generally stronger than others in their own na- 
ture, and give a better ground for certainty. Inward con- 
sciousness and intelligence, »s well as divine faith and in- 
s.piration, usually carry much more force with them than 
sense or human faith, which are often fallible; though 
there are instances wherein human faith, sense and reason- 
ing lay a foundation also for complete assurance, and leave 
no room for doubt. 

Reason in its own nature would always lead us into the 
truth in matters within its compass, if it were used aright, 
or it would require us to suspend our juiigment where 
there is a want of evidence. But it is our sloth, precipi- 
tancy, sense, passion, and many other things, that lead 
our reason astray in this degeiterate and imperfect state : 
Hence it comes to pass that we are guilty of so many er- 
rors in reasoning, e.^pecially about divine things, becanse 
our reason either is busy to inquire, and resolved to deter- 
mine about matters that are above our present react) 5 or 
because we mingle many prejudices gi;d sr.rret influences 
of sense, fancy, fashion, ircli" ation, &c. with our exercises 
of reason, and judge and determine according to their ir- 
regular instances. 

N 



i4C LOGIC : OR, THE Part II. 

Divine faith would never admit of any controversies or 
doublings, if we were but assured thai God had spoken, 
and that we rightly understood his meaning. 

Remark IIL The greatest evidence and certainty of 
any proposition does not depend on the variety of the 
ways or kinds of evidence whereby it is known^ but rather 
upon the strength and degree of evidence, and the clear- 
ness of that hght in or by which it appears to the mind, 
for a proposition that is known only one way may be 
much more certain, and have stronger evidence, than 
another that is sujpposed to be known many ways There- 
fore these propositions. Nothing has no proj erties ; Noth- 
ing can make itself; which areknown only by intelligence, 
are much surer than this proposition, The rainbow has 
real and inherent colours in it; or than this, The sun 
rolls round the earth : though we seem to know both 
these last by our senses, and by the common testimony of 
our neighbors. So any proposition that is clearly evident 
to our own consciousness or diving faith, is much nioe cer- 
tain to us than a thousand others that have only the evi- 
dence of feeble and obscure sensations of mere probable 
reasonings and doubtful arguments, or the witness of fal- 
lible mm, or even though all these should join together. 



CHAPTER in. 

THE SPRINGS OF FALSE JUDGMENT, OR THE 
DOCTRINE OF PREJUDICES. 

INTRODUCTION. , 

IN the end of the foregoing chapter, we have survey- 
ed the several sorts of evidence on which we build our 
assent to propositions These are indeed the general 
grounds upon which we form our judgment conceming 
things. What remains in this Second Fart of Logic is to 
point out tlie several spMT^s and causes of oi r mistakes 
in judging, and to lay down some rules by which we 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. UH 

should conduct ourselves in passing a judgment upon ev- 
ery thing that is proposed to" us. 

I confess many things which will be mentioned in the'?e 
following chapters might be as well referred to the Third 
Part of Logic, where we shall treat of Reasoning and ar- 
gument ; for most of our false judgments seem to include 
a secret bad reasoning in them; and while we shew the 
springs of error, and the rules of true judgment, we do at 
the same .time discover which arguments are fallacious, 
which reasonings are weak, and which are just and strong, 
JTet since this is usually called a judging ill, or judging 
^ell, I think we may without any impropriety treat of it 
here 5 and this will lay a sure foundation for all sorts of 
ratiocination and argument. 

Rash judgments are called prejudices, and so are the 
springs of them. This word in common life signifies an 
ill opinion which we have conceived of some <»ther person, 
or some injury done to him. But when we use the word 
in matters of science, it signifies a judgment that is form- 
ed concerning any person or thing before suiicient exam- 
ination^ and generally we suppose it to mean a false judg- 
ment or mistake : At least, it is an opinion taken up with- 
out solid reason for it, or an assent given to a propositioa 
before we have a just evidence of the truth of it, thought 
the thing itself may happen to be true. 

Sometimes these rash judgments are called preposses-* 
sionsj whereby is meant, that some particufer opmion has 
possessed the mind, and engaged the assent^ without suffi- 
cient search or evidence of the truth of it. 

There is a vast variety of these prejudices and prepos- 
sessions which attejid mankind in every age and condition 
of life; they lay the foundations of many an error^ and 
many an unhappy practice, both in the aifairs of religion, 
and in other civil concernments ; as well as in matters of 
learning. It is necessary for a man who pursues truth 
to inquire into these springs of error, that as far as possi- 
ble he may rid himself of old prejudices, and watch hour- 
ly against new ones. 

The number of them is so great, and they are so inter- 
woven with each other, as well as with the powers of hu- 
man nature, that it is sometimes hard to distinguish IheiB 



U8 LOGIC I OR, THE Part It 

apart ; yet for method's sake we shall reduce them to these 
four general heads, namely, prejudices arising from things> 
orfr^m vvordr, from ourselves, or from other persons 5 
and, after the description of each prejudice, we shall pro- 
pose one or more ways of curing it. 



SECT I. 

FREJUDtCES ARISING FROM THINGS. 

THE first sort of prejudices are those which arisd 
from the things themselves about which we judge. But 
here let it be observed, that there is nothing in the na- 
ture of things that will necessarily lead us into error, if 
we do but use our reason aright, and withhold our judg- 
ment till there appears sufficient evidence of truth. But 
since we are sa unhappily prone to take advantage of ev- 
ery doubtful appearance and circumstance of tilings to 
form a wrong judgment, and plunge ourselves into mis- 
take, therefore it is proper to consider what there is in the 
things themselves that may occasion our errors. 

I. Theob curity of some truths, and the difficulty of 
searching them out, is one occasion of rash and mistaken 
judgment. 

Some truths are difficult because they lie remote from 
the first principles of knowledge, and want a long chain 
of argument to come at them : Such are many of the deep 
things of algebra and geometry, and some of the theorems 
and problems of most parts of the mathematics. Many 
things also in natural philosophy are dark and intricate 
upo.) this account, because we cannot come at any certain 
knowledge of them without the labour of many and diffi- 
cuU, as well as chargeable experiments. 

There are other truths which have great darkness upon 
them, because we have no pjoper means or mediums to 
come at the knowledge of them. 1 hough in our age we 
have found out many of the deep things of nature, by the 
assistance of glasses and other instruments; yet wearenot 
hitherto arrived at any sufficient methods to discover the 
ghape of those little particles of matter which distinguish 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 149 

the several sapours, odours, and colours of bodies 5 nor to 
iiud what sort of atoms compose liquids or solids, and dis^ 
tinguish wood, minerals, metals, glass, stone, &c. There 
is a darkness also lies upon the actions of the intellectual or 
angelical world ; their manners of subsistance And agency, 
the power of spirits to move bodies, and the union of our 
souls with this animal body of ours, are much unknown to 
us on this account. 

Now HI many of these cases, a great part of mankind are 
not content to Le entirely ignorant; but they rather choose 
to form rash and hasty judgments, to guess at things with- 
out just evidence, to b-^lieve somethmg concerning tiiem 
before they can know them 5 and thereby fall into error. 

This sort of prejudice, as well as most others, is cured 
by patience and diligenoe in inquiry and reasoning, and a 
suspension of judgment, till we have attained some proper 
mediums of knowledge, and till we see sufficient evidence 
of the truth. 

II. The appearance of thing«< in a disguise is another 
spring of prejudice, or rash judgment. The outside of 
things, which iirst strikes us, is oftentimes different from 
their inward nature; and we are tempted to judge sud- 
denly according to outward ai3pearances. If a picture is 
daubed with many bright and glaring colours, the vulgar 
eye admires it as an excellent piece; whereas the same 
person judges very contemptuously of some admirable de- 
sign, sketched out only with a black pencil or a coarse 
paper, though by the hand of a Raphael. So the scholar 
spies the name of a new book in a public news paper, he is 
charmed with the title, he purchases, he reads with huge 
expectations, and (indsit all trash and impertinence: This 
is a prejudice derived from the appearance; we are too 
ready to judge that voluaie valuable which liad so good a 
frontispiece. The large heap of encomiums and swelling 
words of assurance, that are bestowed on quack medicineK 
injiiibhc advertisements, tempts many a reader to judge 
them infallible, and to use the pdls or the plaister, with 
vast hope and frequent disappointment. 

We are tempted to form our judg nent of persons as 
well as things by these outward apoearafices. Where 
there is wealth, equipage, and splendor, we are^reaJy ta 



150 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 

call that man liappy ; but we see not the vexing disquie- 
tudes of his soul : And when we spy a person in ragged 
garments, vveform a despicable opinion of hira too sudden- 
ly; we can hardl} think him either happy or wise, our 
judgment is so strangely biassed by outward and sensible 
things. It was through the power of this prejudice, that 
the Jews rejected our blessed Saviour ; they could not suf- 
fer themselves to believe that the man who appeared as 
the son of a carpenter was also ihe Son of God. And be- 
cause St. Paul was of tittle stature, a mean presence, and 
his voice contemptible, some of the Corinthians were temp- 
ted to doubt whether he was inspired or not. 

This prejuJice is cured by long acquaintance with the 
world, and a just observation that things are sometimes 
tetter and so iietimes worse than they appear to be. We 
ought tiieiefore to restrain our excessive forwardness to 
form our opinion of persons or things before we have op- 
portunity to search into them more perfectly. Remem- 
ber that a grey beard does not r£i;^ke a philosopher; all is 
not gold that glistens i and a rough diamond may be worth 
an immense sum. 

III. A mixture of different qualities in the same thing*?, 
is another temptation to judge amiss. We are ready to be 
carried away by that quality which strikes the iiist or the 
strongest impressions upon us, and we judge of the whole 
object according to tliat quality, regardless of all the rest ; 
or sometimes we colour over all the other quahties with 
that one tincture, whether it be bad or good. 

When we have just reason to admire a man for his vir- 
tues, we are sometimes inclined not only to neglect his 
weaknesses, but even to put a good colour crpon them, and 
to think them amiable. When we read a book that has 
many excellent truths in it, and divine sentiments, we are 
tempted to approve not only that whole book, but even all 
the writings of that author. When a poet, an orator, er a 
painter, has performed admirably in several illustrious 
pieces, we sometimes also admire his very errours, we 
mistake his blunders for beauties, and are so ignorantly 
fond as to copy after them. 

It is this prejudice th^t has rendered so many great 
scholars perfectly bigots^ siud inclined th^m to defend Ho- 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 151 

mer or Horace, Livy or Cicero, in tlieir mistakes, and 
vindicate all the foliies of their favourite author. Ii is 
IhiSj that tempts some great writers to support thi savings 
of almost ail tlie ancient fathers of the church, aud ad?- 
mire them even in tneir very reveries. 

On the other hand, if an autiioi n as professed heretical 
sentiments m religion, we lliow our scorn upoD every ihmg 
he writes, we despis*^* even his critical or mathematical 
learning, and wih haid'y allow him cosnmon sense. — If a 
poem has some biemishes in Jt, there is a set of false critics 
who decry it universally^ and will allow no beauties there. 

This sort of prejndice is relieved by learning to distin- 
guish things vvsli, and not to judge in the lump. There is 
scarce any thing in the world of nature or art, in the world 
of morahty or religion, that is perfectly uniform — There 
k a mixture of wihdom and folly, vice and virtue, good 
and evil, Ixith in men and things. We should rememb^ 
that some persons have great wit and little judgment; 
others are judicious, but not vyitty. Some are good hu- 
moured without compliment ; others have all the formali- 
ties of complaisance, but no f^ood humour, We ought to 
know that one man may be vicious and learned^ while an- 
other has virtue without learning. That many a man 
thinks admirably Avell, who has a poor uttei^ance; while 
others have a charming manner of speecli, but their thoughts 
are trifling and impertinent. Some are good neighbours, 
and courteous, and charitable towards men, who have no 
piety tow-ards God ; others are truly religious, but of mo- 
rose natural tempers. Some excellent sayings are found 
in very silly books, and some silly thoughts appear in books 
of value^ W^e should neither praise nor dispraise by whole- 
sale, but separate the good from the evil, and judge of them 
apait: The accuracy of a good judgment consists much 
in making sucii distinction;^. 

Yet let it be noted too, that in common discourse we 
usually denom.inate persons and things according to the 
major part of their ciiaracter. He is to be called a wise 
man who has bat few follies : He is a good philosopher who 
knows much of nature, atid for the most part reasons well 
in matters of human science; and that boou should be CcS* 
teemed well wt itten, which has more of good 3ense m it 
than it has of impertiaeuc^* 



152 LOGIC : OR, THE Part If. 

IV. Though a thing be uniform in its owji nature, yet 
the different lights in which it may be placed, and the dif- 
ferent views in which it appears to uf^ will be ready to ex- 
cite in us mistaken judgments concerning it Lei an erect 
cone be placed on a horizontal plane, at a great distance 
from the eve, and it appears a plain triangle 5 but we shall 
judge that very cone to be nothing but a flat circle if its 
b^^se be obverted towards us. Set a common round plate 
a little obhquely before our eyes afar off, and we shall 
think it an cival figure: But if the very edge of it be turned 
towards us, we shall take it for a straight line. So when 
we view the several folds of a changeable silk, we pronounce 
this part red, and that yellow, because of its different posi- 
tion to the light, though the silk laid smooth in oi;e light 
appears all of one c< lour. 

When we survey the miseries of mankind, and think of 
the sorrows of millions, both on earth and in heli, the di- 
vine government has a terrible aspect, and we may be 
tempted to think hardly even of God himself: But if we 
view ihe profusion of his bounty and grace among his crea- 
tures on earth, or the happy spirits in heaven, we shall 
have so exalted an idea of his goodness as to forget his 
vengeance. Some men dwell entirely upon the promises 
of his gospel, and think him all mercy: Others, under a 
melancholy frame, dwell upon his terrors and his threatnings 
and are overwhelmed with the thoughts of his severity and 
vengeance, as though there were no mercy in him. 

The true method of delivering ourselves from this pre- 
judicCj is to view a thing on all sides, to compare all the 
various appearances of the same thing with one another, 
and let each of them have its full weight in the balance of 
our judgment, befoie we fully determine our o])inion. It 
was by this mean that the modern astronomers came to 
find out that the planet Saturn hath a flat broad circle 
round its globe, which is called its ring, by observing the 
different appearances as a narrow or a broader oval, or, as 
it sometimes seems to be a straight line, in the different 
parts of its twenty nine years revolution through the eclip- 
iic. And if we take the same just and religious survey of 
^he gieat and blessed God m all the discoveries of lus 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. i5» 

vengeance and his mercy, we shall at last conclude him to 
be both just and good. 

V. The casual association of many of our ideas becomes 
the spring of another prejudice or rash judgment, to which 
we are sometimes exposed ff in our younger years we 
have taken. medicines that have b^en nauseous, when any 
medicine whatsoever is afterwards proposed to us under 
sickness, we immediately judge it nauseous : Our fancy has 
so closely joined these ideas together, that we know not 
how to separate them : Then the stomach feels the disgust, 
and perhaps refuses the only drug that can preserve life. 
So a child who has been let blood, joins the ideas of pain 
ancl the surgeon together, and he hates the sight of the 
surgeon because he thinks of his pain : Or if he has drank 
a buter potion, he conceives a bitter idea of thecup which 
held'it, and will drink nothing out of that cup. 

It is for the same reason that the bulk of the common 
people are so superstitiously fond of the psjlms translated 
by Hopkins and Sternhold, andtiiink them sacred and di- 
vine, because they have been now for n\o%2 than an hun- 
dred years bound up in the same covers with our bibles. 

The best rehef against this prejudice of association is to 
consider, whether there beany natural and necessary con- 
nection between these ideas, which fanc)^, custom, or 
chance, hath thus joined together ; and if nature has not 
joined them, let our judgment correct the folly of our im- 
agination^ and separate these ideas again* 



SECT. II> 



PREJUDICES ARISmo FROM W^ORDS. 

OUR ideas and words are so linked <ogether, that while 
we judge of things according to worus, we are led into sev- 
eral mistakes. These may be distributed under two gen- 
eral heads, namely, such as arise from single words or 
phrases, or such as arise from words joined in speech, and 
composing a discourse. 



154 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IL 

1. The most eminent and remarkfible errours of the 
first kind are these three. (1.) When our words are ih- 
significant, and have no ideas ; as when the mystical di- 
vines talk of the prayer of silence, the superjjatural and 
passive night of the soul, the vicinity of powers^ the suspen- 
sion of all thoughts : Or (2.) When our words are law, 
equivocal, and signify two or more ideas 5 as the words, 
Iaw% light, flesh, spirit, righteousness, and many other terms 
in scripture : Or (3.) When two or three words are synon- 
ymous, and signify one idea, as regeneration and new crea- 
tion in the New Testament; both which mean only a 
change of the heart from sin to holiness y or, as the Elec- 
tor of Cologn and the Bishop of Cologn are two titles of 
the same man. 

These kinds of phrases are the occasion of various mis- 
takes; but none so unhappy as thos^ in theology: both 
words without ideas, as well as synonymous and equivocal 
words, have been used and abused by the humours, pas- 
sions, interests, or by the real ignorance and weakness of 
men, to beget terrible contests among Christiarns. 

But to relieve us under all those dangers, and to remove 
these sort of prejudices which arise from sh\g]e words or 
phrases, I must remit the reader to Part T. chap. IV. whrre 
I have treated about words, and to those directions wliich 
I have given concerning the definition of names, Part I. 
chap. VI. sect 3. 

IL There is another sort of false judgments, or mistakes 
which we are exposed t6 by words ; and that is when they 
are joined in speech, and compose a discourse 5 and here 
we are in danger two ways. 

The one is, when a man writes good sense, or speaks 
much to the purpose, but he has Jiot a happy and engag- 
ing manner of expression. Perhaps he uses coarse and 
vulgar words, or old, obsolete, and unfashionable language 
or terms, and phrases that are foreign, latinized, scholastic, 
very uncommon, and hard to be understood : And this is 
still worse, if his sentences are long and intricate, or the 
sound of them harsh and grating to the ear. All these 
indeed are defects in stile, and lead some nice aud un- 
tUmking hearers or readers into au ill opinion of all 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 155 

that such a person speak*? or writes. Many an excellent 
dicourse of our forefatiiers has had abundance of contempt 
cast, upon it by our modern pretenders to sense, for want 
of their distinguishing between tne Jauguage'and the ]d«.as. 

On the other hand, when a man of eloquence speaks or 
writes upon any subject, wear- too ready to run into his 
sentiinents, being sweetly and inseusibly drawn by liie 
smoothness of h»s harargue, and the paUielio power of his 
language. Rhetoric will varnish every error, so that it 
shall appear in the dres^ <*f truih, aud put such ornaments 
upon vice, as to make it look ]?ke virtue : It is an art of 
wondrous and extensive influence : it often conceals, ob- 
scures or overwiielms the truth, and places sometimes a 
gross falsehood in a more alluring light. The decency of 
action, the music of the voice, the harmony of the periods, 
the beauty of the sivle, a^d all ttie engaging airs of the 
speaker, have ofte:n|charued the hearers into error, and 
persuaded them to approve whatsoever is proposed in so 
agreeable a manner. A large assembly st^^nds exposed at 
once to the power of these prejudiaes, and imbibes them 
all. So Cicero and Demosthenes made the Romans and 
the Atrjenians believe almost whatsoever they pleased. 

Theb:st defence against both tl^ese dangers, is to learn 
the skill (as much as possible) of separating our thoughts 
and ideas from words aud phrases, to judge of the things 
in their own natures, and in their natural or just relation to 
one another, abstracted from the use of language, and to 
maintain a steady and obstinate resolution, to hearken to 
nothing but tru h. in whatsoever style or dress il appears. 

Then we shall hear a sermon of pious and jupt senti- 
ments withesieem and reverdnce, thrugjj the preacher has 
but an unpolished style, and many defects in ilie manner 
of his delivery. Then we shall neglect and disregard all 
the flattering insinuations, whereby the orator would make 
way for his own sentiments to take possession of our souls, 
ifhehasnot solid and instructive sense equal to his lan- 
guage. Oratory is a happy talent, when it is rightly 
employed, to excite the passions to the prrchce of virtue 
and piety: but, to Fpeak propeily, this ait has nothing (o 
do in the search after truth. 



136 I.OGIC : OR, TH€ f>ART H. 

^CT. III. 

PREJUDICES ARISING PROM OURSELVES. 

NEITHER ivor.ls nor things ss onld so often lead us a- 
stray from ti uth, if we had not within ourselves such springs 
of error as these that follow. 

L M:^ny errors are derived from our weakness of rea- 
son, and incapacity lo judge of things in our infant state. 
These are called tlie prejudices of infancy. We frame early 
mistakes about the com noi^ objects which surround us, and 
the common affairs of life : We fancy the nui se is our best 
frierjd, because children recejve from their nurses tlreir 
food and other converuences of life. We judge that books 
are very unpleasant thmgs, because perhaps we have been 
driven to tl^em by the scourge W« judge also that the 
sky touches the distant hills, because we cannot inform 
ourselves better in childhood. We believe the stars are 
not risen till the sun is set, because we never see them by 
day. But some of these errors may iseem to be derived 
from the next spring. 

The way to cure the prejudices of infancy, is lo distin- 
guish, as far as we can. which are those opinions which we 
framed in perfect childhood ; to rejmember that at that 
time our reason was incapable of forming a right judgment, 
and to bring these propositions again to be examined at 
the bar of mature reason. 

If. Our senses give us many a false information of things, 
and tempt us to jud^e amiss This is called prejudice of 
sense : as, when we suppose the sun and moon to be flat 
bodies, and to be but a few inches broad, because they ap- 
pear so to the eye Sense inclines us to judge that air has 
no weight, because we do not feel it press heavy upon us 5 
and we judge also by our senses that cold and heat, sweet 
and sour, red and blue, &c. are such real properties in the 
objects themselves, and exactly like those sensations which 
they excite in us. 

Note — Those mistakes of this sort, which all mankind 
drop and lose in their advancing age, are called mere 
prejudices QfiufaDcyj but thojs^ which abide with the 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASOxV. 157 

vKlgar part of the world, and generally with all men, till 
learning and philosophy cure them; more properly attain 
the name of prejudices of sense. 

These prejudices are to be removed sereral ways. (1.) 
By the assistance of one sense we cure the mistake of an- 
other: as, when a stick thrust into the water seems crook- 
ed, we are prevented from judging it to be really so in itself; 
for, when we take it out of the water, both our sight and 
feeling agree and determine it to l>e straight. (2.) The ex- 
ercise of our re ?^.son, and an application to mathematical 
and philosophical studies, cures many other prejudices of 
sense, both with relation to the heavenly and earthly bod- 
ies. (3.) We should remember that otir senses have of- 
ten deceived us in various instances; that they give but a 
confused and imperfect representation of things in many 
cases; that they often represent falsely those very objects 
to which they seem to be suited, such as the shape,motion^ 
size J and situation of gross bodies, if they are but placed at 
a distance from us 5 and as for the minute particles of which 
bodies are composed, our senses cannot distinguish them. 
(4.) We should remember also, that one prime and orig- 
inal design of our senses, is to inform us what various re- 
lations the bodies that are round about us bear to our own 
animal body, and to give us notice what is pleasant and 
useful and what is painful or injurious to us ; but they are 
not sufficient of themselves to lead us into a philosophical 
acquaintance with the inward nature of things. It must 
be confessed, it is by the assistance of the eye and the ear 
especially (which are called the seiises of discipline) that 
our minds are furnished with various parts of knowledge, 
by reading, hearing, and observing things divine and hu- 
man ; yet reason ought always to accompany the exercise 
of our senses, whenever we would form a just judgment of 
things proposed to our inquiry. 

Here it is proper to observe ^Iso, that as the weakness 
of reason in Our infancy^ and the dictates of our senses, 
sometimes in advancing years, lead the wiser part of man- 
kind astray from truth; so the meaner parts of our spe- 
cies, persons whose genius is very low, whose judgment is 
always weak, who are ever indulging the dictates of sense 
and humofjarebut children of a large size, they stand ex- 
O 



158 LOGIC : OR, THE Part II. 

posed to everlasting mistakes in life, and live and die in the 
midst of pn=»judices. 

III. imagination is another fruitful spring of false judg- 
ments. Our imagination is nothing else but the various 
appearances of our sensible ideas in the brain, where the 
soul frequently works in uniting, disjoining, multiplying^ 
magnifying, diminishing, and altering the several shapes, 
colours, sounds, motions, words and things, that have been 
communicated to us by the outward organs of sense. It 
-^is no wonder therefore if fancy leads us into many mis- 
lakes, for it^is but sense at second liand. Whatever is 
strongly impressed upon the imagination, some persons be- 
lieve to be true. Some will choose a particular number 
in a lottery, or lay a large wager on a single chance of a 
dye, and doubt not of success, because their fancy feels so 
powerful an impi-cssion, as assures them it will be pros- 
perous. A thousand pretended prophecies and inspira- 
tions, and all the freaks of enthusiasm have been derived 
from this spring. Dreams are nothing else but the de- 
ceptions of fancy ; A delirium is but a short wildness of 
the imagination ; and a settled irregularity of fancy, is 
distraction and madness. 

One way to gain a victory over this unruly faculty, is to 
set a watch upon it perpetually, and to bridle it in all its 
extravagances ; never to believe any thing merely be- 
cause fancy dictates itj any more than I would believe a 
midnight-dream, nor to trust fancy any farther than it is 
attended with severe reason. It is a very useful anden- 
tCTtaining power of human nature, in matters of illustra- 
tion, persuasion, oratory, poetry, wit, conversation, &c. 
but in the calm inquiry after truth, and the final judgment 
of things, fancy should retire and stand aside, unless it be 
called in to explain and illustrate a difficult point by a si- 
militude. 

Another method of deliverance from these prejudices 
of fancy, is to compare the ideas that arise in our imagina- 
tions with the real nature of things, as often as we have 
occasion to judge concerning them; and let calm and se- 
date reason govern and determine our opinions, though 
fancy should shew never so great a reluctance. Fancy is 
the inferior faculty, and it ought to obey* 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 159 

IV. The various passions or affections of the mind, 
are numerous and endless springs of prejudice. They dis- 
guise every object they converse with, and put tiieir own 
colours upon it, and thus lead the judgment astray from 
truth. It is love that makes the mother think her own 
child the fairest, and will sometimes persuade us that a 
blemish is a beauty. Hope and desire make an hour of 
delay seem as long as two or three hours : Hope inclines 
us to think there is nothing too difficult to be attempted: 
Despair telb us that a brave attempt is mere rashness, and 
that every difficulty is insurmountable. Fear makes us 
imagine that a l>ush shaken with the wind has some sav- 
age beast in it, and multiplies the dangers that attend our 
path: But still there is a more unhappy effect of fear, 
when it keeps millions of souls in slavery to the errors of es- 
tablished reUgion : What could persuade the wise men and 
philosophers of a popish country to believe the gross ab- 
surdities of the Romish church, but the fear of torture, or 
death, the galley, or the inquisition ? Sorrow and melan- 
choly tempt us to think our circumstances much more 
dismal than they are, that we may have some excuse for 
mourning : And envy represents the condition of our 
neighbor better than it is, that there might be some pre- 
tence for her own vexation and uneasiness^. Anger, wrath, 
and revenge, and all those hateful passions, excite in us 
far worse ideas of men than they deserve, and persuade us 
to believe all that is ill of them. A detail of the evil in- 
fluence of the affections of the mind upon our own judg- 
ment would make a large volume. 

The cure of these preju<iices is attained by a constant 
jealousy of ourselves, and watchfulness over our passions, 
that they may never interpose when we are called to pass 
a judgment of any thing; And when our affections are 
warmly engaged, let us abstain from judging. It would 
be also of great use to us to form our deliberate judgments 
of persons and things in the calmest and serenest hours 
of life, when the passions of nature are all silent, and the 
mind enjoys its most perfect composure: and these judg- 
ments so formed should be treasured up in the mind, that 
we might have recourse to them in hours of seed. See 



16d LOGIC : OR, THE Part. EI. 

many sentiments and directions relating to Uiis subject, 
in my Doctrine of the Passions, a nevi edition enlarged. 

V. The fondness we have for selfy and the relation 
M'hich other persons and things have to ourselves, furnish 
us with another long list of prejudices. This indeed might 
be reduced to the passion of self-love ^ but it is so copious 
an head that I choose to tiaine it a distinct spring of false 
judgments. We are generally ready to fancy every thing 
of our own i^as something peculiarly valuable in it, when 
indeed there is no other reason but because it is our own. 
Were we born among the gardens of Ital}^, the rocks of 
Switzerland, or the ice and snows of Russia and Sweden, 
still we would imagine peculiar excellencies in our native 
land. We conceive a good idea of the town and village 
where we first breathed, and tliink the better of a man for 
being born near us. We entertain the best opinion of the 
persons of our own party, and easily believe evil reports 
of persons of a different sect or faction. Our own sex^ our 
kindred, our houses, and our very names, seem to have 
something g.ood and desirable in them. We are ready 
to mingle ail these vvith ourselves, and cannot bear to have 
others think meanly of them. 

So good an opinion have we of our sentiments and prac- 
tices, that it is very difficult to believe what a reprover 
says of our conduct 5 and we are as ready to assent to all 
the language of flattery. We set up our own opinions in 
religion and philosophy as the tests of orthodoxy and truth ; 
and we are prone to judge every practice of other men 
either a duty or a crime, which we think would be a crime 
or a duty in us, though their circumstances are vastly 
diflTerent from our own. This humor prevails sometimes 
to such a degree, that we would make our own taste and 
inclination the standard by which to judge of every dish 
of meat that is set upon the table, every book in a Ubrary, 
every employment, study, and business of life, as well as 
every recreation. 

It is from this evil principle of setting up self for a mod- 
el of what other men ought to be, that the anti-christian 
spirit of impositon £ind persecution had its original: 
Though there is no more reason for it than there was for 
the practice of that tyrant, who having a bed fit for his 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 161 

own size, was reported to stretch men of low stature upon 
the rack, till they were drawn out of the length of his bed ; 
and some add also, that he cut off the legs of any whom 
he found too long for it. 

It is also from a principle near akin to this, that we per- 
vert and strain the writings of many venerable authors, and 
especially the sacred books of scripture, to make them 
speak our own sense. Tli rough tlie influence which our 
own schemes or hypotheses have upon the mind, we some- 
times become so sharp-sighted as to find these schemes in 
those places of scripture where the holy writers never 
thought of them, nor the holy spirit intended them. At 
other times this prejudice brings such a dimness upon the 
sight, that we cannot read any thing that opposes our own 
scheme, though it be written as with sun-beams, and in 
th^ plainest language; and perhaps we are in danger in 
such a case of winking a Uttle against the light. 

We ought to bring our minds free, unbiassed, and teach* 
able, to learn our religion from the word of Gad ; but we 
have generally formed all the lesser as well as the greater 
points of our religion before- hand, and then we read the 
prophets and apostles only to pervert them to confirm our 
own opinions. Were it not for this influence of self^ and 
a bigotry to our own tenets, we could hardly imagine that 
so many strange, absurd, inconsistent, wicked mischiev- 
ous, and bloody principles, should pretend to support and 
defend themselves by the gospel of Christ. 

Every learned critic has his own hypothesis ; and if the 
common text be not favourable to his opinion, a various 
selection shall be made authentic. The text must be sup- 
posed to be defective or redundant ; and the sense of it 
shall be literal or metaphorical, according as it best sup- 
ports his own scheme. Whole chapters or books shall be 
added or left out of the sacred canon, or be turned into par- 
ables by this influence. Luther knew not well how to re- 
concile the episll^e of St. James to the doctrine.of justifica- 
tion by faith alone, and so- he could not allow it to be di- 
vine. The Papists bring all the apocrypha into their bi- 
ble, and stamp divinity upon it : for they can fancy pur* 
gatory is there, and they find prayers for the dead. But 
they leave out the second commandment, because it for- 
Q Z 



162 LOGIC: OR, THE PautIL 

bid* the worship of images. Others suppose the Mosaic 
historv of the creation, aitd the fall of man, to be oriental 
ornaments, or a mere allegory, because the literal sense of 
tliose three chapters of Genesis do not agree wiili iheir 
theories. Even an honest, plain-hearted and unlearned 
Christian is ready to find something in every chapter of 
the bible to countenance his own private sentiments ; but 
he loves those chapters best which speak his own opinion 
plainest: This is a prejudice that sticks very close to our 
natures ; the scholar is infested with it daily, and the me- 
chanic is not free. 

Self has yet a farther and more pQrnicious influence up- 
on our understandings^ and is an unhappy guide in the 
search after truth. When our own inciination, or our 
ease, and honor, or our profit, tempt us to the practice of 
any thing of suspected lawfulness, how do we strain our 
thoughts to find arguments for it and persuade ourselves it 
is lawful ? We colour over iniquity and sinful compliance 
with the names of virtue and innocence, or at least of con- 
straint and necessity. All the difterent and opposite 
sentunentsand practices of majikind are too much influen* 
ced by this mean bribery, and give too just occasion for 
satyi'ical writers to say, that self interest governs all man- 
I^ind. 

When the judge bad awarded due damages to a person 
into whose field a neghbor'S oxen had broke, it is reported 
that he reversed his own sentence, when he heard that 
the oxen which had done this mischief were his^ own. 
Whether this be a history or a parpale, it is still a just rep- 
resentation of the wretched iniliience of self io corrupt 
the judgment. 

One way to amend tins prejudice, is to ihvusi self s^o far 
out of the questioi3, that it may have no manner of influ- 
ence whensoever we are called to judge and consider the 
iiaked nature, truth, and justice of things. In matters of 
equity between man and man, our Saviour has taught us 
an eflectual means of guarding against this prejudice, and 
that is, to put my neighbor in the place of myself, and 
myself in the place of my neighbor, rather than be brib^ 
ed by this corrupt principle of self love to do injury tp 



Chap. HI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 163 

our neighbours. Thence arises that golden rule of dealing 
with others as we would have others deal with us. 

In the judgment of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, 
good and eviJ, we ought to consider that every man has a 
SELF as well as we ; and that the tastes, passion, inclina- 
tions and interests of different men are very different, and 
often contrary, and that they dictate contrary things: Un- 
less therefore all manner of different and contrary proposi- 
tions can be true at once, self cd^n never be a just test, cu: 
standard of truth and falsehood, good and evil. 

VI. Tempers, humours, and peculiar turns of the mind^ 
whether they be natural or acquired, have a great influence 
upon our judgment, and become the occasion of many mis- 
takes. Let us survey a few of them. 

(1.) Some persons are of an easyapd credulous temper, 
while others are perpetually discovering a spirit of contra- 
diction. 

The credulous man is ready to receive every thing fox 
truth that has but a shadow of evidence ; every new book 
that he reads, and every ingenious man with whom he 
converses, has power enough to draw him into the senti- 
ments of the speaker or writer. He basso much com- 
plaisance in him, or weakness of soul, that he is ready to 
resign his own opinion to the ffrst objection which he 
hears, and to receive any sentiments of another that are 
asserted v/ith a positive air and much assurance. Thus he 
is under a kind of necessity, through the indulgence of this 
credulous humour, either to be often changing his opinions, 
or to believe inconsistencies. 

The man of contradiction is of a contrary humour,* for 
he stands ready to opp.ose every thing that is said : He 
gives but a slight attention to iiie reasons of other men, 
iVom an inward and scornful presumption that they have 
110 strength in theoi. When he reads or hears a discourse 
different from his own sentiments, he does not give him- 
self leave to consider whether that discourse may be true i 
but employs all his powers immediately to confute it. — 
Your great disputers, and your men of controversy, are in 
continual danger of this ^ort of prejudice : they contend 
often for victory, and will maintain whatsoever they have 
asserted, while tjuth is lost in the noi^e and tumult of jf€- 



164 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. iC 

c\\ivoa\] contradictions ; and it frequently happens that a- 
debate about opinions is turned into a mutual reproach of 

persons. 

The prejudice of credulity may m some measure be cur- 
ed, by learning to set a high value on truth, and by taking 
more pains to attain it; remembering that truth oftentimes 
lies dark and deep, and requires us to dig for it as hid 
treasure ; and that falsehood often puts on a Tair disguise, 
and therefore we should not yield up our judgment to ev- 
ery plausible appearance. It is no part of civility or good 
breeding to part with truth, but tom.aintain it with decen- 
cy and candour. 

A spirit of contradiction is so pedantic and hateful, that 
a man should take much pains with himself to svatch a- 
gainst every instance of it: He should learn so much good 
humour, at least, as never to oppose any thing without 
just and solid reason for it: He should abate some degrees 
of pride and moroseness, which are never failing ingredi- 
ents in this sort of temper, and should seek after so much 
honesty and conscience as never to contend for conquest or 
triumph ; but to review his own reasons, and to read the 
arguments of his opponents (if possible) with an equal in- 
differency, and be glad to spy truth, and to submit 16 it, 
though it appear on the opposite side. 

(2.) There is another pair of prejudices, derived from 
two tempers of mind, near akin to those I have just bow 
mentioned ; and these are the dogmatical and the sceptical 
humour, that is, alwa37S positive, or always doubting. 

By what means soever the dogmatist came by hh opin- 
ions, whether by his senses or by his fancy, his education 
or his own reading, yet he believed them all with th^* same 
assurances that he does a mathematical truth ; he has 
scacre any mere probabilities that belong to him; every 
thing with him is certain and infallible; every punctilio in 
religion is an article of his faith ; and he answers all man- 
ner of objections by a sovereign contempt. 

Persons of this temper are seldom to be convinced of any 
mistake : A full assurance of their own notions makes ail 
the difficulties on their own side vanish so entirely, that 
they think every pointof their belief is written as with sun- 
besiins, and wondex any ow should find ^ difficulty in it. 



Chap. IIL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 165 

They are amazed that learned men should make a contro- 
versy of what is to tiiem so perspicuous and indubitable. 
The lowest rank of people, botli^ in learned and in vulgar 
life, is very subject to this obstinacy. 

Scepticism is a cowtrar}' prejudice. The dogmatist is 
sure of every thingjand the sceptic believes nothing. Per- 
haps he has found himself often mistaken in matters of 
which he thougiit himself well assured in his younger days, 
and therefore he is afraid to g:ive his assent to any thing 
agaiii. He sees so much shew of reason for every opinionj 
and so many objections also arising against every doctrincj 
that he is ready to throw off the belief of every thing: He 
renounces at once the pursuit of tru^^th^and contents him- 
self to say, There is nothing certain. It is well, if through 
the influence of such a temper he does not cast away his 
religion as well as his philosophy, and abandon himself to 
a profane course of iife, regardless of hell or of heaven. 

Both these prejudices last raentioned, though they are 
so opposite to each other, yet they arise from the same 
spring, and that i:^, impatience of study, and want of dili- 
gent attention in search of truth. Tiie dogmatist is in 
haste to believe something; he cannot keep himself long 
enough in suspence,^ till some bright and convincing evi- 
dence appear on one side, but throws himself casually into 
the sentiments of one party or another, and then he will 
hear no argument to the contrary. The sceptic will not 
take pains to search things to the bottom, but when he sees 
difficulties on both sides, resolves to believe neither of them. 
Humility of soul, patience in study, diligence in inquiry, 
with an honest zeal for truth, would go a great way tow- 
ards the cure of both thes^ follies. 

(3.) Another sort of temper that is very injurious to a 
right judgment of things, is an inconstant, fickle, changea- 
ble spirit, and a very uneven temper of mind. When such 
persons are in one humour, they pass a judgment of things 
agreeable to it; when their humour changes, ihey reverse 
tiieir first judgment, and embrace a new opinion. They 
have no steadiness of soul; they want firmness of mind 
sufficient to establish themselves in any truth, and are 
ready to change it for the next alluring falsehood that is 
agreeable to their change ofhuiii^ur. This fickleness is 



166 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IT. 

sometimes so mingled with their very constitution by na- 
lure, or by distemoer of body, that a cloudy day and a 
lowering skv shall strongly incHne them to form an opm- 
ion both of themselves and of persons and things round 
about them, quite different from what they believe when 
the sun shines, and the heavens are serene. ^ 

This sort of people ought to judge of things and persons 
in their most sedate, peaceful, and composed hours ot lue, 
and reserve these judgments for their conduct at more un- 
happy seasons. 

(4.) Some persons have a violent and turgid manner 
both of talking and thinking; whatsoever they judge of, it 
is always with a tincture of this vanity. They are always 
in extremes, and pronounce concerning every thing m tte 
superlative. If they think a man to be learned, he is the 
chief scholar of the age ; If another has low parts, he is the 
greatest blockhead in nature : If they approve any book on 
divine subjects, it is the best book in the world next to the hi- 
hie : If they speak of a storm of rain or hail, it is She most 
terrible storm that fell since the creation : And a cold win- 
ter day the coldest that ever was knoivn^ 

But the men of this swelling language ought to remem- 
ber, that nature has ten thousand moderate things in it, 
and does not always deal in extremes as they do. 

(5.) I think it may be called another sort of prejudice 
derived from humour, when some men believe a doctrine 
merely because it is ancient, and has been long believed ; 
others are so fond of novelty, that nothing prevails upon 
their assent so much as new thoughts and new notions — 
Again, there are some who set a high esteem upon every 
thing that is foreign and far fetched; therefore China pic- 
tures are admired, how awkward soever: Others value 
things the more for being of our own native grow th, inven- 
tion or manufacture, and these as much despise foreign 
things. 

Some men of letters and theology will not believe a pro- 
position even concerning a sublime subject, till every thing 
mysterious, deep, and difficult, is cut off from it, though 
the scripture asserts it never so plninh^ ; others are so fond 
of a mystery and things incomprehensible, that they would 
scarce believe the doctipt<? of th^ Trinity, if it could be ex- 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 167 

plained ; they incline to that foolish rant of one of the an- 
cients, Credo quia impossibile est s I beheve it because it is 
impossible. 

To cure these mistakes, remenriber that neither antique 
nor novel, foreign nor native, mysterious nor plain, are 
certain characters either of truth or of falsehood. 

I might mention various other humours of men that excite 
in them various prejudices, and leads ihem into rash and 
mistaken judgments 5 but these are sufficient for a specimen. 

Vrr. There are several other weaknesses which faeiorg 
to human nature, whereby we are led into mistakes, and 
indeed are rendered almost incapableofpassinga solid judg- 
ment in matters of great depth and difficulty. Some have 
a native obscurity of perception, (or shall I call it a want of 
natural sagacity?) whereby they are hindered from attain- 
ing clear and distinct ideas. Their thoughts always seem 
to have something confused and cloudy in tjiem, and there- 
fore they judge in the dark. Some have a defect of memo- 
ry, and then they are not capable of comparing their pres- 
ent ideas with a great variety of others, in order to secure 
themselves from inconsistency in judgment. Others may 
have a memory large enough, yet they are subject to the 
same errors, from a narrowness of soul, and such a fixation 
and confinement of thought to a few objects, that they 
scarce ever take a survey of things wide enough to judge 
wisely and well, and to secure themselves from all incon- 
sistencies. 

Though these are natural defects and weaknesses^ yet they 
may in some measure, be relieved by labour, diligence, 
and a due attention to proper rules. 

But among all the causes of false judgment which are 
within ourselves, I ought by no means to leave out that 
universal and original spring of error, of which we are in- 
formed by the word of God ^ and that is, the sin and de- 
fection of our first parents 5 whereby all our best natural 
powers, both of mind and body, are impaired and rendered 
very much inferiour to what they were in a slate of inno- 
cence. Our understanding is darkened, our memory con- 
tracted, our corrupt humours and passions are grown pre- 
dominant, our reason enfeebled, and various disorders at- 



168 LOOfCrOR, THE Paht. IL 

tend our constitution and animal nature, whereby the mind 
is strangely imposed upon in its judgment of things. Nor 
is there any perfect rehef to be expected on earth. There 
is no hope of ever recovering^ from these malndies, but by a 
sincere return to God in the ways of hi« own appointment, 
whereby we shall be kept safe from all dangerous and per- 
nicious errors in the matters of religion ; and though im- 
perfections and mistakes will hang about us in the present 
life as the effects of our original apostacy from God, yet 
we hope for a full deliverance from them when we arrive 
at heaven. 



SECT. IV. 

PREiUDlCES ARISING FROM OTHER PERSONS. 

WERE it not for the springs of prejudice that are lurk- 
ing in ourselves, we should not be subjett to so many mis- 
lakes from the influence of others : But, since our nature 
is so susceptive of errors on all sides, it is fit w^e should 
have hints and notices given us, how far other person-s 
may have power over us, and become the causes of all our 
false judgments. 71ns might also be <^ast into one heap, 
for they are all near iakin, and mingle with each other; 
but for distinction sake let them be called the prejudices of 
education, of custom, of authority, and such as arise from 
the manner of proposal. 

I. Those with whom our education is intrusted may lay 
the first foundationof many mistakes in our j^ounger years. 
How many fooleries and errors are instilled into us by our 
nurses, our fellow-children; bv servants or unskilled teach- 
ers; which are not only maintained through the fol- 
lowing pfirt5 of iife^ but sometimes have a veiy unhappy 
influence upon us ! We are taught that theie are bug- 
bears and goblins in the dark ; our young minds are croud- 
ed with tlie terrible ideas of ghosts appearing upon ev- 
ery occasion, or with the pleasanter tales of fairies danc- 
ing at midnight. We learn (o prophecy betimes, to fore- 
it;li futurities by good or evil omens^ and to presage ap^ 



Chap. TIL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 169 

preaching death in a family by ravens and little worms, 
which we therefore call a death watch. We are taught to 
know beforehand, for a twelvemonth together, which days 
of the week will be fair or foul, which will be lucky or un- 
lucky ; nor is there any thing so silly, but may be impos- 
ed upon our understandings in that early part of life 3 and 
these ridiculous stories abide with us too long, and too far 
influence the weaker part of mankind. 

We choose our particular set and party in the civil, the 
religious, and the learned hfe, by the influence of educa- 
tion. In the colleges of learning, some are for the nomi- 
nals, and some for the realists, in the science of metaphy- 
sics, because their tutors were devoted to these parties. 
The old philosophy and the new have gained thousands of 
partisans the same way : And every rehgion has its infant 
votaries, who are born, live and die in the same faith, 
without examination of any article. The Turks are taught 
early to believe in Mahomet 5 the Jews in Moses i the 
heathens worship a multitude of gods, under the force of 
their education. And it would be well if there were not 
millions of Christians, who have little more to say for their 
religion, than that they were born and bred up in it. The 
greatest part of the Christian world can hardly give any 
reason why they believe the Bible to be the word of God, 
but because they have always believed it and they were 
taught so from their infancy. As Jews and Turks, and 
American Heathens, believe the most monstrous and in- 
credible stories, because they have been trained up amongst 
them, as articles of faith ; so the Papists believe their 
transubstantiaiion, and make no difficulty of assenting to 
impossibilities, since it is the current doctrine of their cate- 
chisms. By the same means, the several sects and par- 
ties in Christianity believe all the strained interpretations 
of scripture by which they have been taught to support 
their own tenets : They find nothing difficult in all the ab- 
surd glosses and far-fetched senses, that are sometimes put 
^iipon the words of the sacred writers, because their ears 
have been always accustomed to these glosses; and there- 
fore they sit so smooth and easy upon their understandings, 
that thejT^ know not how to admit the most natural and 
eajsy interpretation in opposition to them. 
P 



170 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. II. 

Ill llie same manner, we are nursed up in many silly and 
gross mistakes about domestic affairs, as well as in matters 
of political concernment. It is upon the same ground that 
children are trained up to be Whigs and Tories betimes ; 
and every one learns the distinguishing terms of his own 
party, as the Papists learn to say their prayers in Latin, 
without any meaning, reason, or devotion. 

This sort of prejudice must be cured by calling all the 
principles of our young years to the bar of more mature 
reason, that we may judge of the things of nature and po- 
litical affairs by juster rules of philosophy and observation : 
And even the matters of religion must be first inquired in- 
to by reason and conscience, and when these have led us 
to believe scripture to be the word of God, then that be- 
comes our sovereign guide, and reason and conscience must 
submit to receive its dictates. 

II. The next prejudice which I shall mention, is that 
which arises from the custom or fashion of those amongst 
whom we live. Suppose we have freed ourselves from the 
j^ounger prejudices of our education, yet we are in danger 
of having our mind turned aside from truth by the influ- 
ence of general custom. 

Our opinion of meats and drinks, of garments and forms 
of salutation, are influenced much more by custom, than 
by the eye, the ear, or the taste. Custom prevails even 
over sense itself, and therefore no wonder if it prevail 
over reason too. What is it but custom that renders ma- 
ny of the maxims of food and sauces elegant in Britain, 
which would be awkward and nauseous to the inlmbitants 
of China, and indeed were nauseous to us when we first 
tasted them ? What but custom could make those saluta- 
tions polite in Muscovy, which are ridiculous in France 
or England ? AVe call ourselves indeed the politer nations, 
tut it is we who judge thus of ourselves; and that fan- 
cied politeness is oftentimes more owing to custom than 
reason. Why are theforms of our present garments count- 
ed beautiful, and those fashions of our ancestors the mat- 
ter of scoff and contempt, which in their day were all de- 
cent and genteel ? It is custom that forms our opinion of 
dress, and reconciles by degrees to those habits wWch at 
fir^st seemed very odd and monstrous. It must be grant- 



Chap, III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 171 

ed, there are some garments and habits which have a 
natural congruity, or incongruity, modesty, or immodesty, 
decency, or indecency, gaudery, or gravity ; though foe 
the most part there is but little of reason in these affairs : 
But what little there is of reason or natural decency, cus- 
tom triumphs over all. It is almost impossible to per- 
suade a gay lady that any thing can be decent which is 
out of the fashion : And it were well if fashion stretched 
its powers no farther than (he business of drapery and the 
fair sex. 

The methods of our education are governed by custom. 
It is custom, and not reason, that sends every boy to learn 
the Roman poets, and begin a little acquaintance with 
Greek, before he is bound an apprentice to a soapboiler or 
leather seller. It is custom alone that leaches us Latin 
by the rules of a Latin grammar : a tedious and absurd 
method ! And what is it but custom that has for past cen- 
turies confined the brightest geniuses, even of the highest 
rank in the female world, to the business of the needle on- 
ly, and secluded them most unmercifully from the pleasure 
of knowledge, and the divine improvement of reason ? But 
we begin to break all these chains, and reason begins to 
dictate the education of youth. May the grov,i'ng age be 
learned and wise I 

It is by the prejudice arising from our own customs, 
that we judge of all otiier civil and religious forms and 
practices. The rites and ceremonies of war and peace in 
other nations, the forms of weddings and funerals, the 
several ranks of magistracy, the trades and employments 
of both sexes, the public and the domestic affairs oi life, 
and almost every thing of foreign customs is judged irreg- 
ular. It is all imagined to be unreasonable or unnatural, 
by those who have no otlier rule to judge of nature, and 
reason, but the customs of their own country, or the little 
town where they dwell. Custom is called a second na- 
ture, but we often mistake it for nature itself. 

Besides all this, lliere is a fashion in opinions, there is 
a fashion in writing and printing, in style and language. 
In our day it is the vogue of the nation that parliaments 
may settle the succession of the crown, and that a people 
can make a king; in the last age this vvas a doctrine akin 



172 LOGIC ; OR, THE Part. II. 

to treason. Citations from the Latin poets were an em- 
bellishment of style in the last century, and whole pages in 
that day '*ere covered with them ; it is forbidden by cus- 
tom and exposed by the name of pedantry; whereas in 
truth both these are extremes. Sometimes our printed 
books shall abound in capitals, and sometimes reject them 
all. Now we deal much in essavs, and most unreasonably 
despise systematic learning, whereas our fathers had a just 
value for regularity and systems ; then folios and quartos 
were the fashionable sizes, as volumes in octavo are now. 
We are ever ready to run into extremes, and j^et custom 
still persuades us that reason and nature are on our side. 

This business of the fashion has a most powerful influ- 
ence on our judgments 3 for it employs those two strong 
engines of fear and shame to operate upon our understand- 
ings with unhappy success. We are ashamed to believe 
or profess an unfashionable opinion in philosophy; and a 
cowardly soul dares not so much as indulge a thought 
contrary to the estabhshed or fashionable faith, nor act in 
opposition to custom, though it be according to the dic- 
tates of reason. 

I confess there is a respect due to mankind, which 
should incline even the wisest of men to follow the inno- 
cent customs of their country in the outward practices of 
civil life, and in some measure to submit to fashion in all 
indifferent affairs, where reason and scripture make no 
remonstrances against it. But the judgments of the mind 
ought to be for ever free, and not biassed by the customs 
and fashions of any age or nation whatsoever. 

To deliver our understandings from this danger and sla- 
very, we should consider three things. 

1. That the greatest part of the civil customs of any 
particular nation or age spring from humour rather than 
reason. Sometimes the humour of the prince prevails, 
and sometimes the humour of the people. It is either 
the great or the many who dictate the fashion, and these 
have not always the highest reason on their side, 

2. Consider also, that the customs of the same nations 
in diUferent ages, the customs of different nations in the 
same age, and the customs of different towns and villages 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON, 173 

in the same natiorij are very various and contrary to each 
olher. The fashionable learning, language, sentiments, 
and rules of politeness, differ greatly in different countries 
and ages of mankind 5 but tiuth and reason are of a more 
uniform and steady nature, and do not change with the 
fashion. Upon this account, to cure the prepossessions 
which arise from custom, it is of excellent use to travel 
and seethe customs of various countries, and to Kcad the 
travels of other men, and the history of past ages, that ev- 
ery thing may not seem strange and uncouth whicii is not 
practised within the limits of our parish, or in the narrow 
space of our own life-time. 

3. Consider yet again, how often we ourselves have 
changed our opinions concerning the decency, propriety, 
or congruity of several modes or practises in the world, 
especially if we have lived to the age of thirty or forty. 
Custom or fashion, even in all its changes^ has been read^** 
to have some degree of ascendency over our understand- 
ings, and what at one time seemed decent, appears obso- 
lete and disagreeable afterward, when the fashion chan- 
ges. Let us learn therefore to abstract as much as possi- 
ble from custom and fashion, when we would pass a judg- 
ment concerning the real value & intrinsic nature of things. 

III. The authority of men is the spring of another 
rank of prejudices. ^ 

Among these, the authority of our forefathers and an- 
cient authors is most remarkable. We pay deference to 
the opinion of others merely because they lived a thous- 
and years before us ; and even the trifles and impertinen- 
ces that have a mark af antiquity upon them are reveren- 
ced for this reason, because they came from the ancients* 

It is granted that the ancients had many wise and great 
men among them, and some af their writings, which time 
hath delivered down to us, are truly valuable : But those 
writers lived rather in the infant state of the world 3 and 
the philosophers, as well as the polite authors of our age, 
are properly the elders who have seen the mistakes of the 
younger ages of mankind, and corrected them by obser- 
vation and experience. 

Some borrow all their religion from the fathers of the 
Christian church, or from their synods or councils; but 
P2 



174 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. 11. 

lie that will read Monsieur Daille on the use of the fathers, 
will find many reasons why they are by no means fit to 
dictate our faith, since we have the gospel of Christ, and 
the writings of the apostles and prophets in our hands. 

Some persons believe every thing that their kindred, 
their parents and their tutors believe. The veneration 
and the love which they have for their ancestors, incline 
them to swallow down all their opinions at once, without 
examining what truth or falsehood there is in them. Men 
make up their principles by inheritance, and defend them 
as they would their estates, because they are born heirs to 
them. I freely grant, that parents are appointed by God 
and nature to teach us all the sentiments and practice of 
our younger years ; and happy are those whose parents 
lead them into the paths of wisdom and truth ! I grant far- 
ther, that when persons come to years of discretion, and 
judge for themselves, they ought to examine the opinions 
of their parents with the greatest modesty, and with an 
humble deference to their superior character ; they ought 
in matters perfectly dubious to give the preference to 
their parents' advice, and always to pay them the first 
respect, nor ever depart from their opinions and practice, 
till reason and conscience make it necessary. But, after 
all, it is possible tliat parents may be mistaken, and there- 
fore reason and scripture ought^obe our final rules of de- 
termination in matters that relate to this world and that 
which is to come. 

Sometimes a favorite author, or a writer of great name, 
drags a thousand followers afler him into his own mistakes, 
merely by the authority of his name and cliaracter. The 
sentiments of Aristotle were imbibed and maintained by 
all the schools in Europe for several centuries; and a ci- 
tation from his writings was thought a sufficient proof of 
any proposition. The great Descartes had also too many 
implicit believers in the last age, though he himself, in 
his philosophy, disclaims all such iniiuence over the minds 
of his readers, Calvin and Luther, in the days of re- 
formation from Popery, were learned and pioijs men; 
and there have been a succession of their disciples, ev- 
en to this day, who pay loo much reverence to the words 
oi their masters. There are others wlio renounce theu: 



Chap, Iir, RIGHT USE OF REASON. 175 

authority, but give themselves up, in too servile a manner, 
to the opinion and authority of other masters, and follow 
as bad or worse guides in religion. 

If only learned, and wise, and good men had influence 
on the sentiments of others, it would be at least a more ex- 
cusable sort of prejudice, and there would be some colour 
of shadow and reason for it: But that riches, honours, and 
outward splendour, should set up persons for dictators to 
all the rest of mankind ; this is a most shameful invasion of 
the right of our understanding on the one hand, and as 
shameful a slavery of the soul on the other. The poor man^ 
or the labourer, too often believes such a principle in poli^ 
tics, or in morahty, and judges concerning the rights of 
the king and the peoplejust as his wealthy neighbour does. 
Half the parish follows the opinion of the esquire; and the 
tenants of a manor fall into the sentiments of their lord, 
especially if he lives among them. How unreasonable, 
and yet how common is this ! 

As for the principles of religion^ we frequently find how 
they are taken up and forsaken, changed and resumed by 
the influence of princes. In all nations, the priests have 
much power also in dictating the religion of the people, 
but the princes dictate to them : And, where there is a gre^t 
pomp and grandeur attending the priesthood in any religion 
whatsoever, with so much the more reverence and stronger 
faith do the people believe whatever they teach them: 
Yet it is too evident, that riches and dominions, and high 
titles, in church or state, have no manner of pretence to 
truth and certainty, wisdom and goodness, above the rest 
of mortals, because the superiorities in this world are not 
always conferred according to merit. 

I confess, where a man of wisdom and years, of obser- 
vation and experience, gives us his opinion and advice in 
matters of the civil or moral lile ; reason tells us we should 
pay a great attention to him, and it is probable he may be 
in the right. Where a man of long exercise in piety speaks 
of practical religion, there is due deference to be paid to 
his sentiments : And the same we may say concerning an 
ingenious man, long versed in any art or science, he may 
justly expect du^ regard wh^n he speaks of his own affaires, 



176 LOGIx^ : OR, THE Part. II. 

and proper business. But^ in other things, each of these 
may be ignorant enough, notwithstanding ali their piety 
and years^ and particular skill ; Nor even in their own 
proper province are they to be believed in every thing, 
without reserve and without examination. 

To free ourselves from these prejudices^ it is sufficient 
to remember, that there is no rank or character among 
mankind, which has any such pretence to sway the judg- 
ments of other men by their authority ; For there have 
been persons of the same rank and character who have 
maintained different and contrary sentiments; but all 
these can never be true, and therefore the mere name or 
reputation that any of them possess is not a sufficient ev- 
idence of truth. 

Shall we believe the ancients in philosophy ? But some 
of the ancients were Stoics, some Peripatetics, some Pla- 
tonics, and some Epicureans, some Cynics, and some 
Sceptics. Shall we judge of matters of the Christian faith 
by the fathers, or primitive writers for three or four hun- 
dred years after Christ ? But they often contradicted one 
another, and themselves too 5 and, what is worse, they 
sometimes contradicted the scripture itself. Now, among 
all these different and contrary sentiments in philosophy 
and religion, which of the ancients must we believe, for 
we cannot believe them all ? 

Again, To believe in all things as our predecessors did, 
is the ready way to keep mankind in an everlasting state 
of infancy, and to lay an eternal bar against all the im- 
provements of our reason and our happiness. Had the 
present age of philosophers, satisfied themselves with the 
substantial forms and occult qualities of Aristotle, with the 
solid spheres, eccentrics, and epicycles of Ptolemy, and 
the ancient astronomers ; then the great Lord Bacon, Co- 
pernicus, and Descartes, with the greater Sir Isaac New- 
town, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Boyle, had risen in our world 
in vain> We must have blundered en still, in successive 
generations amon^jj absurdities and thick darkness, and a 
hundred useful inventions for the happiness of human life 
had rever been known. 

Thus it is in the matters of philosophy and science. — 
But, you will say, shall not our own ancestors determine 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 177 

our judgment in matters of civil or religious concernment ? 
If they must, then the child of a Heathen must beheve 
that Heathenism is truth ; the son of a Papist must assent 
to all the absurdities of Popery ; the posterity of the Jews 
and Socinians must forever be Soeinians and Jews; and a 
man whose father was of Republican principles, must 
make a succession of Republicans in his family to the end 
of the world. If we ought always to believe whatsoever 
our parents; our priesis or our princes believe, the inhab- 
itants of China ought to worship their own idols, and the 
savages of Africa ought to believe all the nonsense, and 
practise the idolatry of their Negro fathers and kings. 
The British nation, when it was Heathen, could never have 
become Christian; and, when it was a slave to Rome, it 
could never have been reformed. 

Besides, let us consider, that the great God, our common 
Maker, has never given one man's understanding a legal 
and rightful sovereignty to determine truths for others, at 
least after they are past the state of childhood or minority. 

No single person, how learned and J^e, and great so- 
evei, or whatsoever natural, or civil, or ecclesiastical^ re- 
lations he may have to us, can claiin this dominion over 
our faith. St. Paul the apostle, in his private capacity, 
would not do it ; nor hath an inspired man any such au- 
thority, until he makes divine commissions appear. Our 
Saviour himself tells the Jews, that if he had not done such 
monstrous v/orks among them, they had not sinned in dis- 
beheving his doctrines, and refusing him for the Messiah. 
No bishop or presbyter, nor synod or council, no church 
or assembly of men, since the days of inspiration, hath 
power derived to them from God to make creeds or arti- 
cles of faith for us, and impose them upon our under- 
standings. We must all act according to the best of our 
hght and the judgment of our own consciences, using the 
best advantages which providence hath given us, with an 
honest and impartial diligence to inquire and search out 
the truth : For every one of us must give an account of 
himself to God. To believe as the church, or the court 
believes, is but a sorry and a dangerous faith : This prin- 
ciple would make more Heathens than Christians, and 



178 LOGIC : OR, THE Part II. 

more Papists than Protestants 5 and perhaps lead more 
souls to hell than to heaven 5 for our Saviour himself hath 
plainly told us, that if the blind will be lead by the blind, 
they must both fall into the ditch. 

Though there be so much danger of error arising from 
the three prejudices last mentioned, yetj before I dismiss 
this head, I think it proper to take notice, that, as educa- 
tion, custom, and authority, are no sure evidences of truth, 
so neither are they certain marks of falsehood; for rea- 
son and scripture may join to dictate the same things 
which our i>arentS;, our nurses, our tutors, our friends, and 
our country believe and profess. If there appears some- 
times in our age a pride and petulancy in youth, zealous 
to cast off the sentiments of their fathers, and teachers, on 
purpose to shew that they carry none of the prejudices of 
education and authority about them ; they indulge all 
manner of licentious opinions and practices, from a vain 
pretence of asserting their liberty. But alas ! This is but 
changing one prejudice for another; and sometimes it 
happens by this rijf ans, that they make a sacrifice both of 
truth and virtue to the vile prejudices of their pride and 
sensuality. 

IV. There is another tribe of prejudices which are near 
akin to tiiose of authorit}^, and that is, when we receive a 
doctrine because of the manner in which it is proposed to 
us by others. I have already mentioned the powerful in- 
fluence that oratory and fine words have to insinuate a 
false opinion ; and sometimes truth is refused, and suffers 
contempt in the lips of a wise man, for want of the charms 
of language : But there are several other manners of pro- 
posal, whereby mistaken sentiments are powerfully con- 
veyed into the mind. 

Some persons are easily persuaded to believe what an- 
other dictates with a positive air, and a great degree of as- 
surance : They feel the overbearing force of a confident 
dictator, especially if he be of a superior rank or character 
to themselves. 

Some are quickly convinced of the truth of any doc- 
trine, when he that proposes it puts on all the airs of piety, 
and makes solemn appeals to heaven, and protestations 
of the truth of it : The pious mind of a weaker Christian 



Chap. IIL RIGHT USE OF REASON. "179 

is ready to receive any thing that is pronounced with such 
an awful solemnity. 

It is a prejudice near akin to this, when an humble soul 
is frightened into any particular sentiments of rehgion, be- 
cause a man of great name or character pronounces here- 
sy upon the contrary sentiments, cdsts the disbeliever out 
of the church, and forbids him the gates of Iieaven. 

Others are allured into particular opinions by gentler 
practices on the understanding : Not only the soft tem- 
pers of mankind^ but even hardy and rugged souls, are 
sometimes led captives to error hy the soft air of address, 
and the sweet and engaging methods of persuasion and 
kindness. 

J grant, w^here natural or revealed religion plainly dic- 
tate to us the infinite and everlasting importance of any 
sacred docirine, it cannot be improper to use any of these 
][wethods,' to persuade men to receive and obey the truth, 
afier we have given sufficient reason and argument to con- 
vince their uuderstandings. Yet all these methods, con- 
sidered in themselves, have been often used to convey 
falsehood into the soul as well as truth ; and if we build 
our faith merely upon these foundatioKS, without*regard 
to the evidence of truth, and the strength of argument, our 
belief is but the effect of prejudice : For neither the posi- 
tive, the awful or solemn, the terrible or the gentle meth- 
ods of address carry any certain evidence with them that 
truth lies on that side. 

There is another manner of proposing our own opin- 
ion or rather opposing the opinions of others, Avhich de- 
mands a mention here, and that is when persons make a 
jest serve instead of an argument ; when they refute what 
they caii errour, by a turn of wit, and answer every ob- 
jection against their own sentiments by casting a sneer up- 
on the objector. These scoffers practise with success up- 
on weak and cowardly spirits : Such as have not been well 
established in religion or morality, have been laughed oiit 
of the best principles by a confident buffoon : They have 
yielded up their own opinions to a witty banterer, and sold 
their faith and religion for a jest. 

There is no way to cure these evils in such a degener- 
ate world as we live in, but by learning to distinguish well 



180 LOGIC: OR, THE ^ Part. IL 

between the substance of any doctrine, and the manner of 
address, either in proposing, attacking, or defending it ; 
and then by setting a just and severe guard of reason and 
conscience over all the exercises of our judgment, resolv- 
ing to yield to nothing but the convincing evidence of truth, 
rehgiously obeying the light of reason, in matters of pure 
reason, and the dictates of revelation in things that relate 
to our faith. 

Thus we have taken a brief survey of some of the infi- 
nite varieties of prejudice that attend mankind on every 
side of the present state, and the dangers of errour, or of 
rash judgment, we are perpetually exposed to in this life : 
This chapter shall conclude with one remark, and one 
piece of advice. 

The remark is this. The same opinon, whether false or 
true, may be dictated by many prejudices a^ the same 
time; for, as I hinted before, prejudice may happen to 
dictate truth sometimes as well as errour. But, when two 
or more prejudices oppose one another, as it often hap- 
pens, the stronger prevails and gains the assent : Yet how 
seldom does reason interpose with sufficient power to get 
the ascendant of them all, as it ought to do ! 

The advice follows, namely. Since we find such a swarm 
of prejudices attending us both within and without 5 since 
we feel the weakness of our reason, the frailty of our na- 
tures, and our insufficiency to guard ourselves from errour 
upon this account, it is not at all unbecoming the charac- 
ter of a logician or a philosopher, together with the ad- 
vice already given, to direct every person in his search af- 
ter truth to make his daily addresses to heaverc, and im- 
plore the God of truth to lead him into all truth, and to 
ask wisdom of him who giveth liberally to them that ask 
it, and upbraideth us nofwith our follies. 

Such a devout practice will be an excellent preparative 
for the best improvement of all tbe directions and rules 
proposed in the two following chapters. 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 181 



CHAPTER IV. 

GENERAL DIRECTIONS TO ASSIST US IN JUDG- 
ING ARIGHT. 

THE chief design of the art of logic is to assist us in 
forming a true judgment of things 5 a few proper observa-* 
lions for this end have b«en dropt occasionally in some of 
the foregoing chapters : Yet it is necessary to mention them 
again in this place, that we may have a more complete and 
simultaneous view of the general directions, which are ne- 
cessary in order to judge aright. A multitude of advices 
may be framed for this purpose ; the chief of them may^ 
for order sake, be reduced to the following heads. 

Direction I. " When we consider ourselves as philoso- 
phers, or searchers after truth, we should examine all our 
old opinions afresh, and inquire what was the ground of 
them, and whether our assent was built on just evidence 5 
and then we should cast off all those judgments which 
were formed heretofore without due examination." A man 
in pursuit of knowledge should throw off all those preju- 
dices which he had imbibed in times past, and guard against 
all the springs of errour mentioned in the preceding chap- 
ter, with the utmost watchfulness, for time to come. 

Observe here, That this rule of casting away all our fol:- 
mer prejudicale opinions and sentiments is not proposed to 
any of us to be practised at once, considered as men of bu- 
siness or religion, as friends or neighbors, as fathers or sons, 
as magistrates, subjects, or christians ; but merely as phi- 
losophers and searchers after truth : And though it may 
be well presumed that many of our judgments, both true 
and false, together with the practices built thereon in the 
natural, the civil, and the religious life, were formed with- 
out sufficient evidence ; yet an universal rejection of all 
these might destroy at once our present sense and prac- 
tice of duty with regard to God, ourselves, and our fellow- 
creatures. Mankind would be hereby thrown into such a 
Q 



182 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 

State of doubting and indifference, that it would be too long 
ere they recovered any principles of virtue or religion by 
a train of reasonings. 

Besides, the common affairs of human life often demand 
a much speedier determination, and we must many times 
act upon present probabilities : The bulk of mankind have 
not time and leisure, and advantage sufficient to begin all 
their knowledge anew, and to build up every single opin- 
ion and practice afresh, upon the justest grounds of evi- 
dence. 

Yet let it be observed also, that so far as any person is 
capable of forming and correcting his notions, and his 
rules of conduct in the natural, civil, and religious life, 
by the strict rules of logic 5 and so far as he hath time and 
capacity to review his old opinions, to re-examine all those 
which are any ways doubtful, and to determine nothing 
ivithout just evidence, he is likely to become so much the 
wiser and the happier man : and, if divine grace assist him, 
so much the better Christian. And though this cannot be 
done all at once, yet it may be done by prudent steps and 
degrees, till our whole set of opinions and principles be in 
time corrected and reformed, or at least established upon 
juster foundations. 

Direction II. " Endeavour that all your ideas of those 
objects, concerning which you pass any judgment, be clear 
and distinct, complete, comprehensive, extensive, and or- 
derly, as far as you have occasion to judge concerning 
them.^' This is the substance of the last chapter of the 
first part of logic. The rules which direct our conceptions 
must be reviewed, if we would form our judgments aright. 
But if we will make haste to judge at all adventures, while 
our ideas are dark and confused, and very imperfect, we 
shall be in danger of running into many mistakes. This 
is like a person who would pretend to give the sum total of 
a large account in arithmetic, without surveying all the 
particulars 5 or as a painter, who professes to draw a fair 
and distinct landscape in the twilight, when he can hardly 
distinguish a house from a tree. 

Observe here, That this direction does not require us 
to gain clear, distinct, complete ideas of things in all their 
purts, powers^ and qualities, in an absolute senses for this 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 183 

belongs to God alone, and is impossible for us to attain : 
But it is expressed in a relative or limited sense; that is, 
our ideas should be clear, distinct, and con:prehensive, &c. 
at least so far as we have occasion at that time to judge 
concerning them. We may form many true and certain 
judgments concerning God, angels, men, heaven, hell, &c. 
by those partial and very imperfectcoaceptions of them to 
which we have attained, if we judge no further concerning 
them than our conceptions reach. 

We may have a clear and distinct idea of the existence 
of many things in nature, and affirm that they do exist, 
though our ideas of their intimate essences and causes, 
their relations and manners of action, are very confused 
and obscure. We may judge well concerning several 
properties of any being, though other properties are un- 
known ; for perhaps we know not all the properties of any 
being whatsoever. 

Sometimes we have clear 'ideas of the absolute proper- 
ties of an object 5 and we may judge of them with certain- 
ty, while the relative properties are very obscure and un- 
known to us. So we may have a clear and just idea of 
the area of a parallelogram, without knowing what rela- 
tion it bears to the area of a triangle, or a polygon : I may- 
know the length of the diameter of a circle, without know- 
ing what proportion it has to the circumference. 

There are other things, whose external relative proper- 
ties, with respect to each other, or whose relation to us 
we know better than their own inward and absolute prop- 
erties, or their essential distinguishing attributes. We 
perceive clearly, that fire will warm or burn us, and will 
evaporate water 5 and that w^ter will allay our thirst, or 
quench the fire, though we know not the inward distin- 
guishing particles, or prime essential properties of fire 01: 
water, We may know the King, and Lord Chancellor, 
and affirm many things of them in their legal characters, 
though we can have but a confused idea of their persons 
or natural features, if we have never seen their faces. So 
the scripture has revealed God himself to us, as our Crea- 
tor, Preserver, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, and as the ob- 
ject of our worship, in clearer ideas than it has reveal- 
ed many other abstruse questions which may be raised 



184 LOGIC: OR, TttE Part. 11; 

about his divine essence or substance, his immensity or 
omnipresence. 

This therefore is the general observation in order to 
guide our judgments, " That we should not allow ourselves 
to form a judgment concerning things farther than our 
clear and distinct ideas reach, and then Tvearenot in dan- 
ger of errour." 

But there is one considerable objection against this rule, 
and which is necessary to be answered ^ and there is one- 
just and reasonable exception, which is as needful to be 
mentioned. 

The objection is this: May we not judge safely con- 
cerning some total or complete ideas, when we have a 
clear perception only of some parts or properties of them ? 
May we not affirm, that all that is in God is eternal, or 
that all his unknown attributes are infinite, though we 
have so very imperfect an idea of God, eternity, and infin- 
ity ? Again, May we not safely judge of particular objects, 
whose idea is obscure, by a clear idea of the general ? May 
I not affirm. That every unknown species of animals has^ 
inward springs of motion, because I have a clear idea that- 
these inward springs belong to an animal in general ? 

Answer. All those supposed unknown parts, properties, 
orspecies, are clearly and distinctly perceived to be con- 
nected with, or contained in the unknown parts, properties^. 
or general ideas, which we suppose to be clear and distinct, 
as far as we judge of them: And as we have no particular 
idea of those unknown divine attributes, or unknown spe- 
cies of animals 5 so there is nothing particular affil-med 
concerning them beyond what belongs to the general idea 
of divine attributes, or animals, with which I clearly and 
distinctly perceive^em to be connected. 

It may be illustrated in this manner. Suppose a long 
chain lies before me, whose nearest links I see are iron 
rings, and I see them fastened to a post near me, but the 
most distant links lie beyond the reach of my sight, so that 
I know not whether they are oval or round, brass or iron : 
Now I may boldly affirm, the whole length of this chain is 
fastened to the post, for I have a clear idea that the near- 
est links are thus fastened, and a clear idea that the dis- 
tinct links are connected with the nearest, if X can draw 
the whol^ chain by onq link. 



Chap, IV- RIGHT USE OF REASOxV. 18& 

Or thus : If two known ideas, A and B, are evidently- 
joined, or agree, and if C unknown be included in A, and 
also D unknown be included in B, then I may affirm that 
C and D are joined and agree : For I have a clear percep- 
tion of the union of the two known ideas A and B ; and 
also a clear perception of the connexion of the unknown 
ideas with the known. So that clear and distinct ideas must 
still abide as a general necessary qualification, in order to 
form a right judgment: And indeed it is upon this foot that 
all ratiocination is built, and the conclusions are thus form- 
ed, which reduce things unknown from things known. 

Yet it seems to m% that there is one just limitation or 
exception to this general rule of judgment, as built on 
clear and distinct ideas, and it is this. 

Exception. In matter of mere testimony, whether hu« 
man or divine, there is not always a necessity of clear and 
distinct ideas of the things which are believed. Though 
the evidence of propositions, which are entirely formed by 
ourselves depends on the clearness And distinctness of those 
ideas of which they are composed, and on our own clear 
perception of their agreement or disagreement, yet we may 
justly assent to propositions formed by others, when we 
have neither a very clear conception In ourselves of the true 
ideas contained in the words, aor how they agree or disa- 
gree ; provided always, that we have a clear and sufficient 
evidence of the credibility of the persons who inform us. 

Thus when we read in scripture the great doctrines of 
the deity of Christ, of the union of the divine and human 
natures^ in him, of the divine agency of the blessed Spirit^ 
that the Son is the brightness of the Father's glory, that 
all things were created by him and for him, that the Son 
shall give up the kingdom to the Father, and that God 
shall be all in all 5 we may safely believe them : For, tho* 
the ideas of these subjects themselves are )iot sufficiently 
clear, distinct, and perfect, for our own minds to form 
tliese judgments or propositions concerning them, yet we 
Imve a clear and distinct perception of God^s revealing^ 
them, or that they are contained in scripture : and this iy 
sufficient evidence to determine our assent. 

Q2 



186 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IL 

The same thing holds true in some measure, where cred- 
ible human testimony assures us of some propositions, 
while we have no sufficient ideas of the subject and predi- 
cate of them to determine our assent. So when an hon- 
est and learned mathematician assures a plougiiman that 
the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, 
or that the square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled 
triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides 5 
the ploughman, who has but confused ideas of these things, 
may firmly and easilj' believe these propositions, upon the 
same ground because he has evidence of the skill and faith* 
fulness of his informer.* • 

* Perhaps some may object against this representation of things, 
and say, that ** We cannot properly be said to believe a proposition 
any further than we ourselves have ideas under the terms : Therefore^ 
if v^^e have no ideas under the terms^ we believe nothing but the con- 
nection of words or sounds ; and, if we have but obscure and inade- 
quate ideas under the terms, then we partly believe a connection of 
things, and partly a connection of sounds* But that we cannot pro- 
perly be said to believe the proposition, for our faith can never go be- 
yond our ideas." 

Now^ to set this matter in a clear light^ I suppose that every prop- 
osition which is proposed to my assent^ is a sentence made up of 
terms which have some ideas under them known or unknown to me. 
1 confess, if I believe there are no ideas at all under the terms, and , 
^here is nothing meant by them^ then indeed, with regard to me, it 
2S the mere joining of sounds : But if, for instance, a ploughman has 
credible information from an honest and skillful mathematician, that 
un ellipsis is made by the section of a cone^ he believes the proposi- 
tion, or he believes the sentence is IruCj as it is made up of terms . 
which his informant understands, tlu)ugh the ideas be unknown to 
him; that is^ he believes there are some ideas which his informant 
has uader these words which are really connected. And, I think, 
this may be called believing the proposition, for it is a belief of some- 
thing more than the mere joining of sounds; it is a belief of the real 
-onnection of some unknown ideas belonging to those sounds ; and 
u this sense a man may be said to believe the truth of a proposition, 
vhich he doth not understand at all. 

With more reason still may we be said to believe a proposition 
j.pon credible testimony, if v/e have some sort of ideas under th« 
terms^ though they are but partial or inadequate and obscure ; such 
ns Divine answers were given by Urim and Fhummim.- Forj since 
!t is purely upon testimony we believe the known parts of the ideas* 
i,ignifietl by those words to be connected, upon the same testimony 
-ve may aho believe all the unknown parts of the ideas signified by; 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 187 

Direction III. " When you have obtained as clear and 
comprehensive ideas as needful, both of the subject 
and predicate of a proposition, then compare those ideas 
of the subject and predicate together with the utmost at- 
tention, and observe how far they agree, and wherein they 
difler.'^ Whether the proposition may be affirmed abso- 
lutely or relatively, whether in whole or in part, whether 
universally or particularlyj and then under what particu- 
lar limitations. Turn these ideas about in your mind, 
and take a view of them on all sides, just as a mason would 
do to see whether two hewn stones exactly suit each other 

those words to be connected, namely, because our informant is know- 
ing and faithful. And in this sense we may justly be said to believe 
a proposition of scripture entirely, which we understand but very 
imperfectly, because God who reveals it is knowing and faithful in 
perfection. 

And indeed^ unless this representation of the matter be allowed, 
there are but very few propositions in the world^ even in human 
things, to which we give an entire assent, or which we may be said 
either to know, or believe, because there is scarce any thing on earth 
of which we have an ade(|uate, and most perfect idea. And it is 
evident^ that in divine things there is scarce any thing which we 
could either know or believe, without this allowance : For, though 
reason and revelation join to inform me, that God is holy, how ex- 
ceeding inadequate are my ideas of God, and of his holiness ? Yet I 
may boldly and entirely assent to this whole proposition, since 1 am 
sure that every known and unknown idea signified by the term God^ 
is connected with the ideas of the term holiness, because reason part- 
ly informs me, but especially because the divine testimony which 
has connected them is certainly credible. 

I might argue from this head perhaps more forcibly from the doc- 
trine of God's incomprehensibleness* If we could believe nothing 
but what wc have ideas of, it would be impossible for us to believe 
that God is incomprehensible: For this implies in it a belief that 
there are some unknown ideas belonging to the nature of God. — 
Therefore we both believe and profess that something concerning 
unknowif ideas, when we believe and profess that God is imprehen- 
sible. 

I persuade myself that most of those very persons who object a- 
gainst my representation of things, will yet readily confess, ihey be- 
lieve all the propositions in scripture, rather than to declare they do . 
not believe several of them ; though they must acknowledge that sev- 
eral of them are far above their understanding, or that they have 
scarce any ideas of the true sense of them* And therefore, where 
propositions derived from credibk testimony stre ma(J« up oi durk or 



188 LOGIC: OR, THE Pakt. IL 

in every part, and are fit to be joined in erecting a carved 
or fluted pillar. 

Compare the whole subject with the whole predicate in 
their several parts : Take heed in this matter that you 
neither add to, nor diminish the ideas contained in the 
subject or in the predicate ; for such an inadvertence or 
mistake will expose yoa to great errour in judgment. 

Direction IV. " Search for evidence of truth with dili- 
gence and honesty, and be heartily ready to receive evi- 
dence whether for the agreement or disagreement of 
ideas.'* 

Search with diligence; spare no labour in searching for 
the truth, in due proportion to the importance of the pro- 
position. Read the best authors who have writ on that 
subject ; consult your wise and learned friends in conver* 
sation ; and be not unwilliag to borrow hints toward your 

inadequate ideas, I think it is much more proper to say we believe 
them, than that we do not believe them, lest we cut off a multitude 
of ihe propositions of the bible front our assent of faith. 

Yet let it be observed here, that when we believe a proposition on 
mere testimony, of which we have no ideas at all» we can only be 
said to give a general implicit assent to the truth of that proposition, 
without any particular knowledge of, or explicit assent to the special 
truth contained in that proposition: And thus our implicit assent is 
of very little use, unless it be to testify our belief of the knowledge 
and veracity of hinn that informs us. 

As our ideas of a proposition are more or less clear and adequate, as 
well as just and proper, so we do explicitly assent more or less to the 
particular truth contained in that proposition, And our assent here- 
by becomes more or less useful for the increase o^ our knowledge, 
or the direction, of our practice. 

When divine testimony plainly proposes to our faith such a propo- 
sition whereof we have but obscure, doubtful^ and inadequate ideas, 
we are bound implicitly to believe the truth of it, as expressed in 
those terms, in order to shew our subnnission to God who revealed it, 
as a God of perfect knowledge and veracity: But it is our duty to 
use all proper methods to obtain a farther and explicit knowledge of 
the particular truth contained in the proposition, if we would im- 
prove by it either in knowledge or virtue. All necessary rules of 
grammar and criticism should be employed to find out the Very ideas 
that belong to those words, and which were designed by the divine 
speaker or writer. Though we may believe the truth of a proposi- 
tion which we do not understand, yet we should endeavour iO under- 
hand every propositiQawUigh we believe to be true* 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON, 189 

improvement from the meanest person, nor to receive 
any glimpse of light from the most unlearned. Diligence 
and humility is the way to thrive in the riches of the 
understanding, as well as in gold or silver. Search care- 
fully for the evidence of truth, and dig for wisdom as for 
hid treasure. 

Search with a steady honesty of soul, and a sincere im* 
partiality, to find the truth. Watch against every temp- 
tation that might bribe your judgment, or warp it aside 
from truth. Do not indulge yourself to wish any unex- 
amined proposition were true or falsle. A wish often per- 
verts the judgment, and tempts the mind strangely to be- 
lieve upon slight evidence whatsoever we wish to be true 
or false. 

Direction V. "Since the evidence of the agreement or 
cUsagreement of two ideas is the ground of our assent to 
any proposition, or the great criterion of truth ; therefore 
we should suspend our judgment, and neither affirm or de- 
ny till this evidence appear.^^ 

This direction is different from the second^ for, though 
the evidence of the agreement or disagreement of two 
ideas *most times depends on the clearness and distinct- 
ness of the ideas themselves, yet it does not always arise 
hence. Testimony may be sufficient evidence of the a- 
greement or disagreement of two obscure ideas, as we have 
seen just before in the exception under the second direc- 
tion. Therefore, though we are not universally and in 
all cases bound to suspend our judgment till our ideas of 
the objects themselves are clear and distinct, yet we must 
always suspend our judgment, and withhold our assent to, 
or denial of any proposition, till some just evidence appear 
of its truth or falsehood. It is an impatience of doubt and 
suspense, a rashness and precipitance of judgment, and 
hastiness to believe something on one side or the other, 
that plunges us into many errours. 

This direction to dela)'- and to suspend our assent is 
more particularly necessary to be observed, when such 
propositions offer themselves to us as are supported by 
education, authority, custom, inclination, interest, or other 
powerful prejudices: for our judgment is led away in- 
i^ensibly to believe all that they dictate ; and, where pre- 



190 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 

judices and dangers of errour are multiplied^ we should set 
the strictest guard upon our assent. 

Yet remember the caution or limitation liere whicTi I 
gave under the first objection, namely, that this is not to 
be too strictly applied lo, in matters of daily practice, ei- 
ther in human life or religion; but when we consider our- 
selves as philosophers, or searchers after truth, we should 
always withhold our assent where there is not just evi- 
dence : And, as far and as fast as we can, in a due consist- 
ence with our daily necessary duties, we should also re- 
form and adjust all our principles and practices, both in 
rehgion and the civil life, by these rules. 

Direction VI. " We must judge of every proposition 
by those proper and pecuhar mediums or means, whereby 
the evidence of it is to be obtained, whether it be sense, 
consciousness, intelligence, reason or testimony. All our 
faculties and po v/ers are to be employed in judging of their 
proper objects. '^ 

If we judge of sounds, colours, odours, sapors, the 
smoothness, roughness, softness, or hardness of bodies, it 
must be done by the use of our senses : But then we must 
take heed that our senses are well disposed, as shall be 
shevsn afterward. 

And since our senses in their various exercises are i^ 
some cases liable to be deceived, and more especially when 
by our eyes or our ears we judge of the figure, quantity, 
distance, and position of objects that are afar off, we ought 
to call our reason in to the assistance of our senses, and 
correct the errours of one sense by the help of another. 

It is by the powers of sense and reason joined together, 
that we must judge philosophically of the inward nature, 
the secret properties and powers, the causes and effects, 
the relations and proportions, of a thousand corporeal ob- 
jects which surround us on earth, or are placed at a distance 
in the heavens. If a man, on the one hand, confines 
himself only to sensible experiments, and does not exor- 
cise reason upon them, he may surprise himself and oth- 
ers with strange appearances, and learn to entertain the 
world with sights and shews, but never become a philoso- 
pher; And, on the other hand, if a man imprisoned him- 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 191 

self in his closet, and employ the most exquisite powers 
of reason to find out the nature of things in the corporeal 
world, without the use of his senses, and the practice of 
experiments, he will frame to himself a scheme of chime- 
ras, instead of true philosophy. Hence came the inven- 
tion of substantial forms and qualities, of materia prima 
3Xid privatio7i, with all the insignificant names used by the 
Peripatetic writers ; and it was for want of more experi- 
ments that the great Descartes failed in several parts of 
his pliilosophical writings. 

In the abstracted and speculative parts of the mathe- 
matics, which treat of quantity and number, the faculty of 
reason must be chiefly employed to perceive the relation 
of various quantities, and draw certain and useful conclu- 
sions ; but it wants the assistance of sense also to be ac- 
quainted with lines, angles, and figures. And in practical 
mathematics our senses have still greater employment. 

If we would judge of the pure properties and actions of 
the mind, of the nature of spirits, their various perceptions 
and powers, we must not inquire of our eyes and our ears, 
nor the images or shapes laid up in the brain, but we must 
have recourse to our own consciousness of what passes 
within our own mind. 

If we are to pass a judgment upon any thing that ref- 
lates to spirits in a state of union with animal nature, and 
the mixt properties of sensation, fancy, appetite, passion, 
pleasure and pain, which arise thence, we must consult 
our own sensations, and the other powers which we find 
in ourselves considered as men or creatures made up of a 
mind and an animal, and by just reasonings deduce proper 
consequences, and improve our knowledge in these sub- 
jects. 

If we have occasion to judge concerning matters done 
in past ages, or in distant countries, and where we our- 
selves cannot be present, the powers of sense and reason, 
for the most part, are not sufficient to inform us, and we 
must therefore have recourse to the testimony of others : 
And this is either divine or human. 

In matters of mere human prudence, we shall find the 
greatest advantage by making wise observations on our 
own conduct, and the conduct of others, and a survey of 



192 LOGIC : OR, THE Part H. 

the events attending such conduct. Experience in this 
case is equal to a natural sagacity^ or rather superior, A 
treasureof observations and experiences, collected by wise 
men, is of admirable service here. And perhaps there 
is nothing in the world of this kind equal to the sacred 
book of Proverbs, even if we look on it as a mere human 
writing. 

In questions of natural religion, we must exercise the 
faculty of reason which God hath given us 5 and, since he 
has been pleased to afford us his word, we should confirm 
and improve, or correct our reasonings on this subject by 
the divine assistance of the Bible. 

In matters of revealed rehgion, that is, Christianity, Ju- 
daism, &c. which we could nev^r have known by the light 
of nature, the word of God is our only foundation and 
chief hght; though here our reason must be used both to 
iind out the true meaning of God in his word, and to de- 
rive just inferences from what God has written, as well to 
judge of the credentials vvhereby divine testimony is dis- 
tinguished from mere human testimony or from impos- 
ture. 

As divine revelation can never contradict right reason^ 
for tiiey are two great lights given us by our Creator for 
our conduct, so reason ought by no means to assume to 
itself a power to contradict divine revelation. 

Though revelation be not contrary to reason, yet there 
are four classes wherein matters of revelation may be said 
to rise above, or go beyond our reason. 

1. When revelation asserts two things X)f which we have 
clear ideas, to be joined, whose connection or agreement 
is not discoverable by reason ; as when scripture informs 
us, that The dead shall rise, that The earth shall he burnt 
np, and the Man Christ Jesus shall return from heaven^ 
none of these things could ever be found out or proved by 
reason. 

2. When revelation affirms any proposition, while rea- 
son has no clear and distinct ideas of the subject or of the 
predicate ; as, God created all things by Jes7is Christ : By 
the Urim and Tliummim God gave forth divine oracles. 
Tlie predicate of each of these propositions is to us an ob- 
scure idea, for we know not what was the peculiar agen- 



Chap, IV. RIGHT USE OF REASOxV. 193 

cy of Jesus Christ when God the Father created the world 
by him ; nor have we any clear and certain conception 
what the Urim and Thummim were, nor how God gave 
answers to his people by them. 

3. When revelation, in plain and express language, de- 
clares some doctrine which our reason at present knows 
with evidence and certainty, how or in what sense to re- 
concile to some of its own principles ; as, that the child 
Jesus is the mighty God, Isa. ix. 6, which proportion car- 
ries a seeming opposition to the unity and spirituality of 
the Godhead, which are principles of reason. 

4. When two proposition]? or doctrines are plainly as- 
serted by divine revelation, which our reason at present 
knows not how or in what sense, with evidence and cer- 
tainty, to reconcile with one another ; as. The Father is 
the only true God^ John xvii. 3, and yet Christ is over all, 
God blessed for ever, Rom. ix. 6. 

Now divine revelation having declared all these propo- 
sitions, reason is bound to receive them, because it can- 
not prove them to be utterly inconsistent or impossible, 
though the ideas of them may be obscure, though we our- 
selves see not the rational connection of them, and though 
we know not certainly how to reconcile them. In these 
cases, reason must submit to faith ; that is, we are bound 
to believe what God asserts, and wait till he shall clear up 
that which seems dark and difficult, and till the mysteries 
of faith shall be farther explained to us either in this world 
or in the worfd to come,* and reason itself dictates this 
submission. 

Direction VII. " It is very useful to have some general 
principles of truth settled in the mind, whose evidence is 
great and obvious, that they may be always at hand to 
assist us in judging of the great variety of things which 
occur. These may be called first notions, or fundamen- 
tal principles ; for, though many of them are deduced 
from each other, yet most or all of them may be called 
principles when compared with a thousand other judg- 
ments which we form under the regulation and influence 
of these primary propositions." 

* See something more on this subject, Direction IL precediiij;^ 
and chap, v, sec, o. 
R 



194 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. U. 

Every art and science, as well as the affairs of civil 
life and religioHj have peculiar principles of tliis kind be- 
longing to them. There are metaphysical, physical, ma- 
them^atical, political, economical, medicinal, theological, 
moral and prudential principles of judgment. It would 
be too tedious to give a specimen of them all in this place. 
Those which are of the most universal use to us, both as 
men and as Christians, may be found in the following 
chapter among the rules of judgment about particular ob- 
jects. 

Direction VIII. "Let the degrees of your assent to ev- 
ery proposition bear an exact proportion to the different 
degrees of evidence.^^ Remember this is one of the great- 
est principles of wisdom that man can arrive at in this 
^vorld, and the best human security against dangerous mis- 
takes in speculation or practice. 

In the nature of things of which our knowledge is made 
up, there is infinite variety in their degrees of evidence. 
And, as God hath given our minds a power to suspend 
their assent till the evidence be plain, so we have a power 
to receive things which are proposed to us with a strong- 
er or weaker belief, in infinite variety of degrees, propor- 
tionable to their evidence, I believe that planets are in- 
habited, and I beheve that the earth rolls among them 
yearly round the sun ; but I do not believe both these 
propositions with an equal firmnes-s of assent, because the 
arguments for the latter are drawn from mathematical 
observations ; but the arguments for the former are but 
probable conjectures and moral reasonings. Yet neither 
do I believe either of these propositions so firmly as I do 
that the earth is about twenty four thousand miles round, 
because the mathematical proof of this is much easier, 
plainer and stronger. And yet farther, when I say that 
the earth was created by the power of God, I have still a 
more infallible assurance of this than of all the rest, be- 
cause reason and scripture join to assure me of it. 

Direction IX. '^ Keep j-our mind always open to re- 
ceive truth, and never set limits to your own improvement. 
Be ready always to hear what may be objected against 
your favourite opinions, and those which have had longest 
possession of your assent. Aad if there should be ^ny new 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 195 

and uneontrolable evidence brought against these old or 
l>eloved sentiments, do not wink your eyes fast against the 
light, but part with any thing for the sake of truth : Re- 
ilstober when you overcome an errour you gain truth , the 
victory is on your side, and the advantage is all your own." 
I confess those grand principles or belief and practice 
which universally influence our conduct, both with regard 
to this life and the life to come, should be supposed to be 
well settled in the first years of our studies ; such as, the 
existence and {Providence of God, the truth of Christiani- 
t}^, the authority of scripture, the great rules of morality, 
&c. We should avoid a light fluttering genius, ever ready 
to change our foundations, and to be carried about with 
every wind of doctrine. To guard against which incon- 
venience, we should labour with earnest diligence and fer- 
vent prayer, that our most fundamental and important 
points of belief and practice may be established upon just 
grounds of reason and scripture, when we come to years 
of discretion, and fit to judge for ourselves in such impor- 
tant points. Yet, since it is possible that the folly or pre- 
judices of young^rr years may have established persons in 
some mistaken sentiments, even in very important mat- 
ters, we should always hold ourselves ready to receive any 
new advantage toward the correction or improvement 
evenjof our established principles, as well as opinions of 
lesser moment. 



CHAPTER V. 



SPECIAL RULES TO DIRECT US IN JUDGING OF 
PARTICULAR OBJECTS. 

IT would be endless to rnn through all those partic- 
ular' objects concerning which we have occasion to pass a 
ju|gment at one time or another. Things of the most 
frequent occurrence, of the widest extent, and of the 



J% LOGIC: OR, THE Part. II. 

greatest importance^, are the objects and exercises of sersse^ 
of reason^ and speculation 5 the matters of morality, relig- 
ion, and prudence, of human and divine testimony, to- 
gether with the essays of reasoning upon things past ar^ 
future. Special rules relating to all these will be the sub- 
ject of the followinor sections. 



SECT. I. 

PKiNCIPLEB AND KULES OF JUDG3iENT CONCJEftNING THE OB- 
JECTS OF SENSE. 

THOUGH our senses are sometimes liable to be de- 
eeived, yet when they are rightly disposed, and fitly exer- 
cised about their proper objects, with the just assistance of 
reason, they give us sufScient evidence of truth. 

This may be proved by an argument drawn from tha 
^visdom, goodness, and faithfulness of God our Creator. 
It was he gave us our senses and he would not make us of 
such a constitution as to be liable to perpetual deception, 
and unavoidable errour, in using these faculties of sense 
in the best manner we are capable of, about those very 
things which are the proper objects of them. 

This may be proved also by tlie ill consequences that 
would follow from the supposition of the contrary. If we 
could have no certainty of the dictates of our senses, we 
could never be sure of any of the common affairs and oc* 
currences of life. Men could not transact any of their 
civil or moral concerns with any certainty of justice; nor 
indeed could we eat or drink, walk or move, with safety. 
Our senses direct u3 in all these. 

Again, the matters of religion depend in some measure 
upon thecertainty of the dictates of sense; for faith comes 
by hearing; and it is to our senses that God appeals in 
working miracles to prove his own revelation. Now, if, 
when our eyes and ears, and other organs of sense are 
rightly disposed and exercised about their proper objects, 
they were always liable to be deceived, there could be no 
knowledge of the gospel, no proof of divine revelation by 
visions, voices or miracles. 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 197 

Our sense will discover things near us and round about 
us, which are necessary for our present state, with suffi- 
cient exactness 5 and things distant also, so far as they 
relate to our necessary use of them. 

Nor is there need of any more accurate rules for the use 
of our senses, in the judgment of all the common affairs 
of life, or even of miraculous and divine operations, than 
the vulgar part of mankind are sufficiently acquainted witii 
by nature, and by their own daily observations. 

But if we would express these rules in a more exact 
manner, how to judge by the dictates of our senses, ihey 
should be represented thus ; 

1, We must take care that the organs of our senses be 
rightly disposed, and not under the power of any distem- 
per or considerable decay; as, for instance, that our eyes 
are not tinctured with the jaundice, when we could judge 
of colours, lest we pronounce them all yellow : That 
our hands are not burning in a fever, nor benimibed witli 
frost or the palsy, when we would judge of the heat 01: 
coldness of any object. That our palate be not vitiated 
by any disease, or by some other improper taste, when we 
would judge of the true taste of any solid or liquid. This 
direction relates to all our senses ; but the following rules 
chiefly refer to our sight, 

2. We must observe whether the object be at a proper 
distance; for, if it be too near or too far off, our eyes will 
not sufficiently distinguish many things which are proper- 
ly the objects of sight ; and therefore (if possible) we must 
make nearer approaches to the object, or remove farther 
from it, till we have obtained that due distance which gives 
us the clearest perception. 

3. We must not employ our sight to take a full survey 
at once of objects that are too large for it ; but we must 
view them by parts, and then judge of the whole: Nor 
must our senses judge of objects too small, for some things 
which appear through glasses to be really and distinctly 
existent, are either utterly invisible, or greatly confused, 
when we would judge of them by the naked eye. ' 

4, We must place ourselves in such a position toward the 
object, or place the object in such a position toward our 
eve, as may give us the clearest representation of it ; for a 

R2 



198 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. lie 

different position greatly alters the appearance ofthe shape 
of bodies. And for this reason we should change the po- 
sition both of the eye and the object in some cases, that 
by viewing the object in several appearances, we may pass 
a more complete and certain judgment concerning it. 

6. We must consider what the medium is by which ob- 
jects are represented to our senses 5 whether it be thinner 
or thicker 5 whether it be air or vapour, or water, or glass, 
&c. whether it be duly enlightened or dusky, whether it 
reflect or refract, or only transmit the appearance of the 
object; and whether it be tinctured with any particular 
colour : Whether it be moving or at rest. 

6. We must sometimes use other helps to assist our sen- 
ses ; and, if we make use of glasses, we must make all just 
allowances for the thickness or thinness of them, for the 
clearness or dulness, for the smoothness or roughness, for 
the plainness, the convexity or concavity of them, and for 
the distance at which these glasses are placed from the 
eye, or from the object, (or from one another, if there be 
two or more glasses used,) and all this according to the 
rules of art. The same sort of caution should be used al- 
so in mediums which assist the hearing, such as speaking 
trumpets, hearing trumpets, &c. 

7. If the object may be proposed to more senses than 
jone, let us call ^n the substance of some other senses ta 
examine it and this will increase the evidence of what one 
sense dictates. For example. Our ear may assist our eye 
in judging of the distance of bodies which are both visible 
:and sonorous, as an exploded cannon, or a cloud charged 
with thunder. Our feeling may assist our sight in judging 
of the kind, the shape, situation, or distance of bodies that 
jire near at hawd, as whether a garment be silk or stuff, 
&c. So, if I both see, hear, and embrace my friend, I 
am sure he is present. 

8. We should also make several trials, at some distant 
times, and in different circumstances, comparing former 
experiments with latter, and our own observations with 
those of other persons. 

It is by such methods as these that modern philosophy 
has been so greatly improved by the use of sensible ex* 
periments. 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 199 



SECT. II. 

PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OF REASON 

AND SPECULATION. 

IT is by reason we judge both in matters of speculation 
and practice ; there are peculiar rules which relate to things 
practical, whether they be matters of rehgion, morality, 
or prudence, yet many things in this section ma}^ be ap- 
plied to practical inquiries and matters of faith, though it 
chiefly relates to knowledge, or speculations of reason. 

1. Whatsoever clear ideas we can join together without 
inconsistenc}^, are to be counted possible, because almighty 
power can make whatsoever we can conceive. 

2. From the mere possibility of a thing we cannot infer 
its actual existence ; nor from the non-existence of it can 
we infer its impossibihty. 

Note — The idea of God seems to claim an exemption 
from this general rule; for, if he be possible, he certainly 
exists, because the very idea includes eternity 5 and he 
cannot begin to be : If he exist not, he is impossible for the 
very same reason. 

3. Whatsoever is evidently contained in the idea of any 
thing, may be affirmed of that thing with certainty. Rea- 
son is contained in the idea of a man 5 and existence is 
contained in the idea of God ; and therefore we may af- 
firm God exists, and man is reasonable. 

4. It is impossible that the same thing should be, and 
not be at the same time, and in the samt respect. Thence 
it follows that two contradictory ideas cannot be joined in 
the same part of the same subject, at the same time, and 
in the same respects : Or that two contradictory propo- 
sitions can never be both true. 

5. The more we converse with any subject in its various 
properties, the better knowledge of it we are likely to at- 
tain ; and by frequent and repeated inquiries and experi- 
ments, reasonings and conversations about it, we confirm 
our true judgments of that thing, and correct our former 
mistake^. 



209 ^ LOGIC: OR, THE Part. IL 

6. Yet, after our utmost inquiries, we can never be as- 
sured by reason, that we know ail the powers and proper- 
ties of any finite being. 

7. If finite beings are not adequately known by us, much 
less the things infinite: For it is of the nature of a finite 
mind not to be able to comprehend what is infinite. 

8. We may judge and argue very justly and certainly 
concerning infinites, in some parts of them, or so far as 
our ideas reach, though the infinity of them hath some- 
thing incomprehensible in it. And this is built on the gen- 
eral rule folio wing J namely, 

9. Whatsoever is sufficiently clear and evident, ouglit 
not to be denied, though there are other things belonging 
to the same subject which cannot be comprehended • I 
may affirm many things with certainty concerning human 
souls, their union with bodies, concerning the divisibility 
of matter, an:l the attributes of God, though many other 
things relating to them are all darkness to us. 

10. If any opinion proposed has either no arguments, or 
equal arguments for and against it, we must remain in per- 
fect suspense about it, till convincing evidence appear on 
one side. 

11. Where present necessity of action does not constrain 
to determine, we should not immediately yield up our as- 
sent to mere probable arguments, without due reserve, if 
we have any reasonable hope of obtaining greater light and 
evidence on one side or the other : for, when the balance 
of the judgment once resigns its equilibrium or neutrality 
to a mere probable argument, it is too ready to settle itself 
on that side, so that the mind will not easily change that 
judgment, though bright and strong evidence appear after- 
wards on the other side. 

12. Of two opinions, if one has unanswerable difficulties 
attending it, we must not reject it immediatel}'^^, till we ex- 
amine whether the contrary opinion has not difliculties as 
unanswerable, 

13. If each opinion has objections against it, which we 
cannot answer, or reconcile, we should rather embrace 
that which has the least difficulties in it, and which has the 
best arguments to support it: And let our assent b^ar pro- 
portion to the 3upenoi: evidenc^r 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 201 

14. If any doctrine hath very strong and sufSdcient hght 
nnd evidence to command our assent, we should not reject 
it because there is an objection or two against it which we 
ure not able to answer; for, upon this foot a common 
Christian would be baffled out of every article of his faith, 
and must renounce even the dictates of his reason and his 
senses ; and tlie most learned man perhaps would hold 
but very few of them fast: For some objections which at- 
tend the sacred doctrine of the eternity and the omnipre- 
sence of God, and tfie philosophical doctrines of light, 
atoms, space, motion, &c. are hardly solvable to this day. 

15. VViiere two extremes are proposed, either in matters 
of speculation or practice, and neither of them has certain 
and convincing evidence, it is generally safest to take the 
middle way. Moderation is more likely to come near the 
tiiith than doubtful extremes. This is an excellent rule to 
judge of the characters and value of the greatest part of 
persons and things ; for nature seldom deals in superlatives. 
It is a good rule also by which to form our judgment in 
many speculative controversies; a reconciling medium in 
such cases does often best secure truth as well as peace. 

16. When two different propositions have each a very 
strong and cogent evidence, and do not plainly appear in- 
consistent, we may believe both of them, though we can- 
not at present see the way to reconcile them. Reason, as 
well as our own consciousness, assure us, that the will of 
men is free, and that the multitudes of human actions are 
in that respect contingent; and yet reason and scripture 
assure us, that God foreknows them all; and thisimpHes a 
certain fatality. Now, though learned men have not to 
this day hit on any so clear and happy method as is de- 
sired to reconcile these propositions, yet since we do not 
see a plain inconsistency in them, we justly believe them 
both, because their evidence is great. 

17. Let us not therefore too suddenly determine in diffi- 
cult matters, that two things are utterly inconsistent : For 
there are many propositions which may appear incon- 
sistent at first, and yet afterwards we find their consisten- 
cy, and the way of reconciling them may be made plain 
and easy; as also, there are other propositions which 



202 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. IL 

may appear consistent at first, but after due examination, 
Ave find their inconsistency. 

18. For the same reason, we 'should not call those dif- 
ficulties utterly insolvable, or those objections unanswera- 
ble which we are not presently able to answer: Time and 
-diligence may give farther light. 

19. In short, if Ave will secure ourselves from error, we 
should not be too frequent or hasty in asserting the certain 
consistency or inconsistency, the absolute universality, ne- 
cessity, or impossibility of things, where there is not the 
brightest evidence. He is but a ^'^oung and raw philoso- 
pher, who, when he sees two particular ideas evidently a- 
gree, immediately asserts them to agree universally, to a- 
gree necessarily, and that it is impossible it should be oth- 
erwise. Or when he sees evidently that two particular 
ideas happen to disagree, he presently asserts their con- 
stant and natural inconsistency, their utter impossibility of 
agreement, and calls every thing contrary to his opinion 
absurdity and non-sense. A true philosopher will affirm or 
deny with much caution and modest}', unless he has thor- 
oughly examined and found the evidence of every part of 
his assertion exceeding plain. 

20. Let us have a care of builJing our assurance of any 
important point of doctrine upon one single argument if 
there are more to be obtained. W§ should not slight and 
reject all other arguments which support the same doctrine, 
lest if our favorite argument should be refuted, and fail n^, 
we should be tempted to abandon that important principle 
of truth. I think this was a very culpable practice in Des- 
cartes, and some of his followers, who, when he had found 
out the argument for the existence of God, derived from the 
idea of a most perfect and self-existent being, he seemed to 
despise and abandon all other arguments against Atheism. 

21. If we happen to have our chief arguments for any 
opinion refuted, we should not immediately give up the 
opinion itself; for perhaps it may be a truth still, and we 
may find it to be justly supported by other arguments, 
which we might once think weaker, or perhaps by new ar- 
guments which we knew not before. 

22. We ought to esteem that to be sufficient evidence 
of a proposition, where both the kind and the force of the 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 203 

arguments or proofs are as great as the nature of the 
thing admits, and as the necessity or exigence of the case 
requires. So, if we have a credible and certain testimony 
that Christ rose from the dead, it is enough ; we are not to 
expect mathematical or occular demonstration for it 5 at 
least in our day. 

23. Though we should seek what proofs may be attain- 
ed of any proposition, and we should receive any number 
of arguments which are just and evident for the confirma- 
tion of the same truth, yet we must not jud^e of the truth 
of any proposition by the nunber of arguments which 
are brought to support^it, buv by the strength and -weight 
of them : A building will stand firmer and longer on four 
large pillars of marble, than on ten of sand, or earth, or 
timber. 

24. Yet where certain evidence is not to be found or ex- 
pected, a considerable number of probable arguments car- 
ry great weight with them even in matters of speculation. 
That is a probable hypothesis in philosophy or in theolo- 
gy, which goes farthest toward the solution of many diffi- 
.cult questions arising on any subject. 



SECT. IIL 



t»RlNClPLES AND RULES OF JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OF MORAL- 
ITY AND RELIGION. 

HERE it may be proper, in the first place, to mention 
a few definitions of words or terms. 

By matters of morality and religion, I mean tliose things 
which relate to our duty to God, ourselves, or our fellow- 
creatures. 

Moral good, or virtue, or holiness, is an action or tem- 
tempcr conformable to the rule of our duty. Moral evil, 
or vice, or sin, is an action or temper wnconformable to 
the rule of our duty, or a neglect to fulfil it. 

Note — The words vice or virtue, chiefly imply the re- 
lation of our actions to men and this world. Sin and ho- 



204 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IL 

liness, rather imply their relation to God and the other 
world. 

Natural good is that which gives us pleasure or satisfac- 
tion. Natural evil is that which gives us pain or grief. 

Happiness consists in the attainment of the highest and 
most lasting natural good. Misery consists in suffering the 
highest and most lasting natural evil ; that is in short, 
heaven or hell. 

Though this be a just account of perfect happiness and 
perfect misery, y^t wheresoever pain overbalances pleas- 
ure, there is a degree of misery ; and wheresover pleasure 
overbalances pain, there is a degree of happiness. 

I proceed now to lay down some principles and rules of 
judgment in matters of moralit3' and religion. 

1. The will of our Maker, whether discovered by reason 
or revelation, carries the highest authority with it, and is 
thereiore the highest rule of duty to intelligent creatures; 
a conformity t)r non-conformity to it determines their ac- 
tions to be morally good or evil. 

2. Whatsoever is really an immediate duty toward our- 
selves, or toward our fellow-creatures, is more remotely a 
duty to God i and therefore in the practice of it we should 
have an eye to the will of God as our ruk. and to his 
glory as our end. 

8. Our wise and gracious Creator has closely united our 
duty and our happiness together; and has connected sin, 
or vice, and punishment; that is, he has ordained that the 
highest natural good and evil, should have a close connec- 
tion with moral good and evil, and that both in the nature 
of things, and by his own positive appointment. 

4. Conscience should seek all due information, in order 
to determine what is duty, and what is sin, because happi- 
ness and misery depend upon it. 

6. On this account our inchnation to present temporal 
good, and our aversion to present temporal evil, must be 
wisely overbalanced by the consideration of future and 
eternal good or evil, that is, happiness or misery. And 
for this reason we should not omit a duty, or commit a sin, 
to gain any temporal good, or to avoid any temporal evil. 

6. Though our natural reason in a state of innocence 
might be sufficient to find out those duties which were 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 205 

necessary for an innocent creature, in order to abide in the 
favour of his maker, yet in a fallen state, our natural rea- 
son is by no means sufficient to find out all that is necessa- 
ry to restore a sinful creature to the divine favour. 

7. Therefore God hath condescended in various ages of 
mankind, to reveal to sinful men what he requires of them 
in order to their restoration, and has appointed in his word 
some pecuhar matters of faith and practice, in order to 
their salvation. This is called revealed religion, as the 
things knowable concerning God and our duty by the light 
of nature, are called natural religion. 

8. There are also many parts of morality and natural 
religion, or many natural duties relating to God, to our- 
selves, and to our neighbours, which would be exceeding 
difficult and tedious for the bulk of mankind to find out and 
determine by natural reason ; therefore it has pleased God, 
in his sacred book of divine revelation, to express the 
most necessary duties of this kind in a very plain and easy 
manner, and make them intelligible to souls of the lowest 
capacity ; or they may be very easily derived thence by 
the use of reason. 

9. As there are some duties much more necessary, and 
more important than others are, so every duty requires 
our application to understand and practise it in proportion 
to its necessity and importance. 

10. Where two duties seem to stand in opposition to 
each other, and we cannot practise both, the less must give 
way to the greater, and the omission of the less is not sin- 
ful. So ceremonial laws give way to moral: God will 
have mercy and not sacrifice. 

11. In duties of natural religion, we may judge of the 
different degrees of their necessity and importance by rea- 
son, according to their greater or more apparent tendency 
to the honor of God, and the good of men : But in matters 
of revealed religion, it is only divine revelation can cer- 
tainly inform us what is most necessary and important ; 
yet we may be assisted also in that search by the exercises 
of reason. 

12. In actions wherein there may be some scruple about 
the duty or lawfulness of them, we should choose always 



206 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 

the safest side, and abstain as far as we can from the prscc- 
tice 01 things whose lawfulness we suspect. 

13. Points of the greatest importance in human life, or 
in religion, are generally the most evident, both in the na- 
ture of things, and in the word of God; and, wJiere points 
of faith or practice are exceeding difficult to find out, they 
cannot be exceeding important. This proposition may be 
proved by the goodness and faithfulness of God, as well as 
by experience and observation. 

14. In some of the outward practices and forms of reli- 
gion, as well as hunaan affairs, there is frequently a present 
necessity of speedy action one way or another : In such a 
case, having surveyed arguments on both sides, as far as 
our time and circumstances admit, we must guide our 
practice by those reasons which appear most probable, 
and seem at that time to overbalance the rest ; yet always 
reserving room to admit farther light and evidence, when 
such occurrences return again. It is a preponderation of 
circumstantial argument that must determine our actions 
in a thousand occurrences. 

15. We may also determine upon probable arguments 
where the matter is of small consequence, and would not 
answer the trouble of seeking after certainty. Life and 
time are more precious than to have a large share of thorn 
laid out in scrupulous inquiries, whether smoking tobacco, 
or wearing a periwig be lawful or not. 

16. In affairs of greater importance, and which may 
have a long, lasting, and extensive influence on our future 
conduct or happiness, we should not take up with proba- 
bilities, if certainty may be attained. Where there is any 
doubt on the mind in such cases, we should call in the as- 
sistance of all manner of circumstances, reasons, motives, 
consequences on all sides : We must wait longer, and with 
earnest request seek human and divine advice before we 
fully determine our judgment and our practice, according 
to the old Roman sentence, Quod statuendum est semely de- 
liberandum est did; We should belong in considering what 
we must determine once for all/' 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 207 

SECT. IV. 

PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OP HUMAN 

PRUDENCE. ^ 

THE great design of prudence, as distinct from morality 
and religion, is to determine aitd manage ever}^ aflair with 
decency, and to the best advantage. 

Thai is decent which is agreeable to our state, condi* 
tion, or circumstances, whether it be in behaviour, dis- 
course, or action. 

That is advantageous which attains the most and best 
purposes, and avoids the most and greatest inconveniences. 

As there is infinite variety in the circumstances of per- 
sons, things, actions, times and places, so we must be fur- 
nished with such genera] rules as are accommodable to all 
this variety by a wise judgmerit and discretion: For what 
is an act of consummate prudence in^some times, places, 
and circumstances, v/ould be consummate folly in otiiers. 
Now these rules may be ranged in the following manner. 

1. Our regard to persons or tilings should be governed 
by the degrees of concernment we have with them, the re- 
lation we have to them, or the expectation we have from 
them. These should be the measures by which we should 
proportion our diligence and application in any thing that 
relates to them. 

2. We should always consider whether the thing we pur- 
sue be attainable; whether it be worthy our pursuit; 
whether it be worthy of the degree of pursuit ; whether it 
be worthy of the means used in order to attain it. Vhis 
rule is necessary both in matters of knowledge, and mat- 
ters of practice. 

3. When the advantages and disadvantages, convenien- 
ces and inconveniences of any action are balanced togeth- 
er, we must finally determine on tliat side which has the su- 
perior weight; and the sooner in things which are neces- 
sarily and speedily to be done or determined. 

4. If advantages and disadvantages in their own nature 
are equal, then those which are most certain or likely as to 
the event should turn the scale of our judgment and deter- 
mine our practice. 



^,08 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 

5. Where the improbabilities of success or advantage are 
greater than the probabiHties, it is not prudent to act or 
venture^ if the action may be atten^pd with danger or loss 
equal to the proposed gain. It is proper to inquire whether 
this be not the case in almost all lotteries ; for they that 
hold stakes will certainly secure part to themselves ; and 
only the remainder being divided into prizes must render 
the improbability of gain to each adventurer greater than 
the probability. 

6. We should not despise nor neglect any real advan- 
tage, and abandon the pursuit of it, though we cannot at- 
tain all the advantages that we desire. This would be to 
act like children, who are fond of something which strikes^ 
their fancy most, and sullen and regardless of every thing 
else, if they are not humoured in that fancy. 

7. Though a general knowledge of things be useful in 
science and human life, yet we should content ourselves 
with a more superficial knowledge of those things which 
liave the least relation to our chief end and design. 

8. This rule holds good also in matters of business and 
practice, as well as in matters of knowledge ; and therefore 
we should not grasp at every thing, lest in the end we at- 
tain notbing. Persons that, either by an inconstancy of 
temper, or by a vain ambition, will pursue every sort of art 
and science, study and business, seldom grow excellent in 
anyone of them i And projectors who form twenty schemes 
seldom use sufficient application to finish one of them, or 
make it turn to good account. 

0. Take heed of delaying aftd trifling amongst the means 
instead of reaching at the end. Take heed of wasting a 
life in mere speculative studies, which is called to action 
and employment : Dwell not too long in philosophical, 
mathematical, or grammatical parts of learning, when 
your chief design is law, physic, or divinity. Do not spend 
the day in gathering flowers by the way-side, lest night 
come upon you before you arrive at your journey ^s end, 
and then you will not reach it. 

10. Where the case and circumstances of wise and good 
men resemble our own case and circumstances, we may 
borrow a great deal of instruction toward our prudent con- 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 209 

duct from their example 5 as well as in all cases we may 
learn much from their conversation and advice. 

11. After all other rules remember this, that mere spec- 
ulation in matters of human prudence, can never be a per- 
fect director, without experience and observation. We 
may be content therefore in our younger years to commit 
some unavoidable mistakes in point of prudence, and we 
shall see mistakes enough in the conduct of others, both 
which ought to be treasured up amongst our useful obser- 
vations, in order to teach us better judgment in time to 
come. Sometimes the mistakes, imprudencies, and foiiies, 
which ourselves or others have been guilty of, give us 
brighter and more effectual lessons of prudence, than the 
wisest counsels and the fairest examples could ever have 
dpne, 



SECT. V. 

PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OP HUMAN 

TESTIMONY. 

THE evidence of human testimony is not so proper to 
lead us into the knowledge of the essence and inward na- 
ture of things, as to acquaint us with the existence of 
things, and to inform us of matters of fact both past and 
present. And though there be a great deal of fallibility 
in the testimony of men, yet there are some things we 
may be almost as certain of as that the sun shines, or that 
five twenties make an hundred. Who is there at Londoa 
that knows any thing of the world, but believes there is 
such a city as Paris in France ; that the Pope dwells at 
Rome 5 that Julius Caesar was an emperor, or that LuUiei: 
had a great hand in the reformation. 

If we observe the following rules, we may arrive at sucli 
a certainty in many things^^ of human testimony, as that it 
is morally impossible we should be deceived, that is, we 
may obtain a moral certainty. 

1. Let us consider whether the thing reported be in 
itself possible ^ if not, can never be credible, whosoever 
relates it. 

S2 



210 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 

2. Consider farther whether it be possiblej ^Iiether 
there are any concurring circumstances to prove it, beside 
the mere testimony of the person that relates it» I con- 
fess, if these last conditions are wantingj the thing may be 
true, but then it ought to have the stronger testimony to 
support it. 

S. Consider whether the person that relates it be capa- 
ble of knowing the truth: Whether he be a skillful judge 
in such matters; if it be a business of art, or a nice appear- 
ance in nature, or some carious experiment in philosophy. 
But if it be a mere occurrence in life, a plain, sensible mat* 
ter of fact, it is enough to inquire whether he who relates 
it were an eye or ear-witness, or whether he himself had 
it only by hearsay^ or can trace it up to the original. 

4. Consider whether the narrator be honest and faithful, 
as well as skillful : Whether he has no bias upon his mind, 
no peculiar gain or profit by believing or reporting it, no 
interest or principle which might warp his own belief aside 
from truth ; or which might tempt him to prevaricate, to 
speak falsely, or to give a representation a little different 
from the naked truth of things. In short, whether there 
be no occasion of suspicion concerning his report. 

5. Consider whether several persons agree together in 
the report of this matter ^ and if so, then whether those 
persons who joined together in their testimony might not 
be supposed to combine together in falsehood. Whether 
they are persons of sufficient skill, probity and credit. It 
might be also inquired, whether they are of different na- 
tions, sects, parties, opinions, or interests. For the more 
divided ihey are in all these, the more likely is their re- 
port to be true, if they agree togetiier in their account of 
the same thing ; and especially if they persist in it without 
iivavering. 

6. Consider farther, whether the report were capable 
of being easily refuted at first if it had not been true j if 
sOy this confirms the testimony. 

7. Inquire yet again, whether there has been a con- 
stant, uniform tradition and belief of this matter, from the 
very first age or time wJien the thing was transacted, with- 
out any reasonable doubts or contradictions. Or^ 



Chap, V, RIGHT USE OF REASOxV. 211 

8. If any part of it hath been doubted by any consider- 
able persons^ whether it has been searched out and after- 
wards confirmed, by having all the scruples and doubts re- 
moved. In either of these cases the testimony becomes 
more firm and credible. 

9. Inquire on the other hand, whether there are any 
considerable objections remaining against the belief of that 
proposition so attested. Whether there be any thing very 
improbable in the thing itself. Whether any concurrent 
circumstances seem to oppose it. Whether any person 
or persons give a positive and plain testimony against it. 
Whether they are equally skillful and equally faithful as 
those who assert it. Whether there be as many or more 
in number, and whether they might have any secret bias 
or influence on them to contradict it. 

10. Sometimes the entire silence of a thing may have 
something of weight toward the decision of a doubtful 
point of history, or a matter of human faith, namely, 
where the fact is pretended to be public, if the persons who 
were silent about it were skillful to observe, and could not 
but know such an occurrence 5 if they were engaged by 
principles or by interest to have declared it : And these 
things may tend to make a matter suspicious, if it be not 
very well attested by positive proof. 

lis Remember that in some reports there ai'e more 
marks of falsehood than of truth, and in others there are 
more marks of truth than of falsehood. By a comparison 
of all these things together, and putting every argument 
on one side and the others into the balance, w^ must form 
as good a judgment as we can which side preponderates ; 
and give a strong or feeble assent or dissent, or withhold 
our judgment entirely, according to greater or lesser evi- 
dence, according to mpre plain or dubious marks of truth 
or falsehood. 

12. Observe that in matters of human testimony there 
is oftentimes a great mixture of truth an'd falsehood in the 
report itself: Some parts of the story may be peifectly 
true, and some utterly false 5 and some may have such a 
blended confusion of circumstances which are a little wrapt 
a^ide from the truth, and nai^represented, that there i$ 



112 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. II. 

need of good skill and accuracy to form a judgment con- 
cerning them, and determine which part is true, and which 
is false. The whole report is not to he believed, because 
some parts are indubitably true, nor is the whole to be re^ 
jected, because some parts are as evident falsehoods. 

We may dravv two remarkable observations from this 
section. 

Observ, I. How certain is the truth of the christian re^ 
ligion, and particularly of the resurrection of Christ, which 
is a matter of fact on which Christianity is built I We 
have almost all the concurrent evidences that can be de- 
rived from human testimony joining to confirm this glori- 
ous truth. The fact is not impossible ; concurrent cir- 
cumstances cast a favourable aspect on it 3 it was foretold 
by one who wrought miracles, and therefore not unlikely, 
nor unexpected : The apostles and first disciples were eye 
and ear-witnesses, for they conversed with their risen 
Lord 5 they were the most plain, honest men in them- 
selves 'y the temptations of wordly interest did rather dis- 
courage their belief and report of it : They all agree in 
this matter, though they were men of different characters: 
Pharisees and fishermen^ and 'publicans^ men of Judea and 
Galileey and perhaps some heathens^ who were early con- 
verted : The thing might easily have been disproved if it 
were false ; it hath been conveyed by constant tradition 
and writing down to our times j those who at first doubt- 
ed, were afterwards convinced by certain proofs j nor 
have any pretended to give any prjjof of the contrary, 
but merely denied the fact with impudence, in opposition 
to all these evidences. 

Observ. Ih How weak is the faith which is due to a 
multitude of things in ancient human history \ For, though 
many of these criteria^ or marks of credibility, are found 
plainly in the more general and public facts, yet as to 
multitude of particular facts and circumstances, how defi- 
cient are they in such evidence as should demand our as- 
sent : Perhaps there is nothing that ever was done in all 
past ages, and which was not a pabhc fact, so well attest- 
ed as the resurrection of Christ* 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF RfiASQN. 213 



SECT. VI. 

PRINCIPLES AND RULES OP JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OP DIVINE 

TESTIMONY. 

AS human testimony acquaints us with matters of fact^ 
both j^ast and present, which he beyond the reach of our 
personal notice ; so divine testimony is suited to inform 
us both of the nature of things, as well as matters of fact, 
and of things future, as well as present or past. 

Whatsoever is dictated to us by God himself, or by men 
who are divinely inspired, must be believed with full as- 
surance. Reason demands us to believe whatsoever di- 
vine revelation dictates 5 For God is perfectly wise, and 
cannot be deceived ; he is faithful and good, and will not 
deceive his creatures : And when reason has found out the 
certain marks or credentials of divine testimony to belong 
to any proposition, their remains then no farther inquiry 
to be made, but only to find out the true sense and mean- 
ing of that which God has revealed, for reason itself de- 
mands the belief of it. 

Now divine testimony or revelation requires these fol- 
lowing credentials* 

1. That the propositions or doctrines revealed be not 
inconsistent with reason ; for intelligent c-reatures can 
never be bound to believe real inconsistencies. Therefore, 
w^e are sure the popish doctrine ©f transubstantiation is 
not a matter of divine revelation, because it is contrary to 
all our senses and our reason, even in their proper exercises* 

God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of himself, 
and agreeable to his own nature and divine perfections. 
Now many of these perfections are discoverable by the 
light of reason, and whatsoever is inconsistent with these 
perfections cannot be a divine revelation. 

But let it be noted, that in matters of practice towards 
our fellow-creatures, God may command us to act in a 
manner contrary to what reason would direct antecedent 
to that command. So Abraham was commanded to ofler 
up his son a sacrifice : The Israelites were ordered to 
borrow of the Egyptians without spaying them, and to 



214 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II* 

plunder and slay the inhabitants of Canaan : Because God 
has a sovereign right to all things, and can with equity 
disposses his creatures of life, and every thing which he 
has given them, and especially Such sinful creatures as 
mankind ; and he can appoint whom he pleases to be the 
instruments of this just dispossession or deprivation. So 
that these divine commands are not really inconsistent 
with right reason ; for whatsoever is so cannot be believ- 
ed, where that inconsistency appears. 

2. Upon the same account, the whole doctrine of reve- 
lation must be consistent with itself; every part of it must 
be consistent with each other : And though in points of 
practice latter revelation may repeal or cancel former laws, 
yet in matters of belief no latter revelation can be incon- 
sistent with what has been heretofore revealed. 

3. Divine revelation must be confirmed by some divine 
and supernatural appearances, some extraordinary signs 
or tokens, visions, voices, or miracles, wrought^ or pro- 
phecies fulfilled. There must be some demonstrations of 
the presence and power of God, superiour to all the powers 
of nature, or the settled connections which God as Creator 
has established among his creatures in this visible world. 

4. If there are any such extraordinary and wonderful 
appearances and operations brought to contest with, or to 
oppose divine revelation, there must and alwa}^s will be 
such a superiority on the side of that revelation which is 
truly divine, as to manifest that God is there. This was 
the case when the Egyptian sorcerer contended with Mo- 
ses. But the wonders which Moses wrought did so far 
transcend the powers of the magicians, as made them con- 
fess it was the finger of God. 

5. These divine appearances or attestations to revela- 
tion must be either known to ourselves, by our own per- 
sonal observation of tKem, or they must be sufiiciently at- 
tested by others, according to the principles and rules by 
which matters of human faith are to be judged in the fore- 
going section. 

Some of those, who lived in the nations and ages where 
miracles were wrought, were eye and ear witnesses of the 
truth and divinity of the revelation ; but we who live in 
these distant ages^ must have them derived down to us 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 215 

by just and incontestible history and tradition. We also, 
even in these limes, may see the accomplishment of some 
ancient predictions, and thereby obtain that advantage to- 
ward tlie confirmation of our faith in divine revelation ^ 
beyond what those persons enjoyed who lived -when the 
predictions were pronounced. 

6. There is another very considerable confirmation of 
divine testimony ; and that is when the doctrines them- 
selves, either on the publication or the belief of them, pro- 
duce supernatural effects. Such were the miraculous pow- 
ers Avhich were communicated to believers in the first ages 
of Christianity, the conversion of the Jews or Gentiles, 
the amazing success of the gospel of Christ, without hu- 
man aid, and in opposition to a thousand impediments ; 
its power in changing the hearts and lives of ignorant and 
vicious heathens, and wicked and profane creatures in all 
nations, and filHng them with a spirit of virtue, piety and 
goodness^ Wheresoever persons have found this effect in 
their own hearts, wrought by a belief of the gospel of 
Christ they have a witness in themselves of the truth of it, 
and abundant reason to believe it divine. 

Of the difference between reason and revelation, and in 
what sense the latter is superior, see more in Chapter II, 
sec. 9. and Chap. IV. direct, 6» 



SECT. VII. 

PRINCIPLES AMD RULES OF JUDGING CONCERNING THINGS PAST, 
PRESENT, AND TO COME, BY THE iMERE USE OF BBASON. 

THOUGH we attain the greatest assurance of things 
past and future by divine faith, and learn many matters 
of fact, both past and present by human faith, yet reason 
also may in a good degree assist us to judge of matters of 
fact both past, present, and to come, by the following 
principles. 

1. There is a system of beings round about us, of which 
we ourselves are a part, which we call the world, and in 
this world there is a course of nature, or a settled order 



216 LOGIC: OR, THE Part II. 

of causes, effects, antecedents, concomitants, consequences, 
&:c. from which the author of nature doth not vary but 
upoH very important occasions. 

2. Where aotecedents, concomitants, and consequents, 
causes and effects, signs and things signified, subjects and 
adjuncts, are necessarily connected with each other, we 
may infer the causes from the effects, and effects from 
causes, the antecedents from the consequents, as well as 
consequents from antecedents, &c. and thereby be pretty 
certain of many things both past, present, and to come. 
It is by this principle that astronomers can tell what day 
and hour the sun and moon were eclipsed five hundred 
years ago, and predict all future eclipses as long as the 
world shall stand. They can tell precisely at what minute 
the sun rises or sets at Fekin in China, or what altitude 
the dog-star had at midnight or midnoon in Rome on the 
day when Julias Csesar was slain. Gardeners upon the 
same principle can foretell the months when every plant 
will be in bloom, and the ploughman knows the weeks of 
harvest : We are sure, if there be a chicken, there was an 
egg : If there be a rainbow, we are certain it rains not far 
off: If we behold a tree growing on the earth, we know it 
has naturally a root under ground. 

3. Where there is a necessary connection between caus- 
es and effects, antecedents and consequents, signs and 
things signified, we know also that like causes will have 
like effects, and proportionable causes will have propor- 
tionable effects, contrary causes will have contrary effects ; 
and observing men may form many judgments by the rwles 
of similitude and proportion, where the causes, efiects,&:c, 
are not entirely the same. 

4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain connec- 
tion between antecedents, concomitants and consequents, 
we can give but a conjecture, or a probable determination. 
If the clouds gather, or the weather glass sinks, we suppose 
it will be rain. If a man spit blood frequently with cough- 
ing, we suppose his lungs are hurt : If very dangerous 
symptoms appear, y\e expect his death. 

5. Where causes operate freely, with a liberty of indif- 
ference to this or the contrary, there we cannot certainly 
know what the effects will be : For it seems to be con- 



Ohap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 211 

tingent, and the certain knowledge of it belongs only to 
God. This is the case in the greatest part of human ac- 
tions. 

6. Yet wise men, by a just observation of human nature, 
will give very probable conjectures in this matter, also con- 
cerning things past, or things future, because human na- 
ture in all ages and nations has such a conformity to itself. 
By a knowledge of the tempers of men, and their present 
circumstances, we may be able to give a happy guess what 
their conduct will be, and what will be the event, by an 
observation of the like cases in former times. This made 
the Emperor Marcus Antonius to say, " By looking back 
into history, and considering the fate and revolutions of 
governments, you will be able to form a guess and almost 
prophecy upon the future. For things past, present, and 
to come, are strangely uniform, and of a colour ; and are 
commonly cast in the same mould. So that upon the 
matter, forty years of human life may serve for a sample 
of ten thousands.^' Collier's Antonius, Book VII. sec. 50. 

7. There are also some other principles of judging con- 
cerning the past actions of men in former ages, besides 
books, histories and traditions, which are the mediums 
of conveying human testimony ; as we may infer the skill 
and magnificence of the ancients by some fragments of their 
statutes, and ruins of their buildings. We know what 
Roman legions came into Great Britain by numbers of 
bricks dug out of the earth in some parts of the island, 
with the marks of some particular legion upon them, which 
must have been employed there in brick-making. We 
rectify some mistakes in history by statutes, coins, old al- 
tars, utensils of war, &c. We confirm and disprove some 
pretended traditions and historical writings, by medals, 
images, pictures, urns, &c. 

Thus I have gone through all those particular objects 
of our judgment which I first proposed, and have laid 
down principles and rules by which we may safely conduct 
ourselves therein. There is a variety of other objects, 
concerning which we are occasionally called to pass a 
judgment, namely, the characters of persons, the value 
and worth of things, the sense and meaning of particular 
writers, matters of wit, oratory, poesv, matters of equity 
T 



218 LOGIC, &c. Part. II. 

in judicial courts, matters of traffic and commerce be- 
tween man and man^ which would be endless to enumer- 
ate. But if the general and special rules of judgment 
which have been mentioned in these two last chapters are 
treasured up in the mind, and wrought into the very tem- 
per of our souls in our younger years, they will Jay a 
foundation for just and regular judgment concerning a 
thousand special occurrences in the religious, civil, and 
learned life. 



THE 



THIRD PART OF LOGIC. 



OF REASONING ON SYLLOGISM. 

AS the first work of the mind is perception, whereby 
our ideas are formed, and the second is judgment, which 
joins or disjoins our ideas and forms a proposition, so the 
third operation of the mind is reasoning, which joins sev- 
eral propositions together, and makes a syllogism, that is^ 
an argument whereby we are wont to infer something that 
is less known, from truths which are more evident. 

In treating of this subject, let us consider more particu- 
larly, 

1. The nature of a syllogism, and the parts of which it is composed, 

2. The several kinds of syllogisms, with particular rules relating to 
them. 

3. The doctrine of sophisms, or false reasoning, together with the 
means of avoiding them, and the manner of solving or answering 
them* 

4. Some general rules to direct our reasoning. 



CHAPTER I. 

OF THE NATURE OF A SYLLOGISM, AND THE 
PARTS OF WHICH IT IS COMPOSED. 

IF the mere perception and comparison of two ideas 
would always shew us whether they agree or disagree, 
then all rational propositions would be matters of intelli- 
gence, or first principles, and there would be no use ojf 



220 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. Ht 

reasoning^ or drawing any consequences. It is the narrow- 
ness of the human mind which introduces the necessity of 
reasoning. When we are unable to judge of the truth or 
lalsehood of a proposition in an immediate manner, by the 
mere contemplation of its subject and predicate, we are 
then constrained to use a medium, and to compare each of 
them with some third idea, that by seeing how far they 
agree or disagree with it, we may be able to judge how far 
they agree or disagree among themselves : As, if there are 
two lines, A and B, and 1 know not whether they are equal 
or not, I take a third line C, or an inch, and apply it to 
each of them : If it agree with them both, then I infer that 
A and B, are equal : but if it agree with one, and not with 
the other, then I conclude A and B are unequal : If it agree 
with neither of them, there can be no comparison. 

So if the question be whether God must be worshipped^ we 
seek a third idea, suppose the idea of a Creator, and say, 

Our Creator must he worshipped ; 

God is our Creator ; 

Therefore God must he worshipped. 

The comparison of this third idea with the two distinct 
pgyts of the question, usually requires two propositions, 
which are called the premises : The third proposition which 
is drawn from them is the conclusion, wherein the question 
itself is answered, and the subject and predicate joined ei- 
ther in the negative or the affirmative. 

The foundation of all affirmative conclusions is laid in 
this general truth, that as far as two proposed ideas agree 
to any third idea, they agree also among themselves. The 
character of Creator agrees to God, and worship agrees 
to a Creator, therefore worship agrees to God. 

The foundation of all negative conclusions is this, that 
where one of the two proposed ideas agrees with the third 
idea, and the other disagrees with it, they must needs dis- 
agree so far also with one another; as, if no sinners ar& 
happy, and if angels are happy ^ then angels are not sinneris. 

Thus it appears what is the strict and just notion of a 
syllogism : It is a sentence or argument made up of three 
propositions so disposed, as that the last is necessarily in- 
ferred from those which go before, as in the instances 
which have been just mentioned. 



Chap. I. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 221 

In the constitution of a syllogism two things may be 
considered, viz. the matter and form of it. 

The matter of which a syllogism is made up, is three 
propositions ; and these three propositions are made up 
of three ideas or terms variously joined. 

The three terms are called the remote matter of a syl* 
logism ; and the three propositions the proxime or imme- 
diate matter of it. 

The three terms are named the major, the minor, and 
the middle. 

The predicate of the conclusion is called the major ierm^ 
because it is generally of a larger extension than the mi- 
nor term, or the subject. The major and minor terms 
are called the extremes^ 

The middle terra is the third idea invented, and dispos- 
ed in two propositions, in such a manner as to shew the 
connection between the major and minor term in the con- 
clusion ; for which reason the middle term itself is some- 
times called the argument. 

That proposition which contains the predicate of the 
conclusion connected with the middle term, is usually call- 
ed the major propositian^ whereas the minor propositioti 
connects the middle term with the subject of the conclu- 
sion, and is sometimes called the assumption. 

Note — This exact distinction of the several parts of a 
syllogism, and of the major and minor terms connected 
with the middle term in the major and minor propositions, 
does chiefly belong to simple or categorical syllogisms, 
of which we shall Sj^eak in the next chapter, though all 
syllogisms whatever have something analogical to it. 

Note farther, That the major proposition is generally 
placed first, and the minor second, and the conclusion in 
the last place, where the syllogism is regularly composed 
and represented. 

The form of a syllogism is the framing and disposing of 
the premises according to art or just principles of reason- 
ing, and the regular inference of the conclusion from 
tliem. 

The act of reasoning, or inferring one thing from anoth- 
er, is generally expressed and known by the particle ther»- 
forej when the argument is formed according to the rules 
T2 



222 LOGIC : OR THE Part. III. 

of art ; though, in common discourse or writing, such cam- 
al particles as for^ because^ manifest the act of reasoning 
as well as the illative particles then and therefore : And 
wheresoever any of these words are used, there is a per- 
fect syllogism expressed or implied, though perhaps the 
three propositions do not appear, or are not placed in re- 
gular form. 



CHAPTER II. 



OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF SYLLOGISMS, WITH 
PARTICULAR RULES RELATING TO THEM. 

SYLLOGISMS are divided into various kinds, either 
according to the question which is proved by them, accord- 
ing to the nature and composition of them, or according-^ 
to the middle term, which is used to prove the question^ 



SECT, h 

OF L'NIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR SYLLOGISMS, BOTH NEGATIVE 

AND AFFIRiVlATIVE. 

ACCORDING to the question which Is to be proved, so 
syllogisms are divided into universal affirmative, universal 
negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative. — 
This is often called a division of syllogisms drawn from 
the conclusion ^ for so many sorts of conclusions there 
may be, which are marked with the letters, A, E, I, O. 

In an universal affirmative syllogism, one idea is proved 
universally to agree with another, and may be universally 
affirmed of it, as, Every sin deserves deaths every unlawful 
wish is sin ; therefore, every unlawful wish deserves death. 

In an universal negative syllogism, one idea is proved 
tp disagree viih i^Qtbcr idiea uiiiv^rsally) ^nd may b§ 



Chap, II- RIGHT USE OF REASON. 22S 

thus denied of it : as, No injustice can be pleasing to God ; 
all persecution for the sake of conscience is injustice; 
therefore no persecution for conscience sake can be pleas- 
ing to God, 

Particular affirmative, and particular negative syllo- 
gisms may be easily understood by what is said of univer- 
sals, and there will be sufficient examples given of all these 
in the next section. 

The general principle upon which these universal and * 
particular syllogisms are founded, is this, Whatsoever is 
affirmed or denied universally of any idea, may be affirm- 
ed or denied of all the particular kinds of beings which are 
contained in the extension of that universal idea. So the 
desert of death is affirmed universally of sin, and an un- 
lawful wish is one particular kin(l of sin, therefore the de- 
sert of death may be affirmed concerning an unlawful wish,. 
And so of the rest. 

Note. — In the doctrine of syllogisms, a singular and an 
indefinite proposition are ranked among universals, as was,; 
before observed in the doctrine of propositions. 



SECT. II. 

QP PLAIN, SIMPLE SYLLOGISMS, AND THEIR RULES. 

THE next division of syllogisms is into single and conv 
l^aund. This is drawn from the nature and composition 
of them. 

Single syllogisms are made up of three propositions: 
Compound syllogisms contain more than three proposi- 
tions, and may be formed into two or more S3^11ogisms. 

Single syllogisms, for distinction's sake, may be divided 
into simple,* complex, and conjunctive. 

Those are properly calleci siniple oi: categorical syllo- 
gisms, which are made up of three plain, single, or cate- 
gorical propositions, wherein the middle term is evidently 

*As ideas and proposition? are divided into single and compound, 
and single are subdivided into simple and complex ; sa there jvre i)\Q- 
same divisions ?vnd subdivisions applied to syllogismsi 



224 LOGIC : OR, THE Part, III. 

and regularly joined with one part of the question in the 
major proposition, and with the other in the minor, whence 
there follows a plain single conclusion; as. Every human 
virtue is to be sought with diligence; prudence is a human 
virtue; therefore prudence is to be sought dihgently. 

Note — Though the terms of propositions may be com- 
plex ; yet where the composition of the whole argument 
is thus plain, simple, and regular, it is properly called a 
simple syllogism, since the complexion does not belong to 
the syllogistic form of it. 

Simple syllogisms have several rules belonging to them^ 
which being observed, will generally secure us from false 
inferences : But these rules being founded on four general 
axioms, it is necessary to mention these axioms beforehand, 
for the use of those who will enter into the speculative rea- 
son of all these rules. 

Axiom 1. Particular propositions are contained in uni- 
versal, and may be inferred from them; but universals 
are not contained in particulars, nor can be inferred from 
them. 

Axiom 2. In all universal propositions, the subject is 
particular. 

Axiom 3. In all affirmative propositions, the predicate 
has no greater extension than the subject ; for its exten- 
sion is restrained by the subject, and therefore it is always 
to be esteemed as a particular idea. It is by mere acci- 
dent, if it ever be taken universally, and cannot happen 
but in such universal or singular propositions as are recip- 
rocal* 

Axiom 4. The predicate of a negative proposition is al- 
ways taken universally, for in its whole extention it is de- 
nied of the subject : If we say. No stone is vegetable, we 
deny all sorts of vegetation concerning stones. 

The rules of simple, regular Syllogisms are these. 

Rule I. The middle term must not be taken twice par- 
ticularly, but once at least universally. For if the middle 
term be taken for two different parts or kinds of the same 
universal idea, theu the subject of the conclugiou 13 coiupar- 



Chap. IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 22S 

ed with one of these parts, and the predicate with another 
part, and this will never shew whether that subject and 
predicate agree or disagree : There will then be four dis- 
tinct terms in the syllogism, and the two parts of the 
question will not be compared with the same third idea ; 
as if I say, Some men are pious, and some men are rob- 
bers, 1 can never infer that some robbers are pious, for 
the middle terra men being taken twice particularly, it is 
not the same men who are spoken of in the major and mi- 
nor propositions. 

Rule II. The terms in the conclusion must never be tak- 
en more universally than they are in the premises. The 
reason is derived from the first axiom, that generals can 
never be inferred frqm particulars. 

Rule III. A negative conclusion cannot be proved by 
two affirmative premises. For, when two terms of the con- 
clusion are united or agree to the middle term, it does not 
follow by no means that they disagree with one another. 

Rule IV. If one of the premises be negative, tlte con- 
clusion must be negative. For, if the middle term be de- 
nied of either part of the conclusion, it may shew that tha 
terms of the conclusion disagree^ but it can never shew 
that they agree. 

Rule V. If either of the premises be negative, the con- 
clusion must be particular. This may be proved for the 
most part from the first axiom. 

These two last rules are sometimes united in this single 
sentence. The conclusion always follows the weaker part 
of the premises. Now negatives and particulars are 
counted inferior to affirmative and universals. 

Rule VI. From two negative premises nothing can be 
concluded. For they separate the middle term both from 
the subject and predicate of the conclusion ; and when two 
ideas disagree to a third, we cannot infer that they either 
agree or disagree with each other. 

Yet where the negation is a part of the middle term, the 
two premises may look like negatives according to the 
words, but one of them is affirmative in sense: as, IHiat 
has no thought cannot reason ; but a worm has no thought ; 
therefore a worm cannot reason. The minor proposition 
does really affirm the middle term concerning the subject? 



226 LOGIC : OR, THE Part HI. 

namely, a worm has no thought^ and thus it is properly in 
this syllogism an affirmative proposition. 

Rule VII. From two particular premises, nothing can 
be concluded. This rule depends chiefly on the first'axiom. 

A more laborious and accurate proof of these rules, and 
the derivation of every part of them in all possible cases, 
from the foregoing axioms^ require so much time, and are 
of so little importance to assist the right use of reason, that 
it is needless to insist longer upon them here. See all this 
done ingeniously in the Logic called the Art of Thinkings 
Part IIL Chap. III. &c. 



SECT. Ill 



OP THE MODES AND FIGURES OP SIMPLE SYLLOGISMS. 

SIMPLE syllogisms are adorned and surrounded in the 
common books of logic with a variety of inventions about 
moods and figures, wherein, by the artificial contexture of 
the letters A, E, I, and O, men have endeavoured to trans- 
form logic, or the art of reasoning, into a sort of mechan- 
ism, and to teach boys to syllogise, or frame arguments 
and refute them, without any real inward knowledge of 
the question. This is almost in the same manner as 
school-boys have been taught perhaps in their trifling 
years to compose Latin verses, that is, by certain tables 
and squares, with a variety of letters in them, wherein by 
counting every sixth, seventh, or eighth letter, certain 
Latin words should be framed in the form of hexameters or 
pentameters; and this may be done by those who know 
nothing of Latin or of verses. 

I confess some of these logical subtilties have much 
more use than those versifying tables, and there is much 
ingenuity discovered in determining the precise number 
of syllogisms that may be formed in every figure, and giv- 
ing the reasons of them; yetthehght of nature, a good 
judgment, and due consideration of things, tend more to 
true reasoning, than all the trappings of moods and figures. 



ChjLp. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 227 

But lest this book be charged with too great defects and 
iinperfections^it may be proper to give short hints of that 
which some logicians have spent so much time and paper 
upon. 

All the possible compositions of three of the letters, A^ 
E, T, O, to make three propositions, amount to sixty-four ; 
but fifty -four of them are excluded from forming true syl- 
logisms by the the seven rules in the foregoing section : 
The remaining ten are variously diversified by figures and 
moods into fourteen syllogisms. 

The figure of a syllogism is the proper disposition of the 
middle term with the parts of the question. 

A mood is the regular determination of propositions ac- 
cording to their quantity and quality, that is, their univer- 
sal or particular affirmation or negation : which are sig- 
nified by certain artificial words wherein the consonants 
are neglected, and these four vowels. A, E, I, 0, are only 
regarded. 

There are generally counted three figures. 

In the first of them the middle term is the subject of the 
major proposition, and the predicate of the minor. This 
contains four moods, called Barbara^ Celarenty Darii^ Fe- 
rio. And it is the excellency of this figure, that all sorts 
of questions or conclusions may be proved by it, whether 
A, E, I, or O, that is, universal or particular, affirmative 
or negative ; as, 

Bar- Every wicked man is truly miserable : 
da- All tyrants ?».re wicked men ; - 
ra. Therefore all tyrants are truly miserable. 
Ce- He that is always in fear is not happy ; 
lO" Covetous men are always in fear ; 
rent. Therefore covetous men are not happy. 
Da- Whatsoever furthers our salvation is good for us : 
rz- Some afflictions further our salvation ; 
i. Therefore some afflictions are good for us. 
Fe- Nothing that must be repented of is truly desirable^ 
rU Some pleasures must be repented of; 
0. Therefore there are some pleasures which are not 
truly desirable* 



228 <LOGIC: OR, THE Part. III. 

In the second figure the middle t#rm is the predicate of 
Jo#A the premises ; this contains four moods, namely, Ce- 
sare^ Camesfresy Fesfino, BarocOy and it admits only of ne- 
gative conclusions ; as, 

Ce- No liar is fit to be believed ; 
sa- Every good christian is fit to be believed ; 
Te. Therefore no good Christian is a liar. 
The reader may easily form examples of the rest. 
The third figure requires that the middle term be the 
subject of both the premises. It has six moods, namely, 
Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison : 
And it admits only of particular conclusions; as, 
Da- Whosoever loves God shall be saved 4 
rap- All the lovers of God have their imperfections: 
ii. Therefore some who have imperfections shall be 

saved. 
I leave the reader to form examples of the rest. 
The moods of these three figures are comprised in four 
Latin verses. 

Barbara, Celarent, Darii^Ferio^ quoque primse. 
Cesare^ CamestreSy FestinOy Baroco^ secundae. 
Tertia Darapii sibi vindicate nique Felapt(m. 
Adjungens Disamis ^ Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison. 
The special rules of the three figures are these. 
In the first figure the major proposition must always be 
universal and the minor affirmative. 

In the second figure also the major must be trniversalj 
and one of the premises, together with the conelnsion, 
must be negative. 

In the third figure the minor must be affirmative, and 
the conclusion always particular. 

There is also a fourth figure, wherein the middle term is 
predicated in the major proposition, and subjected in the 
minor: But this is a very indirect and obhque manner of 
concluding, and is never used in the sciences, nor in hu- 
man life, and t lerefore I call it useless. — Some logicians 
will allow it to be nothing else but a mere inversion of the 
first figure; the moods of it, namely Baralipton y or Bar ba- 
riy Calentesy Dibatis, Fespamoy Fresisom^ are not worthy to 
be explained by one example. 



€tiAp. II RIGHT USE OF REASON. 229 

SECT. IV- 

OF COMPLEX SYLLOGISMS. 

. It is not the mere use of complex terms in a syllogism 
that gives it this name, though one of the terms is us- 
ually complex ^ but those are properly called complex syU 
logismsy in which the middle term is not connected with 
the whole subject, or the whole predicate rn two distinct 
propositions, but is intermingled and compared with thehi 
by parts, or in a more cofifused manner, in different 
forms of speech 3 as. 

The Sim is a senseless being '; 

The Persians worshipped the tun ; 

Therefore the Persians ivorshippeda stnseless being. 

Here the predicate of the conclusion is, worshipped a 
senseless being, part of which is joined with the middle 
term sun in the major proposition, and the other part in 
the minor. 

Though this sort of argument is confessed to be entan- 
gled or confused, and irregular, if examined by the rules 
of simple syllogisms ) yet there are a great variety of ar- 
guments used in books of learning, and in common life, 
whose consequence is strong and evident, and which must 
be ranked under this head 5 as, 

I Exclusive propositions will form a complex argu- 
ment ; as. Pious men are the only favorites of heaven ; True 
Christians are favorites oj- heaven; Therefore ^n«e CA?7S- 
iians are pious men. Or thus. Hypocrites are not pious men ; 
Therefore hypocrites are not favorites of heaven. 

IL Exceptive propositions will make such complex 
syllogisms ; as^, None but physicians came to the consultation ; 
The nurse is no physician 5 Therefore the nurse came not to 
the consultation. 

III. Or comparative propositions ; as. Knowledge is bet- 
ter than riches ; virtue is better than knowledge ; therefore 
virtue is better than riches. Or thus A dove will fly a mile 
in a minute ; A swallow flies swifter than a dove ; There- 
fore a swallow will fly more than a mile in a minute. 

IV. Or inceptive and desistive propositions j a^, The 

U 



^30 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 

fogs vanish as the sun rises ; But the fogs have not yet &e- 
gim to vanish $ Therefore the smi is not yet risen, 

V. Or modal propositions ; as, It is necessary that a gen- 
eral understand the art of war ^ But Caius does not mider» 
stand ihe^art of war j Therefore it is necessary Caius should 
Viot be a general. Or thus, A total eclipse of the swl would 
cause darkness at noon ; It is possible that the moon at that 
time may totally eclipse the sun; Therefore i7 is possible that 
the moon may cause darkness at noon. 

Besides all these there is a great number o( complex syl- 
logisms which can hardly be reduced under any particu- 
lar titles, because the f(Tms of human language are so ex- 
ceeding various ; as, 

Christianity requires us to believe what the apostles 
wrote 5 St. Paul is an apostle; Therefore Christianity re- 
quires us to believe what St. Paul wrote. 

No human artist can make an animal ; A fly or a worm 
is an animal; Therefore no human artist can make a fly 
or a worm. 

The father always lived in London ; The son always 
lived with the father i Therefore the son always lived in 
London, 

The blossom soon follows the bud ; this pear tree hath ma- 
ny full buds 5 Therefore it will shortly have many blossoms. 

One hall stone never falls alone ; But a hailstone fell 
just now ; Therefore others fell with it. 

Thunder seldom comes without lightning; But it thun- 
dered yesterday ; Therefore probably it lightened also. 

Moses wrote before the Trojan war ; the fii^st Greek 
historians wrote after the Trojan war 3 therefore the first 
Greek historians wrote after Moses.* 

Now the force of all these arguments is so evident and 
conclusive, that though the form of the syllogism be nev- 
er so irregular, yet we are sure the inferences are just and 
true; for the premises, according to the reason of things, 
do really contain the conclusion that is deduced from 

♦ Perhaps some of these s\llogisms may be reduced to those 
which I call connective afterward; but it is of little moment to what 
species they belong: For it is not any formal set of rules, so much 
as the evidence and force of reason, that must determine the truth 
or falsehood of all such syllogisms. 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 231 

them, which is a never failing test of a true syllogism, as 
shall be shewn hereafter. 

The truth of most of these complex syllogisms may also 
be made to appear, if needfulj by reducmg them either to 
regular, simple syllogisms, or to some of the conjunctive 
syllogisms which are described in the next section. 1 will 
give an instance only in the first, and leave the rest to ex- 
ercise the ingenuity of the reader. 

The first argument may be reduced to a syllogism in 
Barbara, thus : 

Th& sun is a senseless being ; 

What the Persians worshipped is the sun; 

Therefore what the Persians worshippedis a senseleis heing* 

Though the conclusive force of this argument is evident^ 
ly without this reduction. 



SECT. V. 

OF CONJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS. 

THOSE are called conjunctive syllogisms \yhere\n one of 
the premises, namely, the major, has distinct parts, which 
are joined by a conjunction, or some such particle of speech. 
Most times the major or minor, or both, are explicitly com- 
pound propositions 5 and generally the major proposition 
is made up of two distinct parts or propositions, in such a 
manner as that, by the assertion of one in the minor, the 
other is either asserted or denied in the conclusion : Or, by 
the denial of one in the minor, the other is either asserted 
or denied in the conclusion. It is hardly possible indeed 
to fit any short definition to include all the kinds of them; 
but the chief amongst them are the conditional syllogism, 
the disjunctive, the relative, and the connective. 

I. The conditional, or hypothetical syllogism, is that 
whose major or minor, or bolh, are conditional proposi- 
tions ; as, If there be a God, the world is governed by 
providence ; but there is a God ; therefore the world is 
governed by providence. 

These syllogisms admit two sorts of true argumentation, 
where the major is conditionaL 



532 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. III. 

1. When the antecedent is asserted in the minor, that 
the consequent may be asserted in the conclusion 5 such is 
the preceding example. This is called arguing from the 
position of the antecedent to the position of the consequent. 

2. When the consequent is contradicted in the minor 
proposition, that the antecedent may be contradicted in 
the conclusion ; as, If Atlieists are in the right, then the 
world exists withaut a cause 5 but the world does not ex- 
ist without a c^ui^e ; therefore Atheists are not in the right. 
This is called arguing from the removing of the conse* 
quent to the removing of the antecedent. 

To remove the antecedent or consequent here, does not 
merely signify the denial of it, but the contradiction of it 5 
for the mere denial of it by a contrary proposition will not 
make a true syllogism, as appears thus: If every creature 
be reasonable, every brute is reasonable; but no brute is 
reasonable 5 therefore no creature is reasonable. Where- 
as if you say in the minor, but every brute is not reason- 
able, then it would follow tinily in the conclusion, there- 
fore every creature is not reasonable. 

When the antecedent or consequent are .negative pro- 
positions, they are removed by an afBrmative; as, If there 
be no God, then the world does not discover creating wis- 
dom : But the world does discover creating wisdom; there- 
fore there is a God. In this instance the consequent is 
removed or contradicted in the minor, that the antecedent 
may be contradicted in the conclusion. So in this argu- 
ment of St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. If the dead rise not, Christ 
died in vain ; but Christ did not die in vain ; therefore 
the dead shall rise. 

There are also two sorts of false arguing, namely, (1.) 
From the removing of the antecedent to the removing of 
the consequent 5 (2.) or, From the position of the conse- 
quent, to the position of the antecedent. Examples of 
these are easily framed ; as, 

(1.) If a minister were a prince he must be honoured f 
but a minister is not a prince; therefore he must not be 
honoured. 

(2 ) If a minister were a prince he must be honoured ; 
but a minister must be honoured ; therefore he is a prince. 

Who sees not the ridiculous falsehood of both th^se syl- 
logisms ? 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON- 23S 

Observ. I. If the subject of the antecedent and the con- 
sequent be the same, then the hypothetical syllogism may 
be turned into a categorical one 5 as, If Csesar be a king 
he must be honoured: But Csesar is a king; therefore, &c. 
This may be changed thus, Every king must be honoured; 
but Csesar is king , therefore, &c. 

Observ, II. If the major proposition only be condition- 
al, the conclusion is categorical ; But if the minor or both 
be conditional, the conclusion is also conditional; as, The 
worshippers of images are idolaters ; If the Papists wor- 
ship a crucifix they are worshippers of an image ; there- 
fore, If the Papists worship a crucifix they are idolaters^. 
But this sort of syllogisms should be avoided as much as 
possible in disputation, because they greatly embarrass a 
cause : The syllogisms, whose major only is hypothetical^ 
are very frequent, and used with great advantage. 

II. A disjunctive syllogism, is when the major proposi- 
tion is disjunctive; as. The earth moves in a circle or a;i 
ellipsis; but it does not move in a circle; therefore, it 
Elioves in an ellipsis. 

A disjunctive syllogism may have many members or 
parts ; thus, It is either spring, summer, autumn, or win- 
ter; but it is not spring, autumn or winter; therefore, it 
is summer. 

The true method of arguing here, is from the assertion 
of one to the denial of the rest, or from the denial of one 
or more to the assertion of what remains; but the major 
should be so framed, that the several parts of it cannot be 
true together, though one of them is evidently tiue. 

III. A relative syllogism requires the major proposi- 
tion to be relative; as. Where Christ is, there shall his 
servants be; but Christ is in heaven ; therefore his ser- 
vants shall be there also. Or, As is the captain so are 
his soldiers; but the captain is a coward ; therefore, his 
soldiers are so too. 

Arguments that relate to the doctrine of proportion 
must be referred to this head ; as. As two are to four, sq 
are three to six ; but two make the half of four; there- 
fore, three make the half of six. 

Besides these, there is another sort of syllogism which 
is verv natural and common;> and yet authors take very 
U2 



^34 ^ LOGIC : OR, THE Part lil, 

little notice of it, call it by an improper name; and de- 
scribe it very defectively ; and that is, 

IV. A connective syllogism. This, some have called 
copulative 5 but it does by no means require the major to 
be a copulative nor a compound proposition (according to 
the definition, given of it, Part II. chap. 11. sec= 6,) but it 
requires that two or more ideas be so connected either in 
the complex subject or predicate of the major, that if one 
of them be affirmed or denied in the minor, common sense 
will naturally shew us what will be the consequence. It 
would be very tedious and useless to frame particular rules 
about them, as will appear by the following examples, 
which are very various, and yet may be farther multiplied. 

(i.) Meekness and humility always go together 5 Moses 
was a man of meekness ; therefore Moses was also hum- 
ble. Or we may form this minor, Pharaoh was no hum- 
ble man ; therefore he was not meek. 

(2.) No man can serve God and mammon 5 the covet- 
ous man serves mammon^ therefore he cannot serve God. 
Or, the minor may run thus. The true Christian serves 
God ; therefore he does not serve mammon. 

(S.) Genius must join with study to make a great rnan ; 
Fiorino has genius but he cannot study; therefore Flori- 
1:0 will never be a great man. Or thus, Quintjus studies 
hard, but has no genius j therefore Quintus will never be 
a great man. 

(4.) Gulo cannot make a dinner without flesh and fish : 
there was no fish to be gotten to-day ; therefore Gulo this 
day car.no t make a dinner. 

(0.) London and Paris are indifferent latitudes; the 
latitude of London is 51 1-2 degrees 5 therefore this can- 
not be the latitude of Paris. 

(6.) The father and the son are of equal stature ; the fa- 
ther is six feet high ; therefore the son is six feet high also. 

(7.) Joseph and Benjamin had one mother ; Rachel 
was the mother of Joseph 5 therefore she was Benjamin's 
mother too. 

(SJ Pride is inconsistent Nvith innocence ; Angels have 
innocence ; therefore they have no pride. Or thus^ Dev- 
ils have pride ; therefore they have not innocence. 

I might multiply other instances of these connective 
syllogisms, by bringing in all sorl3 of e-Kepti^'C; exclusive, 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 235 

comparative, and mod^^i propositions, into theconjposition. 
of them 5 for all these may be wrought into conjunctive, 
as well as into simple syllogisms, and thereby we may ren- 
der them complex. But it would waste time and paper 
w'itiiout equal profit. 

Concerning these various kinds of conjunctive syllo- 
gismSj take these two observations. 

Observ. I. Most of them may be transformed into cate*- 
gorical syllogisms b^ those who have a mind to prove the; 
truth of them that way ; or they may be easily converted 
into each other by changing the forms of speech. 

Observ. II. These conjunctive syllogisms are seldom de- 
ficient or faulty in the form of them 5 for such a deficience 
would be discovefed at first glance generally by common 
reason,* without any artificial rules of logic : Tlie chief care 
therefore is to see that the major proposition be true, upon 
\vhich the whole force of the argumeut usually depends, 

SECT. VI. 

0? COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS. 

AVE properly call those compound syllogisms, which are 
madeof two or more simple syllogisms, and may be re* 
solved into tAem. The chief kinds are these j Epichire^ 
ma, Dilemma, Prosyllogismus, and Sorites. 

I. Epichirema is -a syllogism which contains the proof 
of the major or minor, or both, before it draws the con- 
clusion. This is often used in writing, in public speeches, 
and in common conversation ; that so each part of the dis> 
course may be confirmed and put out of doubt, as it moves 
on to>vard the conclusion which was chiefly designed. — • 
Take this instance. 

Sickness "may be good for us, for it weans us from the 
pleasures of life, and makes us think of dyings 

Bui we are uneasy under sickness, which appears by our 
impatience^ complaints, groanings, &c. 

Therefore' we are uneasy sometimes under that which is 
good for us. 

Another instance you may see in Cicero^s oration in de- 
fence of Milo; who had ^lain Clodiu§. His major proposi- 



236 LOGIC : OR, THE Part Ilf. 

tion is, that, it is lawful for one man to kill another who 
lies in wait to kill him 5 wiiich he proves from the custom 
of nations, from natural equity, examples, &c. his minor is, 
that Clodius laid wait for Milo ; which he proves by his 
arms, guards, &c. and then infers the conclusion ; that, it 
was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius. 

II. A dilemma is an argument which divides the whole 
into all its parts or members by a disjunctive proposition, 
and then infers something concerning each part which is 
finally inferred concerning the whole. Instances of this 
are frequent ; as, In this life we must either obey our vi- 
cious inclinations, or resist them ; to obey them will bring 
sin and sorrow ; to resist them is laborious and painful ^ 
Therefore we cannot be perfectly free from sorrow or pain 
in this Hfe. 

A dilemma becomes faulty or iaefiectqal three ways: First 
When the members of the division are not well opposed, or 
not fully enumerated ; for then the major is false. Second- 
ly, When what is asserted concerning each partis not just 3 
for then the minor is not true. Thirdly, When it may be 
retorted with equal force upon him who utters it. 

There was a famous ancient instance of this case, where- 
in a dilemma was retorted. Euathlus promised Protagoras 
a reward when he had taught him the art of pleading, and 
it was to be paid the first day that he gained any cause in 
the court. After a considerable time Protagoras goes to 
law with Euathlus for the reward, and uses this dilemma : 
Either the cause will go on my side, or on yours y if the 
cause goes on my side, you must pay me according to the 
sentence of the judge : if the cause goes on your side, you 
must pay me according to your bargain : Therefore wheth- 
er the cause goes for or against me, you must pay me the 
reward. But Euathlus retorted the dilemma thus : Either 
I shall gain the cause or lose it : if I gain the cause, then 
nothing will be due to you according to the sentence of 
the judge : But if I lose the cause, nothing will be due to 
you according to my bargain :. TA^re/br^, whether I lose 
or gain the cause, I will not pay you, for nothing will be 
due to you. 

Note. — A dilemma is usually described as though it al- 
my% proved the absurdity. inconTenienCe, or unreasona- 



Chap. il. RIGHT USE OF REASON^ 23? 

lileness of some opinion or practice ; and this is the most 
common design of it 5 but it is plain, that it may be also 
used to prove the truth or advantage of any thing propos- 
ed ; as, In heaven we shall either have desires or not : if 
we have no desires, then we have full satisfaction ; if we 
have desires they shall be satisfied as fast as they arise j 
Therefore in heaven v,e shall be completely satisfied. 

Note 2, — This sort of argument may be composed of 
three or more members, and may be called a trilcmma. 

III. A prosyllogism is when two or more syllogisms are 
so connected together, that the conclusion of the former is 
the major or the minor of the follgwing; as. Blood cannot 
think ^ but the soul of man thinks 5 therefore the soul of 
man is not blood f but the soul of a brute is his blood, ac- 
cording to the scripture : therefore the soul of man is dif- 
ferent from that of a brute. See another instance in the 
introduction to this treatise, p. 9. 

IV. A sorites, is when several middle terms are chosen to 
connect one another successively in several propositions^ 
till tfie last proposition connects its predicate with the first 
subject — Thus, All men of revenge have their souls often 
uneasy 5 uneasy souls are a plague to themselves 5 now to 
be one's own plague is folly in tiie extreme ; therefore, all 
men of revenge are extreme fools. 

'i'he apostle, Rom. viii. 29, gives us an instance of this 
sort of argument, if it were reduced to exact form : 
Whom he foreknew, those he predestinated : whom he 
predestinated he called; whom he called he justified; 
whom he justified, he glorified; therefore, whom he fore- 
knew he glorified. 

To these syllogisms it may not be improper to add 
hiduction, which is, when from several particular proposi- 
tions we infer one general ; as. The doctrine of the Socin- 
ians cannot be proved from the gospels, it cannot be prov- 
ed from the Acts of the Apostles, it cannot be proved from 
the epistles, nor the book of revelation ; therefore it can- 
not be proved from the New Testament. 

Note — This sort of argument is often defective, because 
there is no due care taken to enumerate all the particulars 
on which the conclusion should depend. 

All these four kinds of syllogisms in this section may be 



238 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IIL 

called redundant, because they have more than three 
propositions. But there is one sort of syllogism which is 
defective, and is called an enthymem^ because only the con- 
clusion with one of the premises is expressed while the 
other is supposed and reserved in the mind.- thus, There 
is no true religion without good morals : therefore, a 
knave cannot be truly religious : Or thus, it is our duly to 
love our neighbor as ourselves 5 therefore, there are but 
few who perform their duty. 

Note-This is the most common sort of argument amongst 
mankind both in writing and in speaking; for it would 
take up too much time, and too much retard the discourse 
to draw out all our arguments in mood and figure. Be- 
sides, mankind love to have so much comphment paid to 
Iheir understandings, as to suppose that they know the 
major or minor, which is suppressed and imphed, whea 
you pronounce the other premises and the conclusion. 

Tf there be any debate about this argument, the syllc^ 
gism must be completed, in order to try its force ''and^ 
goodness, by adding the absent propositions. 



SECT. VII. 

OF THE MIDDLE TEKMS, OF COMMON PLACES OB TOPICS, 
AND INVENTION OF ARGUMENTS. 

TITE next division of syllogisms is according to the mid- 
dle term, which is made use of in the proof of the propo- 
sition. Now the middle term (as we have hinted before) 
is often called argument, because the force of the syllo- 
gism depends upon it. We must make a little delay here 
to treat briefly of the doctrine of topics, or places whence 
middle terms or arguments are drawn. 

All arts and sciences have some general subjects which 
belong to them, which are called topics, or common pla- 
ces ; because middle terms are borrowed, and arguments 
derived from them for the proof of the various propositions 
which we have occasion to discourse of. The topics of 
grammar are etymology, noun, verb, construction, signi- 
fication, &c. The topics of logic are genus, species, dif- 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON, 239 

ference, property, definition, division, Sic. The topics 
of ontology, or metaphysics, are cause, effect, action, pas- 
sion, identity, opposition, subject, adjunct, sign, &c. The 
topics of morality, or ethics, are law, sin, duty, authority, 
freedom of will, command, threatening, reward, punish- 
ment, &c. The topics of theology, are God, Christ, faith, 
hope, worship, salvation, &c. 

To these several topics, there belong particular observa- 
tions, axioms, canons, or rules,* which are laid down in 
their proper sciences 5 as, 

Grammar hath such canons, namely, Words in a differ- 
ent construction obtain a different sense. Words derived 
from the^ame primative may probably have some affinity 
in their original meaning, &c. 

Canons in logic are such as these, Every part of a di- 
vision singly taken must contain less than the whole A 
definition must be peculiar and proper to the thing defined. 
Whatever is affirmed or denied of the genus, may be af- 
firmed or denied of the species, &c. 

Metaphysical canons are such as these ^ Final causes be- 
long only to intelligent agents. If a natural and necessa- 
ry cause operate, the effect will follow, &c. and there are 
large catalogues of many more in each distinct science. 

Now it has been the custom of those who teach Icgic or 
-rhetoric, to direct their disciples, when they want an ar- 
gument, to consult the several topics which are suited to 
their subject of discourse, and to rummage over the defi- 
nitions, divisions, and canons, that belong to each topic. 
This is called the invention of argument 3 and it is taught 
with much solemnity in some schools. 

I grant there may be good use of this practice for per- 
sons of a lower genius, when they are to compose any dis- 
course for the public; or for those of superior parts to re- 
fresh their memory, and revive their acquaintance with a 
subject which has been long absent from their thoughts, or 
when their natural spirits labour under indisposition and 
languor ; but when a man of moderate sagacity has made 
himself master of his theme by just dihgence and inquiry^ 

*A canon is a proposition declaring some property of the subject 
■which is not expressed in the definition or division of it, 



^240 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 

he has seldom need to run knocking at the doors of all the 
topics that he ma 3^ furnish himself with argument or mat- 
ter of speaking: Audindeed it is only a man of sense and 
judgment that can use common places or topics well ; for 
amongst this variety he only kno^vs what is fit to be left 
out, as well as what is fit to be spoken. 

By some logical writers this business oftopics and inven- 
tion is treated of in such a manner, with mathematical fig- 
ures and diagrams^ filled with the barbarous technical 
words, Napeas, Nipcis, Ropcros, Nosrop, &c. as though an 
ignorant lad were to be led mechanically in certain artifi- 
cial harnesses and trammels to find out arguments to prove 
or refute any proposition whatsoever without any rational 
knowledge of the ideas. Now there is no need to throw 
words of contempt on such a practice ; the very descrip- 
tion of it carries reproof and ridicule in abundance. 



SECT. vm. 

OF SEVERAL KINDS OF ARGUMENTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS. 

WE proceed now^ to the division of syllogisms according 
to the middle term; and in this part of our treatise the 
syllogisms themselves are properl}'- called arguments, and 
me thus distributed. 

I. Arguments are called grammatical, metaphysical, 
physical, moral, mechanical, theological, &c. according to 
the art, science, or subject, whence the middle term or top- 
ic is borrowed. Thus, if we prove that no man should 
steal from his neighbour, because the scripture forbids it, 
tins is a theological argument : If we prove it from the laws 
of the land, it is political ; but if we prove it from the prin- 
ciples of reason and equity, the argument is moral. 

II. Argum.ents are either certain and evident, or doubt- 
ful and merely probable. 

Probable arguments are those whose conclusions are 
proved by some probable mediumst as, This hill was once 
a church-yard, or a field of battle, because there are many 
human bones found here. This is not a certain argument. 



Chap. Ho RIGHT USE OF REASON. 241 

for human bones might have been conveyed there some 
other way. 

Evident and certain arguments are called demonstra- 
tfons ; for they prove their conclusions by clear mediums 
and undoubted principles 5 and they are generally divided 
into these two sorts. 

1. Demonstrations a p'lort, which prove the effect by ^ 
its necessary cause ; as, I prove the scripture is infallibly 
true^ because it is the word of God who caHnot lie. 

2. Demonstrations a posteriori, which infer the cause 
from its necessary effect 5 «s, I infer there hath been the 
hand of some artificer here, because I find a curious engine ; 
Or, I infer there is ^ God, from the works of his wisdom 
in the visible world. 

The last of these is called demonstratio tou oti, because it 
proves only the existence of a thing 5 the first is named 
demonstratio tou dioti^ because it shews also the cause of 
existence. 

But note, That thongh these two sorts of arguments are 
most peculiarly called demonstrations y yet generally any 
strong and convincing argument obtains that name ; and 
it is the custom of mathematicians to call their argu- 
ments demonstrations y from what medium soever they de^ 
rive them. 

III. Arguments are divided into artificial and inartificial. 

An artificial argument is taken from the nature and cir- 
cumstances of the things; and if the argument be strong, 
it produces a natural certainty 5 as, The world was first 
created by God, because nothing can create itself. 
'" An inartificial argument is the testimony of another, and 
this is called original, when our information proceeds im» 
mediately from the persons concerned, or from eye or ear 
.witnesses of a fact : It is called tradition when it is de- 
livered by the report of others- 

We have taken notice before, that testimony is either 
divine or human. If the human testimony be strong, it 
produces a moral certainty ; but divine testimony produc- 
es a supernatural certainty, which is far superior. 

Note — Arguments taken from human testimony, as well 
as from laws and rules of equity, are called moral; and 
indeed the same nanjc is also applied to every sort of ar- 
W 



^42 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 

gument which is drawn from the free actions of God, or 
the contingent actions of men, wherein we cannot arise to 
a natural certainty, but content ourselves with an high 
degree of probability, which in many cases is scarce infe- 
rior to natural certainty. 

IV. Arguments are either direct or indirect. It is a di- 
rect argument, wherein the middle term is such as proves 
the question itself, and infers that very proposition which 
was the matter of inquiry. An indirect, or obhque argu- 
ment, proves or refutes some other proposition, and ihere^ 
by makes the thing inquired appear to be true by plain 
consequence. 

Several arguments are called indirect; as (I.) When 
some contradictory proposition is proved to be false, im- 
probable, or impossible : Or when upon supposition of the 
falsehood, or denial of the original proposition, some ab- 
surditj^ is inferred. This is called a proof per impossihile^ 
or 3. redudio ab absurdavi. (2) When some other pro- 
position is proved to be true which is less probable, and 
thence it follows that the original proposition is true, be- 
cause it is more probable. This is an argument ex minus 
jyrohohili ad magis, (3.) When any other proposition is 
proved, upon which it was before agreed to yield the ori- 
ginal question. This is an argument tx concesso, 

V. There is yet another rank of arguments which have 
Latin names ; their true distinction is derived from the 
topics or middle terms which are used in them^ though 
they are called an address to our judgmeut, our faith, our 
ignorance, our profession, our modesty, and our passions, 

I. If an argument be taken from the nature or existence 
of things, and addressed to the reason of mankind, it is 
called argumentum ad judicium. 

2. When it is borrowed from some Convincing testimony^ 
it is argumentum ad fidem^ an address to our faith. 

3. When it is drawn from any insufficient medium 
whatsoever, and yet the opposer has not skill to refute or 
answer it, this is argumenium ad ig^wrantiwn^ an ad- 
dress to our igiioranQe. 

4. When it is built upon the professed prfnciples or opin- 
ions of the person with whom we argue, whether th^ 



Chap, II, RIGHT USE Ot^ REASON. 243 

opinions be true or false, it is named argiimentum adiiom^ 
inem^ an address to our prof essed principles. St. Paul often 
uses this argument when he reasons with the Jews, and 
when he says, I speak as a man. 

5. When the argument is fetched from the sentiments of 
some wise, great, or good men, whose authority we rever- 
ence, and hardly dare oppose, it is called argumenium ad 
verecundiam, an address to our modesty. 

6. I add finally, When an argument is borrowed from 
any topics which are suited to engage the inclinations and 
passions of the hearers on the gide of the speaker, rather 
than to convince the judgment, this is argumentiim ad pas^ 
siones, an address to the pas siofis ; or if it be made pub- 
licU^, it is called ad populunij or an appeal to the people. 

After all these divisions of syllogisms or arguments aris- 
ing from the middle term, there is one distinction proper to 
be mentioned, which arises fiom the premises. An argu- 
ment is called uniform, when both the premises are derived 
from the same spring of knowledge, >vhether it be seiise, 
reason, consciousness, human faith, or divine faith : But 
when tlie two premises are derived from diflerent springs 
of knowledge, it is called a mixt argument. 

Whether the conclusion must be called human or divine, 
when one er both premises are matters of divine faith, but 
the conclusion is drawn by human reason, I leave it to be 
disputed and determined in the schools of theology. 

Thus the second chapter is finished, and a particular ac- 
count given of all the chief kinds of syllogisms, or argu- 
ments which are made use of among men, or treated of in 
logic, together with special rules foi'tlie formation of them, 
so far as is necessary. 

If a syllogism agrees with the rules which uxe given for 
the construction and regulation of it^ it is called a true ar- 
-gument : If it disagrees with these rules, it is a paralogism^ 
or false argument : But when a false argument puts on the 
face and appearance of a true one, then it is properly call- 
ed a sophis?n or faUacij^ which shall be the subject of the 
next chapter. 



2U LOGIC : OR, THE Part. III. 



GH AFTER Iir. 



OF THE DOCTRINE OF SOPHISMS. 

FROM truth nothing can really follow but what is true .-^ 
Whensoever therefore vre find a false conclusion drawn 
from premises which seem ta be true, there must be some 
fault in the deduction or inference ; or else one of the 
premises is not true in the sense in which it is used in that 
argument. 

When art argument carri^ the face of truth with it, and 
yet leads us into mistake, it is a sophism; and there is 
some need of a particular description of these fallacious 
arguments, that we may with more ease and readiness, de- 
tect and solve them. 



SECT. L 

OF SEVERAL KINDS OP SOPHISMS, AND THEIR SOLUTIOlf. 

AS the rules of right judgment, and of good ratiocina- 
tion, often coincide with each other, so the doctrine of pre- 
judices, wbicli was treated of in the second part of logic, 
has anticipated a great deal of what might be said on the 
subject of sophisms 5 yet I shall mention the most remark- 
able springs of false argumentation, which are reduced by 
logicians to some of the following heads. 

I. The first sort of sophism iscslied ignoratio elenclii^ or 
a mistake of the ^lees^ion; that is, when something else is 
proved which has neither aoy necessary connexion or con- 
sistency with the thing inquired, and consequently gives no 
determination to the inquiry, though it may seem at first 
sight to determine the question ; as, if any should conclude 
that St. Paul was not a native Jew, by proving that he was 
born a Roman; or if they should pretend to determine 
that he was neither Roman nor Jew, by proving that he 
was born at Tarsus in Cilicia: These sophisms are refuted 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 245 

by shewing that all these three may be true 5 for he was 
born of Jewish parents in the city of Tarsus, and by some 
peculiar privilege granted to his parents, or his native city, 
he was born a denizen of Rome. Thus there^ is neither of 
these three characters of the apostle inconsistent willi each 
otherj and therefore the proving of them true does not re- 
fute the others. 

Or if the question be proposed, Whqther excess of wine 
'can be hurtful to him that drinks it? And the sophister 
should prove that it revives his spirits, it exhiler^tes his 
soul, it gives a man courage, and makes him strong iHid 
active; and then he takes it for granted that he had proved 
his point. 

But the respondent may easily shew, that though wine 
may do all this, yet it may be finally hurtful both to the 
soul and body of him that drinks it to excess. 

Disputers, when they grow warm, are ready to run into 
this fallacy : They dress up the opinion of their adversary 
as they please, and ascribe sentiments to him which he 
doth not acknowledge; and when they have, with a great 
deal of pomp, attacked and confounded these images of 
straw of their own making, they triumph over iheir adver- 
sar}^ as though they had utterly confuted his opinion. 

It is a fallacy of the same kind which a disputant is 
guilty of, when he finds that his adversary is too hard for 
him, and that he cannot fairly prove the question first pro- 
posed 5 he then, with slyness and subtilty, turns the dis- 
course aside to some other kindred point which he can 
prove, and exults in that new argument wherein his oppo- 
nent never contradicted him. 

The way to prevent this fallacy is by keeping the eye 
fixt on the precise point of dispute, and neither wandering 
from it ourselves, nor suffering our antagonist to wander 
from it, or substitute any Ihing else in its room. 

TI. The next sophism is called petitio pincipii, or a sup- 
position ofiuhat is not granted ; that is, when any propo- 
sition is proved by the same proposition in other words, or 
by something that- is equally uncertain and disputed : As if 
any one undertake to prove that -the human soul is extend- 
ed through all the parts of the body, because it resides iu 

W2 



246 LOGIC : OR THE Part. III. 

every member, which is but the same thing in other words. 
Or, if a Papist should pretend to prove that his religion is 
the only catholic religion ; and is derived from Christ and 
his apostles, because it agrees with the doctrine of all the 
fathers of the church, all the holy martyrs, and all the 
Christian world throughout all ages : Whereas this is the 
great point in contest, whether their religion does agree 
with that of all the ^ncient and the primitive Christians, or 
not. 

III. That sort of fallacy which is called a circle, is very 
Dear akin to X\\e peiitio principii ; as when one of the pre- 
mises in a syllogism is questioned and opposed, and we in- 
tend to prove it by the conclusion : Or, when in a train of 
syllogisms we prove the last by recurring to what was the 
conclusion of the first : the Papists are famoi»s at this sort 
of fallacy, when they prove the scriptures to be the word 
of God by the authority or infallible testimony of their 
church ; and when they are called to shew the infallible 
authority of their church, they pretend to prove it bv the 
scriptures. 

IV. The next kind of sophism is called ntm causa pro? 
causa^ov tl>e a^signati^i of a false cause^ This the Peri- 
patetic philosophers were guilty ofcontinually j^ when they 
told us that certain beings, which they called substantial 
forms, were the springs of colonr, motion, vegetation, and 
the various operations of natural beings in the animate 
and inanimate world 5^^ when they informed us that Nature 
was teiribly afraid of a vacuum, and that this was the 
cause why th^ water would not fall out of a long tube if it 
was turned upside down : The moderns as well as the an- 
cients ihll often into this fallacy, when they positively as- 
sign the reasons of natural appearances, without sufficient 
experiments to prove them. 

Astrologers are overrun with this sort of fallacies, and 
they cheat the people grossly, by pretending to tell for- 
tunes, and to deduce the cause of the various occurrences 
in the lives of men from the various positions of the stars 
and planets, which ihey call aspects. 

When comets and eclipses of the sun and moon are 
con$tnie4:l to signify the fate of princes, the revolution of 



Chap. HI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 247 

states, famine, wars and calamities of all kinds, it is a fal- 
lacy that belongs to this rank of sophisms. 

There is scarce any thing more common in human life 
than this sort of human argument. If any two accidental 
events happen to concur, one is perfectly made the cause 
of the other. If Tiiius wronged his neighbour of a guioea,^ 
and in six months after he fell down and broke bis leg^ 
weak men will impute it to divine vengeance on Titius for 
his former injustice. This sophism was found also in the 
early days of the world : For, when holy Job was sur- 
rounded with uncommon miseries, his own friends inferred, 
that he was a most heinous criminal, and charged him with 
aggravated guilt as the caune of his calamities ; though 
God himself by a voice from heaven solved this uncharita- 
ble sopliisra, and cleared his servant Job of that charge. 

How frequent is it among men to impute crimes to 
wrong persons ? We too often charge that upon the wick- 
ed contrivance and premeditated malice of a neighbour, 
which arose merely from ignorance, or from unguarded 
temper. And, on the other hand, when we have a mind 
to excuse ourselves, we practise the same sophism, and 
charge that upon our inadvertence or our ignorance, wliich 
perhaps was designed wickedness. What is really done 
by a necessity of circumstances, we sometimes, impute to. 
choice. And again, we charge that upon necessity which, 
was really desired and chosen. 

Sometimes a person acts out of judgment, in opposition 
to his inclination ; another person perhaps acts the same 
thing out of inclination, and against his judgment. It is 
hard for us to determine with assurance, what are the in- 
ward springs and secret causes of every man's conduct; 
and therefore we should be cautious and slow in passing a 
judgment where the case is not exceeding evident; and 
if we should mistake, let it rather be on tlie charitable^ 
than on the censorious side. 

It is the same sophism that charges mathematical learn- 
ing with leading the minds of men to scepticism and in- 
fitklity, and as unjustly accuses the new philosophy of 
pavinj the way to heresy and schism. Thus the reforma- 
tion from Popery bg^s been charged with the murder and 



248 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 

blood of millions, which in truth to be is imputed to the 
tyraipay of (he princes and the priests, who would not suf- 
fer the people to reform their sentiments and their prac- 
tices according to the word of God. Thus Christianity in 
the primitive ages was charged by the Heathens with all 
the calamities which befei the Roman empire, because the 
Christians renounced the heathen gods and idols. 

The way to relieve ourselves from those sophisms, and 
to secure ourselves from the danger of falling into them, is 
an honest and diligent inquiry into the real nature. and 
causes of things. With a constant watchfulness against all 
those prejudices that might warp the judgment aside from 
truth in that inquiry. 

V. The next is called /^ZZacia accidentis, or a sophism 
wherein we pronounce concerning the nature and essential 
properties of any subject according to something which is 
merely accidental to it. This is akm to the former, and 
is also very frequent in human life. So if opium or the 
Peruvian bark has been used imprudently or unsuccessful- 
ly, whereby the patient has received injury, some weaker 
people absolutely pronounce against the use of the barker 
opium i^pon all occasions whatsoever, and are ready to call 
them poison. So wine has been the accidental occasion 
of drunkenness and quarrels '^ learning and printing may 
have been the accidental cause of sedition in a state 5 the 
reading of the bible, by accident has been used to promote 
heresies or destructive errors ; and for these reasons they 
have been all pronounced evil things. Mahomet forbade 
his followers to the use of wine ; tlie Turks discourage 
learning in their dominions 5 and the Papists forbid the 
sik'iptures to be read by the laity. But liow very unrea- 
sonable are these inferences, and these prohibitions which 
are built upon them. 

VI. The next sophism borders upon the former; and 
that is, when v/e argue from that which is true in particu- 
lar circumstances, to prove the same thing true absolutely, 
simpU' and abstracted from all circumstances; this is call- 
ed in "the schools a sophism a dido secundum quid ad dictum 
sinifjli€ifor; as, That ivhich is bought in the shambles is eat^ 
en for dinner ; Rciio meat is bought in the shambles ; there- 
fore raw meat is eaten for dimmer* Ojr thus, Livy writes fa- 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 24^ 

iles and improbabilities when he describes prodigies and o- 
mens ; therefore Livy^s Roman history is never to be believed 
m any thing. Or thus, There may be some mistakes of 
transcribers in ^ome part of the scriptures ; therefpre scrip' 
tare alone is not a safe guide for our faith. 

This sort of sophism has its reverse also ; as when we 
argue from that which is true simply and absolutely, to 
prove the same thing true in all particular circumstan- 
ces whatsoever;* as if a traitor should argue from the 
sixth commandment, Thou shalt not kill a man^ to prove 
that he himself ought not to be hanged: Or if a madman 
should tell me, I ought not to withhold his sword from him^ 
because no man ought to withhold the property of another. 

These two last species of sophisms are easily solved, by 
shewing the difference betwixt things in their absolute na- 
ture, and the same things surrounded with peculiar cir- 
cumstances^ and considered in regard to special times, pla-* 
ces, persona and occasions 5 or by shewing the difference 
between a moral and a metaph;ysical universality, and that 
the proposition will hold good in one case, but not in the 
other. 

VII. The sophisms of composition and division come 
next to be mentioned. 

The sophism of composition, is when we infer any thing 
concerning ideas in a compound sense, which is only true 
m a divided sense. And when it is said in the gospel that 
Christ made the blind to see, and the deaf to hear, and the 
lame to walk, we ouglit not to infer hence that Christ per- 
formed contradictions 5 but those who were blind before^ 
were made to see, and those who were deaf before, were 
made to hear, &;c. So when the scripture assures us. The 
worst of sinnei's may be saved; it signifies only, that 
they who have been the worst of sinners may repent and 
be saved, not that they shall be saved in their sins. Or if 
any one should argue thus. Two and three are even and odd;. 
Five are two and three ; therefore fve are even and odd. 
Here that is very falsely inferred concerning two and' threes 
in uniony which is only true of them divided. 

* This is arguing from a moral universality, which admits of 
some exceptions, in the same manner as may be argued from meta' 
physicali or st natural universality, which admits of no exception^ 



250 LOGIC : OR, THE PXrt. III. 

The sophism of division, is when we infer the same thing 
concerning ideas in a divided sense, which is only true in a 
compound sense ; as, if we should pretend to prove that 
every soldier in the Grecian army put an hundred thou- 
sand Persians to flight, because tlie Grecian soldiers did so. 
Or if a man should argue, thus, Five is one number ; Two 
and three are Jive ; therefore two and three are one numher. 

This sort of sophism is committed when the word All 
is taken in a collective and a distributive sense, without a 
due disunction ; as, if any one should reason thus, All the 
musical instruments of the Jewish temple made a noble 
concert 5 The harp was a musical instrument of the Jewish 
temple 5 therefore the harp made a noble concert. Here 
the w^ord All in the major is collective, whereas such a con- 
clusion requires that the w^ord ^ZZ should be distributive. 

It is the same fallacy when the universal word All or 
No refers to species-in one proposition and to individuals 
in another; as, All animals were in Noah^s Ark ; therefore 
No animals perished in the flood: Whereas in the premise 
all animals signifies every hind of animal y which does not 
exclude or deny the drowning of a thousand individuals. 

VIII The last sort of sophism arises from our abuse of 
the ambiguity of words, which is the largest and most ex- 
tensive kind of fallacy ; and indeed several of the former 
fallacies might be reduced to this head. 

When the words or phrases are plainly equivocal, they 
are called sophisms Ol equivocation ; as, if we should argue 
thus : He that sends forth a book into the light, desires it 
to be read ; He that throws a book into the fire, sends it 
into the light 3 therefore, He that throws a book into the 
fire desires it to be read. 

This sophism, as well as the foregoing, and all of the 
like nature, are solved by shewing the different senses of 
the words, terms or phrases. Here light in the mojor pro- 
position signifies the public vino of the vjorld ; in the mi- 
nor it signifies the brightness of flame andflre; and there- 
fore the syllogism has four terms, or rather, it has no mid- 
dle term, and proves nothing. 

But %here such gross equivocations and ambiguities ap- 
pear m arguments, there is httle danger of imposing up- 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 251 

on ourselves or others. The greatest danger, and which 
we are perpetually exposed to in reasoning is, where the 
two senses or significations of one term as near akin, and 
not plainly distinguished, and yet they are really sufficient- 
ly different in their sense, to lead us into great mistakes, 
if we are not watchful. And indeed the greatest part of 
controversies in the sacred or citil life arise from the dif- 
ierent senses that are put upon words, and the different 
ideas which are included in tliem ; as have been shewn at 
large in the First Part of Logic^ Chap. IV. which treats 
of words and terms. 

There is, after all these, another sort of sophisms, which 
is wont to be called an imperfect enumeration^ or a false 
induction^ when from a few experiments or observations 
men infer general theorems and universal propositions. 
But this is sufficiently noticed in the foregoing chapter^ 
where we treated of that sort of syllogiism which is called 
•induction. 



SECT. If. 



two GENERAL TESTS OF TRUE SYLLOGISMS, AND METHODS 
OF SOLVING ALL SOPHLSMS. 

BESIDES the special description of true* syllogisms 
and sophisms already given, and the rules by which the one 
are framed, and the other refuted, there are these two gen- 
eral methods of reducing all syllogisms whatsoever to a 
lest of their truth ^r falsehood. 

I. The first is, that the premises must, at least implicit- 
ly, contain the conclusion ; or thus, One ^£)f the premises 
must contain the conclusion, and the other must shew that 
the conclusion is contained in it. The reason of this r ^le 
is this; when any proposition is offered to be proved it is 
necessary to find another proposition which confirms it, 
Vvhich may be called the containing proposition; but be- 
-fcause the second must not contain the first in an expresiS 



Sm LOGIC : OR, THE Pam III 

naanner, and in the same words,* therefore it is necessary 
that a third or, ostensive proposition be found out, to shew 
tfiat the second proposition contains the first which was to 
be proved. L^t us make an experiment of this syllogism : 
Whosoever is a slave to his natural inclination is miserable 5 
The wjcked man is a slave to his natural inclination ; 
therefore, The wicked man is miserable. Here it is evident 
that the major proposition contains the conclusion ; for, 
under a general character of a slave to natyral inclina- 
tions, a wicked man is contair^d or included ; and the mi- 
nor proposition declares it ; whence the conclusion is ev- 
idently deduced, thai the wicked man is miserable. 

In ma4iy affirmative syllogisms we may suppose either 
the major or the minor to contain the conclusion, and the 
other to shew it 5 for there is no great difierence. But in 
negative syllogisms it is the negative proposition that con- 
tains the conclusion and the affirmative proposition shews 
it ; as, Every wise man masters his passions ; No angry man 
masters his passions ; therefore, No angry man is wise. 
Here it is more natural to suppose the minor to be the con- 
tained proposition ; it is the minor implicitly denies wis- 
dom concerning an angry man, because mastering the pas- 
sions is included in wisdom, and the major shews it. 

Note. — This rule may be applied to complex and con- 
junctive^ as well as simple syllogisms^ and is adapted to 
shew the truth or falsehood of any of them- 

11. The second is this ; As the terms in every syllogism 
are usually repeated twice, so they must be taken precise- 
ly in the same sense in both places : For the greatest part 
of mistakes that arise in forming syllogisms, is derived 
from some little difference in the sense of one of the terms 
in the two parts of the syllogism wherein it is used. Let 
us consider the following sophisms* 

1. It is a si7i to kill a man ; A murderer is a man; there- 
fore. It is a bin to kill a murderer. Here the word kill in the 

*It is confessed that conditional and disjunctive major proposi- 

.tions do expressly contain all that is in the conclusion; but thtn it is 

not in a certain and conclusive manner, but only in a dubious form 

of speech, and mingled with other terms ; and therefore it is not the 

sj^me express proposition. 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 25$ 

iirst proposition signifies to kill unjustly, or without law 5 
in the conclusion it is taken absolutely for putting a man 
to death in general, and therefore the inference is not 
good. 

2. JVhat I am, you are not ; but I am a man ; therefore 
You are not a man. This is a Relative syllogism : But if 
it be reduced to a regular categorical form, it will appear 
there is ambiguity in the terras, thus ; WTiat I am is a 
man ; You are not what 1 am ; therefore You are not a man* 
Here what lam in the major proposition hieiken specially 
for my nature ; but in the minor proposition the same 
>vords are X^ke\x individually fov my person; therefore the 
inference must be false, for the syllogism does not take the 
term what lam both times in the same sense. 

3. He that says you are an animal, says true ; but JEfe that 
says you are a goose, says you are an animal ; therefore H& 
that says you are a goose, says true. In the major propo- 
sition the word animal is the predicate of an iaccidental 
proposition ; which accidental proposition being afiirma-* 
tive, renders the predicate of it particular, according to 
chap. XL sec. 2 axiom 3. and consequently the word am- 
"inal there signifies only human dnimality. In the minor 
proposition the wor^ animal, for the same reason, signi- 
fies the animality of a goose; whereby 'it becomes an am- 
higuous term and unfit to build the conclusion upon. Or 
if you say, the word animal in the minor is taken for 
human animality, then the minor is evidently false. 

It is from this lasi general test of syllogisms that we de- 
rive the custom of the respondent in answering the argu- 
ments of the opponent, which is to distinguish upon the 
major or minor proposition, and declare which term is 
used in two senses, and in what sense the proposition may 
be true, and^n what sense it is false. 



X 



254 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. III. 

CHAPTER IV. 



SOME GENERAL RULES TO DIRECT OUR REA. 

SONING. 

MOST of the general and special directions given to 
form our judgment aright in the preceeding part of logic 
might be rehearsed here ; for the judgments which we 
pass upon things are generally built on some secret reason- 
ing or argument by which the proposition is supposed to 
he proved. But there may be yet some farther assistance 
given to our reasoning powers in their search after truth, 
and an observation of the following rules will be of great 
importance for that end. 

Rule I. ^^ Accustom yourselves to clear and distinct 
ideas, to evident propositions, to strong and convincing 
arguments.'^ Converse much with those friends, and 
those books, and those parts of learning, where you meet 
with the greatest clearness of thought, and force of rea- 
soning. The mathematical sciences, and particularly a- 
rithmetic, geometry, and mechanics, abound with these 
advantages. And if there were nothing valuable in them 
for the uses of human life, yet the very speculative parts 
of this sort of learning are well wcrth our study; for by 
perpetual examples they teach us to conceive with clear- 
ness, to connect our ideas and propositions in a train of 
dependence, to reason with strength and demonstration, 
and to distinguish between truth and falsehood. Some- 
thing of these sciences should be studied by every man who 
pretends to learning, and that,^s Mr. Locke expresses it, 
not so much to make us mathematicians, as to make us 
reasonable creatures. 

We should gain such a familiarity with evidence of per- 
ception and force of reasoning, and get such a habit of dis- 
cerning clear truths, that the mind may be soon oflended 
with obscurity and confusion : Then we shall, as it were, 
naturally and witli ease restrain our minds from rash judg- 
ment, before we attain just evidence of the proposition 
whtch is offered to us j and we shall with the same ease, 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 255 

and, as it were naturally, seize and embrace every truth 
(hat is proposed with just evidence. 

Tlie habit of conceiving clearly, of judging justly, and 
of reasoning we!l^ is not to be attained merely by the hap- 
piness of constitution, the brightness of genius, the best nat- 
ural partS) or the best collection of logical precepts: It is 
custom and practice that must form and establish this hab- 
it. We must apply ourselves to it till we perform all this 
readily, and without reflecting on rules. A coherent think- 
er and a strict reasoner is not to be made at once by a set 
of rules, any more than a good painter or musician may 
be formed extempore, by an excellent lecture on music 
or painting. It is of infinite importance therefore in our 
younger years to be tauglit both the value and the prac- 
tice of conceiving clearly and reasoning right : For, when 
we are grown up to the middle of life, or past it, it is no 
wonder that we should not learn good reasoning, any more 
than that an ignorant clown should not be able to learn 
fine language, dancing, or a courtly behaviour, when his 
rustic airs have grown up with him till the age of forty. 

For want of this care, some persons of rank and educa- 
tion dwell all their days among obscure ideas; they con- 
ceive and jud^e always in confusion j they take weak 
arguments for demonstration ; they are led away withi|he 
disguises and shadows of truth. Now, if such personshap- 
pen to have a bright imagination, a volubiUty of speech, 
and a copiousness of language, they not only impose many 
errors upon their own understandings, but they stamp the 
image of their own mistakes, upon their neighbors also, 
and spread their errors abroad. 

It is a matter of just lamentation and pity, to consider 
the weakness of the common i^ultitude of mankind in this 
respect, how they receive any thing into their assent upon 
the most trifling grounds. True reasoning hath very lit- 
tle share in forming their opinions. They resist the most 
convincing arguments by an obstinate adherence to their 
prejudices, and believe the most improbable things with 
the greatest assurance. They talk of the abstrusest mys- 
teries, and determine upon them with the utmost confi- 
dence, and without just evidence either from reason ox" 



^56 LD&I6: OR, THE Part tit 

revelation. A confused heap of dark and inconsistent 
ideas, make up a good part of their knowledge in matters 
of philosophy" as well as religion, hstving never been taught 
ihe use and value of clear and just reasoning. 

Yet it must be still confessed that there are some mys- 
teries in religion, both natural and revealed, as well as 
some abstruse points in philosophy, wherein the wise as 
well as the unwise must he content with obscure ideas. 
There are several things, especially relating to the invisi- 
ble* world, which are unseaiehable in our present state, 
and therefore we must believe what revelation plainly dic- 
tates, though the ideas may be obscure. Reason itself de- 
mands this of us; but we should seek for the brightest ev- 
idence both of the ideas, and of tiie connexion of them 
wheresoever it is attainable. 

Rule II. " Enlarge your general acquaintance with 
things daily, in arder to attain a rich furniture of topics, 
or middle terms, whereby those propositions which occur 
\iiay be either proved or disproved; but especially medi- 
tate and inquire with great diligence and exactness into 
the nature, properties, circumstances, and relations of the 
particular subject about which you judge or argue/'^ 
Consider its causes, effects, consequences, adjuncts, oppo- 
>it^, signs,^&c. so far as is needful to your present pur- 
pose. You should survey a question round about, and on 
rill sides, and extend your views as far as possible to every 
thing that has a connexion with it. This practice has 
many advantages in it; as 

1. It will be a means to suggest to your mind proper 
topics for argument about any proposition that relates to 
the same subject. 

2. It will enable you with greater readiness and justness 
of thought to give an answer to any sudden question upon 
ihat subject, whether it arises in your own mind, or is 
proposed by others. 

3. This will instruct yau to give a plainer and speedier 
solution of any difficulties that may attend the theme of 
your discourse, and to refute the objections of those who 
have espoused a contrary opinion. 

4. By such a large survey of the whole subject in all its 
properties and relations, you will be better secured from 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 257 

inconsistencies, that is, from asserting or denying any 
thing in one place, which contradicts what you have as- 
serted or denied in another : And to attain these ends, an 
extensiveness of understanding, and a large memory, are 
of unspeakable service. 

One would be ready to wonder sometimes how easily 
great, wise, and learned men are led into assertions in some 
parts of the same treatise, which are found to be scarce 
consistent with what they have asserted in other places : 
But the true reason is, the narrowness of the mind of man, 
that it cannot take in all the innumerable properties and 
relations of one subject with a single view 5 and therefore, 
whilst they are intent on one particular part of their theme, 
they bend all their force of thought to prove or disprove 
some proposition that relates to that part, without atten- 
tion to the consequences which may flow from it, and 
which may unhappily affect another part of the same sub- 
ject 5 and by this mean they are sometimes led to say 
things which are inconsistent. In such a case, the great 
dealers in dispute and controversy take pleasure to cast 
nonsense and self contradiction on their antagonist, with 
huge and hateful reproaches. For my part, I rather choose 
to pity human nature, whose necessary narrowness of un- 
derstanding expose us all to some degrees of this frailty. 
But the most extensive survey possible of our whole sub« 
ject is the best remedy against it. It is our judging and 
arguing upon a partial view of tbings, that exposes us to 
mistakes, and pushes us into absurdities, or at least to the 
very borders of them. 

Rule III. " In searching the knowledge of things, al- 
ways keep , the precise point of the present question in 
your eye. ^Take heed that you add nothing to it while 
you are a^uing, nor omit any part of it.'* Watch care- 
fully lest any new ideas slide in to mingle themselves either 
with the subject or the predicate. See that the question 
be not altered by the ambiguity of any word taken in dif- 
ferent senses ; nor let any secret prejudices of your own^ 
or the sophistical arts of others, cheat your understanding 
by changing the question, or shuffling in any thin^else m 
its room. 



258 LOGIC : OR, THE Past IIL 

And for this end it is useful to keep the precise ingftter 
of inquiry as sm/>Ze as may be, and disengaged from a 
comphcation ofideas^ which do not necessarily belong to 
it. By admitting a complication of ideas, and taking too 
many things at once into one question, the irind is some- 
times dazzled and bewildered ; and the truth is lost in 
such a variety and confusion of ideas 5 whereas, by limit- 
ing and narrowing the question, you take a fuller survey 
of the whole of it. 

By keeping the whole point of inquiry in our constant 
\iew, we shall be secured from sudden, rash, and imperti- 
nent responses and determinations, which some have ob- 
truded instead of solutions and solid answers, before they 
perfectly knew the question. 

Rule IV. " When you have exactly considered the pre- 
cise point of inquiry, or what is unknown in the question, 
ihen consider what and how much you know already of 
this question, or of the ideas and terms of which it is com- 
posed.'^ It is by a comparison of the known and unknown 
parts of the question together that you find what reference 
the part known hath unto, or what connection it hath 
with the thing that is sought : Those ideas, whereby tha 
knowft 'dnd unknown parts of the question are connected,, 
willfarnish you with middle terms or arguments whereby 
ilie thing proposed may be proved or disproved. 

In thisj>art of your work, namely, comparing ideas to- 
gether, take due time, and be not too liasty to come to a 
delermiaation, especially in points of importance. Some 
men when they see a little agreement or disagreement be- 
ivveen ideas, they presume a great deal, and so jump into 
the conclusion : This is a short way to fancy, opinion and 
conceit, but a most unsafe and uncertain w||^ to true 
knowledge and wisdom. 

Rule V, '* Jn choosing your middle terms or arguments^ 
to prove any question, always take such topics as are 
surest, and least fallible, and which carry the greatest evi^ 
dence and strength with them.'^ Be not so solicitous 
about the number, as the weiglit of your arguraenls, es- 
pecially in proving any proposition which admits of nat- 
ural certainty, or of complete demonstration. Many 
limes we do iiyury to a cause \py dwdling upon trifling 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON- 259 

arguments. We amuse our hearers with uncertainties, by 
multiplying the miniber of feeble reasonings, before we 
mention those which are more substantial, conclusive, and 
convincing. And too often we yield up our assent to mere 
probable arguments, where certain proofs may be obtained. 

Yet it must be confessed, there are many c^ses wherein 
the growing numbers of probable arguments increases the 
degree of probability, and gives a great and sufficient con- 
firmation to the truth which is sought i as, 

(I.) When we are inquiring the true sense of any word 
or phrase, we are more confirmed in the signification of it, 
by finding the same expression so used in several authors^^ 
or in several places of the same author. 

(2.) When we are searching out the true meaning or 
opinion of any writer, or inquiring into any sacred doctrine 
of scripture, we come to a surer determination of the truth 
by several distinct places wherein the same thing is ex^ 
pressed or plainly implied ; because it is not so probable 
that Jin honest skilful reader should mistake the meaning 
of the writer in many places, as he may in one or two. 

(3 ) When we would prove the importance of any scrip- 
tural doctrine or duty, the multitude of texts, wherein it is 
repeated and inculcated upon the reader, seems naturally 
to instruct us that it is a matter of greater importance 
than other things which are but slightly or singly men- 
tioned in the Bible. 

(4.) In searching out matters of fact in limes past or in 
distant places, in which case moral evidence is sufficient, 
and moral certainty is the utmost which can be attained, 
here we derive a greater assurance of the truth of rt by a 
number of persons, or a multitude of eircnmstances con- 
curring to bear witness to it. 

(5.) From many experiments in natural philosophy, we 
more safely infer a general theorem, than we can from one 
or two. 

(6.) In matters which require present practice, both sa- 
cred and civil, we must content ourselves oftentimes with 
a mere preponderation of probable reasons or arguments. 
Where there are several reasons on each side, for and 
against a thing that is to be done or omitted, a small argu» 
m^nt added to the heap may justly turn the balance on 



260 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 

one side, and determine the judgment, as I have noted ih 
the Second part of Logic. 

To conclude: A growing acquaintance with matters of 
learning) and a daily improvement of our understandings 
in affairs human and divine, will best teach us to judge and 
distinguish in what cases the number of arguments adds to 
their weight and force : It is only experience can fully in- 
form us when we must be determined by probable topics, 
and when we must seek and expect demonstrations. 

Rule VI. "Prove your conclusion (as far as possible) by 
some propositions that are in themselves more plain, evi-' 
dent, and certain, than the conclusion ; or at least such as 
are more known, and more intelligible to the person whom 
you would convince." If we shall neglect this rule, we 
shall endeavour to enlighten that which isobscuie by some-, 
thing equally or more obscure, and to confirm that which 
is doubtful by something equally or more uncertain. Com- 
mon sense dictates to all men, thatit is impossible to estab- 
hsh any truth, and to convince others of it, but by some^ 
thing that is better known*to them than that truth is. 

Rule VII. " Labour in all your arguings to enlighten the 
understanding, as well as to conquer and captivate the 
judgment.'^ Argue in such a manner as may give a natu- 
ral, distinct, and solid knowledge of things to your hear- 
ers, as well as to force their assent by a mere proof of the 
question. Now, to attain this end, the chief topic or me- 
dium of your demonstration should be fetched, as much as 
possible, from the nature of the thing to be proved, or from 
those things which are most naturally connected with it. 

Geometricians sometimes break this rule without neces- 
sity, two ways, namely, 
1. When they prove one proposition only by shewing that 
absurdities will follow if the contradictory proposition be 
supposed or admitted: This is called Rediiciio ad alsurdum^^ 

*Note — This rule chiefly refers to the establishment of some truth 
rather than the refutation of error. It is a very common and useful 
way of arguing, to refute a false proposition, by shewing what evi- 
dent falsehood or absurdity will follow from it : For what proposj. 
tion soever is really absurd and false, does eflfectually prove that prin- 
ciple to be false, from which it is derived ; so that this way of re- 
futing an error is not S9 usually called Reductio ad absurdnnOjL 



CaAP, IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 261 

or Demonstratio per impossibile. As, for instance, When 
they prove all the radii of a circle to be equal, by suppos- 
ing one radius to be longer or shorter than another, and 
then shewing what consequences will follow. This, 1 con- 
fess, forces the assent, but it does not enhghten the mind, 
by shewing the true reason and cause why all radii are 
equal, which is derived from the very construction of /i cir- 
cle : For, since a circle is formed by fixing one encTof a 
straight line in the centre, and moving the other end round, 
(or, which is all one, by compasses kept open to a certain 
extent,) it follows evidently that every part of the circum- 
ference being thus described, must be equally distant from 
the centre, and therefore the Radii which are lines from 
the centre to the circumference, must be all equal. 

2. Geometriciatis forget this rule when they heap up ma- 
ny far fetched lines, figures, and propositions to prove 
some plam, simple, and obvious proposition. This is call- 
ed a Demonstration per aliena et remota. or an argument 
from unnatural and remote mediums : As if, in order to 
prove the radii of a circle are all equal, I should make sev- 
eral triangles and squares about the circle, and then from 
some properties and propositions of squares and triangles 
prove that ihe radii of a circle are eq^iial. 

Yet it must be confessed, that sometimes such questions 
happen, that it is hardly possible to prove them by direct 
arguments drawn from the nature of things, &c. and then 
it may not only hf lawful but necessary to use indirect 
proofs, and arguments drawn from remote mediums, or 
from the absurdity of the contradictory suppositions. 

Such indirect and remote arguments may also be some- 
times used to confirm a proposition, which has been before 
proved by arguments more direct and immediate* 

Rule VIIL Though arguments should give light to the 
^ibject, as well as constrain the assent, yet you must learn 
'- to distinguish well between an explication and in argu- 
ment; and neither impose upon yourselves, ^nor sufier 
yourselves to be imposed upon by others, by mistaking a 
mere illustration for a convincing reason.'^ " 

Axioms themselves, or self evident propositions, may 
want an explication or illustration, though they are not ta 
be proved by reasoning. 



262 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 

Sinijlitudes and allusions have oftentimes a very happy 
influence to explain some difficult truth, and to render the 
idea of it familiar and easy. Where the resemblance is 
just and accurate, Che influence of a simile may proceed so 
far as to shew the possibility of the thing in question : But 
similitudes must not be taken as a solid proof of the truth 
or existence of those thifigs to which they have a resem- 
blance, A too great deference paid to similitudes, or an 
utter rejection of them, seem to be two extremes, and 
ought to be avoided. The late ingenious Mr, Locke, even 
in his inquiries after truth, makes great use of simiUs for 
frequent illustration, and is very happy in the invention of 
them I though he warns us also lest we mistake them for 
conclusive arguments. 

Yet let it be noted here, that a parable or similitude used 
by an author, may give a sufficient proof of the true sense 
and meaning of that author, provided that he draw not this 
similitude beyond the scope and design for which it was 
brought; as when our Saviour affirms. Rev, iii. 3. I will 
come on thee as a thief; this will plainly prove that he de- 
scribes the unexpectedness of his appearance, though it is 
by no means to be drawn to signify any injustice in his 
design. 

Rule IX. ^^ In your whole course of reasoning, keep 
your mind sincerely intent on the pursuit of truth 5 and 
follow solid argument wheresoever it leads you. Let not 
a party spirit, nor any passion or prejudice whatsoever, 
stop or avert the current of your reasoning in quest of true 
knowledge.'' 

When you are inquiring therefore into any subject, 
maintain a due regard to the arguments and objections on 
both sides of a question : Consider, compare, and balance 
them well before you determine for one side. It is a fre- 
quent, but a very faulty practice, to hunt after arguments 
only to make good one side of a question, and entirely to 
neglect and refuse those which favour the other side. If 
we have not given a due weight to arguments on both sides, 
we do but wilfully misguide our judgment, and abuse our 
reason, by forbidding its search after truth. When we 
espouse opinions by a secret bias on the mind, through 
the influence of fear, hope, honour, credit, interest, or any 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 263 

• 

Other prejudice, and then seek arguments only to support 
those opinions, we have neither done our duty to God, nor 
to ourselves, and it is a matter of mere chance if we stum- 
ble upon truth in our way to ease and preferment. The 
power of reasoning was given us by our Maker for this 
very end, to pursue truth ; and we abuse one of his richest 
gifts, if we basely yield it up to be led astray b}^ any of 
the meaner powers of nature, or the perishing interests of 
this hfe. Reason itself, if honestly obeyed, will lead us to 
receive the divine revelation of the gospel where it is duly 
proposed, and this yyill shew us tlie path of life everlasting. 



tHE 

FOUBTH PART OF LOGICe 



OF DISPOSITION AND METHOD. 

IT is not merely a clear and distinct idea, a well fof med 
proposition, or a just argument, tbiat is sufficient to search 
out and communicate the knowledge of a subject. There 
must be a variety and series of them disposed in a due 
manner, in order to attain this end : And therefore it is the 
design of the last part of Logic to teach us the art of 
method. It is that must secure our thoughts from that, 
confusion, darkness, and mistake, which unavoidably at- 
tend the meditations and discourse even of the brightest 
genius who despises the rules of it. 

I. We shall here consider the nature of method, and the 
several kinds of it. 

II. Lay down the general rules of method, with a few 
particulars under them. 



CHAPTER t 



OF THE NATURE OF METHOD, AKd THE SEVE- 
RAL KINDS OF IT, NAMELY, NATURAL AND 
ARBITRARY, SYNTHETIC AND ANALYTIC. 

METHOD, taken in the largest sense, implies the plac- 
ing of several things, or performing several operations in 
sucli an order, as is most convenient to attain some end pror! 
posed : And in this sense it is applied to all the works ot 
nature and art, to all thfe divine affairs of creation and prov- 



Chap. 1. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 266 

idence; and to the artifices, schemes, contrivances, and 
practices of mankind, whether in natural, civil, or sacred 
affairs. 

Now this orderly disposition of things, includes tile 
ideas of prior, posterior, and simultaneous 5 of superior, 
inferior, and equal; of beginning, end, and middle, &c. 
which are described more particularly among the general 
affections of being, in ontology. 

But in logic, the method is usually taken in a more lim- 
ited sense, and the nature of it is thus described ; Method 
is the disposition of a variety of thoughts on any subject in 
such order as may best serve to find out unknown truths, 
to explain and confirm truths that are known, or to fix 
them to the memory. 

It is distributed into two general kinds, namely, natural 
and arbitrary. 

Natural method is that which observes the order of na- 
ture, and proceeds in such a manner as that the knowledge 
of the things which follow depends in a great measure on 
the things which go before, and this is two fold, viz. syn-* 
thUic and analytic,'^ 

* The word analysis has three or four senses, which it may not be 
inaproper to take notice of here. 

J . li signifies the general and particular heads of a discourse with 
their mutual connexions, both co-ordinate and subordinate, drawn 
out by way of abstract in one or more tables, which are frequently- 
placed like an index at the bc^ginning or end of a book. 

2. It signifies the resolving of a discourse into its various subjects 
and arguments, as when any writing of the ancient prophets is re- 
solved into the prophetical, historical, doctrinal, and practical parls 
of it ; it is said to be analysed in general. When a sentence is dis- 
tinguished into the nouns, the verbs^ pronoUns, adverbs^ and other 
particles of speech, which compose it, then it is said to be analysed 
grammatically. When the same sentence is distinguished into sub- 
ject and predicate, proposition, argument, act, object^ cause, effect, 
adjunct, opposite^ &c. then it is analysed logically and metaphysically. 
This last is what is chiefly meant in the theological school, when 
they Speak of analysing a text of scripture, 

3. Analysis signifies particularly the science of algebra, whereiii 
a question being proposed, one Or more letters, as^ x, y, z, or vowels, 
ias, a, e^ i, &c. are linade use of to signify the "unknown number 
^hith being intermingled with ^several kuown numbers in the qu^s' 



266 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. IV- 

Synthetic method is that which begins with the parts,* 
and leads onward to the knowledge of the whole 5 it be- 
gins with the most simple principles, and general truths, 
and proceeds by degrees to that which is drawn from them, 
or compounded of them : And therefore it is called the 
method of composition. 

Analytic method takes the whole compourxd as it finds 
it whether it be a species or an individual, and leads us into 
the knowledge of it, by resolving it into its first principles 
or parts, its generic nature, and its special properties 5 and 
therefore it is called the method of resolution. 

As synthetic method is generally used in teaching^he 
sciences after they are invented, so analytic is most prac- 
tised in finding out things unknown. Though it must be 
confessed that both methods are sometimes employed to 
find out truth and tc» communicate it. 

If we know the parts of any subject easier and better 
than the whole, we consider the parts distinctly, and by put- 
ting them together^ we come to the knowledge of the whole. 
So in grammar we learn first to know letters, we join 
them to make syllables, out of syllables we compose words, 
and of words we make sentences and discourses. So the 
physician and the apothecary knows the nature and pow- 
ers of his simples, namely, his drugs, his herbs, his miner- 
als, &c. and putting them together, and considering their 
several virtues, he finds what will be the nature and pow- 
ers of the bolus, or any compound medicine : This is the 
synthetic method. 

But if we are better acquainted with the whole than 
we are with particular parts, then we divide or resolve the 

tion^ is at last, by the rules of r.rt, separated or released from that en- 
tanglement, and its particular value is found ou\ by shewing its equa- 
tion or equality to some known number. 

4. It signifies analytical method, as here explained in logic. 

*Notej It is confessed that synthesis often begins with the genus 
and proceeds to the species and individuals. But the genus or gen- 
eric nature is then considered only as a physical or essential part of 
the species, though it be sometimes called an universal or logical 
whole. Thus synthetic method maintains its own description still; 
for it begins with the parts^ and proceeds to tlK whole j which is 
composed of them. 



Chap. I. RIGHT USE OF REASON, 267 

whole into its parts, and thereby gain a distinct knowledge 
of them. So in vulgar hfe we learn in the gross what 
plants or minerals are^ and then by chemistry we gain 
the knowledge of salt, sulphur, spirit, water, earth, which 
are the principles of them. So we are first acquainted 
with the whole body of an animal, and then by anatomy 
or dissection we come to learn all the inward and outward 
parts of it. This is the analytic method. 

According to this most general and obvious idea of syn- 
thetic and analytic method, they differ from each other 
as the way which leads up from a valley to a mountain 
differs from itself, considered as it leads down from the 
mountain to the valley; or, as St. Matthew and St. Luke 
prove Christ to be the son of Abraham ; Luke finds it out by 
analysis, rising from Christ to his ancestors ; Matthew 
teaches it in the synthetic method, beginning from Abra- 
ham, and shewing that Christ is found among his poster- 
ity. Therefore it is a useful thing in the sciences, when 
we have by analysis found out a truth, we use the synthet- 
ic method to explain and deliver it, and prove it to be true. 

In this easy view of things, these two kinds of method 
may be preserved conspicuously, and entirely distinct : 
But the subjects of knowledge being infinite, and the 
ways whereby we arrive at this knowledge being almost 
infinitely various, it Is very difficult, and almost impossi- 
ble, ahvays to maintain the precise distinction between 
these two methods. 

This will appear evidently in the following observa- 
tion^. 

Observ. T. The analytic method being used chiefly to 
find out things unknown, it is not limited or confined 
merely to begin with some whole subject, and proceed to 
the knowledge of its parts, but it takes its rise sometimes 
from any single part or property, or from any thing what- 
soever that belongs to a subject which happens to be first 
and most easily known, and thereby inquires into the more 
abstruse and unknown parts, propertie:?, causes, eflfects, 
and modes of it, whether absolute or relative : As, for in- 
stance. 

(1.) Analysis finds out causes by their effects. So in 
the speculative part of natural philosophy, when we observe 



'288 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IV. 

Irght, colours, mation, hardness, softness, and oilier proper- 
ties and powers of bodi-es, or any of the comnnon or un- 
common appearances of things, either on earth or in heav- 
en, we search out tire causes of thenfy. So by the various 
creatures we find out the Creator, and learn his wisdom, 
power and goodness. 

(2.) It finds out effects by their causes. So the practic- 
al and meclianical part of natural philosopliy considers 
such powers of motion, as the wind, the ftre, and tlie wa- 
ter, &c and then contrives what uses they may be applied 
to, and what will be their effects, in order to make mills 
snd engines of various kinds. 

(3.) It finds out the general and special nature of a thing 
by considering the various attributes of the individuals, and 
-observing what is common and what is proper, w4iat is 
accidental and what is essential. *So by surveying the col- 
our, the shape, naotion, rest, place, solidity, and extension 
of bodies, we come to find that the nature of body in gen- 
eral is solid extension ; because all other qualities of bodies 
are changeable ; but this belongs to all bodies, and it en- 
dures through all changes ; and because this is proper to 
body alone, and agrees not to any thing else : and it is the 
foundation of all other properties. 

(4.) Itfindsoutthe remaining properties or parts of a 
thing, by having some parts or properties given. So the 
area of a triangle is found by knowing the height and the 
base. So by having two sides and an angle of a triangle 
given, we find the remaining side and angles. So when 
we know cogitation is the pnme attribute of a spirit, we 
infer its immateriality, and thence its immortality. 

(5.) Analysis finds the means necessary to attain apro- 
])0se4 end, by having the end first assigned. So in moral, 
political, economical affairs, having proposed the govern- 
ment of self, a family, a society, or a nation, in order to 
their best interest, we consider and search out what are the 
proper laws, rules and means to efiect it. So in the prac- 
tices of artificers, manufacturers of varoius kinds, the end 
being proposed, as making cloth, houses, ships, &c. we 
find out ways of composing those things for the several 
uses of human life. But the putting any of these means 
in execution to attain the end, is synthetic method. 



Chap. I. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 269 

Many other particulars might be represented to shew the 
various forms of analytic method, whereby truth is found 
out, and some of them come very near to S3'^nthetic, so 
hardly as to be distinguished. 

Observ. II. Not only the investigation of truth, but the^ 
communication of it also, is often practised in such a method 
as neither agrees precisely to synthetic or analytic. Some 
sciences, if you consider the whole of them in general, are 
treated in synthetic order 5 so physics, or natural philoso- 
phy, begins usually with an account of the general nature 
and properties of matter or bodies, and by degrees descend 
to consider the particular species of bodies, with their 
powers and properties ; yet it is very evident, that when 
philosophers come to particular plants and animals, then 
by chemistry and anatomy they analyse or resolve those 
bodies into their several constituent parts. On the other 
hand, logic is begun in analytic method; the whole is divid- 
ed into its integral parts, according to the four operations 
t)f the mind; yet here and there synthetic method is used 
in the particular branches of it, for it treats of ideas in 
general first, and then descends to the several species of 
them; it teaches how propositions are made up of ideas,, 
and syllogisms of propositions, which is the order of com- 
position. 

The ancient scholastic writers have taken a great deal of 
pains, and engaged in useless disputes, about these twa 
methods, and after all have not been able to give such an 
account of them as to keep them entirely distinct from 
each other, neither in the theory nor in the practice. Some 
of the moderns have avoided this confusion in some mea;s- 
ure by confining themselvss to describe almost nothing 
else but the synthetic, analytic methods of geometricians 
and algebraists, whereby they have too much narrowed the 
nature and rules of method, as though every thing were 
to be treated in mathematical forms. 

Upon the whole, I conclude that neither of these two 
methods should be too scrupulously and superstitiously 
pursued, either in the invention or the communication 
of knowledge. It is enough, if the order of nature be but 
observed in making the knowledge of things, following^ 
depend on the knowledge of the things which go before* 



270 LOGIC: OR, THE PaIit. IV. 

Oftentimes a mixed method will be found most efiectual 
for these purposes 5 and indeed a wise and judicious pros- 
pect of our main end and design must regulate all method 
whatsoever. 

Here the rules of natural method ought to be proposed, 
(whether it be analytic or synthetic, or mixed :) but it is 
proper first to give some account of arbitrary method, lest 
it be thrust at too great a distance from the first mention 
of it. 

Arbitrary method leaves the order of nature, and accom- 
modates itself to many purposes; such as, to treasure up 
things,^ and retain them in memory ; to harrangue and per- 
suade mankind to any practice in the religious or the civil 
life; or to delight, amuse, or entertain the mind. 

As for the assistance of the memory^ in most things a nat- 
ural order has an happy influence ; for reason itself deduc- 
ing one thing from another, greatly assists the memory by 
the natural connection and mutual dependence of things^ 
But there are various other methods which mankind have 
made use of for this purpose, and indeed there are some 
subjects that can hardly be reduced either to analysis or 
^synthesis. 

In reading or writing history, some follow the order of 
file governors of a nation, and dispose every transaction 
under their particular reigns : So the sacred books of Kings 
and Chroniclesare written. Some write in annals or jour- 
nals, and make a new chapter of every year. Some put 
all those transactions together which relate to one subject ; 
that is, all the affairs of one war, one league, one confed- 
eracy, one council, <fec. though it lasted many years, and 
under many rulers. 

So in writing the lives of men, which is called hiography^ 
some authors follow the tract of their years, and place every 
thing in the precise order of time when it occurred : Others 
throw the temper and character of the person, their private 
life, their public stations, their personal occurrences, their 
domestic condtjct, their speeches, their books or writings, 
their sickness and death, into so many distinct chapters. 

In chronology some writers make their epochas to begin 
all with one letter : So in the book called Ductor llistoricus^ 



Chap, L RIGHT USE OF REASON. 271 

the periods all begin with C. : as, Creation, Cataclysm, or 
deluge, Chaldean Empire, Cyrus, Christ, Constantine,&c. 
Some divide their accounts of time according to the four 
great monarchies; Assyrian, Persian, Grecian, and Rom- 
an. Others think it serves the memory best to divide all 
their subjects into the remarkable number of sevens: so 
Prideaux has written an introduction to history. And 
there is a book of diyinity cMed Fasicidus Contriver sarium^ 
by an author of the same name, written in the same meth- 
od, wherein every controversy has seven questions belong- 
ing to it ; tho' the order of nature seems to be too much 
neglected by confinement ta this septenary number. 

Those writers and speakers whose chief business is to 
amuse or delight, to allure, terrify, or persuade mankind, 
do not confine themselves to any natural order, but in a 
cryptical or hidden method adapt every thing to their de- 
signed ends. Sometimes they omit those things which 
might injure their design, or grow tedious to their hear- 
ers, though they seem to have a necessary relatioa to the 
point in hand: Sometimes they add those things which 
have no great references to the subject, but are suited to. 
allure or refresh the mind and the e^r. They dilate some-- 
time, and flourish long upon little incidents, and they skip 
over, and but shghtly touch the drier parts of their theme. 
They place the first things last^and the last things first, 
with wondrous art"; and yet so manage it as to conceal 
their artifice^ and lead the senses and passions of their 
hearers intp a pleasing and powerful captivity. 

It is chiefly poesy and oratory that require the practice 
of this kind of arbitrary method t They omit things essen- 
tial which are not beautiful, they insert little needless cir» 
cumstances^ and beautiful digressions, they invert times 
and actions, in order to place every thing in the most af- 
fecting light ^ and for this end, in their practice they neg- 
lect all logical forms ; yet a good acquaintance with the 
forms of logic and natural method is of admirable use to 
those who would attain these arts in perfection ; hereby 
they will be able to range their own thoughts in such a 
method and scheme^ as tcf take a more large and compre- 



272 LOGIC : OR, THE • Part IV. 

hensive survey of iheir subject and design in all the parts 
of it; and by this mean they will better judge what to 
choose and what to refuse, and how to dress and manage 
the whole scene before tliem, so as to attain their own 
ends with greater glory and success. 



CHAPTER IL 

THE RULES OF METHOD, GENERAL AND PAR^ 

TICULAR. 

THE general rules of true method in the pursuit or com- 
munication of knowledge, may be all comprised under the 
following heads. It must be (L) Safe. (2.) Plain fnxii easy ^ 
(3.) Distinct. (4) Full or without defect. (5.) Short or 
without superfluity. (6.) Proper to the subject and the de-* 
sign. (7.) Connected^ 

Rule L Among all the qualifications of a good method, 
there is none more, necessary and important than that it 
should be safe, and secure from, error \ and to this end 
these four particular or special directions should be observ- 
ed. 4 

L ^* Use great care and circumspection in laying the 
foundation of your discourse, or your scheme of thoughts 
upon any subject." Those propositions which are to stand 
as first principles, and on which the whole argument de- 
pends, must be viewed on all sides with the utmost accura- 
cy, lest an error being admitted there, should diffuse itself 
through the whole subje(^ See therefore that your gen- 
eral definitions ordeecrijnions are as accurate as the nature 
of the thing will bear : See that your general divisions and 
distributions be just and exact, according to the rules given 
in the first part of logic : See that your axioms be suffi- 
ciently evident, so as to demand the assent of those that 
examine them with due attention: See that your first and 
more immediate consequences from these principles be well 



Chap. IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 273^ 

drawn ; and take the same care of all other propositions 
that have a powerful and spreading influence through the 
several parts of your discourse. 

For want of this carcj sometimes a large treatise has 
been written by a long deduction of consequences from one 
or two doubtful principles, which principles have been ef- 
fectually refuted in a fesv lines, and thus the whole treatise 
has been destroyed at once : So the largest and fairest 
building sinks and tumbles to the ground, if the foundation 
and corner-stones of it are feeble and insufficient. 

2, *' It is a very advisable thing that your primary and 
fundamental propositions be not onlj^ evident and true, but 
they should be made a Ut^le familiar to the mind by dwell- 
ing upon them before you proceed farther.'^ By thts mea» 
you will gain so full an acquaintance with them, that you 
may draw consequences from them with much more free- 
dom, with greater variety, brighter evidence, and with a 
firmer certainty, than if you have but a slight and sudderi- 
view of them. 

3\ "As you proceed in connexion of your arguments^ 
see that your ground be made lirm in every step.'' See 
that every link of yoiur chain of reasoning be strong and 
good : For if but one link be feeble and doubtful, the whole 
chain of arguments feels the weakness of it^ and lies ex- 
posed to every objector, and the original question remains 
undetermined. 

4. " Draw up all your propositions and arguments with 
so much caution, and express your ideas with such a just 
limitation, as may preclude or anticipate any objections.'^ 
Yet remember this is only to be done, as far as it is possi- 
ble, without toa much entangling the question, or introduc- 
ing complicated ideas, and obscuring the sense. But if 
such a cautious and limited dress of the question should 
render the ideas too much complicated, or the sense ob- 
scure, then it is better to keep the argument more simple, 
clear, and easy to be understood, and afterwards mention 
the objections distinctly in their full strength, and give a 
distinct answer to them. 

Rule II. Let your method be plain and easy, so that 
your hearers or readers^ as well as youiselff may run 



274 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IV- 

through it without embarrassment, and may take a clear 
and comprehensive view of the whole scheme. To this 
end the following particular directions will be useful. 

1. ^^ Begin always with those things which are best 
known and most obvious, whereby the mind may have no 
difficulty or fatigue, and proceed by regular and easy steps 
to things that are more difficult.'^ And as far as possible, 
let not the understanding, or the proof of any of your po- 
sitions, depend on the positions that follow, but always on 
those which go before. It is a matter of wonder that in 
so knowing an age as this, there should be so many persons 
offering violence daily to this rule, by teaching the Latin 
language by a grammar written in Latin; which method 
seems to require a perfect knowledge of an unknown 
tongue, in order to learn the first rudiments of it. 

2. " Do not effect excessive haste in learnin^or teaching 
any science, nor hurry at once into the midst of it, lest you 
be too soon involved in several new and strange ideas and 
propositions which cannot be well understood without a 
longer and closer attention to those which go before.'^ — 
Such sort of speed is but a waste of time, and will constrain 
you to take many steps backward again, if you would ar- 
rive at a regular and complete knowledge of the subject. 

3. " Be not fond of crowding too many thoughts and 
reasonings into one sentence or paragraph, beyond the ap- 
prehension or capacity of your readers or hearers.'^ There 
are some persons of a good genius and a capacious mind, 
who write and speak very obscurely upon this account ; 
they affect a Jong train of dependencies, before they come 
to a period; they imagine that they can never fill their 
page with too much sense ; but they little think how they 
bury their own best ideas in the crowd, and render them in 
a manner invisible and useless to the greatest part of man- 
kind. Such men may be great scholars, yet they are but 
poor teachers. 

4. " For the same reason, avoid too many subdivisions. 
Contrive your scheme of thoughts in such a manner as 
will finish your whole argument with as few inferiour 
branches as reason will admit 3 and let them be such as 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 2i5 

are obvious and open to the understanding, that they may 
be within one single view of the mind '^ This will not only 
assist the understanding to receive, but it will aid the 
memory also to retain truth : Whereas a discourse cut out 
into a vast multitude of gradual subordinations, has many 
inconveniences in it; it gives pain to the mind and memo- 
ry, in surveying and retaining the scheme of discourse, and 
exposes the unskilful hearer to mingle the superior and in- 
ferior particulars together 5 it leads lliem into a thick wood 
instead of open day-light, and places them in a labyrinth 
instead of a plain path. 

5. ^' Give all diligCLce in your younger years to obtain 
a clear and easy way of expressing your conceptions, that 
your words, as fast as you utter them, may stamp your 
own ideas exactly on the mind of the hearer." This is a 
most happy talent for the conveyance of truth, and an ex- 
cellent security against mistakes and needless controver- 
sies. 

Rule III. Let your method be distinct, and without the 
perplexing mixture of things that ought to be kept sepa- 
rate, and this will be easily practised by four directions. 

1* " Do not bring unnecessary or heterogeneous* matter 
into your discourse on any subject 5 that is, do not mingle 
an argument on one subject with matters that relate en- 
tirely to another, but just so far as is necessary to give a 
clearer knowledge of the subject in hand.'^ Examples in 
logic may be borrowed from any of the sciences to illus- 
trate the rules; but long interpositions of natural philoso- 
phy, of the imagination and passions, of agency of spirits 
united to bodies, &c. break the thread of discourse, and 
perplex the subject. 

2. ^' Let every complicated theme or idea be divided 
into its distinct single parts, as far as the nature of the 
subject and your present design require it." Though you 
must not abound in needless subdivisions, yet something 
of this work is very necessary; and it is a good judgment 
alone can dictate how far to proce:/ed in it, and when to 
{Jtop. 

« Things of otie kind are called homogeneousi things of different 
kinds are heterogeneous. 



■^ 



S76 LOGIC : OR, THE Pakt IV. 

Compound ideas must be reduced to a simple form in 
order to understand them well. You may easily master 
that subject in all the charts of it by a regular succession, 
which would confound the understanding to survey them 
at once. So we conie at the knowledge of a verjr complet- 
ed diagram in geometry, or a complicated machine in me- 
chanics, by having it parcelled out to us in its several 
parts and principles, according to this and the foregoing 
rules of method. 
^3. " Call every idea, proposition and argument to its 
wn place. Put those things all together that belong to 
'one part or property, one consideration or view of your 
Siibject.'^ This will prevent needless repetitii^ns, and 
keep you from intermixing things which are different. — 
We must maintain this distinction of things and places if 
we would be safe from error, ft is confusion that leads us 
into endless mistakes, which naturally arise from a variety 
of ideas ill-joined, ill-sorted, ,or ill-disposed. It is one 
great use of method, that a multitude of thoughts and 
propositions may be so distinctly ranged in their proper 
situations, that the mind may not be overwhelmed with a 
confused attention to them all at once, nor be distracted 
with their variety, nor be tempted to unite things which 
ought to be separated, nor to disjoin things which should 
be united. 

4. '' In the partition of your discourse into distinct 
heads, take heed that your particulars do not interfere 
with the generals, nor with each other.'^ Think it is not 
enough that you make use of distinct expressions in each 
particular, but take care that the ideas be distinct also. It 
is mere foolery to multiply distinct particulars in treating 
X)f things, where the difference of your particulars lies on- 
ly in names and words. 

Rule IV. The method of treating a subject should be 
plenary or full, so that noihing may be wanting; nothing 
which is necessary or proper should be omitted. 

When you are called to explain a subject, do not pass 
by, nor skip over any thing in it which is very difficult or 
obscure^ 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 277 

When you enumerate the parts or the properties of any 
subject, do it in a complete and comprehensive manner. 

When you are asserting or proving any truth, see that 
every doubtful or disputable part of the argument be well 
supported and confirmed. 

If you are to illustrate or argue a point of difficulty, be 
not too scanty of words but rather become a litUe copious 
and diffiisive in your language : Set the truth before the 
reader in several lights, turn the various sides of it to view, 
in order to give a full idea and firm evidence of the prop- 
osition. 

When you are drawing up a narrative of any matter of 
fact, see that no important circumstances be omitted. 

When you propose the solution of any difficulty, con- 
sider all the various cases wherein it can happen, and shew 
how they may be solved. 

In short, let your enumerations, your division, and dis- 
tributions of things, be so accurate, that no needful idea or 
part may be left out. 

This fulness of method does not require that every thing 
should be said which can be said upon any subject ; for 
this would make each single science endless : But you 
should say every thing which is necessary to the design in 
view, and which has a proper and direct t€i?dency to this 
end; always proportioning the amplitude of your malter^ 
and the fulness of your disccurse, to your great design, to 
the length of your time, to the convenience, delight, and 
profit of your hearers. 

Rule V. As your method must be full without deficien- 
cy, so it must be short, or without superfluity. Tlie fulness 
of a discourse enlarges our knowledge, and the well co>«cer- 
ted brevity saves our time* In order to observe this rule, 
it will be enough to point out the chief of those superflui- 
ties or redundancies, which some persons are guilty of in 
their discourses, with a due caution against them. 

1. "Avoid all needless repetitions of the same thing in 
different parts of your discourse." It must be confr^srd 
there are several cases wher-ein a review of some foregoiMg 
proposition is needful to explain or prove several of the fol- 
lowing positions; but let your method be so connived, as 
far as possible, that it may occasiou the tiewest rehearsals 
Z 



^78 LOGIC : OR, THE Part lY^ 

nOf the same thing; for it is not grateful to the hearers, 
without evident necessity. 

2. ^' Have a care of tedious proHxity, or drawing out 
any part of your discourse to ah unnecessary and tiresonie 
length.'^ It is much more honorable for an instructor, an 
orator, a pleader, or a preacher, that his hearers should 
say, I was afraid he would havedone, than that they should 
be tempted to shew signs of uneasiness, and long for the 
conclusion. 

^Besides, there is another inconvenience in it; when you 
affect to amplify on the former branches of a discourse, 
you will often lay a necessity uponyourself of contr?*cting 
the latter and most useful parts of it, and perhaps prevent 
yours^'f in the most important part of your design. Many 
a preacher has been guilty of Xh'is fault in former days; 
nor is the present age without some instances of this weak- 
.Bess. 

3. '* Do not multiply explications where there is no 
difficulty, or darkness, or danger of mistake.'^ Be not fond 
of tracing every word of your theme, through all thegram- 
xnaticai, the logical, and metaphysical characters and rela- 
tions of it; nor shew your critical learning in spreading 
abroad the various senses of a word, and 4he various ori- 
gins of those senses, the etymology of terms, the synony- 
mous and the paronymous or kindred names, &c. where 
the chief point of discourse docs not at all require it* You 

,would laugh at a pedant, who, professing to explain the 
Athanasian creed, should acquaint you that Alhanasius i& 
derived from a Greek word, which signifies imiriortality, 
and that the same word Athanasius signifies also the herb 

. ianzy. 

Ihere are some persons so fond of their learned distinc- 

. lions, that they will shew their subtilty b)^ distinguishing 

/where there is no difference. And the same silly affecta- 
tion will introduce distinctions upon every occurrence, and 
bring three or four negatives upon every suhject of dis- 
course ; first to declare what it is not, and then what it is : 
Whereas such negatives ought never to be mentioned 
where there is no apparent danger of mistake. How ri- 
diculous would that writer, who, if he were speaking of 

ftjie Nicene creed, should declare negatively, (1.) That he 



CffAp. II. RIGHT USE OF REASO>f, 270 

did not mean the doctrine which the inhabitants of Nice 
believed ; nor, (2.) A creed written by them ; but, (3.) 
Positivelyj a creed composed by several Christian bishops 
met together in the city of Nice ? The positive is sufficient 
here, and the two negatives are impertinent. 

4. " Be not fond of proving those things which need no 
proof Such as self-evident propositions and truths uni- 
versally confessed, or such as are entirely agreed to, and 
granted b}' our opponents. It is this vain affectation of 
proving every thing that has led geometricians to form 
useless and intricate demonstrations to support som'e theo- 
rems, which are sufficiently evident to the eye by inspec- 
tion; or to the mind by the first mention of them; and it 
is the same humour that reigns sometimes in the pulpit, 
•and spends half the sermon in proving some general truths ' 
which is never disputed or doubted, and thereby robs the 
anditory of more useful entertainment. 

5. As there are some things so evidently true, that they 
want no proof, so there are others so evidently false, that 
they want no refutation. It is mere trifling, and a waste 
of our precious moments, to invert a'nd raise such objections 
as no man would ever make in earnest, and that merely 
for the sake of answering and solving them : This break;s 
in notoriously upon the due brevity of method. 

6. "Avoid in general all learned formsj all trappinggof 
art, and ceremonies of the schools^ where there is no need 
of them*" It is reported concierning the late Czar of Mus- 
covy, that when he first acquainted himself with mathe- 
matical learning, he practised all the rules of circum valla- 
tk>n and contravallaiion, at the siege of a town in Livo- 
nia ; and by the length of those formahties he lost the op* 
portunity of taking the town. 

7. "Do not suffer every occasional and incidental thought 
to carry you away into a long parenthesis, and thus to 
stretch out your discourse, and divert you from the point 
in hand.'' In the pursuit of your subject, if any useful 
thought occur which belongs to some other theme, note it 
down for the sake of your memory on some other paper^j 
and lay it by in reserve for its proper place and season : 
but let it not incorporate itself with your present theme^ 
nor draw off your mind from your main business^ tfiougb 



280 LOGIC : OR, THE Fart IV. 

it should be ever so inviting. A man who walks directly 
but slowly toward his journey*s end, will arrive thither 
much sooner than his neighbour, who runs into every 
crooked turning which he meets, and wanders aside to gaze 
at every thing that strikes his eyes by the way, or to gather 
every gaudy flower that grows by the side of the road. 

To sum up all : "There is a happy medium to be ob- 
served in our' method, so that the brevity may not render 
the sense obscure, nor the argument feeble^ nor our knowl- 
edge merely supei-ficial : And on the other hand, that the 
fulness and copiousuess of our method may not waste the 
time, tire the learner, or fill the mind with trifles and im- 
pertinencies." 

The copious and the contracted way of writing have each 
their peculiar advantages. Tiiere is a proper use to be 
made of large pai-aphrases, and full, particular, and diffu- 
sive explications and arguments; these are fittest fjr those 
who design to be acquainted thoroughly with every part 
of the subject. There is also an use of shorter hints, ab- 
stracts, and compendiums, to instruct those who seek only 
a slight and general knowledge, as well as to refresh the 
memory of those who have learned the science already, 
and gone through a large scheme. But it is a gross abuse 
of tliese various methods of instruction, when a person has 
read a mere compendium or epitome of any science, and 
he vainly imagines that he understands the whole science. 
So one br)y may become a philosopher by reading over the 
mere dry definitions and divisions of Scheibler^s Compendi- 
um of Peripateticism : So another may boast that he un- 
derstands anatomy because he has seen a skeletoi] ; and a 
third profess himself a learned divine, when he can repeat 
the apostles' creed. 

Rule VI. «' Take care that your method be proper to 
the subject in hand, proper to your present design, as well 
as proper to the age and place wherein you dwell. 

1. Let your method be proper to the subject. All sci- 
ences must not be learned or taught in one method. Mo- 
rality and theology, metaphysics and logic, will not be 
easily and happily reduced to strict mathematical method, 
Tiiose who have tried, have found much inconvenience 
therein. 



Chap. It RIGHT USE OF REASON, 2fffl 

Some things have more need to be explained than to be 
proved j as axioms, or self-evident propositions ; and in- 
deed all the first great principles, the chief and most im- 
portant doctrines both of natural and revealed religion ; for 
when the sense of them is clearly explained, they appeat 
so evident in the light of nature or scripture, that they 
want no other proof. There are other things that stand in 
need of proof, as well as explication, as many mathemati- 
cal theorems, and several deep controversies in morality 
and divinity. There are yet other sorts of subjects whicfi 
want rather to be warmly impressed upon the mmd by fer- 
vent exhortation, and stand in more need of this than tney 
do either of proof or explication ; such are the most gene^ 
ral, plain, and obvious duties of piety towards God, and 
love towards men, with the governments of all our inclina- 
tions and passions. Now these several subjects ought to, 
be treated in a different manner and method* 

Again there are some subjects in the same treatise which 
are more useful and necessary than others, and some parts 
of a subject which are eminently and chiefly designed by a 
writer or speaker : True method will teach us to dwell 
longer upon these themes, and to lay out more thought 
and labour upon them; whereas the same art of method 
will teach us to cut short those things which are used only 
to introduce our main subject, and to st^nd as scaffolding 
merely to aid the structure of our discourse. It will teach 
us also to content ourselves with brief hints of those mat- 
ters ^vhich are merely occasional and incidental. 

2 Your method must be adjusted by your design ; for 
if you treat of the same subject with two different views 
and designs, you will find it necessary to use different 
methods. Suppose the doctrine of the sacred Trinity were 
your theme, and you were to read a lecture to young stu- 
dents on the subject, or if you designed a treatise for the 
conviction of learned men, you would pursue a very differ- 
ent method from that which would be proper to regulate a 
practical discourse or a sermon to instruct common chris- 
tians merely in the pious impr )ve-nent of this doctrine, and' 
shaken them to the duties which are derived thence. 

Z2 



S82 LOGIC : OR, THE Paet. IV. 

In short we must not first lay down certain and precise 
rules of method, and resolve to confine the matter we dis« 
course of, to that particular form and order of topics ; but 
we must well consider, and study the subject of our dis- 
course thoroughly, and take a just survey of our present 
design, and these will give sufBcient hints of the particular 
form and order in vvhich we should handle it, provided 
that we are moderately skilled in the general laws of meth- 
od and order. 

Yet let it be noted here, that neither the subject, nor 
matter of a discourse, nor the particular design of it, can 
so precisely determine the method, as to leave no room 
for liberty and variety. The very same theme may be 
handled, and that also with the same design, in several 
different methods, among which it is hard to say which is 
the best. In writing a system of divinity, some begin 
with the scriptures, and thence deduce all other doctrines 
and duties. Some begin with the being of God and his 
attributes, so far as he is known by the light of nature f 
and then proceed to the doctrines of revelation. Some 
distinguish the whole subject into the credenda and agen- 
da, that is^ Things to be believed, and things to be done. 
Some tliink it best to explain the whole Christian religion 
by an historical detail of all the discoveries which God has 
made of himself to this lower world, beginning at the 
creation in the first chapter of Genesis, and so proceeding 
onward according to the narrative of the Old and New 
Testameni= And there are others that endeavour to in- 
clude the whole of rehgion under these four heads, namely, 
The apostles' creed^ the Loi^d^s prayer, the ten commaiidents^ 
and the two sacraments / though I cannot but think this is 
the least accurate of any. The same variety may be al- 
lowed in treating other subjects. This very treatise of lo- 
gic is an instance of it, whose method diflers very consid- 
erably from any others which I have seen, as they difier 
also greatly from one another, though several of them are 
confessed to be well written. 

3. Though a just view of our subject and our design 
may dictate proper rules of natural method, yet there must 
be some little difference at least paid to the custom of 
the age wb^r^iii w^ live, and to the humour and genius 



Chaf. II. right use of REASON. 283 

of our readers or hearers : which if we utterly reject and 
disdain, our performances will fail of the desired success, 
even though we may have followed the just rules of meth- 
od, I will mention but this one instance 5 In the former 
century it was frequent with learned men to divide their 
theme or subject into a great multitude of co-ordinate 
members or parts, they abounded also in the forms of lo- 
gic and distinction, and indulged numerous ranks of sub- 
ordination. Nowj though we ought not to abandon the 
rules of just method and division, in order to compare 
with the modish writers in our age who have renounced 
them, yet it is prudent to pay so much respect to the cus- 
tom of the age, as to use these forms of division with due 
moderation, and not affect to multiply them in such a 
manner, as to give an early and needless disgust to the 
generality of your present readers* The same may be 
said concerning various other methods of conduct in the 
affairs of learning, as well as the affa rs of life, wherein 
we must indulge a little to custom : And yet we must by 
no means suffer ourselves so far to be imposed upon and 
governed by it as to neglect those rules of method which 
are necessary for the safe, easy, and complete inquiry in- 
to truth, or the ready and effectual communication of it 
to others. 

Rule VII. The last requisite of method is, that the 
parts of a discoure should be well connected ; and these 
three short directions will suffice for this purpose. 

1. " Keep your main end and design ever in view, and 
let all the parts of your discourse have a tendency towards 
it, and as far as possible make that tendency visible all 
the way :'' Otherwise the readers or hearers will have 
reason to wonder for what end that or this particular was 
introduced, 

2. " Let the mutual relation and dependence of the 
several branches of your discourse be so just and evide» t, 
that every part may naturally lead onward to the i;ext, 
without any huge chasms or breaks which interrupt and 
deform the scheme." The connexion of truths should 
arise and appear in their successive rank and order, as 
the several parts of a fine prospect jiscend just behind Ciich 
other, in their natural and regular elevations and distan** 



284 LOGIC. PartVL 

ces and invite the eye to climb onward with constant plea- 
sure till it reach the sky. Whatsoever hori id beauty a 
precipice or a cataract may add to the prospect of a coun- 
try, yet such sort of hideous and abrupt appearances in a 
scene of reasoning are real blemishes and not beauties. 
When the reader is passing over such a treatise, he often 
finds a wide vacancy, and makes an uneasy stop, and 
knows not how to transport his thoughts over to the next 
particular, for want of some clue orjConnecting idea to lay 
hold of. 

3. " Acquaint yourself with all the proper and decent 
forms of transition from one part of a discourse to anotln 
er, and practise them as occasion offers." Where the ideas, 
propositions and arguments, are happily disposed, and 
well connected, the truth indeed is secure 5 but it renders 
the discourse much more agreeable, when proper and 
graceful expression joins the parts of it together in so en^ 
tertaining a manner, that the reader knows not how to 
leave off till he hath arrived at tiie end. 

These are the general and most important rules of true 
Method ; and though they belong chiefly to the communi- 
cation of knowledge, yet an early and thorough acquaint- 
ance with them will be of considerable use to towards the 
pursuit and attainment of it. 

Those persons who have never any occasion to commu- 
nicate knowledge by writing or by public discourses, may 
also with great advantage peruse these rules of method, 
that they may learn to judge with justice and accuracy 
concerning the performances of otliers. And besides, a 
good acquaintance with method, will greatly assist every 
one in ranging, disposing and managing all human affairs. 
The particular means or method for a farther improvement 
of the understanding are very various, such as meditation, 
readmg, conversing, disputing, by speech or by writing, 
question and answer, &c. And in each of these practices 
some special forms may be observed, and special rules 
may be given to facilitate and secure our inquiries after 
truth: But this would require a little volume by itself, and 
a treatise of Logic has always been esteemed sufficiently 
(Cpii^lete without it. 

THE ENI>- 



A TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



THE IiUroduction or general Scheme, pagt 6 

THE FIRST PART, Viz. 

Of Perception and Ideas, 

CHAP. I. Ofthe nature of Ideas. p. 11 

CHAP. 11. Of the Objects of Perception. Sect. 1. Of 
Being in general, p, 13. Sect. 2. Of Substances and 
their various kinds, p. 14. Sect. 3. Of Modes and their 
various kinds ^ and first of essential and accidental 
modeSj p. 18. Sect. 4. The farther divisions of raode, 
p. 22. Sect. 5. Of the Ten Categories— Of Substance 
modified, p. 25. Sect. 6. Of Not-being, p. 26. 

CHAP. III. Of the several sorts of Perception or Ideas. 
Sect. 1. Of sensible, spiritual, and abstracted ideas, p. 
27. Sect. 2, Of simple and complex, compound and 
collective ideas, p, 31. Sect. 3. Of universal and par- 
ticular ideas, real and imaginary, p. 32. Sect. 4. The 
division of ideas with regard to their quaUties, p. 36. 

CHAP. IV. Of words, and their several divisions, togeth- 
er with the advantage and danger of them. Sect I. Of 
words in general and their use, p. 41. Sect. 2. Of nega- 
tive and positive terms, p. 45. Sect. 3. Of Simple and 
complex terms, p. 47. Sect, 4. Of words common and 
proper, p, 49- Sect. 5. Of concrete and ab.^tract terms, 
p. 50. Sect. 6 Of uni vocal and rqui vocal words, p. 51. 
Sect, 7. Various kinds of equivocal words, p. 52. Sect. 
8. The origin or causes of equivocal words, p. 57. 



286 A TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

CHAP. V. General directions relating to our ideas, 
namely, L Of acquiring a treaj<ure of ideas — 2. Of re- 
taining ideas in memory — 3. Of selecting useful ideas — 
4. Of the goverment of our thoughts, p. 60. 

CHAP. VI. Special rules to direct our conceptions of 
things, p. 66, Sect 1, Of gaining clear and distinct 
ideas, p. 67. Sect. 2. Of the definition of words or 
names, p. 69. Sect 3. Directions concerning the defi- 
nition of names, p. 70. Sect. 4. Of the definition of 
things, p. 82. Sect. 5. Rules of Definition of the thing, 
p. 85. Sect. 6. Observatians concerning the definition 
of things, p. 88. Sect 7. Of a complete conception of 
things, p. 94. Sect. 8. Of division and the rules of it, 
p. 96. Sect. 9. Of a comprehensive coHception of 
things, and of abstraction, p. 100. Sect. 10 Of the ex- 
tensive conception of things, and of distribution, p. 103. 
Sect. 11. Of an orderly conception of things, p. 107^ 
Sect. 12. These five rules of conception exemplified, p. 
108. Sect 13. An illustration of these five rules by 
similitudes, p. 110. 

THE SEC OJSrD PART, Viz. 

Of Judgment and proposition, 

CHAP. I. Of the nature of a propositit)a and its several 
paits, p. 114. 

CHAP. IL Of the various kinds of propositions. Sect. 
1. Of universal, particular, indefinite, and singular pro- 
positions, p. 117. Sect. 2.^ Of afiirmitive and negative 
propositions, p. 125. Sect. 3. Of the opposition and 
conversion of propositions, p. 125 Sect. 4. Of pure 
and modal propositions, p. 127. Sect. 5. Of single pro- 
positions, whether simple or complex, p. 129. Sect. 6. 
Of compound propositions, p 131, Sect. 7. Of true 
a!id false propositions, p. 135. Sect 8. Of certain and 
doubtful propositions of knowledge and opinion, p. 138. 
Sect. 9. Of sense, consciousness, intelligence, reason, 
faith, and inspiration, p. 140. 



A TABLE OF CONTENTS. 28? 

€H4P. III. The springs of false judgment, or the doc- 
trine of prejudices, p 146. Sect. 1. Prejudices arising 
from things, p. 148. Sect. 2 Prejudices arising from 
words, p. 153, Sect. 3. Prejudices arising from our- 
selves, p 156. Sect. 4. Prejudices arising from other 
persons, p. 168. 

CHAP. IV. General directions to assist us in judging 
aright, p. 181. 

CHAP. V. Special Rules to direct us in judging particu- 
lar objects, p 195- Sect. 1. Principles and rules of 
judgment concerning the objects of sense, p. 196. 
Sect. 2. Principles and rules of judgment in matters of 
reason and speculation, p. 199. Sect. 3. Principles 
and rules of judgment in matters of morality and reli- 
gion, p. 203. Sect. 4. Principles and rules of judgment 
in matters of human prudence, p. 207. Sect. 5. Prin- 
ciples and rules of judgment in matters of human testi- 
mony, p 209. Sect 6. Principles and rules of judg- 
ment in matters of divine testimony, p. 213. Sect. 7. 
Principles and ru^es of judgment concerning things p^^stj 
present, and to come, by the mere use of reason p. 216* 



THE THIRD PART, Viz. 

Of Reasoning and Syllogism, 

CHAP. I. Of the nature of a syllogism, and of the parts 
of which it is composed, p 219. 

CHAP. 11. Of the various kinds of syllogisms, with par- 
ticular rules relating to them. Sect. 1. Of Universal 
and particular syllogisms both negative »nd affirmative, 
p. 222. Sect. 2 Of plain, simple syllogisms, and their 
rules, p. 223. Sect. 3. Of the moods and figures of sim- 
ple syllogisms, p 226 Sect 4. Of complex syllogisms, 
p. 229. Sect. 5 Of conjunctive syllogisms, p. 23i. 
Sect. 6. Of compouijd syllogisms, p 235, Sect. 7. Of 
the middle termsi of common places or topics, and in- 



288 A TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

venlion of arguments, p. 238. Sect 8. Of several kinds 
of arguments and demonstrations^ p. 240. 

CHAP in. The doctrines of sophisms. Sect. 1. Of 
several kinds of sophisms, and their solution, p. 244. 
Sect. 2. Two general tests of true syllogisms, and 
methods of solving all sophisms, p. 251. 

CHAP. IV. Some general rules to direct our reasoning^ 
page 254. 

THE FOURTH PART, Viz. 

Of Disposition and Method. 
CHAP, I. The nature and kinds of method, p. 264. 
CHAP. II. General and special rules of method, p. 272. 



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